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THE 



TWELVE DECISIVE 



BATTLES OF THE WAR: 



A HISTORY 



EASTERN AND WESTERN CAMPAIGNS. 



w 



RELATION TO THE ACTIONS THAT DECIDED THEIR ISSUE. 



BY 



WILLIAM SWIKTOIST, ^~of^i 

AUTUOS OF " CAMPAIGNS OJ THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC." 




NEW YORK: 

DICK & FITZGEEALD, PUBLISHERS. 

1867. 



£ntert>d according to Act of Congross, in the year 18GT, 

BY DICK A FITZGERALD, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of tlie Uniled SUitos 

for the Southern District of New Yurlt, 






INTRODUCTION. 



During the late War it was common to speak of the "in- 
decisiveness " of its greatest battles. In one sense, the reflec- 
tion was just ; since the very occurrence of so many engage- 
ments showed that no one had been finally decisive. But in the 
more important sense, the comment was false ; and its error lay 
in forgetting that a battle inconclusive as to the whole problem 
of the W'ar may yet be conclusive as to one stage of that problem. 
This distinction could not easily be drawn during the heat and 
ferment of actual conflict ; and especially when popular criticism 
was more in the way of impatient complaint against the conduct 
of operations than of thoughtful study of their weight and 
meaning. 

The Sadowas of history are few, since few are the wars wherein 
the antagonists concur to expend all their g.nthered powers in one 
blow, and, having set their fortunes on a single cast, resolve to 
stand the hazard of the die. More commonly, whether by reason 
of near equality in the combatants, or of geographical, social, 
]»olilicaI obstacles to easy conquest, or by reason of the intense 
passions aroused, or from whatever cause, wars are long-continu- 
ing and dubious, stretch over many campaigns, and embrace many 



4 INTEODUCTION. 

great battles. Of such sort was the American "War of Insur 
rection. 

Where a Tours or a Waterloo is in discussion, the question 
regarding its results is quickly settled, the most unreflective 
appreciating them at a glance. But where, in the other class 
of wars, the final issue can be traced back to no single field, but 
many great and sanguinary ones are on the record, the study of 
the comparative influence of each joinder m battle upon the grand 
result becomes far more attractive, profound, and useful. A 
hasty critic will aver that all the battles of such a contest were 
indecisive; a more judicious observer discriminates between them, 
and assigns to each its proper historic value. 

But what rule of judgment sh:ill be adopted, so as to select 
from the throng of battles those which may be pronounced 
decisive ? The rule should be to choose such as settled the fate 
of campaigns, the possession of great strategic points, the 
capture or dispersion of armies, the success or defeat of grand 
invasions, and, in brief, such battles as, though not final upon the 
war itself, were final upon the successive stages through which 
tlie war was foted to pass. 

My purpose in this volume has been to describe, according to 
this principle, the decisive battles of the late War in America. 
It is not probable that all, or even the majority of my readers, 
will agree with me in all the battles I have selected ; nor would 
all, or perhaps any greater number, agree in any other selection 
or combination. Each student of the war, from his peculiar 
turn of mind, or habit of thought, or from pardonable local 
prejudice, or from special sources of information, may honestly 
form his own opinion on the decisiveness of its battles. Besides, 



ESTTEODUCTION. 5 

llie events themselves are so recent, that the deceptive haze sur- 
rounding them may not yet, in all cases, have furled away. 
Still, with regard to most of the battles here set forth, there must 
needs be substantial unanimity ; and with regard to the rest, I 
am convinced, from much examination, that they will stand the 
test of criticism. Possibly, he who objects to the presence or 
absence of this or the other battle in the list may find his 
neighbor quite satisfied on that point, while the latter, in turn, 
regrets an omission or insertion which had greatly pleased the 
former. 

During the war, many operations at first appeared trivial 
which brought forth the largest results ; while others, like those 
on the coast of North Carolina or west of the Mississippi, wheqce 
great things were expected, sank in value, though prosecuted to 
success. So, too, actions in which victory was claimed, for the 
moment, by both parties, like Shiloh or the naval fight in Hampton 
Roads, proved to be not dubious, but decisive in their fruits : 
others, thought to be overwhelming, like Fredericksburg, did 
not essentially vary the time or the manner of the war's con- 
clusion. But the mist which immediately enveloped both events 
and actors, could not but distort the former from their true bear- 
ings, some being greatly magnified, others as greatly diminished ; 
nor could they take on their just size and relations until they lay 
in the perspective of history. 

Of the twelve decisive battles, Bull Run made known that the 
contest was to be a war, not a " sixty days " riot : Douelson 
conquered the western Border States for the Union: Shiloh 
overthrew the first, and Murfreesboro' the second, of the Con 
federate aggressive campaigns at the West : Antictam overtlire^^ 



6 INTKODTJCTION. 

tlie first, and Gettysburg the second, of the Confederate aggres- 
sive campaigns at the East : the fight of the Monitor and Merri- 
mac settled the naval supremacy of the Union : Vicksbnrg re- 
opened the Mississippi, and, as it were, bisected the Confederacy : 
Atlanta opened a path through Georgia, and, as it were, trisected 
the Confederacy : the battle in the Wilderness inaugurated that 
dernier resort of " hammering out " which made an end of the 
Lisurrection : Nashville annihilated the Confederacy at the West : 
Five Forks was the initial stroke of that series under which it 
toppled at the East, and so the continent over. 

Many battles there are, only a little less lustrous than these, as 
worthy of record in a complete history, and seeming for the time 
as decisive, but which, in fine, assumed each a different aspect 
when, in the progress of events, another battle was required to 
solve that part of the problem which they had been designed to 
solve. Thus, Fredericksburg did not substantially alter the rela- 
tions of the combatants, sanguinary as was the shock of arms, 
but left them facing each other for a more decisive grapple. 
Thus, Chancellorsville, conclusive though it then appeared, did 
not settle that summer's campaign, as was seen when, a few 
weeks later, it was decided on the heights of Gettysburg. Thus, 
the magnificent conquest of New Orleans did not open the great 
river, but that result waited for the triumph at Vicksburg, while 
on the other hand the trans-Mississippi campaigns to which it 
gave rise, and whence so much was expected, affected but slightly 
the development of the war. Thus, the expulsion of Bragg from 
the crest of Missionary Ridge left his army to make front again 
beyond the Georgia line, and it was Sherman's campaign that 
drove it into and out from Athmta. Thus, that first prolonged 



INTKODUCTION. 7 

and terrible measure of strength, between the Army of the 
Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, which began with 
the Peninsular campaign, was not ended there betwixt the York 
and the James, but very far away, on the banks of the Antietam. 
Nor did the Peninsular struggle, nor the passage of anus with 
Pope that succeeded it, give the right clue to the final and 
decisive battle of the varied campaign. Thus, Spottsylvania, 
North Anna, and Cold Harbor, were features of a campaign which 
did not end the war, but was prudently abandoned for a better ; 
and though all were startling expressions of a decisive element in 
the war, namely, that of unceasing " attrition," yet this element 
had been introduced at the previous battle of the Wilderness, and 
had stamped it as a decisive action. 

It only remains to subjoin a word upon the method and manner 
of the present volume. A somewhat close military study of the 
war from its beginning to its end, and indeed up to this writing, 
many facilities in the possession of documents and verbal infor- 
mation communicated to me by busy actors in the drama, joined 
with some personal observation of a part of the battle-scenes here 
depicted, induced its publication. In a former work I purported 
to set forth a " critical history " of one of the great Union 
armies. My aim now is to give a series of battle-sketches 
designed more for popular than professional instruction. It 
seemed to me that from many of the books on the war a wrong 
impression of the events described would be left on the mind of 
.the reader I have endeavored to give a true and impartial 
account of the battles here recorded, that the perusal might 
neither mislead nor be devoid of profit. And in order to gain 
for the book a readier acceptance I have labored, while holding 



8 INTRODUCXION. - 

to Strict accuracy, to avoid some details which might bo appro- 
priate to more elaborate technical histories, but which to this 
would add diffuseness without picturesqueness. 

In dividing each sketch into three sections, the Prelude, the 
Battle, and the Results, I aimed not only to describe the day of the 
battle, but to thoroughly explain the train of events which led up 
to it, and the circumstances under which it was fought ; and then 
to show what it accomplished or failed to accomplish. In this 
way, too, a continuous thread of description will be found to 
run from the beginning to the end of the war, whereon are strung 
conveniently its Twelve Decisive Battles. 

I must express my obligation to many general and field officers 
for valuable manuscript material, and also to G. E. Pond, 
Esq., for aid in its redaction. It has not been thought advis- 
able to incumber the pages with notes of reference, the book 
not being in the least of a controversial character. An ana- 
lytical index will be found at the close of the volume. 

w.s. 



CONTEI^rTS 



I. 

PAOie. 
BULL RUN". 

L Prelude to Bull Run 13 

n. The Battle of Bull Run 24 

IIL Results of BuU Run 42 

II. 

DONELSON. 

L Prelude to Donelson '. 56 

IL The Siege and Fall of Fort Donelson 66 

III. Results of Donelson 80 

III. 
SHILOH. 

L Prelude to Shiloh 8S 

IL The Battle of Shiloh 103 

III. Results of Shiloh 131 

IV. 

ANTIETAM. 

I. Prelude to Antietam '. 13? 

IL The Battle of Antietam 157 

III. Results of Antietam 113 



10 CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

V. 

MURFREESBORO. 

I. Preliido to Murfreesboro' 118 

II. The Battle of Murfreesboro' 194: 

III. Eesults of Murfreesboro' 213 

VI. 

THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 

I. Prelude to Hampton Roads 226 

II. The Battle of Hampton Roads 241 

III. Results of Hampton Roads 203 

VII. 

VICKSBURG. 

I. Prelude to Vicksburg 262 

II. The Siege and Fall of Yicksburg 284 

in. Results of Vicksburg 307 

VIII. 

GETTYSBURG. 

I. Prelude to Gettysburg 311 

II. The Battle of Gettysburg 326 

III. Results of Gettysburg 351 

IX. 

WILDERNESS. 

I Prelude to the 'Wilderness 356 

II. The Battle of the Wilderness 3C3 

DI. Results of the Wilderness 382 

X. 

ATLANTA. 

I. Prelude to Atlanta 385 

IL The Battle of Atlanta 404 

III. Results of Atlanta .• 414 



CONTENTS. 



11 



PAGB. 

XI. 

NASHVILLE . 

L Prelude to Nashville 426 

IL The Battle of Nashville 450 

ni Results of Nashville 468 

XII. 

PIVE FORKS. 

L Prelude to Five Forks 478 

IL The Battle of Five Forks ^ 488 

TTL Results of Five Forks 494 



PORTRAITS. 



General Grant frontispiece. '^' 

Major-General McClellan opposite 139 ^ 

Major-Gkneral Rosecbans 

Major-Geneeal Meade 

Lieutenant-General Sherman 

Major-General Thomas ... 

Major-General Sheridan 



178 


^' 


" 311 


^ 


" 385 


A' 


" 426 


\^ 


478 


i^- 



MAPS AND PLANS. 



Map of Shiloh opposite 103 

Map of Antietam 

Map of Murfreesboro 

Map of Vicksburg 

Map of Atlanta 

Map of Nashville % 

Map of Five Forks 



157 ^ 
194 i, 
284 
404 - 
450 
488 



THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE 

WAR. 



I. 
BULL RUN. 



PRELUDE TO BULL RUN. 

The night of the 20th of July, 1861, two officers sat in 
earnest conference in a farm-house within the hamlet of Ma- 
nassas, Virginia. Their discussion, as well might be, was 
grave and anxious ; for into their hands, as its two most 
famous soldiers, the insurgent South had committed the for- 
tunes of its untried army and the fate of its new-born Con- 
federacy. Of these men one was General Beauregard, lately 
called from Fort Sumter to lead the army now lying encamp- 
ed along the neighboring stream of Bull Eun. The other 
Was General J. E. Johnston, who, responding to his associ- 
ate's appeal, had hastened to unite his Army of the Shenan- 
doah with the one at Manassas, in order to meet the massive 
array which, long menacing, had at length launched forward 
from the Potomac, and which that night announced, in a 
thousand bivouac fires, its presence along the heights of Cen- 
tre ville. The single subject of council was the procedure of 
the morrow, before whose close it was manifest must bo de- 
cided the great initial struggle between tlie araiies of South 
and North. A map of the country lay before the generals ; 
and by its aid they planned how best Lhey might or parry or 

16 



14 THE TYfELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

strike. Impulse and conviction alike prompted the latter 
course : it was resolved to assume the offensive, and, with 
this intent, Avhat remained of night was spent ia determining 
the method of attack. But, Avhile this project was taking 
shape, the army at Centreville was already in motion. 
Throughout the hazy midsummer's night, the Union col- 
nmns wended their way through the moonlit forests towards 
the stream of Bull Run, inspired l)y a like purpose of offence. 
Thus in action and in council the night hours wore away. 
And when, with the first light of dawn, Johnston hastily 
signed the orders of attack, the boom of a single gun, start- 
ling the stillness of the Saljbath air, proclaimed that the 
Union force already confronted the Confederate army at 
Bull Run. 

It was the si<2:nal-2run of Manassas. 

If we may imagine to ourselves a dispassionate obser\^er, 
who, regarding the two "points of mighty opposites" here 
arrayed against each other, should liave attempted to forecast 
the issue of the contest about to be joined, it is easy to see 
how futile must have been his sagest speculations. The ani- 
mosities engendered by political quarrels, checked but to 
gather fresh fury by repression, had at length burst into a 
war that rent in twain the American Republic. Instantly 
from sea to sea the continent had swarmed with armed men ; 
and, with that fierce intensity of hate which comes only of 
changed love, the strife between brothers began. As north- 
ward and southward thronged the combatants to the brink 
of the chasm which had cleft the Union, peaceful America 
seemed peopled in a day with a race of soldiers. 

What was chiefly manifest at the outset Avas the energy 
with which the war j^romised to be waged. It took rise in 
those passions which stir the profoimdcr depths of human 
nature, provoking men to the verge of possibility in action 
and in self-sacrifice. Searching for historic precedent to 



BULL RUN. 15 

gwde his judgment upon the giant (fuarrel between the 
North and South, the reflective observer would find no 
parallel thereto in the world's record. It came of no royal 
spleen, or restless ennui, or lust of money or power ; not of 
the theft of a necklace, or of a monarch's spouse ; its source 
was not in the spretce injuria forma of a despised court 
beauty, nor in a favorite's malice nor a minister's jealousy. 
It was even no affiiir of grand diplomatic intrigue or of over- 
leaping national ambition, wdth its specious popular hallow 
of rijrht. Of such wars an end can be awaited when the 
burden and the blood shall have wearied rulers and ruled, 
and made alike loathsome the end and the means of strife. 

But this struggle between North and South stretched its 
roots too deep down into ultimate human motives, and laid 
hold too tenaciously of principle, for such termination. It 
lacked not, indeed, the stimulus of glory, of national con- 
quest, and of that powerful emotion symbolized in the banner 
of the country. And verily the material considerations put 
at issue were on so grand a scale as to ennoble the cause only 
less than an ethical impulse. In lieu of going " to gain a 
little patch of ground that had in it no profit but the name," 
the moiety of a continent lay the territorial prize between the 
combatants. If the struggle was in part political as well as 
moral, at least it meant life or death for a Republic of thirty 
millions of people, the rehabilitation or the ruin of the broad- 
est scheme in modern state-craft, and the governmental des- 
tinies of the America of the future, teeming with its hundreds 
of millions. While, underlying all these vast considerations, 
that honor was at stake Avhich causes men " greatly to find 
quarrel in a straw ; " — and underlying both national pride 
and national aggrandizement, were influences more iniiversal 
and more potent. For, granted that base motives impelled 
many leaders and many followers, as, of blind liiitc, of cun- 
ning, blood-thirstiness., greed of money or of rank — from no 
such selfish ends did the embattled nation resort to the sword. 



16 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

On the one hand was a mighty tempest of indignation against 
what was conceived and held to be heaven-defying injustice, 
viohition of faith pledged three generations gone, despotic 
oppression : which hot passion, in its return fitful, subsided 
to the steady aspiration for independence and for a new Union 
untrammelled by the traditions of the old. Towering up 
against this cause stood the strong cause of the North — 
marvellously compact of the sterner and the milder motives, 
of duty -with high emotion, a blending of flame and fire : 
the integrity and sovereignty of the majestic Union, the 
defence of the government rccc'ved from the fathers, the su- 
premacy of the Constitution of the Republic, the honor and 
dignity of the Nation, — to which motives were superadded 
the cry of humanity, and a glow caught from a vision yonder, 
along the yet untrodden path, of liberty guarded by law. 

Whoever should cast a parallel between such a war and the 
methodical conflict waged betwixt the swollen body-guards 
of two European princes, set upon each other at the wave of 
a single hand, and heedless of the cause of their mutual 
slaughtering, would preposterously err. There were, in- 
deed, no standing armies worth consideration, it being that 
deadliest of struggles, a national war, millions against mill- 
ions, and every soldier comprehending its cause and its 
aim — a war, therefore, in Avshich fresh levies spring joyfnlly 
forward as the earlier are exhausted, and which terminates 
only when one of the combatants, never yielding nor ever 
compromising, lies spent and helpless at the other's feet. 

With such fell intensity of purpose it was that North and 
South rose up and grappled m the spring of 18G1. And, as 
if incentive enough were not present, in touching all the better 
of the fundamental springs of their humimity, fraternal afiec- 
tion curdled to maddening hatred in their veins. For it is a 
law of human nature, that the more tightly the bonds of 
concord have united men in society, the deeper is the hate 
when once they are parted. 



BULL RL^. 17 

Accordingly, from the hour when the Union flag ran down 
from Sumter, one incessant drum-roll seemed to echo through 
the streets of ever^ city, along every hillside and valley, 
soundmg the alarum. No act or thought thereafter seemed 
worthy but thought and act of war. Trade stopped in its 
channels, and the myriad callings of peace were thinned of 
their followers ; for to wage war or prepare for it was the only 
duty of the hour. Men too old or feeble to give life could 
at least give property to the cause, and children too young to 
march might at least wear the colors and chant the battle- 
songs ; while, more memorable than aught else, wives, moth- 
ers, daughters, impelled by a sublime sentiment, Aveepingly 
gave all that they held dearest to the common cause. Amid 
such emotion the people rendezvoused unbidden to the rival 
banners in multitudes so great, that, no equipments being 
ready for them, by the thousand they were turned away. 
Despite all horrors lying in wait, grim and ghastly in the 
gloom ahead, — perhaps from the consciousness of such hor- 
rors, — the spectacle of America in the spring of 1861 con- 
tained something more inspiring than anything in her past 
history. With a proud step, as if rejoicing to be accounted 
worthy of such sacrifice, the nation, stimulated by the noblest 
motives and with faith in God, marched on to the baptism 
of blood. 

But the very intensity of the emotions under which the 
nation rushed to arms prevented a cool estimate of the mili- 
tary probabilities of its issue, much more of the chances of 
the first fruit of battle. On each side was perfect faith in its 
troops, in its leaders, and, above all, in the heaven-borii 
justice of its cause. That one side or the other must bo 
fatally deceived was a truth, which, as usual, did not, from 
either, exact an instant's pause for reflection. Tliis confi- 
dence in success was stimulated somewhat by the noisy 
vaporing and boasting common to humanity, but more espe- 
cially by the popular ignorance existing North and South of 



18 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR, 

how wars are waged and battles won. Half a century of 
comparative peace was just ending for America, and, in the 
interval, not only military training and #nilitary knoAvledge, 
but even military traditions, had greatly died out. The 
garrisons were slender, the standing armies almost nominal, 
the State militia but feeble cadres, if not empty names. In 
the undrilled, undisciplined, and flimsily-organized "mobs 
of town-meetings," which took the field at the first drum- 
call, a keen eye could discern magnificent soldiery ; but it 
was soldiery in prospective. Such antecedents would, of 
themselves, cloud the issue of any contest between two 
armies of volunteers, with little but their sinewy frames and 
their matchless patriotism to recommend them. This uncer- 
tainty was enlianccd by the very character of the war, which 
was not only a national or people's war, but the war of a 
Republican people ; and not only that, but a war within the 
American Republic, where, more than an^-vvhere else, the 
people is king. Grant that little was to be apprehended 
from such mobile and fickle democracies as were wont in 
Athens to arbitrarily lengthen and shorten and wage her wars, 
yet at least the independent life of the American people, their 
great freedom from the restraints of close-fitting laws, their 
daily custom of following largely individual will and sense 
of right, rather than the despotic commands of a strong, 
controlling government, might greatly disconcert all military 
predictions. The very conduct of the war, too, would be 
doubtless submitted, at first, to popular criticism and decis- 
ion : so that even military orders must be countersigned, as it 
were, before execution, by the people as commander-in-chief. 
Ilowbeit these considerations, and such as these, puzzling 
the opinion of an impartial observer, had little popular 
lodgment North or South. Each section, looking at its aim, 
its means, and the zeal and constancy of its people, half sus- 
pected of disloyalty a man Avho could prognosticate a weari- 
some and bloody contest. Rejoicing not only in the integi'ity 



BULL RUN. 19 

of its cause, and its rallying shout of the law of the land, 
the North also properly confided in its exhaustless 
resources of men, money, materials, and all the appliances 
of war, which made ultimate victory, with constancy, as sure 
as the risinof of the sun. But it forsfot the South's chances 
for prolonging the war until that constancy should give way, 
chances quite threefold, independent of the power of the South- 
ern people. First, in a recognition of its right to self-gov- 
ernment by trans-atlantic powers ; secondly, in the alliance 
or the possession of the border states ; thirdly, in fatal dis- 
sensions at the North. Each possibility led into the other, 
also ; and on the maturity of one, both the others would 
come to fruition. The four million slaves, fancied at the 
North to be a fatal weakness, the South would make a tower 
of strength, using them as producers of the means of waging 
war ; and thus that fjreat continorent of able-bodied Northern- 
ers, retained in shop and field to toil and spin for the clothing 
and food and arms of the troops at the front, the South 
would match in its blacks. Nay, the slave system itself, 
audaciously heralded by its Vice-President as the corner- 
stone of the Confederacy, chill though it might all foreign 
sympathy, would at least consolidate the South into one 
grand military organization, cohesive, mobile, adamantine. 

While North and South thus carefully summed up its 
own resources, each as persistently shut its eyes to the 
military possibilities of the other, and soon ventured to 
deride its powers. For, with strange forge tfulness of the 
common blood flowing in their veins, the common soil which 
had nurtured them, and the historic glories wherein Northern 
and Southern fames were indistinguishedly blent, each antag- 
onist made pretence to despise the other's valor. The one 
was easily cajoled into the notion that on the mere show of 
the first fruits of its strength, and the measureless resources 
lying untouched behind, its disheartened adversary would 
throw up his hands in submission. The other nursed the 



20 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAK. 

monstrous conceit that one of his own men Avas a match for 
live opposing warriors. Accordingly, popular speculation, 
avoiding as far as possible all serious thoughts of what 
might be the beginning of the war, fondly dwelt on what 
ought to be its ending. In place of discussion upon the 
organizing, disciplining, and handling of vast armies, the 
choice of lines of operation, the possible jDlans of campaign, 
there were chiefly current windy generalities, based upon 
fanciful distinctions in the diverse ancestry — Cavalier or 
Roundhead — and the diverse occupations — jMaine lumber- 
man or Georgia planter — of the contestants. Something 
of this idle generalization, and much of tempestuous haste, 
were observable in leaders as in led, on both sides ; and 
the former marshalled their arrays in a supreme contidence 
which agitated rather than steadied the flame of popular enthu- 
siasm. The Southern people were encouraged to believe 
that one blow would bring Washington and Baltimore to 
their feet, a second Philadelphia, and, ere long, a treaty of 
peace should be signed on the banks of the Susquehanna. 
The government at Washington, on the other hand, did not 
seek to conceal its conviction, that, in sixty days or ninety 
days, the waters of oblivion would roll over the insun-ection. 
In truth, however, the military knowledge or insight of 
statesmen was but little removed, in those early days, from 
the ignorance of the laity. 

Thus, then, confident in success, North and South, when 
once the gaimtlet was flung down, rivalled each other in 
eagerness to precipitate the contest, finnly believing that an 
overwhelming triumph might be seized from the very initial 
measurement of strength. But where should the decisive 
blow be struck? The military topography of America had 
hardly been broached as a science of serious study ; and, so 
far as essayed, concerned almost exclusively the Coast 
Defences, — that is, the methods of foiling the attacks of 
the ocean expeditions of foreign powers. It never contem- 



BULL EUX. 21 

plated the lines of operations or strategic positions of armies 
within the continent — that would have anticipated the dread 
contingency of civil war. But while the geographical problem 
was, for a moment, in abeyance, the rapid drift of political 
events seized and drew the unformed military campaigns into 
its current. 

On the 1-fi.th day of April, 1861, the honored flag was 
hauled down from Fort Sumter ; and on the same day 
President Lincoln, compelled thereto by the decisive 
tidings from Charleston Harbor, called 75,000 militia into 
the field to maintain the sovereignty of the Union. At that 
great epoch, the strip of Southern *' border states," com- 
prising Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, 
had not joined the fortunes of the Confederacy ; but the 
convulsions of such a movement powerful!}'' shook these States, 
already trembling on the brink of the gulf which had torn 
the Union asunder. Virginia first plunged over, and drew 
after her, necessarily, Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Caro- 
lina. Such was the secondary secession movement — the 
secession of the southerly border states. The northerly 
border states — Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri — long 
tottering, yet withstood this second convulsion like the first, 
and then settled by slow degrees, firmer and firmer, on the 
the rock of the Union. Accordingly it happened, that, 
from first to last, the river Potomac formed the north- 
easterly boundary between the antagonists, and in a natural 
impulse both leaped forward at once to its shores. By the 
most unfortunate of chances, on this river was located the 
national capital, and this fact shaped the entire course and 
character of the war. The 75,000 three-months' militia, 
gathering from farm and forge, armed or unarmed, jwured, 
on all railroads, straight to Washington at the cry of " the 
Capital is in danger. " Two days after Sumter, the Virginia 
Convention passed its ordinance of secession ; and three days 
later, the vanguard of the armed 75,000 militia, the JNIassa- 



22 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

chusetts quota, fought its way through the city of Baltimore, 
whose pavements, upon the 86th anniversary of Lexington, 
ran with the first blood of tlie civil Avar. The militia had 
not too much hastened, though they had left the plough 
clinging in the soil, and the half-smelt iron glowing in the 
furnace fire. But, then, it was theirs to save ISlaryland, and 
therewith, the paths which lay across it to Washington ; and, 
above all, to avert the ineffable disgi-acc of the fall of the 
national capital. 

So, then, it fell out that the very site of the govern- 
mental capital was such as forced the Northern troops to con- 
verge thereon, turning Washington and its environs, before 
midsummer, into a crowdedly garrisoned city, with a multi- 
tude of outlying camps. Meanwhile, on the further bank 
of the Potomac, the Confederate forces gathered an op}X)sing 
head, drawing up from the whole South to a focus in Virginia. 
Neither was their choice of position fortuitous, and, indeed, 
it was based on several reasons, each alone sufficiently sub- 
stantial. Two schemes were of possible suggestion — the 
one to seduce the offensive army far down from its northera 
bases, and deliver battle in the interior of the Confederacy — 
the other to plant the standard of revolt on the outer wall, 
and dispute stoutly from the first every foot of soil claimed 
to be Confederate. The latter was infinitely more inspiring 
and more dignifying to its cause, since at the outset territo- 
rial occupation by an enemy earned with it a moi'al weight 
altogether disproportionate to its military meaning. And 
this truth quadrupled in force when thereto was added the 
state-pride of Virginia, which never would have brooked the 
uncontested abandonment of her soil. And again, successful 
retention of the Southern border states w^ould attract the 
northerly border states, whose presence as guests in the Con- 
federate mansion, was not only yearned for but expected for 
many months or years. But, while a swoop from the border 
might some day, perchance, gather Kentucky and Maryland 



• BULL RUN. 23 

into the fold, these States would not long attend a deliverer 
who was fighting for life hundreds of miles away ; and the 
slender reward which welcomed Virginia's espousal of the 
Confederacy, by instant abandonment to Northern conquest, 
would become warning sufficient for other States aojainst cast- 
ing in their lots with the refluent South. Finally, the more 
Virginia was regarded, the more admirable a field did it pre- 
sent for the purpose of the Confederates. Time was soon to 
show that its stubborn defence was repaid and repaid *many 
times by a stimulus of state pride and home love, Avhich in 
addition to the Confederate sentiment animated those vast 
quotas of admirable soldiers whom Virginia poured forth uu- 
stintingly, filling up the battle-gaps till all were gone. 

The Virginia Convention, as has been seen, passed, on the 
16th of April, its ordinance of secession, with the proviso 
that the people should ratify or reject it by a vote on the 23d 
of May. But this vote the Convention instantly forestalled, 
by decreeing on the 24th of April, that, pending the popular 
decision, "military operations, offensive and defensive, in 
Virginia, should be under the chief control and direction of 
the President of the Confederate troops." - At once, there- 
fore, while Virginia volunteers were rallying in great num- 
bers under the plea of State defence. Confederate troops 
were suffered to cross the frontiers of the State and take 
position within her borders. Not able even to await the 
popular vote in Virginia, the Confederate Government, on 
the 20th of April, removed its seat of authority from Mont- 
gomery to Richmond. In truth, however, the presence and 
operations of Confederate armies within her limits had already 
so long compromised Virginia and so thoroughly committed 
her to the Southern cause, that the removal of the Confed- 
erate capital to the seat of her area could not more effectually 
do so. But the latter movement, at once bold and wise, 
swept off, when consummated, all doubt, if any were still 
remaining, that Virginia was to be the great battle-ground of 



24 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the war. The shifting and quivering lines of operations 
heretofore proposed at the North were at once absorbed and 
steadied in one clear, straight j^ath, and aimless plans and 
quests gave way to a fixed objective. The army at "Wash- 
ington, Avhich had long since rendered meaningless by its 
presence there its first rallying-call, turning its eyes from its 
own capital to that of the insurgents, audaciously thrust into 
their northernmost State, now raised a fiercer and more 
clamorous battle-cry, and people and rulers swelled the shout 
of " Onward to Richmond." 



II. 

THE BATTLE OF BULL BUN". 

Midsummer came before rTorth and South had joined in 
the long-expected battle. The feverish rate at which the 
nation had been living, the intensity of popular feeling, and 
the vastncss of that still doubtful stake for which the game 
of war was playing, had united to make the preceding 
Spring longer than a decade of ordinary years. A taste of 
battle, wherein the advantages were divided, set the edge of 
thirst for deadlier combat. The skimiishes at Big Bethel and 
Vienna, won by the Confederates, had been more than bal- 
anced by McClellan's brilliant minor campaign in West Vir- 
ginia. But these affairs, though popularly magnified into 
monstrous proportions, were even then felt to be trivial pro- 
logues to an unknown drama. Impatient of what seemed un- 
precedented delay, the jjeople had, by their excited Congi-ess- 
men, and, indeed, by most of the public men of the day, 
beset the leaders of the Union troops for a forward move- 
ment, until the latter, against their better judgment, and with 
plentiful protests of the necessities of further preparation, 
sent their army into the world, literally "'before its time, 
scarce half-made up," to seek its fortunes on the battle-field. 



# BULL RUN. 25 

111 the early days of July, a plan of operations having 
been matured by General McDowell, and accepted by the 
President and his cabinet, was put in train of execution. At 
that time the main Confederate Army, about 20,000 strong, 
lay encamped, under General Beauregard, along the stream 
of Bull Run. His head-quarters were at Manassas Junction, 
the point where the great railroad ininning between "Washing- 
ton and Richmond is joined by the one leading down from the 
Valley of the Shenandoah. A force here obviously covered 
Richmond by planting itself across the direct line of march 
from Washington ; menaced the latter city ; suspended the 
Virginia railroad system ; and kept open two lines of railroad 
supply, of which the westerly one communicated with the 
rich Shenandoah valley, and with the army guarding it. The 
latter, about 8,000 strong, lay, under the command of General 
J. E. Johnston, at Winchester, and was so posted as to hold 
the valley, observe Harper's Ferry and the Union forces in 
its front, menace McClellan, approaching from the west, and, 
if need be, join Beauregard. At Hampton, Magruder had a 
few thousand men holding the peninsula between the James 
and York rivers. 

Now, facing and menacing these bodies were the Union 
forces, under direction of Scott. Foremost was the " Grand 
Ai-my,'' under General McDowell ; which, on the night of 
the same 23d of May, when Virginia declared for secession, 
crossed into that State, and began the long task of recon- 
quering it to the Union. It vras 30,000 strong, and 
made up of the three-months' militia, a few advance regi- 
ments of the three-years' men, for whom the President had 
already called, and a handful of regulars. At Fort Monroe 
General Butler had a small column of troops ; while near 
Harper's Ferry, menacing Johnston, General Patterson com- 
manded a force of 18,000 of the same unkneaded and hetero- 
geneous sort as that of McDowell. The latter officer, survey- 
ing the field of war, and estimating the forces then upon it 



26 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

with a soldierly coolness and precision quite rare in those 
early days, declared his ability to march against and dislodge 
the chief Confederate army, under Beauregard, provided 
he had the promise that the outlaying forces under Patterson 
and Butler should engage the attention (as they might easily 
do from their numerical superiority) of Johnston and Ma- 
gruder. This assurance was emphatically given by General 
Scott, and the 9th July fixed for the march. Patterson was 
instantly ordered to again cross the Potomac, and so 
demonstrate against Johnston as to prevent his joining 
Beauregard. 

McDowell crossed the Potomac, to use his own words, 
" with everything green " : he could " with difficulty get any 
officers," and vras "obliged to organize, and discipline, and 
march and fight, all at the same time." He found difficulty 
alike in getting the troops and transportation designed for 
the expedition ; and a part of the latter crossed the Potomac 
to him, raw and undrillcd, on the day of the start, while the 
trains did not move until still later. However, by great 
exertions, emplojdng himself even with details which usually 
fall to the duties of subordinate commanders and staff- 
officers, he got his army, such as it Avas, in hand, and, on the 
afternoon of July 16th, moved it out from the works on the 
southerly bank of the Potomac, leaving Runyan's (Fifth) 
Division as garrison. The marching force was about 30,000 
strong, nearly all three-months' men, whose terms of service 
were expiring — the object of their rally having been the de- 
fence of Washington. These all spiritedly marched to open 
the offensive campaign ; and even some regiments entitled to 
discharge nobly remained, only two leaving — a Pennsyl- 
vania regiment and a New York artillery battalion — who, 
going back at Centreville, left McDowell still a little over 
28,000 strong. In this force were about 800 regulars, of 
various regiments, clustered into a battalion under Major 
Sykes. There were four divisions in the column — the First 



♦ ■ BULL RUN. 27 

under General Tyler, the Second nnder Colonel Hunter, 
the Third under Colonel Heintzelman, the Fifth under 
Colonel Miles. The advance struck Fairfax Court House 
next day, and found that Beauregard's outposts there had 
taken the alarm and vanished ; thence it moved onward to 
Centreville. The troops were unaccustomed to marching, 
and did not understand the value of dispatch, "svhile their 
officers were mainly ignorant of how to march them : so that 
the army did not reach the latter point till the 18th, a day 
after McDowell's intention. Tyler's advance thence pushed 
immediately down to Bull Eun, which, as we have seen, was 
Beauregard's line of defence. Now, the plan of battle had 
been to turn Beauregard's right, under cover of a demon- 
stration made straightforward from Centreville, on the road 
to IManassas Junction, against Beauregard's centre. But 
Tyler was one of those numerous officers in whom, confident 
of success, zeal outran discretion ; and, believing from the 
success of his advance thus fiir that he could push straight 
through to Manassas with his single division, he moved forward 
to Mitchell's Ford, and opened a sharp artillery fire, which 
provoked a response from the Confederate batteries. Xot 
content Avith this reconnoissance, which, so far, was harmless, 
Tyler deployed his infantry brigade along the stream at 
Blackburn's Ford, and let them fire into the opposite woods. 
Of course the Confederates at once returned a hot reply, this 
being their strong position, and, in a few exchanges, put to 
flight the troops opposing. So far as material result was 
concerned, the affair was trifling, the Confederate loss being 
68, and the Union about 100 ; but it had a great effect on 
the morale of the main attacking army, who recommenced 
their familiar speculations on "masked batteries." Some- 
thing, hoAvever, Avas learned of the Confederate position. 
The next day, the 19th, the troops all got into position, and 
their rations, which Avere in the rear, also came up. The 
19th and the morning of the 20th Avere spent in recomiois- 



28 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

sances, which determined McDowell to abandon the project 
of turning the enemy's right, and to make a neyv order of 
attack designed to turn his left. 

Meanwhile, however, the Confederates were losing no 
time. Johnston having received directions from Eichmond 
to join his corps to that of Beauregard, withdrew from 
Patterson's front, marched through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, 
and thence transferred his infantry by rail to Manassas. 
This point Johnston, with ten regiments, reached on the 20th. 
Superior in rank to Beauregard, he adopted unhesitatingly 
the former's dispositions and plans in the emergency. There 
were now eight brigades positioned on the line of Bull Run, 
a distance of eight miles : General Ewell's on the rio^ht at 
Union Mills Ford, General Jones's at McLean's Ford, General 
Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford, General Bonham's at 
Mitchell's Ford, Colonel Cooke's at Bull's Ford, about three 
miles above, and Colonel Evans's at the extreme left at Stone 
Brido-e. The briijades of General Holmes and General 
Early were in reserve in rear of the right. So skilfully and 
rapidly had been the tranfer of Johnston's force that a great 
j)art of it was already in position, and it was accounted 
certain that the few remaiuing thousands would roach the 
ground by noon of the morrow, thus giving an available 
strenirth of 27,000 men for the defence of the Confederate 
position. 

That this force could decisively repulse a column of equal 
size, — for even if nothing had been left in reserve at his 
trains, full twenty-five thousand men were at McDowell's 
disposal, — was beyond all doubt. The choice of position 
and the friendly aid of abatis and of artillery in jDosition, 
had put the matter beyond question, it was thought, especially 
against raw troops ; and the whole ground, of which his oppo- 
nent was ignorant, was familiar to the inquiring mind of 
Beauregard, who been occupying his camp, and intrench- 
ing it so far as he thought necessary, since the latter part of 



BULL EUN. 



29 



May. There was, however, a diflicultj at this point : it sup- 
posed an immediate attack by McDowell. It was prudent 
to consider that, so soon as Johnston's withdrawal had 
been learned by Patterson, the news must instantly have 
been telegraphed to Washington, and thence sent to McDow- 
ell, who would, accordingly, delay his attack until ho should 
also be reinforced, either by Patterson's army or other troops, 
and until the numerical superiority on which his plan of attack 
was based, should be restored. It was possible that Mc- 
Dowell already knew the position of affairs, and it was also 
possible that, if he did not know it, some other cause would 
delay his attack, like want of rations, or the attending of 
reinforcements, until it did become known. What was un- 
pleasantly certain was that already after having once burst 
at the line of Bull Eun with the head of his column, he had 
now delayed in inaction more than two days. 

With such probabilities but one true course remained for 
the Confederate generals : it was to advance instantly to the 
attack before any reinforcements could come up to their 
adversary. This plan would, to be sure, sacrifice the sup- 
posed advantages of position and superior knowledge of the 
ground ; but these latter might become useless by holding 
them until McDowell should be strong enough to overcome 
them ; and equally fatal might it be to delay in the hope that 
McDowell would disclose his intentions. A bold offensive 
was the soldierly course — a method which suited the in- 
stincts of both officers as well as the crisis of affairs. So 
far as numbers were concerned they could safely rely before 
nightfall of the next day, on no imjiortant disparity ; while 
by effecting a surprise, and getting the advantage of success- 
ful attack, victory could be even earlier counted on. It was 
therefore decided by Johnston and Beauregard, on the night 
of the 20th, to cross Bull Run on their right, at the lower 
fords, and attempt to turn the Union left at Centreville. They 
relied on the spirit of their troops, now greatly encouraged by 



30 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

Longstreet's repulse of Tyler at Blackburn's ford. "What 
might have come of this plan, it is idle now to speculate, for 
when the orders to put the brigades in motion had been exe- 
cuted, on the morning of the 21st, a delay of several hours 
in their transmission by the staff officers occurred, and, in 
the interval, McDowell had passed Ball Run, handsomely 
turned his opponent's left flank, and thrown him on the 
defensive. 

McDowell's plan of battle was one unusually sensible and 
soldierly for that early da}^ and perfectly worthy of com- 
mendation at the present. The reconnoissances of Major 
Barnard and the other engineer officers, during the 19th and 
20th, had disclosed the facts on which it was based. The 
stream called Bull E,un ran south-easterly about equidistant 
between the Confederate head-quarters at INIanassas and the 
Union head-quarters at Centreville. The main road between 
these points crossed the run at Blackburn's ford, three miles 
from Centreville, while, on either side, a lower and an upper 
road, diverging from Centreville, struck the run respectively 
at Union Mills Ford and the Stone Bridge. Here, then, 
Avere naturally located the right, the centre, and the left of 
the Confederate position at Bull Eun. The AVarrenton turn- 
pike road, the one from Centreville to Stone Bridge, was four 
miles long, and of course the Confederates had placed artil- 
lery and obstructed the adjacent ground on their side of the 
stream by heavy abatis. Two miles above, however, beyond 
the Confederate left, carelessly guarded, a good ford was 
discovered at Sudley Springs, and though no road led thither, 
the intervening woods were passable. McDowell's plan of 
attack was to pass this Sudley Springs ford with his right, 
under pretence of attack in front, and, having gained the rear 
of the position at Stone Bridge, to dislodge the enemy, and 
throAV himself on the railroad between Beaures^ard and John- 
ston ; for he had not learned of their junction. Miles 's divis- 



BULL RUN'. 31 

ion was to remain in reserve at Centre ville, holding the 
position, and strengthening it witli earthworks and abattis, 
and demonstrating with one brigade against Blackburn's ford 
in artillery fire. Tyler's division was to move on the pike to 
Stone Bridge, threatening it, and afterwards crossing it. The 
main body, the two divisions of Hunter and Heintzelraan, 
was to march across the country to Sudley Ford, and turn 
the enemy's left flank. 

The time of starting was fixed for half-past two o'clock of 
Sunday morning, July 21st, and soon after midnight the 
troops were all astir. But unused to the swift mechanical 
manoeuvres of veterans, and with the oflicers as unskilled as 
the men, Tyler's advance division was not out upon the road 
till long after the time, and the other two. Hunter's and 
Heintzelman's, which had to march behind it on the turnpike 
for some distance, were thereby fatally delayed. Hunter 
could not digress from the AVarrenton turnpike till six 
o'clock, and, the route through the woods to Sudley Ford 
being longer and harder than was thought, the head of the 
flanking column did not reach the stream until half-past nine, 
three hours later than the time fixed. IMeanwhile, Tyler had 
reached Stone Bridge on the turnpike, and at the appointed 
moment, half-past six, fired his signal gun. 

It was a signal gun for the Confederates, too, who, intent 
on other things, and anticipating either to attack or be at- 
tacked fiir down the stream, on their right, had only Evans's 
demi-brigade, or regiment and a half, at the turnpike bridge. 
Even the latter hardly responded to Tyler's fire, except in 
some slight musketry exchanges between the skh-mishers on 
the banks of the run. Yet, from so slight a circumstance, 
McDoYv^cll appears to have divined the fact that the mind of 
the Confederate commander must be occupied with some 
dangerous scheme concerning the other flank ; and he in- 
stantly withdrew from Tyler Kcyes's brigade to where, two 
miles back from the run, on the turnpike, the road forks to 



32 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Manassas, holding also in reserve one of Heintzelman's bri- 
gades, " in case we should have to send any troops back to 
reinforce Miles's division." For it had already "become a 
question " with McDowell, whether the Confederate general 
"did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by 
Blackburn's Ford." 

But the clamor of Tyler!s guns had roused the Con- 
federate commanders to a true sense of their j^osition, and 
dropping yet unmeshed the toils which they were knotting 
for their opponent, they hastened to cut through those which 
menaced to entangle themselves. His morning's tardiness 
enabled them to do so. Hunter, having thrown the head of 
his column across Sudley Ford, at half-past nine, turned and 
marched down to take the works at Stone Bridge in reverse. 
For the first mile, the region around the road leading from 
Sudley Ford to the Warrenton turnpike, which the run 
crosses at Stone Bridge, is thickly wooded, with some cleared 
fields on the right. Thence, however, to the turnpike the 
ground is open, with rolling fields on both sides of the Sud- 
ley road. Colonel Hunter's column was strung along the 
road in the ordinary march by the flank, and it was quite ten 
o'clock when its advance brigade, Burnside's, emerging from 
the wood, spread out into this open space. Its leading regi- 
ment was very quickly greeted by two pieces of artillery, 
succeeded by the musketry rattle of Evans's brigade. The 
Confederates had saved themselves. Evans had, as we have 
seen, held the extreme Confederate left on the Warrenton 
turnpike and at Stone Bridge. The light cannonade of 
Tyler had been successful, as designed, in occupying his 
attention for three hours ; that is, till half-past nine o'clock. 
At that time, however, he plainly saw that a large force 
crossing the river, was moving through the woods to his rear ; 
and, sending for reinforcements, he moved back his brigade, 
consisting of a regiment and a battalion, and two pieces of 
artillery. The Sudley Spring road crosses the turnpike 



"^ BULL EUN. 33 

little more than a mile back from the Stone Briclfje. Of 
course, therefore, Evans had not far to move, and in half an 
hour the whole of his change of front was easily made. A 
petty tributary of Bull Run, called Young's Branch, shoots 
northerly over the turnpike near this crossing of the Sudlc}' 
Springs road, and thence bending forward in a wide curve 
around the base of an elevation over which the turnpike 
runs, flows along back across the turnpike near Stone Bridge. 
Evans, throwing his demi-brigade out to meet Hunter, found, 
north of the turnpike and of the bend of Young's Branch, very 
good ground for his purpose. His right rested in a long and 
narrow grove in front of Young's Branch ; his centre crossed 
the Sudley road, some distance north of the pike, and his 
left was concealed among some houses^ sheds, hay-stacks, 
and fences, on the farm of one Dogan. AYhat with artillery 
and musketry he had a good fire down the slope'at his enemy, 
whenever he might debouch from the woods many hundred 
yards distant. 

The moment the head of Burnside's brigade appeared, 
Evans opened fire ; and the former, too eager and too un- 
trained to form proper line of battle, sharply responded. A 
brisk, but irregular and unimportant skirmish went on for 
half an hour between Burnside and Evans, while the former 
was getting his troops in hand. Porter's brigade, coming out 
of the woods, formed on Burnside's right, and Sykes's eight 
hundred regulars were sent to his left, while Griffin's battery 
got into position and attacked the Confederate artillery, and 
then the general battle began. Evans, meanwhile, had got 
up similar welcome reinforcements. A part of Colonel 
Bee's brigade, which had come from Johnston's army, was 
despatched to him, and a part of Colonel Bartow's, with six 
more pieces of artillery, of Imboden and Richardson. And, 
meanwhile, other supporting forces were arranging a second 
position in the rear. Bee and Bartow having crossed to 
Evans, the fight was sharply carried on. Hunter's left, in 

3 



34 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

which was Sykes's battalion, pressed rapidly against the 
grove in front of the Confederate right, and drove it back 
upon the road. More tenaciously Bee, who was now in com- 
mand, clung to his left. But the Union force managed to 
keep its early advantage ; and, pressing along with vigor, 
Hunter at length drove the Confederates back right and left, 
carrying with it the grove and the house ; and finally sweep- 
ing across Young's Branch, across the turnpike, where the 
Sudley road reaches it, he forced the Confederates up the 
slopes to the heights beyond. At the turnpike. Colonel 
Hampton's legion had been thrown in to the assistance of 
Evans, Bee, and Bartow ; but it was too late to check the prog- 
ress of Hunter, and could only, according to General John- 
ston, "render efficient service in maintaining the orderly 
character of the retreat from that point. " Up the slope to a 
plateau on its crest rushed Bee's discomfited troops, and there 
found, solid and strong, and dressed in line, a full brigade 
holding the heights, and awaiting the rolling shock of battle. 
It was the brigade of Colonel Jackson — already a great 
soldier, since already he was possessed of those moral quali- 
ties which made him chiefly what he is now in history. Here, 
rallying his men, Bee pointed them for encouragement to 
their fresher comrades : " There is Jackson, standing like a 
stone icall; " and one word of the pithy exclamation became 
immortal. 

In tliis way Ilmiter's division auspiciously opened the 
battle of Bull Eun. A still greater success was awaiting the 
Union army. The brigades of Colonel W. T. Sherman and 
General Schenck, of Tyler's division, had been lying quietly 
on the turnpike in front of Slone Bridge. By ten o'clock, _ 
however, it was perceived from tree-tops that Evans's bri- 
gade, on the other side, -which had been drawing back 
from the bridge for h:ilf an hour, was now nearly all gone 
up the turnpike, and thence out to meet Hunter, the head of 
whose column could also be discerned from the same rude 



BULL KUN. 35 

observatory. Hunter's fire drew nearer and nearer as lie 
forced Evans back; but at length, almost an hour later, 
clouds of dust showed that the five supporting regiments of 
Bee and Bartow, with their artillery, had reached Evans, 
having crossed the turnpike, and that Evans was holding his 
ground. Tyler accordingly now ordered Sherman to cross 
the run, and Keyes to follow him, to Colonel Hunter's left. 
The quick eye of the former had earlier seen a horseman 
fording at a point above, and, having noted tlie place, he now 
led thither his brigade, and crossed without difficulty. The 
firing guided his march ; but Hunter's success was already 
assured, and Sherman, reporting to McDowell, was simply 
ordered " to join in the pursuit of the enemy, who was 
falling back to the left of the Sudley Springs road." Keyes 
came up and formed on his left, while Heintzelman moved 
over the conquered field, crossed Young's Branch, and 
marched up the turnpike road beyond. 

At this lime the fortunes of the Confederates were in a 
critical condition. Their left had been turned, the Warren- 
ton turnpike taken from them, uncovering Stone Bridge, and 
their line driven back a mile and a half since morning. The 
loss of this ground had allowed Tyler to cross two thirds of 
his division to Hunter's aid , while Heintzelman had already 
got into position. While McDowell had thus worked nearly 
all of his three divisions into good position, and was advan- 
cing nearly 18,000 strong, the Confederate lines had been 
thrown into confusion, and it was doubtful for a time whether 
an equivalent force could be quickly enough hurried forward 
to check the very mucli strengthened columns with which the 
enemy was now about to renew the conflict. But Johnston 
and Beauregard, ordering up the brigades of Holmes, Early, 
Bonham, and Ewell, and the batteries of Pendleton and Alber- 
tis, hastily rode to the scene of conflict, four miles distant 
from their head-quarters, to rally their disheartened forces. 
"We came," says Johnston, "not a moment too soon," for 



36 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OP THE WAR. 

" the long contest had greatly discouraged the troops of Bee 
and Evans." He found "that the aspect of affiiirs was 
critical;" but by great efforts, "and some example," the 
"battle was re-established," and, after a time, "many of the 
broken troops, fragments of companies, and individual 
straijulers, were re-formed and brouarht into action." The 
tide of fugitives, with their wild stories of disaster, which 
had begun to set from the Confederate ranks, in the custom 
of raw troops, was checked ; and an inexplicable lull in the 
Union attack (inexplicable except from the newness of the 
experience of the Union commanders) afforded golden 
minutes to the anxious Confederate generals. 

The position on which the Confederates had now made a 
stand was a broad table-land elevated from 100 to 150 feet 
above Bull Run, and rising at its most advantageous points 
still higher. Around its northerly and easterly bases runs 
Young's Branch, while another creek encloses the northerly 
side ; along the westerly side is the Sudley Springs road, 
nearly parallel with Bull Run at this point, and from it about 
a mile and a half distant. The main plateau is generally 
bare, and broken into rugged ridges ; but its southerly and 
easterly heights are thickly wooded Avith pines, and at its 
westerly crest the Sudley road runs through a forest of oaks. 
In this opening victory the Union troops had seized the 
slopes leading up to the plateau from the turnpike. They 
now fought, in general, to sweep the Confederates from the 
crest and the plateau beyond. The latter had rallied and re- 
inforced their line, and the brigades of Bee, Evans, Bartow, 
Bonham, Jackson, Plampton's legion, and Fisher's regiment, 
were put in line of battle, with the batteries of Imbodeu, 
Pendleton, Albertis, and others. 

To carry the position, McDowell now had the brigades of 
Wilcox and Howard on the right, supported by part of 
Porter's brigade, and the cavalry under Palmer ; the brigades 
of Franklin and Sherman in the centre and up the road, and 



BULL RUN. 37 

Iveyes's brigade on the left. Eicketts's and Griffin's batteries 
were on the right, and tlie Rhode Island battery on the left. 
It will thus be seen that Heintzelman's division was on the 
right, a part of Hunter's (now under Porter, Hunter being 
wounded), in the centre, and two brigades of Tyler on the 
left. Schenck's brigade and Ayers's battery were still on the 
other side of the river, and Miles's division, 9,000 strong, 
back at Centreville. McDowell had, however, 18,000 men 
with him on the field of action ; from which, nevertheless, he 
had to deduct the losses of the morning and some withdrawn 
troops, like Burnside's brigade. The force which Johnston 
could bring immediately to bear Vv'as even less than this, for 
McDowell's demonstrations with the reserves of Miles and 
Eichardson detained several Confederate brigades at the lower 
fords of Bull Eun, from fear of a crossing at that point. In- 
deed it was not until three o'clock that the withdrawal of a 
part of these forces, and the arrival of Johnston's first troops 
from the valley, gave to the Confederates numerical equality, 
and at length, in their turn, superiority. 

Accordingly, until three o'clock, the tide of battle steadily 
continued to turn against the Confederates. On the Union 
left, Kcyes's brigade charged up the slope from the turnpike ; 
and, finding itself in sharp conflict Avith both cavalry and 
infantr^^ succeeded nevertheless in reaching the crest 
and seizing the buildings known as the Eobinson House on the 
plateau above : a position, however, which had soon to be 
abandoned. The great contest meanwhile was on the Union 
right, where, not far from the Henry house, some annoying 
Confederate batteries had been planted, and upon which from 
a neighboring crest, carried earlier in the day by the Union 
troops, the batteries of Griffin and Eicketts played. Between 
and around these batteries, from one o'clock till three, a 
fierce conflict raged, and forward and backed surged the op- 
posing lines, the westerly edge of the plateau and the Sudley 
wood and the neighboring woods — nay, the two Union 



38 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

batteries themselves, passing alternately from the grasp of 
either antagonist into that of the other. Three times the 
Confederates overran Griffin's battery, and three times they 
were repulsed ; while thrice also the Union forces surged in 
vain against the Confederate position. The Union advance 
seemed, at three o'clock, effectually checked, and an alternate 
roll forth and back in the attempts to carry or to hold the 
high plateau which formed the Confederate position, appeared 
to be the fate of the rest of the day. 

Had the assaulting army been what it late was Avhen it 
streamed up jNIaryc's heights or stormed the salient at Spott- 
sylvania, had its brigade and battalion commanders been al- 
ready the trained soldiers who later manipulated corps cZ'arwee 
or stood at the head of great armies, the plateau would in- 
cvita]:)ly have been carried; for it was really an untenable 
position. But had the raw Confederates been the fire- 
tempered troops who threw themselves on Cemetery Ridge, 
and passed through the terrific musketry of Antietam, they 
would have repulsed their assailants ; for the latter were al- 
ready exhausted, and, besides, were fighting without definite 
plan. But in truth, their later skill, the offspring of experi- 
ence, was Avanting to both leaders and soldiers on both sides. 

So, then, from noon of the sultriest day in the year, 
scorched by the merciless sun, the parched and panting com- 
batants fiercely grappling, writhed hither and thither over an 
indecisive field. For hours, on the slopes leading up to the 
table-land, nought was discernible, amid tlie choking clouds 
of dust and the heavy, slow-wreathing volumes of cannon- 
smoke, but the unsupported and fruitless attacks of gallant 
subdivisions — brigades or battalions shooting out hero or 
yonder in a brief spurt of triumjih, to be forced back in as 
sure a retrograde. Three o'clock had passed. McDowell 
still felt that the day, begun with prosperous omens, could 
be made his own. The Confederates, unwillingly compelled 
to throw in everything in the desperate attempt to hold the 



' BULL RUN. 39 

plateau, head stripped even the lower fords of their proper 
defences, and, in a choice of threatened evils, had resolved 
to risk the menace of Miles and Richardson, in order to meet 
the actual and present peril offered by INIcDowclL Accord- 
ingl}', E well's brigade had been hurriedly ordered up from 
Union Mills Ford ; Holmes's brigade came in from the rear 
of Ewell's ; Early's marched up from McLean's Ford, burst- 
ing in at the very crisis of the battle ; two regiments and a 
battery of Bonham had been early taken from Mitchell's 
Ford, and a third regiment followed. The brigades of 
Evans, Cooke, Bee, Jackson and Bartow were all in. It Avas 
absolutely necessary to leave Jones and Longstrcct at the 
lower fords, to watch the entire reserve division of Miles. 
"While the Confederates were thus pressed for more troops, 
McDowell had two brigades almost fresh, besides Burnside's, 
in reserve since noon. Howard's brigade Avas accordingly 
marched up to the front, and prepared to take part in the 
contest, and, meanwhile, Tyler having marched doAvn to 
Stone Bridge, and dislodged the*batteries there, had just 
succeeded, Avith his engineers, in clearing of abatis the 
AA'hole length of the turnpike, and seizing the' country adjoin- 
ing. Then McDoAvell, orclerinsf Schenck's fresh briijade across 
Stone Bridge to turn the Confederate right, prepared to make 
Avhat might yet prove a final and triumphant effort. 

At that moment, the loud cheers of fresh troops and a 
lieaAy rattle of musketry Avere heard directly on the right flank 
and rear of the Union forces Avho Avere struggling over the 

CO o 

ridge at the Henry house. It was tho van of the long- 
awaited column from the Shenandoah Valley, Avhose advance 
brigade, Elzey's, led by Kirby Smith in person, had plunged 
into the battle at its very critical point. Alive to the mo- 
mentous consequences hanging on a single hour's delay of 
these troops, Johnston himself had gone to hasten them for- 
AA^ard, and had sagaciously ordered that, instead of continuing 
down the railroad to the Junction, the cars should be stopped 



40 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

opposite the battle-field, and the troops marched across the 
country to his hard-pressed left. The plan Avas even wiser 
than it seemed ; for, in the mean time, the Union troops had 
so far fought onward in " striving," as Johnston says, " to 
outflank and drive back our left, and thus separate us from 
Manassas," that Smith's brigades, on arriving, instead of 
joining on the Confederate left, struck full upon the flank 
and rear of the Union rio-ht. 

In a moment, the battle was ended. The raw militia, ex- 
hausted by ill-conducted marching since midnight, and by a 
five hours* battle, faint from lack of food and thirsting for 
water — results of their ov^^n improvidence — broken up in 
organization by their successful advances, as well as by the 
day's losses — did not for an instant resist the impact of the 
fresh foe hurled full upon their flank and rear. Under the 
sweeping cross fire of Elze^-'s and -Early's brigades of infan- 
try, Stuart's brigade of cavalry, and Beckham's battery, the 
right Aving, which had thitherto clung to the slopes, or surged 
forward on them, at onoc melted away. Like wildfire ran 
from man to man the cry that "Johnston's troops had come !■" 
Crushed alike by the knoAvledge and the physical experience 
of that new presence, the Union troops gave way in absolute 
and irretrievable disorder. At once their commander saw 
that all was lost, and, knowing well the composition of his 
forces, felt that the escape of anything must be a matter of 
fortune, the chance in his favor being the equally raw compo- 
sition of the forces opposing. Howard's brigade had bejsn 
swept back in tha tide of retreat, but it was of no conse- 
quence, for ]\IcDowcll had no longer the offensive purpose 
for which he was begiiming to use it. Schcnck had not 
crossed the bridge ; but it was idle for him to do so. Mc- 
Dowell wisely contented himself with throwing his seven 
hundred and fifty or eight hundred regulars on the hill oppo- 
site the one surmounted by the Henry house, to cover as 
well as he miirht the confused retreat. 



BULL EUN. 41 

The news of Kirby Smith's arrival Lad spread as quickly 
through the Confederate as the Union ranks, there producing 
as much relief and joy as to their opponents it had carried 
despair and ruin. With exulting shouts, the Avhole army 
rose and pressed forward in pursuit. But the work was al- 
ready entirely over, and, save an exchange of shots with 
Sykes's sullen and stubborn handful of regulars, as they closed 
in behind the beaten army, nothing remained but to pick up 
here and there the exliausted or woundgd stragglers in the 
flight. No longer now a triumphant army, but a disorganized 
collection of men, the Union troops finally abandoning their 
oft-captured and oft-recovered artillery, streamed confusedly 
over the Warrentou turnpike, crowding that and the fields 
adjoining, and recrossed Bull Run. The fording of that riv- 
ulet wrecked what faint shadow of organization there had been 
on retreating from the battle-field. Like the waters bursting 
from a broken dyke, the troops spread over all roads and 
fields, and so swept back to Ccntreville. There an assemblage 
of camp-followers. Congressmen, correspondents and civilian 
teamsters, was collected. A stray shell or two from an 
advanced Confederate battery run forward ta Cub Run, burst 
among the wagons of the hireling teamsters, and instantly 
began a groundless panic there, a hundred-fold greater 
than the defeat of the troops on the field ; and, blocking 
the road w4th their abandoned Avagons, and flinging away 
property in their flight, the throng of civilians and team- 
sters streamed back on Washington. Thither also the 
soldiers, soon coming up, continued their retreat ; for Mc- 
Dowell, observing the condition of the army and its lack 
of supplies, saw that little could be gained by an effort 
to rally at Centreville. Leaving, therefore, the greater part 
of three divisions to wander unorganized back to their works 
on the Virginia side of the Potomac, McDowell bent himself 
to the task of covering the retreat with the very large reserves 
which had not been in the battle. This was easily accom- 



42 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

plishecl : ]Miles had foolishly withdrawn from Blackburn's 
Ford to Ccntreville, endangering the retreat of the whole 
arm}^ On the heights, however, he remained, and there 
Schenck's brigade, too, of Tyler's division, being tolerably 
uninjured, and the handful of cavalry were drawn up to check 
the expected pursuit. Howbeit no pursuit of importance 
was made. The Southern troops, excepting the fresh arrivals, 
were as badly used up as their adversaries, and in getting 
hastily over Bull Ej^m, had also, like them, almost broken up 
what organization they possessed ; nor did the commanders dare 
to go too far with their raw troops. They moved a few miles 
over the field to Cub Eun, and then stopped on observing be- 
yond, as Gen. Johnston says, " the apparent firmness of the 
United States troops at Centre villc, who had not been engaged, 
which checked our pursuit." Those latter waited and watched 
till the great broken army behind them had rolled off out of 
sight, talking over the battle as they marched, and till the 
victorious Confederates, heedless of pursuit, were seen to 
be content to pick up the trophies dropped by their discom- 
fited enemy. Then, at midnight, the cavalry which had bivou- 
acked in the same field it occupied the night preceding, Avas 
roused up, and the Union rear-guard formed column and 
marched away from sight and sound of the battle-field. 

III. 

RESULTS OF BULL RUN. 

Such was Bull Run — a battle which, beinc: fousfht soon 
after the rise of the war, so entirely efiected its subsequent 
course, that it is hard to picture what might have been its 
sequel, but for this event. What Hallam declares so strongly 
of Charles Martel's victory at Tours, in its import upon the 
world's destiny, may be averred of the influence of the battle 
of Bull Run upon the entire struggle of North and South : — 
" a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama in 



BULL EUN. 43 

all its subsequent scenes." Indeed, eliminate its record, and 
the key seems lost to all ensuing military history of the re- 
bellion, many of whose phenomena are only explicable by an 
earlier, all-controlling experience. 

Before considering, however, the larger results of Bull Run, 
it will be necessary to glance at its immediate fruits, prefacing 
this summary, also, with some explanations : for npon no 
other battle in America was ever launched so much false, 
irrelative, and trivial comment, as was at the time put forth 
both officially and unofficially, and equally on both sides, con- 
cernins: Bull Run. Much of the mis-statement of the official 
reports was doubtless deliberate, and for future military pur- 
poses, it being deemed expedient, for personal or patriotic 
motives, to conceal or distort facts which history is already 
reporting aright. In addition, however, most general officers 
of that day were entirely raw in the exercise of commands 
as large as those which were necessarily thrust upon them, and 
made astounding blunders concerning the numbers and plans 
of their adversaries, and the nature and strength of geographi- 
cal positions. Such being the truth with regard to professional 
soldiers, nothing need be said of the shallow, ignorant, and 
flippant lay- writers, who, of course, must be exi^ectcd to go 
still wider astray in accuracy and pertinency. Nine tenths 
of all the profuse generalizations about Bull Run, flooding 
the English and American press after its occurrence, are 
already in oblivion, their absurdity having been exposed by 
subsequent campaigns and battles, compared with whose ter- 
rific grandeur, this aflair at Manassas was but a rcconnoissauce 
and a skirmish. 

The battle of Bull Run may be placed at once among those 
conflicts whose issues arc, until decided, the most doubtful 
and accidental, and yet, when decided, most easily compre- 
hensible and explicable. Being fought on both sides by raw 
troops (for the handful of regular troops are alone excepted) , 
it was impossible at the outset to predict the result. The con- 



44 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

centration of Confederate troops, producing at length a sub- 
stantial equality in numbers, made the incertitude still stronger. 
Even the choice of position would not solve the difficulty, — 
for its real importance was greatly over-estimated. What can 
be averred, however, is, that the chances of accident were 
gi^eatly increased by the character of the combatants, and, 
when fortune seemed inclined to one or the other of the ban- 
ners, the rout of the other Avould probably be universal. It 
was left for the shock of battle to determine which of the armies 
should be dispersed. Passing thence to the q,ctual occur- 
rence, we find the Union plan of campaign very well formed. 
It never could in any event have accomplished what civilian 
enthusiasts expected, an unimpeded march into Richmond 
— not even if its triumph on the battle-field had been as 
complete as its repulse ; but an initial victory it was well cal- 
culated to secure. On the other hand the rapid and delicate 
withdrawal of Johnston's forces and their junction with Beau- 
regard is equally worthy of praise, inasmuch as it precisely 
checkmated McDowell's plan of campaign, and again took 
away the lattcr's assurance of victory. Here again, the 
meed of censure must not be passed upon the Union com- 
mander at Manassas, but upon those who permitted his plans 
to be thwarted while he was necessarily ignorant of the result. 
Coming noAV to the tactical conduct and the phenomena of 
the battle-field, we find the troops on both sides standing up 
to the work with the blood of their race ; and, nevertheless, 
on both sides there were the strongest proofs of how much 
was to be learned of the soldier's art, in camp, on the march, 
and in battle itself, and in those thousand skilful devices, and 
that familiar acquaintance with danger, which make the vet- 
eran soldier more valuable, though not always more intrin- 
sically manly, than the recruit. Amongst the officers on 
both sides, of all grades, this fact was still more palpable, 
even amongst those who subsequently rose to great and well- 
descrvcd distinction, after having at Bull Run put forth 



BULL RUN. 45 

evidences of genius. For it is a very shallow judgment, as 
well as a very doubtful eulogy, which, led astray in biograph- 
ical zeal hesitates to admit that its subject can learn anything 
by experience in the military as i:i other arts, and prefers to 
loudly protest that the perfect hero has made no mistakes 
from beginning to end. Most of the commanders did not at 
first understand how to conveniently march troops in large 
bodies ; and, on the Union side at least, where the motion 
was of necessity greater, the preliminary movement to Cen- 
treville, the exhausting flank march from 2 o'clock on the 
battle-morning, and the manoeuvres under the terrible sun of 
the day, doubtless exhausted thrice the energy they would 
have required, from being ill-timed and ill-conducted ; and 
this ignorance alone, other things being equal, can easily lose 
a battle. The troops had not learned at that early day, as 
they did later, to supply the defects of their division, and 
brigade, and regimental officers, in this respect, by their own 
self-taught veteran devices for ease in marching, for rest, and 
for refreshment. On the contrary, while excitement or igno- 
rance of probabilities had kept the Union tjioops sleepless, 
their unthinking improvidence caused them to fling away 
haversacks and canteens in the hot morning march, and left 
them without rations during the long toils of the day. 

On the actual field, to the Union troops and most of 
their officers, it honestly appeared that their opponents were 
intrenched in an inexpugnable Gibraltar, hopeless to attack ; 
while, in reality, the position was untenable against skilful 
attack. So, in the reports of many officers, as well as in the 
talk of their men, there were innumerable "masked batteries," 
which seemed a terrible, and almost an unfair advantage ac- 
corded to their enemy. The troops, fighting bravely, yet 
became disorganized by their own advance almost as much as 
by repulse. Individual impulses had not yet been drilled out 
of them; straggling occurred here and there, without much 
sense of its enormity on the part of the ofienders ; and, 



46 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

finally, when even routed, the whole body marched off with- 
out attempt at organization, talking over the causes of their 
defeat, and many deliberately dropping the accoutrements, 
and even the guns for which they had decided there could be 
no further use. The troops on the Confederate side, gallant 
and disposed to fight as they were, were equally thrown into 
the confused state common to imdisciplined volunteers, hy 
severe repulse. It has been described how dangerously they 
were demoralized by their hard fight, when Johnston and 
Beauregard rode among them to rally the lines, while victory 
was inclining to the Union cause. A sympathetic eye-witness 
on the Confederate side, wrote that, at two o'clock, "the 
fortunes of the day were dark. The remnants of the regi- 
ments, so badly injured, or wounded and worn, as they 
staggered out, gave gloomy pictures of the scene." These 
stragglers — not cowardly but undisciplined — poured in dan- 
gerous numbers from the field, as two hours later did the 
whole Union army. 

But the want of experience of which we speak was quite 
as observable among the ofiicers on both sides. The opening 
tactical manoeuvres, on the Union part, whether in conse- 
quence of erroneous reconnoissanccs, or of the bad handling 
of the troops, were delayed three hours, and the victory thus 
shut out, as it were, from the troops, before they could fire a 
gun. Then again, perilous lulls occurred in the battle — one 
of them during the all-important half-hour when the Con- 
federate generals were rallying their troops in great distress — 
because the brigade commanders hardly knew what to do next. 
And when their attacks were afterwards made on the Con- 
federate key position, they were made by brigades at a time, 
and without concert or cohesion. Indeed, Hunter's first 
attack, in the morning, was a fire from the head of column. 
Many minor instances of inexperience in Virginia wood- 
fighting occurred ; of which, by way of a single exami)le, may 
be mentioned the first seizure of Griffin's battery by Stone- 



BULL RUN. 47 

■wall Jackson. The Union chief of artillery tliouglit the regi- 
ments which Jackson moved forward to take the battery was 
only the two regiment of supports, which he expected from 
the same quarter ; and, allowing them to approach without 
fire, in an instant the cannoneers and horses were shot down, 
and the pieces, till recaptured, left in Confederate hands. 
So, on the Confederate side, the great mistake was made by 
Beauregard at the outset, of supposing Bull Run to be a de- 
fensive line, to be passed only at the fords. Again, the 
morning of the battle revealed to him that his whole left 
flank was either actually turned, or being turned — and this, 
in spite of the facilities for observing the marching of troops 
in the neighborhood of Sudley Springs ; and, in spite of the 
delays of the Union column, and a pause of a part of it for 
half an hour at the ford. Moreover, his line was so con- 
stituted, that its left was driven back more than a mile before 
it become linn a^rain ; and his forces beiuGf, thousrh less than 
30,000 in number, strung over a range of eight miles, before 
the right could get up to the left, the day had nearly gone 
against the Confederates. His own opening dispositions for 
attack, also, had so absorbed attention that McDowell mean- 
while had easily got the offensive ; and so defective was the 
staff-sj'stcm, that Beauregard and Johnston were wondering 
for some hours, ignorant that the orders had not been 
delivered, why their right brigades did not move forward to 
the attack. Here, on the other hand, it is equally clear that 
the Confederate generals were justified in making no attempt 
to pursue. It would have required an attack on the Union 
reserves, comprising a full third of IMcDowell's troops, who 
lay in good position on the heights of Centre ville, covering 
the retreat of the other two thirds. This attack might well 
have been regarded as dangerous, especially to those know- 
ing, as Beauregard and Johnston did, the demoralization oi 
their forces, even after the arrival of reinforcements. "Pur- 
suit," said General Johnston to the writer of this sketch, 



48 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

after the war ended, ''could not be thought of; for -vve were 
ahnost as much disorganized by our victory as the Federals 
by their defeat." Indeed, making all allowances for the mag- 
niloquent reports of those early days, it had been, to use the 
words of Mr. Davis, " a hard-fought field," and the victors 
were in no condition to pursue. 

The material fruits of the Confederate victory at Bull Run 
were the possession of the field, and of many prisoners and 
spoils, the precise figures, however, being, for causes already 
rehearsed, difficult to fix. The official Confederate loss in 
the battle was 378 killed, 1489 wounded, and 30 missing — 
a total of 1897 ; the official Union loss was 481 killed, 1011 
wounded, and an unknown number of missing and wounded 
and missing. The Confederate reports showed a total of 
1460 Union prisoners, wounded and unwounded, captured 
during and after the action. Besides these, there were many 
stragglers who never came back ; so that the total Union loss 
may be safely put down, in round numbers, at from 3500 to 
4000 men. The Union troops abandoned on the field and in 
their retreat, 28 guns, aliout 5900 muskets, nearly half a 
million cartridges, 64 artillery horses, 26 wagons, ten colors, 
and much camp equipage and clothing. 

But the victory at Bull Run gained more than a field : it 
won a campaign. Midsummer passed, autumn came and 
went, winter at last found the Union and Confederate troops 
in Virginia in their peaceful log-camps. The 3'ear 1861 
slipped entirely away without another forward movement in 
Virginia ; the new year opened silently there ; spring came 
again before the spell which Bull Run had thrown was broken 
up. Nor was this true of Virginia alone, but of tho whole 
"West ; incessant skirmishes and desultory engagements by 
detached forces occupied the time and strength which had been 
designed for grand operations ; for these latter were repress- 
ed at their beginning, and the military year of 1861, from 



BULL EUN. 49 

which so much had been hoped, came to its end at the battle 
of Bull Run. 

Nevertheless, the immediate and material consequences of 
this initial battle were dust in the balance, «ontrasted with its 
grand moral influences. Then, for the first time, the North 
knew that long and bloody war lay before it, for which it 
had not made adequate preparation. Much reliance it had 
hitherto placed on what it regarded as the supreme justice 
of its cause and on the matchless enthusiasm of its million 
defenders. By virtue of the one bitter cup quaficd at Ma- 
nassas, it saw with clear eyes a truth proclaimed by universal 
history, that, whatever the intrinsic dignity of a national 
cause, when once it falls under the dread arbitrament 
of the sword, its surest hope of success is in the resort to 
the laws of Avar and the application of military science, y 
Numbers Avill not supply the place of discipline, nor will 
enthusiasm allow the rules of war to be contravened. It is 
military strategy, it is the tactics and logistics of campaign- 
ing, it is in short the profession of war to which a cause, 
deserving to find in its own nobleness defence sufficient, has 
to be entrusted ; and, as a client rests his fortunes in his 
patron's hands, to be submitted to the dull, mechanical chan- 
nels of an unsympathetic professional routine, with all the 
law's delay and with new chances of failure from the 
superior professional talent of the opposing advocate sufiered 
to intervene, so was the North forced to intrust its honor 
and very existence to the watch-care of a professional soldiery. 
With the first unwelcome consciousness of that necessity, 
there came a momentary pang of disappointment and a 
flutter of incertitude ; for it had been thought that an upright 
cause would, in some indefinite way, prove its own advocate. 
It had been imagined, also, that nothing but that sublime 
self-sacrifice, and that supreme devotion of all which makes 
life worth the living, which could be seen at countless 
hearthstones, from ocean to ocean, were required to trium- 



50 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

phantly vindicate the integrity of the Union. The initial 
shocli of general battle had taught a different lesson, and had 
declared not only that mere numerical strength could not 
avail, in itself, against an adroit enemy, but also that neither 
the highest inspiration of patriotism, nor the profoundest 
devotion to duty, no, nor yet the wildest enthusiasm rein- 
forced by the call of duty, could win battles and decide the 
issue of campaigns. But this battle taught something more 
and more important, by disclosing that if the heart of the 
North was pledged to its cause, not less entirely was the 
heart of the South given to that opposing cause which, after 
long and anxious doubt, it had noAV made its own. Many 
scenes had the Union troops to relate, on returning to Wash- 
ington, in which dying Southern soldiers, tasting tlie grateful 
drop of water which humanity did not refuse even in the 
ferocity of battle, said : "You liave fought for your country ; 
I die for mine." 

Learning, then, therefore, not only that ill-directed enthu- 
siasm would not avail, even against the most unscrupulous 
and miprincipled opponents, and convinced, moreover, that 
whatever might be true of Southern leaders, Southern men 
with muskets in their hands Avere not without principle or 
without a cause — that indeed, they would overmatch enthusi- 
asm by enthusiasm — tlie North began to gird itself to a long 
and sanguinary contest. In the change which then came over 
its spirit, a reaction almost as remarkable and as violent as 
its first impetus with regard to the conduct of the Avar, suc- 
ceeded. Tlie restless leaders and demagogues Avho had en- 
couraged the people to fancy that a more levee en masse and 
a popular crusade against the South, like that which Peter 
the Hermit and Walter the Penniless directed upon Jerusa- 
lem, Avould gain them Richmond and the South, were covered 
with confusion. With patience and docility the people noAv 
submitted to tedious military manipulations, while their vol- 
imtecrs, all aglow with fire, were hammered and tempered 



BULL RUN. 51 

into drilled and veteran soldiers. Reflective observers, look- 
ing beyond the trivial and accidental occurrences of JManassas, i 
saw that patriotism had not so much lowered at the North as / 
deepened, and if the thin leaping flames of excitement bad ' 
subsided, it was but to the white heat of fixed and unquench- ] 
able purpose. Its baptism of blood was also for the North/' 
its reconsccration. It had learned from experience what a 
philosophical historian proclaims to be a fundamental truth 
of military history, and a canon to which, strange as it may 
seem, there is no real exception : — "One of the most certain 
of all lessons of military history," says Dr. Arnold, "although 
some writers have neglected it, and some have even disputed 
it, is the superiority of discipline to enthusiasm. The 
first thing, then, to be done in all warfare, whether for\ 
eigu or domestic, is to discipline our men, and till they are 
thoroughly disciplined to avoid above all things the exposing 
them to any general action with the enemy. History is fall 
indeed of instances of great victories gained by a very small 
force over a very large one ; but not by undisciplined men, , 
hoAvevcr brave and enthusiastic, over those who were well 
disciplined, except under peculiar circumstances of surprise 
or local advantages, such as cannot affect the truth of the [ 
general rule." Impressed with this trutb, the North de- * 
voted what was left of summer with the autumn and the 
winter to the levying and disciplining of great armies, 
the accumulation of material of war, and meanwhile busily 
arranged formal campaigns. In place of the comparative 
handful of untrained three-months' militia, who had once 
been thought more than adequate to dVerrun the South before 
their term of service should expire, the new campaign was 
begun with a round half million of soldiers, enlisted "for 
three years or the war." In Virginia the broken mass of 
fugitives who marched from Bull Run to Washington, be- 
came, when swelled and moulded into symmetry under the 
hand of a skilful organizer, the Grand Army of the Potomac. 



52 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Ever}^ arm was increased and made efficient. Three companies 
of cavalry were all that crossed the Potomac with McDowell's 
army in May of 1861.; seven companies were absolutely 
all that marched with it to Bull Run — two companies 
being left behind in "Washington. " People years hence," 
said the commander of one of these companies, "will hardly 
believe this ; but it is, nevertheless, strictly true." Such 
was the petty nucleus of the splendid corps of twenty thou- 
sand horsemen Avho, under Sheridan, swept through the Shen- 
andoah Valley and took so glorious a part at Five Forks 
and Culpepper Court House. Instead of seven companies, 
McClcllan took with him to the Peninsula alone ten regiments 
or thereabouts, of Stoncman's cavalry, and as great a force 
was left in other parts of Virginia. In place of nine imperfect 
batteries of thirty guns, which remained from Bull Eun as the 
entire artillery of the Army in the East, spring found ninety- 
two batteries, of five hundred and twenty guns, with a corps 
of twelve thousand and five hundred disciplined artillerists. 
Two hundred thousand volunteer infantry, many of them 
seasoned since the opening of autumn by drill and exercise 
in camp and garrison, were ready for march. The engineer, 
the quarter-master, the ordnance, the commissary and the 
medical departments, had been raised to a proportionate size 
and efficiency. 

If upon the South the influence of Bull Run was less im- 
mediate, it was not the less powerful. The first emotion 
inspired by the result was commingled of relief, of joy, and of 
confidence in the future. A great burden had been lifted ; 
for despite the braggart professions of superiority indulged 
by the more vainglorious of its mercurial population, thought- 
ful men in the South had felt that infinite consequences, pos- 
sibly the fate of the war, pivoted on its first great battle ; and 
that the issues of this battle were absolutely beyond the scope 
of prediction. Now was at least to be war, not a mere riot. 
Best and most inspiring of all, Bull Run had secured for the 



BULL EUN. 53 

South a period of probation during which" infinite results 
might be compassed. A whole year had been gained. A 
Avhole year ? and in less time than that States had been founded 
which flourished through ages ! 

Thus the result first in importance of the victory of Bull Euu 
was to furnish the South with that element of visible success 
which was needful to unify the South, for there Avcrc tens of 
thousands of rich, of brave, of patriotic and of greatly influen- 
tial men whose minds had never been thoroughly made up to 
permanently accept the Confederacy. Deprecating at the outset 
the eifort at secession, partly on the ground of right, partl}^ on 
the ground of expediency, these men could not find it in their 
consciences, certainly not in their discretion, as men of the 
world, to espouse a government which, in their eyes, was 
neither a de jure nor a de facto authority. To enrol this influ- 
ential class, and thereby to take from the loyal North its plau- 
sible hopes from " Southern Unionists," and, weld the South 
into a homogeneous nation, with but a single sentiment and 
aim, there was wanting a victory in the field. That victory 
was won, and thereafter thousands of those who before had 
refrained from the strife out of no selfish motives, but from 
loyalty to law, till law should be hopelessly disowned, and a 
greater law take the vacant seat and by visible proofs support 
a claim to sovereignty, these men threw, at length, their 
swords into the scale, and with them life, fortune, and honor. 

The uncounted hundred millions who from across the 
ocean gazed on through four years with never-ceasing wonder, 
upon the mighty drama whose stage was a hemisphere, were 
not less aflfected than the actors themselves by its opening 
scene. Sympathy indeed was quickly distributed to one or 
other of the combatants, according to the character, or sensi- 
bilities, or understanding of the onlookers. But it was only 
or chiefly after the struggle at Bull Eun that, for the South 
especially. Transatlantic sympathy took practical shape, and 
manifested its sincerity in supplies of money, ships, arms, 



54 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

munitions of war, and whatever other material assistance 
could be sent across the water. The tendencies of foreign 
governments also to recognize as a belligerent power the nas- 
cent Confederacy, which had before been chiefly inclinations 
matured to more positive acts ; and, above all, the people of 
Europe exerted upon their governments a strong pressure for 
the absolute recognition of the Southern Confederacy. This 
favorable sentiment being reflected across the Atlantic, had 
its full efiect in raising the hopes of the insurgent South. 

Nor do we yet reach the limits of the general residts of 
Bull Run. Something I shall perhaps be expected to say of 
the "'cneral and well-OTOundcd confidence which Bull E.un 
gave to the South in the valor of its troops. Had this sensi- 
ment risen no higher than Avas justified by a sensible review 
of the circumstances of the victory, it might have simply 
acted as a stimulus to the South. But in the temper in which 
it found the people, it afforded so colorable an excuse for still 
more extravagant and ridiculous assertions of Southern 
prowess as to damage most seriously the cause they had at 
heart. 

In tracing the connecting links in the complicated chain of 
cause and effect that runs through war, it will frequently be 
discovered that results the most momentous go back to influ- 
ences seemingly the most remote. Of this truth the aspect 
and prospect of the rebellion, in so far as regards the military 
resources of the South at the opening of the campaign of the 
folloAving year, furnish a striking illustration. It was in no 
slight degree the victory of the Confederates at Bull Run that 
in the following spring prepared for them a crushing defeat on 
the Cumljcrland and the Tennessee. Inflated with pride at their 
triumph in the first clash of arms, the Southern leaders no less 
than the Southern people, anticipated no other result whenever 
it might please the men of the North to test their jDrowcss : so 
that while the North durino^ the succeedinir autumn and win- 
ter was forming a colossal annaniont, tha Cjufederates, re- 



BULL EUN. 55 

posing in vainglorious confidence, contented themselves "with 
preparations little proportioned to their actual needs. This 
apathy especially prevailed at the West. It was in vain that 
General Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Department, 
labored to produce a realizing sense of the requirements of 
his situation. " I appealed," says he, in an epistle of lam- 
entation, written after the fall of Fort Donelson, " I appealed 
in vain to the War Department and the Governors of States 
— the aid given was small." It thus came about that at the 
opening of the spring campaign of 1862 the entire force gar- 
risoning his very extended line of three hundred miles, from 
the Cumberland Mountains to the Mississijopi River, numbered 
some 37,000 men. The result was, as will hereafter appear, 
that when Grant moved against Johnston his line, everywhere 
weak, was easily broken, and with the fall of Donelson the 
whole Avestern system of defence fell in ruins to the ground. 
The high-blown confidence of the people was then succeeded 
by demoralization and a distrust of ultimate success that pre- 
vented the Confederate Government from ever evokiusr the 
full military strength of the west. 

Kegarding the great lessons of the battle fought on the 
plains of Manassas and the marvellous scope it instantly lent 
to the American conflict, it may be truthfully asserted that the 
cannon of Bull Run echoed henceforth on every battle-field of 
the war, — aye, down to the very surrender at Aj)pomattox 
Court House. 



5o THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES 07 THE WAR. 



II. 

DONELSON. 



PRELUDE TO DONELSON. 

Throughout the vast extent of tcrritoiy enclosed between 
the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, the year 1861 passed 
without military operations of moment, but not without 
preparations for war on a colossal scale. The beginning of 
1862 saw in the West a mighty armament and a formidable 
fleet ready to move against the enemy. Events had clearly 
determined the theatre of the war, which indeed was already 
marked out by tlie controlling lines of physical geograpliy. 

The centre zone presents a striking natural peculiarity, 
which not only shaped the lines of military operation, but 
which was bound up with a series of natural influences that 
powerfully affected the course of the war. This region is 
divided by tlie Tennessee River into two distinct parts, which 
may be called the upper centre zone and the lower centre 
zone. In the latter the water-shed carries all the rivers into 
the Gulf of ]\Iexico ; in the former, enclosed between the 
Tennessee and the Ohio, and embracing the States of Ten- 
nessee and Kentucky, the rivers, rising in the Alleghanies, 
flow westward and northward and swell the volume of the 
Father of Waters. 

Now it is worthy of note, that while the States of the lower 
centre zone were carried into secession by a kind of political 



♦ DONELSON. 57 

gravitation as potent as the propulsive force that hurries their 
waters to the Gulf, Tennessee resisted the primary secession 
movement, and only fell into the secondary movement inaug- 
urated by Virginia, and that Kentucky, after a brief dream 
of neutrality, resisted altogether, and adhered to the Union. 

Kentucky's loyalty marked out that State as the theatre of 
war in the West, for it was soon seen by the insurgents that, 
as the great water high\vays of the Tennessee and Cumber- 
land, which conduct to the very heart of the South, flow 
northward through that State, and empty into the Oliio, the 
loss of Kentucky must be the loss of all the territory north 
of the Tennessee. When, therefore, Kentucky committed 
herself definitively to the side of the Union, the insurgents 
crossed her borders, seized and fortified Columbus, on the 
Mississippi, obstructed the Tennessee and Cumberland, in- 
trenched themselves at Bowling Green — ma word, sought 
to gain the dominion of the whole upper centre zone, by an- 
ticipating control of the Mississippi water-shed. 

The defensive line taken up by the Confederates embraced 
a very extended front, stretching through Kentucky from 
the Mississippi to the Cumberland Mountains. Tlie control 
of this theatre of operations had since September, 1861, been 
in the hands of General Albert Sydney Johnston, an old offi- 
cer of the service of the United States, and popularly es- 
teemed at the time the ablest of those who had linked their 
fortunes with the revolt. 

The left flank of Johnston's line rested on the Mississippi, 
at Columbus, twenty miles south of the mouth of the Ohio, 
where, upon a range of bold and jutting bluffs, a fortified 
camp was formed, and powerful batteries were erected to 
close the navigation of the river. The force at this point 
was under General Leonidas Polk, a whilom bishop of the 
Episcopal Church, who had exchanged the crozicr for the 
weapons of carnal warfare. Running eastward from Colum- 
bus, the line passed through Forts Henry and Donelson — 



58 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

two works, placed the one on the right bank of the Tennes- 
see and the other on the left bank of the Cumberland (forty 
miles from where these rivers empty into the Ohio), with the 
view of obstructing the Union advance by those highways of 
communication. It then took a forward leap to Bowling 
Green — a strongly intrenched camp, covering Nashville and 
the Louisville and Nashville Eailroad. Finally, the right 
flank was posted at Cumberland Gay, Avhere the Confederates 
held the gateway to the mountain region of East Tennessee. 
To act against this defensive cordon, and to open the Mis- 
sissippi, two Union armies were assembled on two widely 
separated lines of operation. At the point where the Ohio 
joins the INIississippi, the wedge-shaped figure of Southern 
Illinois, thrust forward in a sharp salient between the States 
of Missouri and Kentucky, ends in a tongue of laud upon 
which stands the town of Cairo. It is an unlovely, amphib- 
ious region, scarcely satirized in Dickens's famous descrip- 
tion ; but its commanding strategic importance had caused 
it to be made a point of rendezvous for a land and naval 
force destined to operate in the valley of the ]\Iississippi. 
The naval force, consisting of a fleet of gun-boats and river 
iron-clads constructed in the workshops of St. Louis and 
Cincinnati, was placed under the charge of Commodore A. 
H. Foote, an ofiicer distinguished alike for the unaffected 
piety of his character and his daring inspirations as a com- 
mander. The command of the land force had in August 
been assigned to a certain Brigadier-General U. S. Grant — 
a quiet, unimposing, and unostentatious officer, whom, at the 
time, neither the pu])lic voice nor the whisperings of his own 
jirophctic soul marked out for that astonishing career that 
was to link his name Avith the mightiest achievements of the 
war. When, in November, 1861, General Halleck took 
commaud of the "Department of Missouri," he enlarged the 
"District of Cairo" to include all the southern jiart of Illi- 
nois, all that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland, and 



V DONELSON. 59 

the southern counties of Missouri south of Cape Girardeau, 
and Grant proceeded energetically with the task of organiz- 
ing an army for the impending campaign in the Mississippi 
valley. 

The other Union army had been gathered on the Ohio, at 
Louisville, and thrown forward into Central Kentucky along 
the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and into 
Eastern Kentucky towards Cumberland Gap. The region 
covered by the activities of this army constituted the Depart- 
ment of the Ohio. Its command was for a time entrusted 
to General Robert Anderson, but, in October, it was trans- 
ferred to General W. T. Sherman.' That officer's pregnant 
military views, however, so far outran the short-sighted 
enthusiasm and crude experimentalism of the time that he 
was pronounced " crazy," and he was displaced (November 
12) by General Don Carlos Buell — a soldier whdse convic- 
tions certainly could not have sensibly diflfered from those 
of Sherman, but who was by temper more reticent in their 
expression. Buell immediately began putting forth all his en- 
ergies to prepare movable columns for an advance upon Nash- 
ville and East Tennessee. By the end of December he had 
collected troops enough to organize four divisions — about 
forty thousand men. Two of these divisions were on the 
Louisville and Nashville Railroad — :- the one at Mumfordsville 
and the other at Bacon Creek ; a third division was posted 
near Green River ; the fourth division, forming Buell's left, 
was at Lebanon, under command of General G. H. Thomas. 

If with this view of the relative situation of the opposing 
fofces, we consider the problem to be solved by the Union 
armies, it will appear that, in its general stragetic aspect, 
there were two forces operating upon two independent lines 
against two other bodies holding an interior position. Grant, 
at Cairo, threatened the Confederates at Columbus and the forts 
of the Cumberland and Tennessee ; while Buell, on the Louis- 
ville and Nashville Railroad, menaced Bowling Green and East 



60 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Tennessee. But Johnston, witli a direct line of railroad from 
Bowling Green to Columbus, was in position to concentrate 
at either point more rapidly than Grant and Buell could unite 
the one with the other. Besides, the duty devolving on each 
of the Union commanders seemed beset with difficulties. The 
position at Bowling Green, strengthened as it was by fortifica- 
tions on both sides of Barren River, and covered by a formid- 
able stream, might be supposed to be inassailable by direct 
attack, while it could hardly be turned. In addition, the 
Cumberland Mountains, running almost parallel with Buell's 
line of operations, gave the Confederates a great facility for 
incursions into North-Eastern Kentucky. These were of 
frequent occurrence, and difficult to prevent ; and they were, 
in fact, only checked at last by the brilliant stroke of Mill 
Spring (January 18, 1862), where General Thomas first 
chained a victory to the Union standard, and began that 
splendid series of solid and substantial achievements with 
which his name is associated. Howbeit, this success, though 
very valuable morally in inspiring the Union troops, had no 
direct bearing on the problem before Buell, which was to dis- 
lodjre Johnston from Bowlinor Green. The obstructions to an 
advance against that "Manassas of the West," as it was 
called, presented so formidable a front that it was difficult to 
see how thoy were to be overcome. 

Nor, seemingly, was the situation of the army at Cairo 
much more promising. Columbus was known to be power- 
fully fortified, and in the high-flown language of the time, it 
had acquired the appellation of a " Gibraltar." It was con- 
nected, too, by unpleasant asssociation with Belmont,fto 
which place General Grant had made an expedition in No- 
vember, 1861. After he had burnt the insurgent camp, the 
Confederates, crossing from Columbus, which is directly op- 
posite Belmont, drove the Union force with a considerable 
loss to the shelter of its transports, and compelled it to return 
to Cairo. One or two subsequent advances, or shows of 



DONELSON. 61 

advance towards Columbus, by the Kentucky side, had each 
been followed by a retrogadc movement, the effect of which 
was unfavorable to the morale of new and high-spirited 
troops. If it had been possible to lay Columbus under siege, 
the operation would have been embarassed by the menace to 
the Union force offered by the presence of the garrisons of 
the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland. Finally, its 
capture, without the capture of the force it contained, could 
have been of slight value, and would have decided nothing. 

But while the Union commanders thus confronted each his 
special task, and counted with prudent calculation the stops 
and limitations that beset an advance, and phunied with wise 
devisement how they might be overcome, a new solution of 
the whole problem presented itself. The conception of what 
afterwards proved to be the true method of initiative in the 
"West, presented itself to so many minds almost simultane- 
ousl}^ that it is not easy to say to whom primarily belongs 
the credit. It is certain that General Buell, in a communica- 
tion to General Halleck, suggested the plan as early as the 
very beginning of Januar}^ 1862 ; and it is equally certain 
that soon afterwards General Grant, without knowledge of 
what Buell had advised Halleck, but acting on the result of 
reconnoissances made by General C. F. Smith and Commo- 
dore Foote, requested permission to execute the identical 
operation proposed by Buell. Taking note of the remarkable 
course of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, and knowing 
that at the season of high water these streams are naviagble to 
large vessels to the very heart of the South, the officers 
named saw that if the obstruction to the navigation of the 
Cumberland and Tennessee could be removed, nearly the 
whole upper centre zone must become untenable to the enemy. 
Their plan, accordingly, was to employ the land and naval 
force that had been assembled at Cairo in reducing Forts 
Henry and Donelson, which held the gateway of these water 
lines ; for it was plain that if these could be opened, both 



62 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Columbus and Bowling Green would be taken in reverse, 
that Johnston's line of communication would be severed, that 
the whole of the Confederate front of defence, as then drawn, 
must fall to the ground. This plan met the approval of 
Halleck, who on the 30th of January, 18G2, gave to Grant 
and Foote the eagerly-awaited laissez aller. 

On the morning of the 2d of February the fleet of gun- 
boats and iron-clads, followed by a long line of transports, 
freighted with troops, left Cairo to test their metal against 
the river strongholds of the enemy. Steaming up the Ohio 
to Paducah, the vessels by night turned their prows into the 
Tennessee, and next morning they anchored a few miles below 
Fort Henry, against which it was resolved to make the coup 
d^essai. 

The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, after a great 
curve by the south and west, turn northward : as they near 
the Ohio they approach A^ery close to each other. At the 
boundary line between Kentucky and Tennessee these streams 
are separated by only twelve miles, and it was at points im- 
mediately south of this line that the Confederate commander 
had raised his bulwark of defence — Fort Henry being located 
on the right bank of the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson on the 
left bank of the Cumberland. Both were bastion earth Avorks, 
armed with heavy guns to defend the water faces, and en- 
closed in an extended line of infai:itry breastworks. A direct 
road connected the two forts. After two days spent in de- 
barking the troops and in reconnoissances, it w^as decided 
to make a combined land and naval attack asrainst Fort 
Henry on the morning of the 6th. The fleet was to 
move up the stream and open fire at twelve o'clock ; Grant, 
whose forces lay encamped three miles below the work, was 
to march at eleven ; and he believed that he could readily 
get his troops up to the rear of the fort in time to intercept 
the retreat of the garrison, if the fire of the fleet should be 



DONELSON. 63 

such as to induce the Commandant to abandon it. Confident in 
his iron-clads, Foote declared he would reduce the fort in an 
hour, and urged Grant to make an earlier start or he would 
be too late : but Grant thought otherwise. At the appointed 
time the Commodore steamed up toward Henry, his four 
iron-clads leading and followed by thretj wooden gun- 
boats. Opening fire at a thousand yards, he gradually closed 
on the fort, with daring gallantry running his vessels to 
within six hundred yards of the enemy. The armament of 
Fort Henry consisted of seventeen guns, twelve of which 
bore well on the river. These Avere of the following descrip- 
tion : one ten-inch Columl)iad, one rifled gun of 24-pound 
calibre, two 42-pounders, and eight 32-pounders, all ar- 
ranged to fire through embrasures, formed by raising the 
parapet between the guns with sand bags carefully laid. The 
line of rifle-trenches guarding the land approaches was held 
by a garrison of 3,200 men, and the whole was under command 
of Brisradier-General Tilghman. 

The fire of the fleet was for a time returned with spirit by 
the fort ; but the extraordinary vigor of Foote's attack soon 
made itself felt, and several accidents occurred to disconcert 
the enemy. In a short time the rifled cannon burst, killing 
three of the men at the piece, and disabling a number of 
others. Then all the gunners at another piece were wounded 
by a shell that passed through the embrasure. Soon after- 
wards a premature discharge occurred at one of the 42-pound- 
ers, killing three of the men ; and finally the Columbiad was 
rendered unserviceable by the breaking of a priming wire in 
the vent. The artillerists then became discouragad, and 
some even ceased to work the smaller guns, under the belief 
that their shot were too light to produce any efiect on the 
iron-clad sides of the Union vessels. Tilghman exerted him- 
self to the utmost to encourage and urge his men ; but they 
had become thoroughly demoralized, and when he made an 
efibrt to get men from the outer lines to take the place of his 



Q-i, THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF .THE WAR. 

exhausted gunners, he failed in the attempt. He then in- 
structed the commander of the troops to Avithdraw them to 
Fort Donelson, while with the artillerists, numbering less 
than a hundred, he remained to surrender the work. Foote 
had declared he would reduce the fort in an hour, and he 
kept his promise, for in five minutes after that time the -white 
flag appeared on the parapet. "When Tilghman asked Avhat 
terms would be accorded him, the Commodore formulated 
the conditions in two words, "unconditional surrender" — 
a phrase which, inaugurated by that brave sailor, served 
afterwards as the blazon of many a splendid victory at the 
West. The only serious damage sustained by the fleet 
was experienced by the iron-clad Essex, which received a 
shot in its boiler, resulting in the scalding and burning of 
twenty-nine officers and men, including Commander Porter. 
The land force which had been much delayed in the miry 
roads did not arrive till some time after the surrender : the 
fugitive garrison, therefore, made good its escape and hast- 
ened in dismay to ensconse itself behind the bulwarks of 
Fort Donelson. Thither, also, the propitious fate noAV plainly 
pointed the way for the Union force. 

I have thus traced the process by which the dim outlines of 
the first western campaign gi-ew into definite shape in the 
brilliant plan of breaking Johnston's defensive system by a 
perpendicular force moving on the river lines of the Cum- 
berland and Tennessee ; and I have shown with what success 
this plan was initiated at Fort Henry. Before passing to the 
recital of the weightier triumph at Donelson, it will be per- 
tinent to examine the precise condition of the Confederates 
in respect of the material resources they had wherewith to 
meet the massive force arrayed against them, and the method 
of action adopted by the Confederate commander. 

From the time when Albert Sydney Johnston assumed the 
command of the Western Department, he had limited his 
views to the maintenance of a simple attitude of defence. To 



DONELSON. 65 

this course he was led from the inatlequacy of his strength; 
for although he succeeded in giving both Buell and Grant the 
impression that he confronted each with an overwhelming 
force, his army was in reality pitifully slight. On the eastern 
line, at Bowling Green and its dependencies, he had of troops 
not quite 22,000 ; and on the western line, at Columbus and 
the forts of the Tennessee and Cumberland, about 15,000. 
The total aggregate was some 37,000 men, and with this 
force he attempted to defend a line three hundred miles in 
length, stretching from the Cumberland Mountains to the 
Mississippi. In this condition, outnumbered on both lines, 
Johnston does not appear to have comprehended that a defen- 
sive attitude could only result fatally to him — that his sole 
ground of hope rested in taking advantage of his interior 
position to concentrate the gross of his force at a single point, 
and assume the offensive against one or the other of the two 
Union armies. Connected with this is a piece of secret 
history, revealed to me by General Beauregard since the close 
of the war, which will not be out of place here. 

Towards the close of the first month of the year 1862 Gen- 
eral Beauregard was transferred from Virginia to the West, to 
take charge, imder S^alney Johnston of the defence of the 
Mississippi valley. Un route he visited Johnston at his head- 
quarters at BoAvling Green, and between the two officers a 
prolonged conference ensued touching the best method of 
action. It was with the liveliest concern that Beauregard, 
who had understood at Eichmond that Johnston's force num- 
60,000 men, learned that it was in reality little over one half 
that aggregate. But that officer was always essentially ag- 
gressive in his military inspiration, and he now i3roposed that 
the Avorks at Columbus should be so reduced that their defence 
might be sustained by two or three thousand men ; that the 
remaining twelve thousand should be brought to Bowling 
Green aiid joined to the twenty-tAvo thousand there, and that 
with the united force, a vigorous, and if possible a crushing 



QQ THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

blow should be dealt Bucll's army, which was regarded at the 
time as the most menacuig, for Grant and Foote had not yet 
moved. Johnston fell in Avith this plan, and Beauregard pro- 
ceeded to Columbus to put it in train of execution. Scarcely, 
however, had he started for Columbus Avhen the thunder of 
Union guns on the Tennessee apprised him that it Avas too 
late, and by the time he reached the Mississippi, Fort Henry 
had fallen. The clamor of those guns, like the knocking at 
the gate that affrighted the soul of ]\Iacbcth, startled John- 
ston with the omen of doom; for it, too, was a knocking at 
the gate — the gate which once broken down, exposed the 
very citadel of all his strength. 

"Then," says he, "I resolved to defend Nashville at Don- 
elson." 

♦ II. 

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF FORT DONELSON. 

When, on the night of the 6tli of February, Johnston 
received tidings of the f:vll of Fort Henry, it was plain to 
him that not only was his position at Bowling Green seriously 
jeopardized, but that Nashville itself must become untenable 
unless the key of the Cumberland could be securely held. 
That key was Donelson, which had the character of a 
fortress thrust out on the flank of Nashville and Bowling 
Green. In order, therefore, to insure so solid a defence that 
hostile efforts should not prevail against that stronghold, 
Johnston ventured upon parting with the major part of his 
own force. He accordingly detached the commands of 
Buckner, Pillow, and Floyd, to Donelson, which raised the 
effective of the defending force to 1G,000, while at Bowling 
Green he retained but 14,000 to confront Buell and cover 
Nashville. In a word, he resolved "to defend Nashville at 
Donelson." 

Had General Grant been in condition immediately after 



DONELSON. 67 

the foil of Fort Henry to move upon Donelson, lie would 
have had the advantage of striking at a time when the posi- 
tion was in a very imperfect state of defence. But not only 
was it necessary to await the accumulation of supplies for the 
intended change of base from the Tennessee to the Cumber- 
land : it was requisite to allow time for repairing the damage 
suffered by the gun-boats, the importance of which auxiliary 
was, from their brilliant achievement at Fort Henry, very 
natnrally magnified. Accordingly, though Fort Henry was 
captured on the 6th of February, it was the l'2th before 
General Grant put his columns in motion towards Donel- 
son, before which he drew up his force on the afternoon of 
the same day — the distance between the two works being 
but twelve miles. But on the 9tli, the garrison of Fort Don- 
elson, composed chiefly of those who made their escape from 
Fort Henry, was reinforced b}'" the command of General 
Pillow; and on the 12th it received a further accession of 
several thousand men, brought by General Buckner from 
Bowling Green. The following day General Floyd arrived, 
bringing with him his brigade ; and as that officer was the 
senior Brigadier, he assumed command of the whole Confed- 
erate force. 

Fort Donelson, the stronghold, that thus became the object 
of attack and defence by the forces we haA-e seen converging 
upon it, was situated on the left bank of the Cumberland, 
forty miles from the embouchere of that river in the Ohio. 
It cQusisted of a large field-work of irregular trace, drawn 
on a commanding hill near the town of Dover, and enclosing 
nearly a hundred acres; while on the hill-side, riverward, 
were two powerful Avater-batteries, Avith an armament of 
eight 32-poundcrs, three 32-pounder carronades, one 10-inch 
and one 8-inch Columbiad, and one rifled gun of 32-pounder 
calibre. These batteries Avere admirably placed to control 
the river approaches, and the position Avas flanked both above 
and bcloAV the fort by small tributaries of the Cumberland, 



gg THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAK. 

which had been converted by the high water into deep 
sloughs. • 

But while Fort Donclson had excellent command of the 
river front, it was ill-placed and, in fact, untenable with 
reference to attack from the rear or land side, by which 
General Grant was approaching from Fort Henry. From 
that side the site was completely commanded by a range of 
hills around the work. When, however, it was seen that 
attack was imminent, the Confederates hastened to anticipate 
possession of this ground and drew thereon a line of infantry- 
cover consisting of earthworks, rifle-trenches, and abatis. 
As reinforcements arrived, heavy details were employed in 
the construction of these defences, and by the night of the 
12th, when the Union forces arrived, these were in readiness. 
The line was about two miles and a half in extent, and 
enclosed within its left flank the little town of Dover, in 
which were the enemj^'s commissary and quarter-master's 
stores. The ground is much broken by hills and ravines, 
and in most part heavily wooded ; but the works were laid 
out by a skilful Engineer, and formed a very formidable line 
of defence. The troops under Buckner garrisoned the right, 
and those under Pillov.'^ the left of this line. 

The force with which General Grant approached Fort 
Donelson on the afternoon of the 12th consisted of two 
divisions of about 15,000 men — the First division of 
four brigades under Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand ; 
the Second division of three brigades under Brigadier-Gen- 
eral C. F. Smith. The brigades of the First division were 
commanded by Colonels Oglesby, W. II. L. Wallace, 
McArthur, and Morrison ; those of the Second by Colonels 
Cook, Lauman, and M. L. Smith. Six regiments were to be 
transported by water from Fort Henry to Donelson, and 
united Avith other regiments brought from Cairo and South- 
land, formed the Third division under Brigadier General 



DONELSON. g9 

Lew Wallace. Smith's division immediately took position 
on the left ; McClernand's on the right. 

The men who followed Grant in Avhat was really both his 
and their maiden campaign, were green soldiers ; but they 
were men of the West — large, free, hardy, open-handed, 
brave, and from their very first campaign they showed that 
they had already many of the qualities and aptitudes of vet- 
erans. It was seen, for example, that the adventurous habits 
of the men that composed the Western array gave it a great 
mobility, and as its functions were to be offensive rather than 
defensive — as it had no Washington to cover, but, on the 
contrary, had resolved to hew its Avay to the Gulf, — that 
army early took and retained through all its career a kind of 
conquering, cinisading spirit, a freedom and confidence in 
large aggressive operations, never possessed by the great 
armj^ of the East. Already, in their first campaign, these 
men, as they boldly pressed up against the enemy's strong- 
hold of the Cumberland, gave promise of that mettle they 
showed in the colossal operations that were to fill the coming 
years. 

By the night of the 12tli the line of investment was drawn 
closely around the enemy's defenses ; and at dawn of the 
13th hostilities began with a furious cannonade and sharp- 
shooting, and in the afternoon an assault was made by four 
regiments with the view to carry a height near the enemy's 
centre ; but though executed with great vigor, it resulted in 
a complete repulse, with a considerable loss. Nevertheless, 
the assault was, under the circumstances, a judicious meas- 
ure ; for this bold front served to impose on the enemy in 
regard to the Union force, which, in reality, did not at this 
time exceed that of the Confederates. Next day, Friday the 
14th, Foote's fleet of iron-clads and gun-boats, together with 
transports bearing supplies and annnunition and a powerful 
reinforcement of 10,000 men, arrived, amid the joyful cheers 
of the army. The fresh troops were formed into a division 



70 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

under General Lew AVallace, and assigned a position in the 
centre of the line, between the divisions of Smith and 
McClernand. 

The neAv accession to his strengtli received by Grant es- 
tablished a preponderance of force on the Union side, and it 
was resolved to make an immediate combined attack by the 
fleet against the water batteries and by the army against the 
defensive line of the Confederates. But it required all day 
of the 14th for the ncAvly-arrived troops to get into position : 
so that in the afternoon the fleet alone was in position to 
begin operations. As, hoAvevcr, the success at Fort Kenry 
had inspired the greatest confidence, both in the oflcnsive 
power and the capacity for resistance of the floating batteries, 
Footc, without further delay, moved forward to the attack 
with four iron-clads and two wooden jjun-boats. The firinsT 
was opened at a mile and a half, and continued steadily until 
the vessels had approached within less than four hundred 
yards of the fort. During all this time the vessels met no 
response from the batteries, the Confederates reserving their 
fire till the fleet had come v.ithin point blank range. All the 
guns in the water batteries, twelve in number, then opened 
fire, and a strenuous contest began between fleet and fort. 
But it soon became manifest that, as the conditions of attack 
and defence differed materially from those at Fort Henry, so 
also was the result destined to be different. The water bat- 
teries, from their position, had a most effective plunging fire 
on the fleet, and while the shot and shell of the ships pro- 
duced no impression on the powerful sand embankments that 
protected the guns, the Colmubiud and 32-pound rillo told 
with Altai cfTect on the iron-clads. "Two unlucky shots," 
says General Grant, "disabled two of the armored gun-boats, 
so that they were carried back by the current, and the re- 
maining two were very much disabled." Thirty-five shots 
had struck the Louisville, thirt^^-five the Carondelet, twenty- 
one the Pittsburg, and fifty-nine the St. Louis, which was 



DONELSON. 71 

the lliig-ship. Fifty-four persons were killed and wounded, 
and the Commodore himself received a severe hurt in the 
foot. After an hour and a half's fighting, the brave sailor 
was obliged to hoist the signal for retiring. It remains to 
add, that in this remarkable contest the Confederate batteries 
were uninjured, and not a man in them was killed. 

The result of the two days' operations against Fort Donel- 
sou Avas far from encouraging ; and seemed to reduce the 
Union army to a position of complete dead-lock. The jjar- 
tial assaults upon the defensive line of the Confederates had 
met so decisive a repulse as to augur ill for any future at- 
tempts of that nature ; and the damage to the fleet deprived 
the Union commander of an auxiliary upon which he had 
confidently counted to greatly simplify the problem before 
him. In a word, the entire combination of effort for the 
reduction of Fort Donelson was to all appearances undone ; 
and it became necessary to form new plans. It was accord- 
ingly resolved in a conference between General Grant and 
Commodore Foote, on the evening of Frida}^ that the com- 
modore should return to Cairo, repair and augment his fleet, 
and return with a naval force adequate for a new and stronger 
attack. In the mean time Grant was to perfect the invest- 
ment, and await the arrival of reinforcements from Cairo and 
Louisville. 

But while the Union commanders thus planned operations 
that looked to a successful issue only at a distant day, the 
enemy had formed a resolve that precipitated an immediate 
crisis and hastened his own ruin. While, on Friday night, 
Grant and Foote were consulting with reference to their ulte- 
rior purposes, Floyd also called a council of his officers, and 
it must be said that if to the Union commanders the prospect 
as it presented itself to them was far from encouraging, to 
the Confederates the outlook, as they consulted together, was 
altogether gloomy. They had seen that very afternoon a 



72 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

numerous fleet of transports arrive with heavy reinforce- 
ments to an army Avhich they already magnified to double its 
actual strength ; they knew that the whole available Union 
force in the Western States could speedily be concentrated 
against Fort Donelson ; and they perceived that as they were 
completely enveloped by the line of investment, and every 
avcinie of exit and entrance from the land side cut off, it 
would be easy for General Grant, by extending his right and 
erecting batteries on the Cum])crland above Fort Donelson, 
to cut off their one remaining source of supply by water, 
when they nuist be reduced to capitulation. 

In this state of facts the Confederate officers unanimously 
agreed that the only course which held out a rational hope of 
escape was to recover, by a vigorous offensive stroke, the roads 
leading to Nashville, and thus open the way for their retreat. 
It Avas determined to make this attempt the following morn- 
ing, and the plan of operation was as follows : From the 
position enclosed Avithin the Confederate lines of defence two 
roads lead towards Nashville — the one called the AVynu's 
Ferry road, runs from Dover through Charlotte ; the other, 
an obscure and bad road, crosses the flats of the Cumberland. 
But as the latter Avas at this time submerged by the overfloAV 
of the river, and considered impracticable for infantry and 
artillery, it only remained to force open the Wynn's Ferry 
road, covering Avhich Avas planted the division of McClernand, 
forming the right Aving of the Union line of investment. In 
the method of action resolved upon. Pillow's division, forming 
the Confederate left, Avas to make a vigorous attack upon the 
Union right flank ; and Duckner's division, leaving in the in- 
trcnchments on the Confederate right a minimum of force, Avas 
to be moved over to strike at the same time the Union right 
centre planted on the Wynn's Ferry road. It AA^as hoped 
that if PilloAv's attack Avas successful it would roll back the 
Union right (McClernand) on the centre (Walhice) Avhcii the 
shaken mass, taken in flaulc by Buckner, would be throAva 



DONELSON. 73 

back in confusion on the left (Smitli). In the latter case 
Grant's force would be routed and driven to its transports ; 
but in any case it was at least expected to uncover the AVynn's 
Ferry road, and thereby an avenue of escape. The plan 
was not ill conceived, and its execution np to a certain point 
was, as will now be seen, a complete success. 

Pillow's column, eight thousand strong, was formed before 
dawn of Saturday the 15th, and moved forward at 5 a. m. 
It was hoped to make the movement a surprise, and it has 
been commonly, though incorrectly, written down as such. 
But in point of fact the head of the hostile column Avas greeted 
by a fire from the Union force before Pillow had time to assume 
a line of battle, and his force suffered severely for an hour while 
making its formation. This being accomplished, there en- 
sued a strenuous contest, in which the Confederates strove to 
force the Union position, but were unable to make any im- 
pression upon it. In the disposition of McClernand's division 
its three brigades Avere placed from right to left in the order 
of McArthur, Oglesby, and W. H. L. Wallace. Pillow's 
line covered the front of the two right brigades, and extended 
a considerable distance beyond the flank. After much una- 
vailing effort, it occurred to one of Pillow's brigade com- 
manders, Colonel Baldwin (who appears to have what his 
chief had not, a correct eye for ground), to direct the left of 
the line to advance under cover of a ravine, SAvinging round 
parallel Avith the Confederate front. This manoeuvre brought 
the force directly on and in rear of the naked Union right 
flank. The movement Avas supported by the Avhole Confed- 
erate line, all the regiments on the left throAving for\vard their 
left Avings ; so that PilloAv succeeded in making a change of 
front to the ri^rht, and the Union brisrade on the extreme 
right being taken en revers Avas at once SAvept from its 
jDOsition. 

While PilloAv's attack thus fell upon the tAvo right brigades 
of McClernard's division, Buckner, Avho had mcanAvhilc moved 



74 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

over from the extreme right of the Confederate line to sup- 
port the assault of Pillow, had formed his troops opposite 
McClernand's left brigade, under Colonel W. II. L. Wallace : 
so that the whole hostile mass was concentrated against one 
third of the Union force. Buckner, however, met with less 
success than his colleague ; for when he advanced to attack 
the brigade of Wallace, he struck so steady a front of infan- 
try and received so severe a lire from the Union batteries, 
that his troops fell back greatly demoralized to their trenches. 
Meantime, Pillow proceeded to follow up his first successful 
stroke, and by direct and steady pressure, succeeded in 
drivins: back the next brigade on the right, — the brifjade of 
Oglesby. Pillow pajs a deserved tribute to the stubboru 
bravery of the Union troops, when he says that "they did 
not retreat, but fell back fighting and contesting every inch 
of the ground," for every step gained by the enemy, a heavy 
price in blood was exacted. Nevertheless, in the relations 
of the contending forces, it Avas open to the Confederates by 
simply advancing to continually outflank the Union line ; and 
when after an extremely obstinate resistance to the left bri- 
gade of McClernand, nnder Colonel W. II. L. Wallace, found 
its right completely uncovered, and saw itself assailed in 
overpowering force by the troops of Buckner (who succeeded 
in stimulating his men by the news of their comrade's success 
to renew the attack), it also gave way, and by nine a. m. 
the whole position occupied by Grant's right division was in 
the hands of the ienemy. And the Wynn's Ferry road — the 
avenue of escape — was open ! 

With the whole hostile mass hurled against one third of 
Union force, was it wonderful it went down? Not wonderful, 
indeed ; but yet it would hardl}' be possible to imagine a sit- 
uation more critical than that in which the whole army was 
now placed. Moreover, the imminence of the peril was in- 
creased by an accidental circumstance. General Grant had 
gone on board a gun-boat to consult Avith Commodore Fo'ote, 



DONELSON. 75 

and during all these pregnant hours there was no officer who 
could combine and conduct the farces upon thnt fearful field. 
The division of General Lew "Wallace, which held position 
next on the left of IMcClernand was indeed called up by the 
sound of battle on the right ; but the inference drawn was 
that it was McClernand attackin":. At leno^th- about 8 a. m. 
Wallace received a messac^e from that officer, askinij assist- 
ance ; but not deeming he had authority to take the offensive 
he forwarded the despatch to head-quarters, from which, how- 
ever, the commander was still absent. Soon, another mes- 
sage reached him from McClernand that disclosed the fuU ex- 
tent of the disaster. lie then promptly forwarded one of his 
two brigades, undtr Colonel Cruft, to the assistance of the 
right. It only reached the scene of action in time to make a 
brief resistance, and then share the fate of the whole right 
wing. What that fate was, soon became apparent to Wal- 
lace ; for flocks of fugitives from the battle-field came 
crowding up the hill in rear of his own line, bringing unmis- 
takable tokens of disaster. Seeing now how critical the sit- 
uation was, Wallace promptly put in motion his remaining 
brigade under Colonel Thayer. The movement was made by 
the right flank at double quick. The column liad marclied 
but a short distance when the retiring brigades of McCler- 
nand were met withdrawing to the left, — retiring indeed, 
but cooll}', and without confusion, complaining chiefly that 
their ammunition was exhausted, to which circumstance the 
men attributed their mishap. The enemy was following, 
though without much cohesion : so that Wallace had time to 
deploy his brigade on the crest of a hill Avhich crossed the 
line on which the enemy was making towards the left and 
form a line of battle at right angles with his former front 
before the Confederates could make dispositions to renew the 
assault. 

And here we may pause a moment to note hoAv the enemy, 
led away by his very success from the primal object for 



7G THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

which this effort had been made, was hurried forward to his 
own destruction. The purpose of the Confederates was al- 
ready fully accomplished — all that part of the Union army 
that barred their exit from the cul de sac in which they found 
themselves placed was driven away, and the door was open 
for their departure. But in their then exultant mood such 
a measure seemed but a lame and impotent conclusion for so 
brilliant a prelude. They had rolled back their antagonist's 
v'lsrht on his centre : let them now drive the confused mass 
violently against his left and the swift-flowing Cumberlaiid — 
would not that be a consummation which would cause Floyd 
and Pillow to strike the stars with their sublime heads ? And 
so t!ioso worthies resolved. * 

But little did they reck m their high-blown fancies of the 
mettle of the men with whom they nuist try conclusions in 
the issue of this great emprise. Enraged at the untoward 
fortunes of the morning, and determined to regain whatever 
of honor they had lost, the troops of the right wing had no 
sooner refilled their cartridge-boxes than they returned and 
reformed I^ehind the firm front which Wallace now presented. 
And when immediately afterwards the Confederates again 
advanced, and began to ascend the crest, they were met by a 
fire before which their line staircjcred and broke : so that the 
oflicers could only rally them out of range. They then es- 
sayed another charge ; but this met a still more disastrous 
repulse, and then their ofBeers could not rally them at all. 
Many fled precipitately to their works ; the rest were bi-ought 
to a stand upon the ground wrested from McClernard. 

So stood affairs when General Grant reached the field of 
action. Bitter as must have been the pang experienced by 
that commander at the sight of his Avrecked and stranded 
lines, his resolve was instantly taken; and this resolve, then 
taken upon his first field, presents a complete illustration of 
that trait of character to Avhich General Grant owes most of 
his achievements. It has frequently been seen that gcncr- 



DONELSON. 77 

als have accomplished great things who, devoid of high 
mental jjarts, have nevertheless possessed an immovable will, 
and an offensive temperament. That steady will, that per- 
tinacious temper, that quality of " hammering continuously," 
which have been noted as the dominant traits of Grant's mind, 
he already possessed upon the field of Donelson. And it is 
here worthy of note that of the motives that then prompted 
him, General Grant aftenvards gave an interesting revelation. 
In the crisis of the greater disaster at Shiloh, that officer 
visited the division of Sherman, and, in speaking of the sit- 
uation of affairs, recurred to his experience at Donelson. 
"On riding upon the field," said ho, "I saw that either side 
was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. I 
took the opportunity and ordered an advance along the whole 
line." 

Such indeed was the order that now went forth to the di- 
vision commanders both to the right and left — to Wallace on 
the right, to retake the grourid lost in the morning ; to Smith 
on the left, who had not been engaged at all, to storm the 
enemy's works in his front. The manner of execution is now 
to be seen. 

So weighty had been the accumulation of force on the en- 
emy's left for the grhnd effort of the morning, that the whole 
right of the line, originally held by the troops of Buckncr, 
was left comparatively unguarded. General Smith's division 
confronted this flank, and the prompt manner in which the 
initiative was seized gave that officer the advantage of thi;3 
circumstance at the first onset. The storming force was 
formed of Lauman's brigade in column of battalions, v/ith 
Cook's brigade in line of battle on its left to cover that flank, 
and make a feint against the fort. It was led in person by 
General Smith, an officer of distinguished gallantry, under 
whose inspiring example the troops moved steadily forward 
to the assault. The preparations for the attack had, however, 
been seen by the enemy, and Buckner's command was hastily 



78 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

summoned back to the defence of the works vacated in the 
mornhig. These were approached just as Smith's cohunn was 
moving up the crest ; but the Union force, having the advan- 
tage in that it had completed its dispositions, met the head of 
the hostile column with so determined a fire that it was con- 
tinually staggered ; and the Union troops, tearing away the 
abatis, rushed forward and seized the breastworks. Buck- 
ner, after a vain effort to dislodge the intrusive force, was fain 
to fall back and take refuije within the outworks of the fort, 
surrendering to the assailants all the high ground on the Con- 
federate right — ground which completely commanded the 
main work, and saAV in reverse a great part of the Confeder- 
ate lines. We return now to the operations against the other 
flank, where the success was no less complete. 

When Pillow's troops retired from the assault of the jiosi- 
tion where Wallace had thrown his force to check their 
further advance, they reformed upon the ground originally 
held by the Union right. To dislodge the enemy from this 
position, and drive him back within his works, was the duty 
assigned to Wallace. The advance was made with a force of 
two brigades and two battalions, and Avas executed in so 
spirited a manner and with so bold a front, that the enemy, 
after a brief resistance, abandoned the ground, and hastily 
recoiled to his own lines. And thus aflairs stood at sunset ; 
the integrity of the line of investment Afas restored complete 
in all its parts, and on the left, a commanding position was 
held within the enemy's works. The day's conflict had cost, 
as near as may be counted, a sacrifice of about two thousand 
killed and wounded on each side. 

When the operations of Saturday closed, General Grant 
made his dispositions for a general assault at daylight the fol- 
lowing morning. But circumstances otherwise determined 
the event. 

Late that same niijht another meetins: of the Gonfeder- 



DONELSON. 79 

ate loaders took place at the head-quarters in Dover, where 
Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and their staff-officers assembled to 
counsel together as to their fortunes. These were certainly 
sorry enough. Until late at night, it had been hoped that 
they Avould still be able to extricate their commands from the 
trap in which they found themselves ; for they were not 
aware that the Union force had reoccupied its lines of the 
morning. 

When, however, the scouts, who had been sent out to re- 
connoitre, returned with tidings of the real state of the case, 
there ensued a scene which, even as portrayed in the Confed- 
erate official reports, would seem to have resembled less a 
council of war than a conclave of ruined gamesters. After 
a good deal of bickering touching a proposition made by 
Pillow to cut their way out, the bitter conclusion was reached 
that surrender was inevitable. But who should make the 
surrender? Pillow said, "As for myself I will never sur- 
render — I will die first." Floyd, whose guilty conscience 
caused him to see everything through a noose, added, "Xor 
will I. I cannot and will not surrender ; but I must confess, 
personal reasons control me.'' — " Then I suppose, gentlemen," 
said Buckner, the only one of the trio that seems to have had 
any sense of honor ; " I suppose the surrender will devolve 
upon me?" Floyd replied, addressing himself to Buck- 
ner, "General, if you- are put in command, will you allow 
me to take out my brigade?" — "Yes, sir," responded 
Buckner, " if you leave before the enemy act on my prop- 
osition of capitulation." — "Then, sir," said Floyd, "I sur- 
render the command ; " and Pillow, who was next in com- 
mand, added quickly, " I pass it." Thereupon Buckner called 
for writing materials and a bugler ; and Floyd and Pillow 
hastened off to save their precious persons. 

During the night, two small steamers had come up the 
Cumberland : Floyd seizing them, succeeded in carrying off 



80 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

fifteen hundred men of his own brigade. Pillow and his 
staff made good their escape to the opposite shore in a skiff, 
and Colonel Forest, with three or four hundred of his troop- 
ers managed to traverse the slough through which the infan- 
try could not pass, and got away by the river road. 

It was by this time dawn of Sunday, and Buckner having 
completed his writing, forwarded, under flag of truce, to Gen. 
Grant, a communication asking the appointment of com- 
missioners to settle upon terms of capitulation, to which end 
he requested an armistice till noon. To this Grant promptly 
penned his characteristic reply: "No terms other than an 
unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I 
propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner, 
demurring at what he called these " ungenerous and unchivalric 
terms," was, nevertheless, obliged to accept them. 

In the early morning nine thousand men laid down their 
arms, and the Stars and Stripes floated over the stronghold 
of the Cumberland. 



III. 
RESULTS OF DONELSON. 

The fall of Donelson was to the Confederate system of 
defence in the West like the removal of the key-stone from 
an arch : it bore the whole structure in ruin to the ground. 
It will be proper, therefore, in estimating the degree in which 
Donelson is to be considered a decisive field, to set forth first 
of all what were its direct military consequences. These will, 
at the same time, afford a striking illustration of the train of 
evils that in war follow dispositions originally faulty. 

As soon as General Johnston leai'nt that the fort at Donel- 
son was invested by the Union army, he became so fearful of 
the consequences which must result from its flill that he 
evacuated his stronghold at Bowling Green as a position 



m DONELSON. 81 

much too far advanced for prudence. With his force of 
14,000 men he fell back to the north bank of the Cumberland, 
opposite Nashville, and there awaited the issue. Buell then ad- 
vanced along the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 
occupied Bowling Green, and prepared to press on towards 
Nashville. At midnight of the 15th of February, Johnston 
received news of a glorious victory at Donelson — at dawn of 
the 16th he was met by tidings of a defeat and a capitulation. 
The blow was decisive. He immediately crossed the Cum- 
berland to Nashville. But neither could Nashville itself be 
held. Situated in a wide basin, intersected by the Cumber- 
land, the key to which had just been wrenched from the Con- 
federates, approached from all directions by good turnpike 
roads, and surrounded by commanding hills, involving works 
of at least twenty miles in extent, the capital of Tennessee 
was untenable by a less force than fifty thousand men. 
There was no alternative : Johnston abandoned Nashville amid 
the wildest panic and terror of the people, and retiring 
southward took position at Murfreesboro', where he endeav- 
-ored to collect an army fit to offer battle. Buell jiromptly 
pushed on from Bowling Green ; and, on the 23d of 
February Nashville was occupied by the vanguard of the 
Army of the Cumberland. 

While such was the effect of the fall of Donelson upon 
the right of the Confederate cordon, it was felt not less sen- 
sibly at its extreme left, where that flank rested on the Mis- 
sissippi. By that event Columbus was turned and became 
untenable. Instead of being any longer part of a system of 
defence, giving strength to and receiving support from the 
other parts of the line, it was left an isolated outwork, thrown 
out of all just position and relations. It was accordingly not 
long before Polk received instructions from General Beaure- 
gard to " evacuate Columbus and select a defensive position 
below." With this view, choice was made of the position 
embracing Island No. 10, the main land in Madrid Bend, on 



82 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

the Tennessee shore, and New Madrid. The work of re- 
moving the large stores of supplies and numerous siege guns 
was begun the 25th of February and completed on the 1st 
of March, without molestation. The following day Colum- 
bus was occupied by the Union force. But even this new 
position at Island No. 10 was simply designed as a temporary 
resting-place, the tenure of which was to be entirely contin- 
gent on future actions in the field. 

Such were the astonishing events that, in a territorial point 
of view, followed this brilliant stroke. To say that it car- 
ried forward the whole Union front of war two hundred miles 
further south is not even an adequate statement. It was the 
downfall of a system of defences. It cleared Kentucky com- 
pletely of all insurgent force. It threw the Confederates back 
into the centre of Tennessee, the capital of which was brought 
under Union dominion. It unbound the Cumberland and 
the Tennessee. In a word, it brought practically under the 
Union control the whole upper centre zone. 

Nor was its moral efiect less remarkable. This is to be 
estimated both in reference to the North and the South. • 

Consider that it was the initial campaign in the West, and 
judge of the measureless content diifused throughout the 
whole North by results so brilliant. Consider, too, its rela- 
tions to the course of the war as a whole. The last trial of 
strength had been Bull Run, the sting and humiliation of 
which were still bitterly felt at the opening of this campaign ; 
for it had been followed by entire inaction at the East — 
inaction which however much imposed by sound military 
considerations, was at the time little understood by the peo- 
ple. Is it true, then, men had begun to say to themselves 
that there is really something in the vaunted Southern 
prowess and invincibility? But how quickly such doubts 
and fears vanished when the story of Donelson Avas told ! It 
was then seen by palpable proof that not only were the men 
of the North equal to them of the South in courage, but that 



DONELSON. 83 

they had superior steadfastness and endurance ; that they 
could not only storm works, but stem the current of disas- 
ter with unflinching front ; and it was seen, too, that North- 
ern generals could jjlan and manoeuvre, and that by judicious 
disposition great results might be achieved with comparatively 
slight sacrifice of life. Thus, while darkness covered the 
East, there suddenly flashed from the Western horizon an 
auroral light that overspread all the land with the day-spring 
of hope. 

Throughout the South, on the contrary, the events of this 
campaign produced universal terror and alarm. These senti- 
ments were due not only to the patent results of the cam- 
paign, — to the capture of an army and the breaking up of a 
whole system of defence, — but to a certain element of mys- 
tery in the agencies by which these results Avere produced, 
and the mistrust thereljy engendered in the minds of the 
people of the South touching the value of their whole mili- 
tary procedure. From the success of Beauregard in holding 
his position in Virginia there had grown up what may be 
called the Manassas theory — the theory of the impregna- 
bility of great intrenched camps. Hence Bowling Green 
and Columbus were each named a "Manassas of the West"; 
and it was never doubted that these stronsfholds could be 
held indefinitely. But when the Southern people saw both 
these positions fall without either of them being directly 
attacked at all, this delusion was rudely dispelled, and in 
its place, in obedience to that Roman maxim, so true to 
human nature, Omne ignotum jpro magnifico, — there arose a 
vague terror that magnified the peril. This sentiment of 
alarm spread through all the borders ; and when, two days 
after the fall of Donelson, the so-styled "permanent Con- 
gress" met in its first session at Tlichmond, Mr. Davis was 
forced to confess, in a message of lamentation, that the South 
" had attempted too much." In point of fact, however, the 
South had rather attempted ill what it had undertaken than 



84 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

attempted too much. With the revelations ah-eady made 
of the actual condition of Confederate military strength at 
the West, it needs no recondite process to reach the root 
of their disasters. But these were undoubtedly hastened 
and augmented by the ill-judged method in which that 
strength was used. A brief exposition of this will perhaps 
show that the Confederate commander. General Albert Sidney 
Johnston, scarcely merits the exalted reputation he has 
enjoyed : this, indeed, provided the dispositions were his 
own, and that he was left untramelled, of which there seems 
to be no doubt. 

To retain two armies on two widely-separated lines of 
operation, each confronted by a superior force — to hold 
them thus until Grant and Bucll had completed their porten- 
tous preparations and were ready to move, — was, indeed, 
the way to invite disaster. Beauregard's plan of uniting every- 
thing at Bowling Green and overwhelming Buell was correct, 
and Johnston assented to it. But it was too late ; he had 
waited too long : Grant moved, and Johnston, baulked in 
his offensive intent, had to turn his efforts to the defence of 
his menaced left flank. He resolved to defend Nashville at 
Donelson. Yet, here again his dispositions had the character 
of a weak division of force. He made everything contin- 
gent on the issue on the Cumberland, and at the same time 
retained on the Nashville line, where he intended to do 
nothing but fall back, as great a force as he assigned to the 
defence of the position that was to decide his fortunes. The 
fourteen thousand men with which he fell back from Bowling 
Green he did not regard as available for any serious opposi- 
tion to the advance of Buell ; yet it was certainly too large to 
do nothing but fall back with. Moreover, he committed a 
great error in shutting up the army for the defence of his 
water flank within the works at Donelson. As a position 
for an army, Fort Donelson was nothing ; Fort Henry was 
nothing. The specific intent of these works was to bar the 



DONELSON. 35 

Tennessee and the Cumberland to the advance of a fleet. 
The event proved that had they been properly constructed, 
both would have beei! equal to this object ; for in a conflict 
of an hour and a half the batteries at Donelson inflicted on 
the gun-boats a decisive repulse without themselves sufiering 
any damage. With the garrisons of these works foot-loose 
and united with the force forwarded from Bowlins: Green, a 
field-army could have been formed that would have covered 
these works indirectly, and which, being free to roam in all 
directions, might have made itself very formidable. As for 
the " Gibraltar" of Columbus, it was a mere bete noir. The 
works were so constructed as to require at least fifty thousand 
men for their defence — five times the force the Confederates 
had at hand. 

These lessons were indeed not lost on General Johnston. 
In the shipwreck of his army he read the prodigious mistake 
he had committed ; he saw that the only hope of salvation lay 
in concentration and a vigorous oflensive, and in a remarkable 
letter addressed from Murfreesboro' to Mr. Davis he fore- 
shadowed the new policy and the expectations he based there- 
on in this significant utterance : " If I join this corps to the 
forces of General Beauregard, then those who are now de- 
claiming against me will be without an argument." 

How these forces were joined, and what befell thereon, 
will form the subject-matter of the story of that chequered 
campaign that culminated at Shiloh. 



gg THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 



in. 

SHILOH. 



I. 

PRELUDE TO SHILOH. 

On the westerly bank of the Tennessee, 219 miles from its 
mouth, is the historic spot of Pittsburg Landing. Its site is 
just below that great bend in the river, where, having trended 
many miles along the boundary-line of Alabama, it sweeps 
northerly in a majestic curve, and thence flowing past Fort 
Henry, pours its Avaters into the Ohio. The neighboring 
country is undulating, broken into hills and ravines, and 
wooded for the most part with tall oak-trees and occasional 
patches of undergrowth. Fens and swamps, too, intervene, 
and, at the spring freshets, the back-water swells the creeks, 
inundating the roads near the river's margin. It is, in general, 
a rough and unprepossessing region, wherein cultivated clear- 
ings seldom break the continuity of forest. Pittsburg Land- 
ing, scarcely laying claim, witli its two log cabins, even to 
the dignity of a hamlet, is distant a dozen miles north-easterly 
from the crossing of the three State lines of Alabama, JNIissis- 
sippi, and Tennessee — a mere point of steamboat freighting 
and debarkation for Corinth, eighteen miles south-west, for 
Purdy, about as far north-west, and for similar towns on the 
adjoining railroads. The river banks at the Landing rise 
quite eighty feet, but are cloven by a series of ravines, 



SHILOH. 87 

through one of which runs the main road thence to Corinth, 
forking to Purdy. Beyond the crest of the acclivity stretches 
back a kind of table-land, rolling and ridgy, cleared near the 
shores, but wooded and rough further from the river. A 
rude log chapel, three miles out, is called Shiloh Church ; 
and, just beyond, rise not far from each other two petty 
streams. Owl Creek and Lick Creek, which, thence diverging, 
run windingly into the Tennessee, five miles apart, on either 
side of the landing. 

On this rugged, elevated plateau, encompassed by the river 
and its little tributaries like a picture in its frame, lay en- 
camped on the night of the 5th of April, 1862, five divisions of 
General Grant's Army of "West Tennessee ; with a sixth, five 
miles down the bank, at Crump's Landing. Thrust though 
it was far out into the enemy's domain, yet the very scene of 
its encampment told more strongly than any language how 
absolutely secure this army felt from any hostile visit, and 
how unsuspicious it was of any shock of battle. The camps 
had been fixed on the bank nearest the enemy, while the 
other was equally available. The five divisions, irregularly 
grouped between the creeks and river, were palpably posi- 
tioned without any regard to order of battle or to possible at- 
tack. Behind, rolled a broad and deep river, without fords, 
without bridges, without transportation. Before, not a single, 
spadeful of earth had been thrown up for intrenchment during 
the month's sojourn, whether in front of the advance divisions, 
or across the roads leading into the camp, or at the fords on 
the flanks. Not a single cavalryman patrolled the outer walks ; 
the scanty infantry outposts lay within a mile of the main line, 
and their unconcealed camp-fires flared high and cheerily into 
the damp April air. The few sentinels were wont to chat 
and laugh aloud, and, whenever morning came, their pieces 
were irregularly discharged, merely to clear them of their 
loads. Within the noiseless ro%vs of white tents lining and 
dotting the rough plateau, the slumberous army now dreamt 



88 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

peacefully of home, or of that day yet distant when it would 
march on the enemy's stronghold at Corinth, joined by the 
column of Buell. At that moment, the leading division of Bu- 
ell's army of the Ohio lay at Savannah, nine miles down the 
river on the other bank. Wearied that night with their four 
days' march from Columbia, Nelson's men slept heavily. A 
long rest had been promised to them, to be broken only the 
next day by a formal Sunday inspection, and leisurely during 
the week ensuing it would join the associate army of West 
Tennessee ; for transportation had not yet been made ready 
for its passage of the river, nor had General Halleck yet come 
down from St. Louis to direct the movement on Corinth, for 
which it had marched. Behind Nelson, the rest of Buell's 
army trailed that night its line of bivouac fires full thirty 
miles backward on the road to Columbia. 

Silent in Shiloh woods yonder, within sight of- Grant's 
camp-fires and within sound of his noisy pickets, lay grimly 
awaiting the dawn, 40,000 Confederate soldiers. It was the 
third of the three «:reat armies drawn tojjethcr that niarht to- 
wards Pittsburg Landing, — an army supposed by its fourscore 
thousand dormant foes, from Commanding-General to drum- 
mer-boy, to be lying perdu behind its Corinth fieldworks, 
tweifty miles away. It had crept close to the Union lines, 
three fourths of a mile from tlie pickets, less than two from 
the main camp — so close that, throughout the night, the 
bivouac hum and stir and the noisy random shots of un- 
trained sentinels on the opposing lines indistinguishably min- 
gled. This stealthily-moved host lay on its arms, weary 
after a hard day's march over miry roads on the 4th, a day's 
forming on the 5th, and a bivouac in the drenching rain 
of the night intervening. No fires were lighted on the ad- 
vanced lines, and, farther back, the few embers, glowing here 
and there, were hidden in holes dug in the ground. Most 
of the men lay awake, prone in their blankets, or chatted in 
low tones, grouped around the stacked arms, awaiting the 



SHILOH. 89 

supplies which commissaries and staff-officers were hurrying 
from the rear ; for, with the improvidence of raw troops, they 
had ah'eady spent their five days' rations at the end of three, 
and were ill-prepared to give battle. But others oppressed 
with sleep, had for the time forgotten both cold and hunger. 

Sheltered in the gloom of tall trees, and under the watch 
and ward of chosen sentinels, patrolling and challenging with 
low, steady voice, a council of Confederate generals gathered 
in the cleared spot which, at converging paths, formed the 
head-quarters. A small fire of logs crackling and sputtering 
in the centre threw a strange light on the surrounding figures. 
A drum served for writing-desk near the firelight, and a few 
camp-stools for furniture, eked out by blankets spread upon 
the ground. 

Foremost in the group stood Albert Sydney Johnston, the 
Commander-in-Chief. Tall, erect, well-knit, and powerful, 
his dignified and martial figure gained effect by the gray mili- 
tary cloak which protected it from the chilly evening. His 
face, bronzed and set by the campaigns of two and forty years 
in the Black Hawk war, in the Texan struggle for indepen- 
dence, in th^- war with Mexico, and for many years past in 
Indian outpost service through Utah and California, was a 
trustworthy index to the man. The firm mouth and chin and 
the steadfast, sunken eyes, showed a soldier resolute, self- 
controlled, thouglitful, and fearless. Grave, modest, and 
reticent always, he seemed at this council even more abstract- 
ed than his wont. Often he moved from the fire to the edge 
of the group as if walking away to ruminate his own thoughts, 
and anon returned to take part iii the discussion. He was, 
indeed, greatly impressed with his responsibility ; and in his 
supreme devotion to his cause, had no moment to spare for 
personal forebodings. Before another sunset, this soldier was 
fated to have fought his last battle. 

In marked contrast to the Scotch features and bearing of 
Johnston, was his associate, Beauregard. Walking rapidly 



90 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

to and fro, with his lithe and slender figure divested of its 
outer cloak, he spoke tersely and spiritedly with a tinge 
of French accent, on the prospects of the morrow. His face, 
with its small, regular features, pointed beard, and keen eyes, 
showed somewhat the effect of the illness under which he was 
still laboring ; but his bearing was entirely soldierly, his 
short step was energetic and firm, his voice clear and strong. 
Obviously vexed at the day's mishaps of manoeuvre, he only 
awaited anxiously for success in the coming battle, in which 
he had a personal as well as a patriotic stake. For already 
the brilliant promise of his youthful Mexican career had come 
to fruition, and with the laurels of Fort Sumter and Manassas 
still fresh upon him, he had come to restore the Confederate 
fortunes in the West. 

Near by was Hardee, whose corps lay closest to the Union 
outposts, a Georgian, but matching the inherited foreign air 
of Beauregard, by one acquired by long military education in 
France. As compiler of the Infantry Tactics, and Com- 
mandant of Cadets at West Point, and as a fine theoretical 
soldier, his opinions received due weight. Physically, he 
appeared tall, broad-shouldered, and muscular, and from his 
good-humored face did not seem to take amiss a little rally- 
ing, which even the grave occasion did not forbid a brother 
officer from indulging, on his gallantry in other fields than 
those of Avar. 

Breckinridge, commander of the reserves, and rather of 
forensic than of martial renown, a man of fine features and 
imposing appearance, lay silent upon his blanket, and did 
not obtrude his views upon older soldiers. In truth, his 
general opinions were well-known to be like Beauregard's, 
strongly aggressive. Vice-President, and almost President 
of the Union, little more than a twelvemonth gone, he was 
still quite as much Kentuckian as Confederate ; and to " re- 
deem" Kentucky he had urged, long before the fall of Fort 
Henry, an ofiensive campaign against Louisville. 



SHILOH. 91 

Bragg, proud of his well-drilled Pensacola corps, and 
vaunting in general the power of discipline, was, neverthe- 
less, in marked physical contrast to the uniform military 
bearing of the others. , His face was wan and haggard, its 
features being rude and irregular, and his body stooping. 
His beard was iron-gray, and growing together over the 
bridge of his nose were a pair of bushy black eyebrows, 
under which his sharp and restless eyes seemed befitting to 
his character as a thorough disciplinarian, and to his well- 
known tartness of temper. Even before the war his fame 
was national, and his name, and that of his battery, as insep- 
arably linked as Taylor's with the historic field of Buena 
Vista. 

Lieutenant General Polk, whilom Bishop of Louisiana 
who, — a West Pointer by education, — had exchanged 
the crosier for the sword, was the last of the main figures of 
the group. He was above the middle height, and broad- 
chested, and his open fiice denoted courtesy and courage as 
well as a fine intelligence. 

The council was lons^ and animated. Beaureo^ard and 
Bragg, the chief speakers, talked often and earnestly, while 
Polk and Breckinridge said little, in the presence of these 
more famous soldiers. There was much that was vexatious. 
The weather had been contrary from the start, the country was 
hostile to campaigning, the raw troops were unused to march- 
ing and manoeuvre, their officers not less so. Already a day 
had been lost ; for the night before, the rain descending in 
torrents, had drenched the men in bivouac and made the nar- 
row and tortuous roads, always bad at best, next to impassa- 
ble. The artillery and trains and even the infantry columns 
struggled painfully through the mire, so that what with raw 
troops and raw officers, with carelessly examined ground and 
roads twisting confusingly through brake and swamp, joined 
to some misapprehensions on the part of corps commanders, 
two days had been expended iu getting hither from Corinth. 



92 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Instead of attacking at dawn of the 5 th, dusk found the 
troops wet, hungry, and exhausted, and just brought into po- 
sition. The whole move had been based on striking a blow 
before Buell should come up, and every minute was golden. 

The wretched organization of the army was another subject 
of discussion, and of ill-boding. Two days' experience had 
shown its lamentable defects. Bragg openly declared that 
many officers in the army were not equal to the men whom 
they were expected to command ; Beauregard regretted the 
want of ensrineers to inform him of the terrain of the morrow's 
battle-field ; and all the generals found much to apprehend 
from the imperfect staff organization, while the responsibility 
for these and other failings, was by more than one speaker 
laid directly at the door of the Eichmond authorities, where 
unquestionably it belonged. 

As the discussion, however, went on, and the encouraging 
omens were in turn reviewed, the tone of the council became 
firm and confident. The enemy had been secretly approached 
and the surprise would be complete. He was found most lam- 
entably unprepared — the general absent at his head-quarters, 
nine miles down the river, and on the other shore at that, 
with his camp unintrenched, not one cavalry picket out, 
with his outposts near his main line, with his troops badly 
placed, and finally, with no pontoons or transportation on 
the river, to which it was proposed to drive him. Anxious 
inquiry was made, indeed, concerning the whereabouts of 
Buell ; but on this all important point, Beauregard, from the 
last report of the spies, who had brought him fresh news of 
each day's march of Buell, and each night's bivouac, was 
able to declare him at least one day's march from the battle- 
field, and with no boats ready to cross him. Moreover, the 
Confederate troops, despite their hard initiation, were full of 
fire and confident of victory. In numbers, they were nearly 
equal to Grant's forces, who were, also, for the most part 
raw and indifferently organized ; while against the conquerors 



SHILOH. 93 

at Donelson, could be matched Bragg's fine corps from Pen- 
sacola. 

Ten o'clock came and passed before the ofBcers had all 
separated, but at length the early start arranged for the mor- 
row, provoked the suggestion of retirement. All parted with 
high hopes. Of the associate commanders, Johnston was 
clearly resolved to wipe out the hasty and unjust reproach 
cast on him after Donelson, while Beauregard, forgetting 
alike his sickness and his disappointment at the ill-otaened 
delay, pointing the departing officers towards the Tennessee, 
said, with a confident smile, " Gentlemen, to-morrow night we 
sleep in the enemy's camp." 

It was the eve of Shiloh. 



The situation just portrayed had followed upon a note- 
worthy chain of events. With the fall of Fort Donelson, 
cruml>led forever the entire first line of Tennessee defence — 
the line of the Cumberland , as it may be called — stretching 
due east from Columbus, through Fort Henry, Fort Donel- 
son, and Nashville, to Mill Spring, and onward to the Alle- 
ghanies. But the recoil was slight, for a secondary line had 
already been stretched out and was a-fortifying. General Polk, 
in receiving orders to evacuate Columbus, was also directed 
to " select a defensive position below ; " and the pomt chosen 
was forty miles down the Mississippi, embracing Island No. 
10, the main land in Madrid Bend, and the village there. 
This, being rapidly intrenched, became the point d'appui tor 
the left of what was hastily pencilled as the second grand 
Confederate line for the defence of the easterly slope of the 
Mississippi Yalley. From Island No. 10 it was at first pop- 
ularly believed the cordon would strike easterly through 
Jackson, the head-quarters of one Confederate army, to Mur- 
freesboro', the head-quarters of another, and thence to Cum- 
berland Gap, thus retiring the Confederate right and centre 



94 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

through a vast segment, and abandoning all East Kentucky 
and much of Tennessee, but keeping the left strong and fast 
as witli the death-clutch on the Mississippi, and fairly pro- 
truding the line at Island No. 10. But great events forced 
the abandonment of this line before it had acquired consist- 
ency. The fall of Donelson had developed a new problem 
for the Union commanders, since two lines of advance into 
the Confederacy were now presented by the physical geogra- 
phy of the region. One runs south-easterly through Nash- 
ville to the rocky eyrie of Chattanooga, the future route of 
Rosecrans — thence onward to the ocean, the future path of 
Sherman : the other is the line of the Mississippi. It "was 
needful to fight them both out in conquering the Confederacy, 
and, accordingly, the absolute importance of neither could be 
overrated. But, it having been wisely resolved no longer, as 
at the outset, to move over both at once, it remained to give 
to one or other the priority in time. The choice fell upon 
the Mississippi route, fur many potent reasons. The repos- 
session of the Mississippi was one of those grand national 
ideas which are so powerful in moving a people to patriotic 
ejSbrt. It was to reopen the Mississippi to navigation, that 
the "West had risen en masse, recognizing in its obstruction 
by insurgent batteries an act quite as astounding as the men 
on the other flank of the Alleghanies had discovered in the 
menaced siege of Washington. Such a success would be more 
palpable and grander than the mere penetration of half a 
dozen States in any other direction — and proportionally add 
prestige to the Union arms, dishearten the Confederates, and 
challenge the applause of the world. These were general 
considerations : there were special ones more important. 
The campaign on the Mississippi allowed naval co-operation ; 
not so that towards Chattanooga. The latter required grand 
preparations of supplies and reinforcement, and the opening 
and holding of long lines of railroad communication. All 
that was conquered of Ihc river could be easily held — not 



• SHILOH. 95 

SO, as Buell found, with the road to Chattanooga ; for a move 
to the south-east, besides exposing the flanks and rear of the 
column itself, would leave all "Western Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee to the returning enemy, and unravel the victorious 
campaign as far back as Louisville or Cairo. Finally, it ran 
the hazard of a series of battles deep in the recesses of the 
Confederacy. 

There was still another class of weighty and special cir- 
cumstances. The Confederates were holding points all along 
the Mississippi — at Columbus, Island 10, Fort Pillow, 
Memphis, — and a column moving down the left bank would 
cut them all off, with their garrisons, armaments, and strat- 
egic positions. It might even interpose between Johnston's 
Tennessee army at Murfreesboro', and Beauregard's Missis- 
sippi army at Corinth, and attack one before the other c uld 
come up. Now the second line of Confederate defence 
chosen by Johnston was that of the ]\Iemphis and Charles- 
ton Railroad — too obvious an one for a doubt of its selec- 
tion to rest in the minds of either of the contestants. It is 
true that, as we shall presently see, Beauregard was under- 
mining all these schemes and reducing this second line to one 
of little moment, his primary thought being a new offensive 
campaign, which should provide its own parry in its reeling 
stroke. But this conception the Union generals did not 
know ; and never, indeed, discovered it till its consumma- 
tion on the battlcfground of Shiloh. What they did learn, 
after their jalans were formed, was that Johnston had joined 
Beauregard, and hence so much of the scheme as contem- 
plated the separation of these officers, had come too tardy off. 
But there was, then, of course, only the more urgency for 
the original plan, that of concentrating everything on the 
]VIississippi line, so as to cut off jNIemphis and the river forts, 
to seize another section of the river, and, above all, to sever 
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The importance of 
this great Southern central line of transportation between 



96 THE. TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OE THE WAR. 

East and West proclaims itself, without need of description, 
along its whole length, from the Mississippi to the sea. All 
the leading Union generals urged a snapping of that railroad 
chain — Buell urged it, Ilalleck urged it. Grant urged it. 
Indeed, the two latter officers at first moved without waiting 
for a concentration of force, and only Johnston's junction 
with Beauregard warned them of its necessity : then, Buell's 
army, which had already been pressingly tendered several 
times, was at last joined in the grand campaign. 

The great railroad line which Halleck was now bent on 
permanently securing, as the main object of the campaign, 
could have been tapped at any one of several points. But 
everji^hing pointed to an advance up the Tennessee as the 
most practicable. It was the shortest route thitherward ; and, 
besides, being so largely accomplished in transports, and with 
a w^ater line of communication kept open by the navy, it 
would not consume the spring with vast preparations of 
troops and trains for a land advance. Moreover, it threatened 
the rear of all the enemy's positions on the Mississippi — ■ 
Memphis, Eandolph, New Madrid, Island No. 10 — and 
directly co-operated with Pope and Foote, who were hammer- 
ing and tunnelling their way down the river, first at and 
around Columbus, and afterwards at Island 10. But, above 
all, it was as if, straight from Fort Henry, there lay a direct 
highway, patent, possible, even now opened up through 
Tennessee to Alabama, and directly beckoning to conquest — 
a broad highway whereon the gun-boats — those terrors of the 
Confederates, and inestimable Union allies — could carry 
their flag unchallenged fourscore miles into the enemy's 
domain. 

Up the broad stream, accordingly, Halleck promptly pushed 
the conquerors of Donelson. This fort surrendered on the 
16th day of February ; and five divisions of Grant's army 
were made ready, and embarked on transports early in jNIarch. 
On the 4th of March (for reasons it is needless to exhume) 



SHILOH. 97 

General Grant was ordered to turn over his forces to General 
C. F. Smith. Halleck's original design was to establish the 
expedition as far up the river as Florence, to which point 
Phelps's gun-boat reconnoissance with the Tyler and Lexington 
had penetrated on the 8th of February preceding. But a 
reconnoissance of the same boats on the 1st of March, was 
checked by a hostile battery at Pittsburgh Landing, and had 
disclosed the enemy in a formidable position at Corinth ; so 
that it became out of the question to go higher up. Indeed, 
the first point of landing and depot of supplies was very wisely 
fixed on the right or easterly bank of the Tennessee, at 
Savannah. Thence it was resolved to cross the army to Pitts- 
burgh Landing, in support of two columns to be despatched 
to cut the railroad, one above and the other below Corinth ; 
and if these were successful, to move at once against the 
enemy's position. Accordingly, the Tyler steamed to Dan- 
ville Bridge, twenty-one miles above Fort Henry, to await 
the transports ; and these, arriving on the 9th, with General 
Smith and a large portion of his army, and Sherman's division 
in advance, were conveyed without molestation to Savannah, 
where they debarked during the 11th. The next night 
Walhice's division was put ashore at Crump's Landing, five 
miles below Pittsburgh Landing ; on the 14th, at the latter 
point, they were quickly joined by Smith's own division and 
those of IMcClernand and Prentiss, and the movement was 
then complete. Instantly on landing. General Wallace was 
sent out on the direct road from Crumps's to Purdy, and, 
without opposition, tore up, a few miles north of that village, 
half a mile of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which runs from 
Corinth to Columbus. But the iNIemphis and Charleston 
Hailroad was too far beyond for him to attack ; and Sherman's 
column, sent against the latter road, south of Corinth, proved 
unsuccessful, because the river rising rapidly had overflowed 
in deep back water between him and his objective. At this 
time, unhappily, General Smith fell sick of a mortal illness. 



QS THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

"That elegant soldier," said McClellan ; that "gallant and 
elegant officer ! " said Sherman admiringly, four years later, 
adding : " Had he lived, probably some of us younger fellows 
would not have attained our present positions." Smith's own 
division was turned over to General W. H. L. Wallace ; and, 
meanwhile, the command of the whole expedition had again 
devolved upon General Grant, who, emerging from his brief 
cloud, Avas restored to command on the 14th, and arrived at 
the head-quarters at Savannah on the 17th of March. There- 
upon three weeks of inactivity elapsed, broken only by the 
battle-thunders of Shiloh. 

Meanwhile, a second arm}^ was faring forth to the field. 
March had found Bucll and Ilalleck in i^arallel commands, 
the one at St. Louis, in the Department of the Missouri, the 
other at Nashville, in the Department of the Ohio. Buell, 
first to detect the clandestine withdrawal of Johnston from 
his front to the jNIemphis and Charleston Railroad, urgently 
suggested a movement up the Tennessee in force, which 
movement, however, General Halleck had already thought 
of. Finding their views in unison, Bucll next repeatedly 
tendered, by telegram, his own forces for co-operation ; and 
at length an excellent opportunity for accepting this proposal 
came on the 12th of March, when the two departments were 
united as the Department of the Mississippi, under General 
Halleck. The latter officer then telegraphed Buell to move, 
and Buell on the very same night, the 15th, \nit in motion his 
cavalry, followed next morning by McCook's division of in- 
fontry. ]\IcCook reached Columbia on the 17th, but found 
that, while all the other bridges on the route had been saved 
by the promptness of Buell's march, those over Duck River 
had been destroyed by the enemy. The river was then forty 
feet deep, and though gradually receding, it would not do to 
wait till it became fordable ; and the engineer corps worked 
strenuously at building a bridge, which, however, was not 
finished till the 31st, when all five divisions again moved for- 



J 



SHILOH. 99 

•ward briskly and handsomely to Savannah, the point of ren- 
dezvous fixed by General Halleck. There, Buell was led to 
expect, according to his instructions, that he would find 
General Grant and his army. On the 28th, General Halleck 
informed General Buell that Grant would attack the enemy 
"as soon as the roads are passable," and that the latter was 
receiving reinforcements for that purpose. Buell had as- 
signed the 5th day of April for the arrival of his advance 
division. Nelson's at Savannah. But, on the 4th, General 
Grant sent Nelson a despatch, stating that he need not hurry, 
as the transportation for taking him across to the left bank 
was not yet ready, and would not be ready till the 8th ; the 
day, by the way, after the closing battle of Shiloh. The 
next day, in response to a suggestion from Buell, that per- 
haps it Avould be well to strike the river twenty miles higher 
up than Savannah, by the Waynesboro' road, which would 
have brought him opposite Hamburg, — Halleck telegraphed 
" You are right about concentrating at Waynesboro' ; futute 
movements must depend on those of the enemy." A hundred 
such indications show, like that of the position of Grant's 
army, already spoken of, how all the Union generals suj)posed 
their task was to be one of attack, not of defence, — a de- 
liberate forward movement on Corinth, to be undertaken 
some days later. But, as good fortune would have it, Hal- 
leck's despatch did not reach Buell till he had pushed beyond 
Waynesboro' in his hasty strides, and Nelson also pressed on 
to Savannah at Buell's originally appointed time, instead of 
making the delay which the despatch from Grant had author- 
ized. Despite the rains and the bad roads (which, at this 
same time, lost the Confederates the fatal twenty-four hours 
in their march from Corinth) , .the eighty-two miles from Co- 
lumbia to Savannah Avere made by Nelson in four days, and 
his division lay at Savannah on the eve of Shiloh. Behind, 
at convenient distances, were the divisions of Crittenden, 
McCook, Wood, and Thomas. 



100 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

TVliile the Union Generals were thus eager with their plot, 
their antagonists had secretly dressed a counterplot, the mas- 
ter-spirit in whose devising was Beauregard. .This was, in a 
word, to rapidly gather an army at Corinth, and fling it upon 
the reckless camp at Pittsburg Landing before Buell's arrival, 
and, that succeeding, to march noi-thward in aggressive cam- 
paign. The plan was as prompt of adoption as it was bold 
in conception, and to Corinth quickly flowed from all direc- 
tions, troops for the army of invasion. The Gulf States were 
dredged of their gaiTisons from Memphis to Apalachicola, 
and the trans-Mississippi states, from Missouri to Texas, 
poured their troops out at Beauregard's command. Supplies 
and material, forage and subsistence, were brought on all 
railroads, while, ordnance lacking, Beauregard begged their 
bells of churches and families, and many batteries were cast 
from the metal so collected. 

The concentration of troops began on the first of March. 
The first process was to strip the great foi*ts of all their 
foolish accumulations of troops ; for on arriving ^Vest, 
Beauregard had found Columbus full of troops, and its 
works built for 14,000. His comment Avas pointed ; " with 
such a force shut up within a fort, how many troops do 
you plan to have outside? Fort Donelson, indefensible, 
and badly defended, has fallen, as well it might, its works 
being nothing. Unless you have strong works, and troops 
capable of defending them to the last, it is better not to 
have forts." His plan, accordingly, was to withdraw their 
garrisons from the neighboring forts, leave 2,000 men at one 
strong point on the river above Memphis, with provisions 
enough for sixty days, spread torpedoes, and, with the aid of 
gun-boats, set these men to hold the river. All the other 
works should set free their troops to join in an aggressive 
movement, and luiving concentrated everything, he would 
take the initiative, and seize a victory. Accordingly, he had 
ordered Polk to withdraw from Columbus to Island 10, which 



SHILOH. 101 

had been prepared for his reception. The latter point he de- 
signed to hold only till he could prepare Fort Pillow, still 
further down, which he had selected as the real river defence 
of Memphis ; and, in fact, it was finished on the very day 
when Island 10 was evacuated. Polk's corps of two divis- 
ions soon joined Beauregard from Columbus, and Bragg*s 
fine corps, also of two divisions, came up from Mobile and 
Pensacola. The latter had been well drilled by that dis- 
ciplinarian, and were pronounced the best troops in the 
Confederacy ; though in reality, they were not the superiors 
of the Virginian army of Joe Johnston; but those were the 
early days of the war, when the skirmishes and picket duty 
around Santa Rosa and Ship Island, and the threatening of 
Fort Pickens were supposed to season recruits into veterans. 
The Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Louisiana were called on for volunteers, and issued at once 
strenuous alarum-cries, so that in speedy response their peo- 
ple flocked towards Corinth by regiments, companies, squads, 
or unarmed and singl3% All these were slowly crystallized 
into the Army of the Mississippi, and to these Johnston added 
all his forces, forming Hardee's corps, himself assuming su- 
preme command, with Beauregard as second. 

The march of Buell hastened preparations, but most of the 
troops were entirely raw, and hence the army took its shape 
slowly. Above all, it lacked the appliances of organization j 
for the Richmond authorities, usually self-suiBcient, narrow- 
minded, and wrong-headed past all belief, in their Conduct of 
affairs, yet went to no such inconceivable lengths of folly and 
stupidity, as in their reluctance to organize their armies, and 
in their jealousy of conferring such ordinary military i^ank 
and such latitude of power as is necessary for the assembling 
of an army, and the gradation of its component parts. The 
first condition Beauregard had made in going West, was a 
fixed number of troops to fight with, but these, of course, he 
did not get, nor any approximation thereto. The second 



102 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

condition was the detail to him of a staff corps, and some 
such officers of a higher grade as could aid him in his task of 
remodelling the Western army. He got that no more than 
the other, though both were promised with equal distinct- 
ness : his fixed number of colonels and lieutenant-colonels, 
which were to have been sent, never came. These neces- 
sities were doubly felt when the problem was to assort and 
mould the fragmentary bodies of volunteers pouring into 
Corinth. However, by laying the shoulder to the wheel in 
steady work, the 1st of April arrived with some approxima- 
tion — though a vexatiously imperfect one — to the task 
undertaken, for the troops were at last in good condition and 
very confident. Johnston's forces lay chiefly along the rail- 
road easterly from Corinth to luka, northerly from Corinth to 
Bethel. Spies and officious people in the region had brought 
daily and nightly news of the progress of Buell, and the 
position of each division's bivouac, and equally minute and 
positive details were known of Grant's army. When Buell's 
bridge over Duck River was built, it was felt that the blow 
must be struck at once; and when, just before midnight of 
the 2d of April, a courier brought news of Buell's rapid 
stride from Columbia, the advance Avas instantly ordered. 
It was already a day later than originally intended, and then 
the dispositions for guarding the depots of supplies and the 
roads around Corinth and Purdy had to be made. But on 
the 3d, the remainder of the army, about 40,000 strong, 
moved straight forward over the practicable roads towards 
the river, where, sixteen miles distant, lay Grant's army at 
Pittsburg Landing. The advance was to march "till within 
sight of the enemy's outposts," 

Immediately on starting the roads were found in wretched 
condition, — an evil augmented by the rawness of the 
troops in marching. By the night of the 4th, however, 
the niain interval had been passed, and the troops or- 
dered to attack at dawn of the 5th. The advance cavalry 



PLAN OF THE 



April 6«»&7*M86^. 



^m^ 




7t/i. moriUnff 



SHILOH. 103 

flushed and eager, had already got upon the Union out- 
posts, and been repulsed by Sherman's advance, for their 
pains. But, about 2 o'clock on the 5th, a furious rain-storm 
fell, and continuing for hours, drenched the whole army as it 
lay in bivouac, filled the creeks, spoiled the roads, and ren- 
dered attack impossible. In addition, the bad organization 
delayed the troops from getting into position. Intolerably 
vexatious as was this loss of a whole day, it only remained to 
endure it. The lines were moved up still nearer, till the 
advance was but three fourths of a mile from the Union 
pickets, and but two miles from the main camp. The troops 
were in three lines, according to the order of attack. Har- 
dee's corps of two divisions covered the intersection of the 
Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, with half its cavalry on either 
flank, between Owl and Lick creeks ; Gladden's brigade 
of Withers' division of Bragg's corps filling up the space to 
the latter stream. Eight hundred yards behind him lay the 
rest of Bra2r«r's two divisions in the second line. With a 
little wider interval, Polk's corps formed the third, and re- 
serve line, with Breckinridge's reserve divisions upon its 
right and rear. The roads were cleared, and the attack or- 
dered betimes in the morning ; and so passed the eve of 
Shiloh. 

II. 

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 

The morning of Sunday, April 6th, broke clear and 
pleasant after the rains of the days preceding, and found the 
Union army still peacefully sleeping in its camps along the 
Tennessee. The general topography of the rugged plateau, 
which, seamed with ravines, but mainly ninety or a hundred 
feet above the road-bottom, contained the encampment, has 
already been drawn : it was at once camp and battle-ground. 
Its southerly limit is Lick Creek, which, rising a few miles 
in the interior, runs between very high banks easterly to 



104 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the Tennessee, at right angles with the latter, three miles 
above the landing. Near its source. Owl Creek, bending like 
an arm around the camping-ground, forms the westerly and 
northerly boundary of the plateau, and emptying into Snake 
Creek, joins the Tennessee at right angles, two miles below 
the Landing. The drift or slope of the land is, in general, 
from the bluffs of Lick Creek across to the banks of Owl 
Creek; but the enclosure is uneven, and lesser rivulets, of 
course, swell those already mentioned. The battle-ground 
is from three to five miles wide, and as much in length. 
The troops Averc posted with reference to the roads from the 
Landing. The main road winding up the top of the hill, 
there branches, and the right hand one leads along the river 
across Snake Creek to Crump's Landing. Further on, a 
mile from the Landiilg, the main road sends out another 
branch, this time to the south, up the shore across Lick 
Creek to Hamburg. Continuing inland, it once more divides, 
this time into two roads, both leading to Corinth, of 
which the one nearest the Hamburg road is called the Ridge 
road, from its elevation. Shiloh Church is three miles out 
from the Landing, on the further road to Corinth, near Owl 
Creek, and thence a road runs north-westerly to Purdy. The 
many cross-roads and interlacing paths need not be described. 
The divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, and Sherman, 
formed the advance line of Grant's army ; those of Hurlburt 
and W. H. L. Wallace the forces at the Landijig. Sher- 
man's division, facing south, covered the Corinth road at 
Shiloh Church, with one brigade on each side of the road, 
and one on the extreme right guarding the bridge on the 
Purdy road over Owl Creek ; while, detached to the extreme 
left of the whole army, Sherman had a brigade, under Colonel 
Stuart, guarding the Hamburg road at Lick Creek Ford, 
near the Tennessee. Prentiss, on Sherman's left,. was guard- 
ing the Hidge road, facing southerly and south-westerly. 
McClernand was on Sherman's left and rear, on the Purdy 



SHILOH. 105 

road — his lino and Sherman's formhig an acute angle, by the 
extension of their left wings. Hurlburt and W. H. L. Wal- 
lace were back at the bluff near the Landing, where were all 
the supplies, — the forage, subsistence, stores, and trains. 
Lew Wallace lay at Crump's Landing, with his brigades 
posted conveniently on the road rumiing thence to Purdy.;.j 

Ere the gray of dawn, the advanced line of Johnston's 
army, composed of Hardee's corps, strengthened on its right 
by Gladden 's brigade from Bragg's, stealthily crept through 
the narrow belt of woods, beyond which all night they had 
seen their innocent enemy's camp-fires blazing. No fife or 
drum was allowed ; the cavalry bugles sounded no reveille ; 
butw'ith suppressed voices, the subordinate officers roused 
their men, for many of whom, indeed, the knowledge of what 
was to come, had proved too exciting for sound slumber. 
Bragg's line as quickly followed, and, in suit, the line of 
Polk and Breckinridge. 

By one of those undefiuable impulses or misgivings which 
detect the approach of catastrophe Avithout physical warning of 
it, it happened that Colonel Peabody, of the 25th Missouri, 
commanding the first brigade of Prentiss's division, became 
convinced that all was not right in front. Very early Sunday 
morning, therefore, he sent out three companies of his own regi- 
ment and two of Major Powell's 12th Michigan, under Powell's 
command, to reconnoitre, and to seize on some advance squads 
of the enemy, who had been reported flitting about, one and a 
half mj^es distant from camp on the main Corinth road. It was 
the gray of dawn when they reached the spot indicated ; and 
almost immediately, from long dense lines of men, coming 
swiftly through the tall trees, opened a rattling fire of mus- 
ketry. Jt was the enemy in force. The little baud fell back 
in haste, firing as best they might. Close on their heels 
pressed the whole of Hardee's line, and enveloping the left 
of Prentiss's camp, stretched in a broad swathe across to the 
gap between his division and Sherman's, and thence onward 



lOG THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

across Sherman's. Instantly tho woods were alive with the 
rattle of musketry right and left, on front and flank. The 
Confederate batteries, galloping up on every practicable road 
and path, unlimbered in hot haste, and poured their shot 
over the head of the infantry in the direction of the tents now 
faintly gleaming ahead. The startled infantry outposts, 
mechanically returning a straggling fire, yielded overborne 
by the mighty rush of their enemy, and then streamed 
straight back to the main camps. The divisions of Sherman, 
Prentiss, and McClernand started from their peaceful slumbers 
amid the roar and smoke of battle. The exultant Con- 
federates, creeping so long with painful reticence, now woke 
the forests with their fierce, long-pent yells. The flying 
pickets served, like avant-couriers to point the way for their 
pursuers. And thus, with the breaking light of day, over- 
hung by sulphurous battle-clouds, through which darted the 
cannon-flash, while the dim smoke curled forward through 
every ravine and road, and enveloped the camps, Grant's 
army woke to the battle of Shiloh. 

So rude an awakening might well unnerve veterans, and 
much more these raw troops thus thrust invitingly out for 
attack, many of whom were unused even to loading their 
own muskets. But instantly, from all tho tents, amid the 
long-roll of drums, the quick cries of "turn out," and "fall 
in," from company-officers and sergeants, the rapid roll- 
calls of the orderlies, the clink of rammer and gunstock, 
the ordsrs mingling everywhere, in all tones, from officers of 
all grades, the astounded troops of Sherman, Prentiss, and 
McClernand hurried half dressed into line ; while command- 
ers were hastily fastening on swords, or mounting horses, 
and aids were flying back to rouse tho men of Huulbut and 
Wallace in the rear. 

At the height of the shouting, the forming of the troops, 
the spurring hither and tliithcr of the aids, the fastening 
of belts and boxes, and the dressing of the laggards, 



SHILOH. 107 

the enemy's advance with loud yells swept through the inter- 
vening forest, and burst upon the camps. 

It was now about 7 o'clock, and ths resistance of the 
Union picket line, feeble as it necessarily was, had been of 
priceless service in gaining time, while the rough and imprac- 
ticable interval over which the Confederates had to pass 
served to break up somewhat as well as to extend and thin 
their lines. There seems to have been no spscial tactical 
formation, nor any massing of men on a kcj'^-point — the 
key-point, if any there was, had not been discovered. The 
movement in short, was predicated on a surprise, and the 
method, to fling the three corps-deep lines of the Army of the 
Mississippi straight against the Union army from creek to creek ; 
to " drive it back into the Tennessee." As for the Union 
generals, overwhelmed with surprise and chagrin, they could 
only strike back where the enemy struck, seeking above all 
to save the camps. Such was the nature of the confused, 
irregular, but bloody series of conflicts, which now raged for 
three hours, during Avhich time the Union troops succumbed, 
and yielded the first breadth of debatable ground. 

Prentiss' division occupied the Union left (except for the 
detached brigade of Stuart), and covered the Corinth ridge 
road. Against him rushed Hardee's right and Gladden 's 
brigade, but it was a full hour before the outposts of Peabody 's 
brigade had been driven back into Prentiss' camps. By 
that time Prentiss had his line hastily fomied. About 7 
o'clock. Gladden moved upon Prentiss' centre, and soon the 
roar of artillery and musketry on both sides proclaimed 
general battle. Meanwhile, Hardee's line having been pro- 
tracted and divided all along the Union front, Bragg tlirew 
the second line by detachments, into the gaps, to reinforce 
it. Before half past seven o'clock, therefore, Bragg's lino 
had moved uj), and was fighting, intermingled with Hardee's. 
Now the risrht of Brasrar's two divisions was the division of 
Withers, one brigade of which, Gladden's, had the niglit 



108 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

before been put into the first line, on Hardee's right. The 
whole three bria^ades ^vcre now fiijhtins: tojjether ao:ainst 
Prentiss' division. Chalmers' brigade swept around to Pren- 
tiss' left flank ; Gladden 's pushed at his centre, iind Jackson's 
struck his left, and began to pour through the gap between 
Prentiss and Sherman. The batteries on both sides being 
run to the front, plowed through the opposing ranks ; Glad- 
den was struck by a cannon shot and mortally wounded, 
charging at the head of his brigade ; Peabody was mortally 
wounded in the Union lines. The Confederates pressed on, 
gaining little by little on cither flank, till the fire from their 
three batteries, as well as the infantry fire of their three bri- 
gades began to cross in Prentiss' lines. Uegiments gave 
ground here and there, now on the left, now on the right, 
nowin front, and before nine o'clock, the Confederates having 
driven Prentiss from all his camps, were masters of the 
field. The camps were quickly despoiled, accoutrements, 
clothing, rations just cooked, and plunder of all sorts even, 
seized. With difficulty the officers drew their men together, 
and Witliers's triumphant division was re-formed, to move 
once more on the new line of the Union left. 

Simultaneously, Hardee's centre and left had been attack- 
ing the Union right, or the division of Sherman, wliose line 
ran across the other Corinth road. The centre was at Shiloh 
Church, and Sherman had put two batteries there, those of 
Taylor and Waterhouse, and two brigades, Hildebrand's on the 
left of the road, and Buckland's on the right. On the right 
of Buckland was McDowell's brigade, with Behr's battery on 
the right and rear, on the Purdy road. McClernaud, just in 
rear of Sherman, had promptly sent three regiments to the 
support of Ilildebrand, on Sherman's left, and three batteries 
soon after moved over. By seven o'clock, the Confederate 
advance showed through the woods, and opened a straggling 
fire. 

Half an hour later, the whole Confederate force was up; 



SHILOH. 109 

the three brigades of Hardee's corps — Hindmaii's, Cleburne's, 
und Wood's^ formed the right of the line which burst upon 
Sherman. Bragg's original second line of two divisions had 
already been separated, as we have seen, and the right one, 
Withers 's, thrown against Prentiss. His left division, that 
of Euggles, was formed on Hardee's left, its three brigades 
being Gibson's, Anderson's, and Pond's. 

Before eight o'clock, the battle was raging with fury at all 
points ; for, in dogged determination to drive their foe to the 
river, the line of Confederate advance was determined simply 
by what might yield to their onset. For an hour the contest 
was severe, the Union batteries being well posted and extreme- 
ly well served, and inflicting grievous punishment iipon the 
Confederates, whenever the latter appeared from the cover. 
Sherman himself was indefatigable in remedying the mis- 
fortunes of the surprise ; he moved in every part of the field, 
attended personally to the fire of batteries, held up raw regi- 
ments to their task, and, long before noon, became the 
central figure on the Union side at Shiloh. Towards his left, 
when Hindman, Cleburne, and Wood gradually passed in 
between himself and Prentiss, and swung upon his left flank, 
the firing was so hot (for Sherman clung to this point with 
bull-dog tenacity, regarding it as the key-point to his posi- 
tion) that Bragg threw Gibson's brigade of Euggles 's division 
across to Hindman's support. Sherman's batteries, however, 
tore this column badly while it marched across by the right 
flank to its new position ; the other two brigades of Euggles, 
those of Anderson and Pond, remained and attacked Sher- 
man's right, under McDowell. Polk's third, or reserve line 
was not long kept from the contest. Three regiments and 
several batteries from McClernand, and four regiments from 
Hurlburt had early arrived on Sherman's left, and enabled 
him to withstand the Confederate attack there. Seeing this 
heavy reinforcement at an important point, Johnston, who 
had ridden to the front, and who, according to Polk, at once 



110 TIIE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

shoAYcd " the ardor and energy of a true soldier," and promised 
victory in "the vigor with which he pressed forward his 
troops " — Johnston himself called on Polk for a brigade to 
support the right. Stew^art's brigade of Clark's division was 
given to him, and he took it in person. Beauregard next 
demanded a brigade for the left to help Ruggles, and Chea- 
tham led one to that point. Finally, Polk threw his two re- 
maining brigades against Sherman's centre. The Confcder- 
ate troops, being now all in action, soon served Sherman as 
they were serving Prentiss. The latter, at nine o'clock, had 
been driven from his camps, and the brigade of Polk's corps, 
which Johnston led into the gap between Prentiss and Sher- 
man, completely turned the latter's left flank. The rush 
which fmally broke Prentiss, also broke up Plildebrand, and 
his two left regiments fell back in great disorder and " disap- 
peared from the field. " Instantly the Confederates swooped 
upon Waterhouse's battery, and Sherman's left was turned. 
He gallantly clung a little longer to Shiloh Church, and held 
up ]\IcDowell and Buckland, together with the two brigades 
sent from McClcrnand's division. Polk's two brigades, 
however, now moved up, and, with those of Anderson and 
Pond, attacked the two Union divisions, and carried Behr's 
battery in an instant. Meanwhile, the Confederates hurried 
their artillery down along the brook in the gap on Sherman's 
left and rear, and routed his troops with an enfilading fire. 
Sherman then fell back, and, before ten o'clock, had surren- 
dered his w'hole camp. General Polk says that the forces of 
Sherman and McClernand immediately opposed to him, 
"fought with determined courage, and contested every inch 
of ground," and that "the resistance at this point was as 
stubborn as at any other on the field." 

We have now, at ten o'clock, reached a soi-t of epoch in 
the battle. The first onset of the Confederates has been suc- 
cessful, and the divisions of Sherman and Prentiss, supported 
in part by those of Hurlburt and W. II. L. Wallace, have 



SHILOH. Ill 

been driven from their camps. Tliere was neither at this 
time nor later, any positive lull in the battle ; but the retreat 
of the Union forces caused the taking up of a new and con- 
centrated line, and a portion of the Confederates paused in 
unsoldierly fashion for plundering the captured camps, before 
they essayed the sequel of their task. Sherman, on losing 
his camps and two batteries, had two brigades left to work 
with, JklcDo well's and Buckland's, and Taylor's battery. As 
for Hildebrand's brigade, they had mostly long since fled, 
and were running towards the Tennessee, on whose banks an 
immense thronfj of fujjitives from the various divisions, in 
detachments of all sizes from regiments down to groups of 
fours, was already collecting, and swelling each hour. Sher- 
man's remaining troops retreated to McCleniand's right, where 
they were halted, and got in hand to renew the contest. The 
Union line was so confused and irregular thenceforth, and so 
constantly swaying and shifting, that it would be uninstruc- 
tive as well as uncandid, to pretend to draw it in detail. In 
general, however, Sherman's residue of troops was on the 
right ; next, McClernand's division ; next, Wallace's ; next 
(after recovering), Prentiss's; next, Ilurlburt's ; finally, Stu- 
art's detached brigade of Sherman's division. A word will 
explain how this disposition was reached. The stress of the 
opening attack on Prentiss and Sherman was very naturally 
along the two Corinth roads across Avhich they lay. Between 
the roads was an unguarded interval, into which the Confed- 
erates had passed, and by which they had flanked both divis- 
ions. McClernand, Hurlburt and Wallace had instantly 
moved up to relieve the stress on this worst point — which 
supposing we assign to the first Union positions the dignity 
of a line, — would be called the centre. There they substan- 
tially remained, receiving the shock of battle as they came 
up — McClernand first, because nearest, and the others quickly 
after. Sherman, on being driven back, had naturally fallen 
on the riijht of McClernand, so as not to impede his fire. 



112 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES O? THE WAR. 

McClcrnand had moved forward in detachments, as wc haye 
seen, to Sherman's left, in instant answer to an urgent call 
for help. Now, by the abandonment of the camps of the 
two advance divisions, he was stoutly holding his own, having 
swung around so as to face nearly south-east, on the main 
Corinth road. Wallace's shortest road up from the landing 
brought him to the left of IMcClernand, where he arrived in 
time to receive the direct impact of the dense column pouring 
down the Corinth road after turning Prentiss out of his tents. 
Hurlburt, at 7^ o'clock, had received a message from Shennan 
that " he was already attacked in force, heavily upon his left." 
We have seen that the main battle began about seven. Hurl- 
burt within ten minutes had Veatch's briijade on the march to 
Sherman's left, where it soon arrived, and went into action, 
together with the column from McClcrnand. In the new 
alignment it became separated, half being formed on Mc- 
Clernand's right, and half on his left. A few minutes later, 
came similar tidings from Prentiss, and Hurlburt then took 
forward his two remaining brigades, those of Williams and 
Laumann. He marched to the rear and left of Prentiss, and 
met an appalling sight. " His regiments drifted through my 
advance," Prentiss gallantly striving, but in vain, to rally 
them. Fortunatel}^ Hurlburt's men were not broken \ip by 
this perforation ofi their columns, and their line was rapidly 
formed. Behind Hurlburt, Prentiss " succeeded in rallying 
a considerable portion of his command," and then, says the 
former, " I permitted him to pass to the front of the right of 
my third brigade, when they redeemed their honor." 

Stuart's brigade, or what was left of it, for he had suffered 
like Sherman and Prentiss from the independent volition of 
some subordinates, in moving their commands to the rear — 
was on Hurlburt's left. Weeks before, when this whole 
camping-ground had been occupied with a view to moving 
on Corinth, Sherman had stretched his command over the 
front, along Owl and Lick creeks, — a space of three or four 



SHILOH. 113 

miles, the other divisions being placed as already indicated, 
in quasi support. Stuart, accordingly, was off on the left 
on the Hamburg road, which crosses Lick Creek near the 
Tennessee. At 7i o'clock he had received from Prentiss a 
verbal message like that sent to Hurlburt. " In a very short 
time," he adds, "I discovered the pelican flag advancing in 
the rear of General Prentiss's head-quarters." So quickly 
was the latter officer's camp turned on the left. Stuart 
formed his three regiments, and, in answer to a request, 
Hurlburt in fifteen minutes had a battery and a regiment in 
the Ions: interval between Stuart and Prentiss. Half an hour 
elapsed, during which the enemy got a battery in a com- 
manding position, and opened a fire of shells on Stuart's 
camp. Before long, the Confederates began to move across 
upon him from Prentiss's left and against his other flank. 
The ground is the highest on the whole field, and defensible 
by a small force. Riding to the right, Stuart found that 
" the battery had left without firing a gun, and the battalion 
on its right had disappeared." Riding to the left, he found 
his own regiment there had also departed, as he was told, to 
" a ridge of ground very defensible for infantry " in the rear. 
"But," he expressively adds, "I could not find them, and 
had no intimation as to where they had gone." Several 
hours later, it is pleasant to know, that his search was re- 
warded, by discovering " seventeen or eighteen men " of this 
force, who, under the adjutant, joined him. 

For five hours, now, the battle went confusedly on. Its 
general tenor was the forcing back of the Union troops more 
or less slowly to the landing. Had the terrain been other 
than it was, the result might have been more quickly accom- 
plished. But rolling and wooded, cleft and cut up by 
ravines, with hero and there a commanding and defensible 
ridge but no salient positions, it afforded opportunity for 
protracted, irregular, and severe fighting. Both in attack 
and defence it threw upon subordinate officers the care 



114 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

of their own commands. It prevented also the decision of 
the day by a stroke on either side, and neither a blow nor a 
counter-blow was of necessity fatal. In this irregular and 
fragmentary fighting, however, the chief brunt fell upon 
Wallace, McClernand, and Hurlburt, — not only because the 
divisions of the two former had had the experience of Dou- 
elson, while the other three divisions were mostly raw, but 
also because the troops of Sherman and Prentiss had become 
disorganized and used up by the morning's surprise. General 
Grant came upon the field as soon as he could arrive from 
Savannah, where he had heard the roar of battle. It took a 
considerable time to reach the Landing, but not long after- 
wards to ride to the point to which his troops had been driven 
from their camps. 

The Confederate lines had, meanwhile, been not much less 
confused than those of their enemy. They had advanced 
with three lines of battle and a reserve ; in two hours they 
had thrown everything in, by divisions, brigades, or even 
regiments, just where it happened to be wanted. As some 
of the Union divisions had at times portions of three or four 
divisions under their control in the confused disorganization, 
so it was precisely with the Confederate corps commanders. 
Polk's corjDS was divided from one end of the line to the 
other. At length, he sought out General Bragg, and it 
was arranged that Bragg henceforth should take charge 
of the right, Polk of the centre, and Hardee of the left, 
independent of former dispositions. This was at half past 
ten o'clock, and the commands so continued thenceforth 
through the day. From that time till three the conflict went 
on with vigor. The Confederate leaders now positioned 
troops, now encouraged them, now personally led them. 
The right of the Confederate line under Breckinridge had 
for several hours a long and obstinate contest with Plurlburt, 
aided by Prentiss. But the Union centre, held by Wallace, 
and the left by McClernand, were especially aimed at by the 



SHILOH. 115 

Confederates, in order to cut their way through to the Land- 
ing. Here was the Confederate centre, which has been de- 
scribed as flanking Sherman on the left and Prentiss on the 
right, — Hardee's line, with the brigades of Ilindman, Cle- 
burne, and Wood, three brigades of Polk's corps, under 
Cheatham, and Gibson's brigade of Rusfffles's division. Braofff 
and Polk again and again tried to force this position. Wal- 
lace had the three batteries of Cavender's battalion well 
posted on commanding ridges and well served, and his in- 
fantry behaved well. McCleruand did the same for his three 
batteries, those of Schwartz, Dresser, and McAllister. Under 
Wallace's vigorous command, Bragg's efforts long ftiiled. 
On the left, however, Polk and Hardee, attacking with the 
brigades of Pond and Anderson, and a portion of the centre, 
had already found easier work. Sherman's disordered line 
in that quarter could with difficulty be recovered from the 
shock of the morning. It was formed of parts of Buck- 
land's and McDowell's brigades. The former officer says 
that, in forming line again on the Purdy road, "the fleeing 
mass from the left broke through our lines, and many of our 
men caught the infection and fled with the crowd." One 
regiment, Cockerill's, was kept in something like organiza- 
tion ; but as to the rest, "we made every effort to rally our 
men, with but poor success. They had become scattered in 
every direction." The Confederates accordingly turned the 
Union right, and possessed themselves of McClernand's 
camps, and half the guns of his three batteries. McClernand 
and the rest of Sherman fell back to the right of Wallace, 
w^ho still held fast to his camp near the Landing. 

So far as the Cgnfederates had a tactical plan now, it 
was to turn the Union left, and, sweeping along the bank, 
capture their base at the Landing, and drive them down the 
river. On the Confederate right, opposite Hurlburt and 
Stuart, were the divisions of Breckinridge, Withers, and 
Cheatham, under the direction of JTohnston himself, who, 



116 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

energetic and determined, was exerting his personal influence 
with his men. The Confederate General became frequently 
exposed to the hot fire of artillery and musketry rolling from 
Hurlburt's line. One of the latter's batteries, indeed, had 
been instantly abandoned by its officers and men, as he says, 
"with the common impulse of disgraceful cowardice." The 
other two, however, had an effective fire from commanding 
positions, while several of his infantry regiments exhausted 
their ammunition for a time. For a time the Confederates 
made tremendous charges against this position, and, amid the 
hot fire which was returned, about two o'clock a ball struck 
Johnston as he sat on his horse, eagerly regarding the move- 
ment. He refused to notice it, and gave orders as before ; 
but it was the death-wound. Governor Harris, his volunteer 
aid, riding up, found him reeling in the saddle. "Are you 
hurt?" "Yes, I fear mortally." And, with these words, 
stretching out his arms, he fell upon his companion, and a 
few minutes later expired. 

Of the military character of Sydney Johnston, it is difficult 
to speak with surety. He has certainly left a great fame ; 
but this probably has its foundation rather in what was an- 
ticipated of him than in what he achieved. He was a man of 
a high order of character, just, generous, chivalrous, and 
brave. He had an eminent administrative faculty, and Davis 
highly regarded his political talent. But it is doubtful 
whether he would have risen to the rank of such men as 
Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, or Jackson. His manner of de- 
fending the frontier committed to him was very faulty, and 
the readiness with which he followed the suggestions of Beau- 
regard shows that he had but little power of initiative and 
but slight appreciation of grand war. 

It was now three o'clock, and the battle was at its height. 
Dissatisfied with his reception by Walla<3e, on the Corinth 
road, Bragg, on hearing of Johnston's fall, on the right, de- 
termined to move rouifd thither and try his success anew. 



SHILOH. 117 

He gathered up the three divisions already spoken of, and, 
with specific orders of attack, flung them against Hurlburt, 
Stuart, and Prentiss. The assault was irresistible, and the 
whole left of the Union position giving way, Bragg's column 
drove Stuart and Hurlburt to the Landing, swept through 
Hurlburt's camp, pillaging it like those of Prentiss, Sherman, 
Stuart, and McClernand. Simultaneously, Polk and Hardee, 
rolling in from the Confederate left, forced back the Union 
right, and drove all Wallace's division, with what was left of 
Sherman, back to the Landing, — the brave W. H. L. Wallace 
falling in breasting this whelming flood. Swooping over the 
field, right and left, the Confederates gathered up entire the re- 
mainder of Prentiss's division — about 3000 in number — with 
that officer himself, and hurried them triumphantly to 
Corinth. 

At five o'clock the fate of the Union army was extremely 
critical. Its enemy had driven it by persistent fighting out 
of five camps, and for miles over every ridge and across every 
road, stream, and ravine, in its chosen camping-ground. Fully 
3000 prisoners and many wounded were left in his hands, and 
a great part of the artillery with much other spoils, to 
gi'ace his triumph. Bragg's order, " Forward, let every order 
be forward;" Beauregard's order, "Foward boys, and drive 
them into the Tennessee," had been filled almost to the letter, 
since near at hand rolled the river, Avith no transportation for 
reinforcements or for retreat. Before, an enemy flushed 
with conquest, called on their leaders for the coup de gi-ace. 
What can be done with the Union troeps ? , Surely the being 
at bay will give desperation. Unhappily the whole army 
greatly disorganized all day, was now an absolute wreck ; 
and such broken regiments and disordered battalions as at- 
tempted to rally at the Landing, often found the officers gone 
on whom they were wont to rely. Not the divisions alone 
but the brigades, the regiments, the companies, were mixed 
up in hopeless confusion, and it was only a heterogeneous 



118 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

mass of hot and exhausted men, with or without guns as 
might be, that converged on the river-bank. The fugitives 
covered the shore down as far as Crump's, where guards 
were at length posted to try to catch some of them and drive 
them back. The constant "disappearance," as the generals 
have it, of regiments and parts of regiments since morning, 
added to thousands of individual movements to the rear, had 
swarmed the Landing with troops enough — enough in 
numbers — to have driven the enemy back to Corinth. Their 
words were singularly uniform — " We are all cut to pieces." 
General Grant says he had a dozen officers arrested for cow- 
ardice on the first day's battle. General Rousseau speaks of 
" 10,000 fugitives, who lined the banks of the river and filled 
the woods adjacent to the Landing." General Buell, before 
the final disaster, found at the Landing, stragglers by "whole 
companies and almost regiments ; and at the Landing the bank 
swarmed with a confused mass of men of various regiments. 
There could not have been less than 4000 or 5000. Late 
in the day it became much greater." At five o'clock "the 
throng of disorganized and demoralized troops increased 
continually by fresh fugitives," and intermingled "were great 
numbers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to 
the river. With few exceptions, all efforts to form the troops 
and move them forward to the fight utterly failed." Nelson 
says, "I found cowering under the river-bank, when I crossed, 
from 7000 to 10,000 men, frantic with fright, and utterly 
demoralized." Of the troops lately driven back, he expressed 
the want of organization by saying the last position " formed 
a semicircle of artillery totally unsupported by infantry, 
whose fire was the only check to the audacious approach of 
the enemy." Even this was not all. The Confederates sweeping 
the whole field down to the bluff above the Landing, were 
already almost upon the latter point. Such was the outlook 
for the gallant fragments of the Union army at 5 o'clock 
on Sunday. 



SHILOH. 119 

But Grant's star was fixed in the ascendant. It chanced 
that the Confederates, by sweeping away Prentiss on the 
Union left, had been thrown chiefly towards the southerly 
side of the Landing. Now, at that point, as has been de- 
scribed, intervenes a precipitous wooded ravine, "deep, anA 
impassable for artillery or cavalry," says General Grant, 
"and very difficult for infantry." And it was precisely here, 
that, as that commander explains, "a desperate effort was 
made by the enemy to turn our left and get possession of 
the landing, transports, etc." A hard task, therefore, was 
set the Confederates at the end of their day's toil. In 
addition, the Union gun-boats now reinforced the troops, and 
at half past five furiously raked the hostile lines which had 
drawn towards the Landing. The moral effect of these shells 
on both the armies, was even greater, as so often at that 
stage of the war, than the physical. A third piece of fortune 
favored the Union armies. It chanced that, on the bluff, had 
been deposited and parked many siege guns, with heavy ord- 
nance of various sorts, designed as a part of the train for that 
future move upon Corinth, which to-day had been so unex- 
pectedly barred. No artillerists, of course, had yet been pre- 
pared for the guns ; but Colonel Webster, of General Grant's 
staff, energetically called for volunteers to get these pieces 
into position and essay work with them ; and plenty of can- 
noneers he found whose field artillery had been captured 
during the day. 

As the fragments of light batteries came galloping in, these 
were ranged with the heavy guns, and, in short, a formidable 
semicircle of forty or fifty guns, or more, of all sizes, soon 
girdled the Landing, along the brow of the ravine, which 
formed an excellent defence. This latter, indeed, stretched 
far beyond the bluff, and winding around, continued its pro- 
tection quite to the Corinth road, the guns dotting its edgo, 
all along. On the right of the guns an effort was made to 
disentangle the army that had rushed pell-mell in that direc- 



120 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

tion, ■while, on the left, the gun-boats partly covered the 
artillery position. 

At this crisis, also, and to assure the fortune of the army 
so lately trembling in the balance, Buell's advance rushed 
with. loud cheers upon the scene. It was Nelson's division, 
which had arrived thirty hours before at General Grant's 
head-quarters, but, finding no transportation ready, had been 
kept all day from the battle. But, stimulated by the ever- 
nearing roar of battle, Nelson's men had hurried along the 
overflowed roads of the west bank, and Buell, finding the 
artillery- wheels sticking hub-deep in mire, had authorized 
Nelson to drop his trains and push on. So, by effort and 
expedient, Nelson got up the river, was ferried across, and 
his well-drilled men, disregarding what they saw and heard, 
rushed spiritedly to the front, and Ammen's brigade deployed 
in support of the artillery at the point of danger. The glad 
news of reinforcement spread like wildfire in the driven 
army. 

Already now, the Confederates were surging and recoiling 
in a desperate series of final charges. Warned by the de- 
scending sun to do quickly what remained to be done, they 
threw forward everything to the attempt. Their batteries, 
run to the front, crowned the inferior crest of the ravine, and 
opened a defiant fire from ridge to ridge, and threw shells 
even across the river into the woods on the other bank. 
Their infantry, wasted by the day's slaughter, had become 
almost disorganized by the plunder of the last two Union 
camps, and a fatal loss of time ensued while their oflicers 
pulled them out from the spoils. The men, still spirited, 
gazed somewhat aghast at the gun-crowned slope above them, 
whence Webster's artillery thundered across the ravine, 
while their right flank was swept by broadsides of 8-inch 
shells from the Lexington and Tyler. " Forward " was the 
word throughout the Confederate line. Bragg held the right, 
on the southerly slope of the ravine, extending near the 



SIIILOH. 121 

river, but prevented from reaching it by the gun-boat fire ; 
Polk the centre, nearer the head of the ravine ; while Hardee 
carried the left beyond the Corinth road. At the latter point, 
the line was half a mile from the water, and four hundred 
yards from the artillery on the bluffs. There were few or- 
ganizations even of regiments, on the Union side, but a 
straggling line from Wallace's and other commands, volunta- 
rily rallying near the guns, was already opening an indepen- 
dent but annoying fire : and these resolute soldiers were as 
safe as the torrent of fugitives incessantly pouring down to 
the Landing, among whom the Confederate shells were burst- 
ing. Again and again, through the fire of the artillery, the 
gun-boats and Ammen's fresh brigade and the severe flanking 
fire of troops rallying on the Union right, the Confederates 
streamed down the ravine and clambered up the dense thick- 
ets on the other slope. Again and again they were repulsed 
with perfect ease, and amid great loss ; for besides their nat- 
ural exhaustion, the commands had been so broken up by the 
victory of the day and by the scramble for the spoils, that 
while some brigades were forming others were charging, 
and there was no concerted attack, but only spontaneous rushes 
by subdivisions, speedily checked by flank fire. And, when 
once some of Breckenridge's troops, on the right, did nearly 
turn the artillery position, so that some of the gunners aban- 
doned their pieces, Ammen, who had just deployed, again 
and finally drove the assailants down the slope. 

Confident still, flushed with past success, and observing 
the Union debacle behind the artillery, Bragg and Polk urged 
a fresh and more compact assault, on the ground that the 
nearer they drew to the Union position, the less perilous 
were the siege guns and gun-boats. But the commander-in- 
chief had been struck down, and Beauregard, succeeding to 
supreme responsibility,. decided otherwise. Bitterly then he 
recalled the lack of discipline and organization in his army, 
entailed by the jealousy and ill-timed punctiliousness of Rich- 



122 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE TTAR. 

mond. Victory itself had fatally disordered his lines, and 
the last hard task of assault had thrown them back in confu- 
sion from the almost impregnable position. Better to with- 
draw with victory than hazard final defeat ; for already the 
sun was in the horizon, and the musket-flashes lit up the 
woods. The troops were all intermingled, and several bri- 
gade commanders had been encountered by the general, who 
did not know where their brigades were. Since darkness 
already threatened to leave the army in dense thickets under 
the enemy's murderous fire, all that was left of the day would 
be required in withdrawing so disorganized a force. Buell 
could not have got more than one division along those miry 
roads to the river. It Avas a day's work well done : to-mor- 
row should be sealed what had auspiciously begun. Thus 
reasoning, Beauregard called ofi" the troojjs just as they were 
starting: on another charije, and ordered them out of ransje. 
Then night and rain fell on the field of Shiloh. 

Next morning, the astounded Confederates beheld a fresh 
enemy in the lines whence they had expelled a former the 
day preceding. Surely the Union. host Avas hydra-like, with 
a new and deadlier crest springing on the trunk from which 
the other had been shorn : or like the mystic wrestler who 
rose refreshed from mother-earth, whenever he was flung 
there, spent and bleeding. The new foe was the army of 
Buell ; and as Beauregard caught sight of its handsomely- 
deployed columns, he instantly felt that in counting on possi- 
ble tardiness or w'ant of skill in its commander, he had 
reckoned without his host. Buell, so soon as his restless 
troops could be thrown across Duck river, had (though unsus- 
picious of the need) driven them on with such soldierly 
celerity to Savannah that, had the attack of Beauregard been 
expected and prepared for. Nelson's division Avas in season to 
have been posted far out in the woods at Shiloh Church ; for 
they were at Grant's head-quarters eighteen hours before the 



SHILOH. 123 

battle. "With like energy, Buell at the first roar of battle 
had despatched couriers to all his other divisions to drop 
their trains and move up by forced marches ; so that, on 
Monday morning, three divisions and three batteries were 
j)resent to redeem the lost laurels of Sunday. Lew "Wal- 
lace's division, too, was up from Crump's Landing. Hearing 
the guns on Sunday at Shiloh, he drew up his troops to 
march, and impatiently awaited the orders, which, in eflfect, 
came at llj^ o'clock, bidding him push over to Snake Creek, 
cross it, and form on the Union right. Quickly his troops 
were off, but on the road they met three officers of Grant's 
staff, who were travelling that way. For Wallace they 
brought no orders, but they did bring such vivid tidings of 
the day's disaster and gloom, that Wallace learned that what 
was once the Union right was now in the Confederate rear. 
Instantly halting, he retraced his steps, crossed Snake Creek 
by the river road, nearer the Landing, and arrived at night- 
fall, after the battle Avas over. 

What with the arrival of Buell's troops and Lew Wallace's, 
and the untying from its almost Gordian knot of the army 
of Grant, there was a busy stir on Monday morning. Of 
Grant's forces, after eliminating the dead who lay on the 
field, the wounded who all night lay there, still more pitiable, 
and the hopelessly fugitive, there was still a respectable re- 
mainder ; and the batteries were assorted and patched, and 
the artillerists rallied, for of these there were more than 
enough for the guns. As for the Confederate army, it rose 
from bivouac in sorry plight, and the day's work obvious 
before them was not of a sort to freshen their spirits. At 
least, however, Beauregard had fulfilled his promise to "sleep 
in the enemy's camp," for his lines were in those of Prentiss, 
McClernand, and Sherman, and the latter 's head-quarters had 
been usurped by Beauregard. But it was an uneasy slumber 
they had seized, in camps hardly Avorth the winning ; for 
throu"^hout the niizht the gun-boats had thrown cifi^ht-inch 



124 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

shells towards the camps at intervals of ten and fifteen mhi- 
utes, which, as Beauregard reports, "had broken the rest of 
the men." At midnight, too, a drenching rain had fallen 
upon them ; and so, tired, wet, faint with hunger, and with 
no rations for the coming day, at dawn they rose again for 
battle with a new army. 

Monday was ^iuell's opportunity ; and he proposed to 
drive the enemy across Owl Creek, to whence he came. 
Having thrown heavy pickets well out, and formed Nelson's 
and Crittenden's divisions in advance of Grant's line, he gave 
orders to attack at dawn. Four fresh divisions could be 
counted on — Nelson's, Crittenden's, and McCook's, of Buell's 
army, and Lew Vv^allace's, of Grant's — about 27,000 strong ; 
while a large force of Graut's troops were gradually brought 
up as supports, and, indeed, subsequently took part in the 
battle. While many of Buell's troops were unaccustomed to 
battle, they were all well drilled and well managed, and, 
accordingly, were sure of a better fortune than that of their 
comrades of yesterday. Whatever, indeed, the amount of 
disorganization and disaster on the day before, as at Bull 
Eun, nothing could be said against the courage or manliness 
of the troops ; for the fault was chiefly iu the negligence and 
inexperience of their officers : it was fine material, but it had 
not been finely used, and many of the same regiments which 
then behaved badly, afterwards, when better disciplined and 
directed, made themselves an honorable name. The troops 
of Bucll and Wallace were somewhat exhausted by the pre- 
vious day's marches and a restless night ; for Wallace, like 
Beauregard, noted that " it stormed all night terribly " ; and 
that the gun-boat fire made "sleep almost impossible"; but 
they were in good condition and confident. Behind them 
foi-med the troops engaged before, and moved up as the 
former advanced, and, as Buell writes, "rendered willing and 
efficient service during the day." Against nearly 50,000, the 
Confederates could now oppose less than 30,000 jaded men. 



SHILOH. 125 

Beauregard, too, had suffered, though not as much as Grant, 
from straggling, for his troops were raw, and his troops had 
broken by hundreds from the ranks and strayed back towards 
Corinth, till a provost-guard drove them back. The killed 
and wounded on Monday had amounted to 6000 or 8000, and 
the exhausted and stragglers swelled the troops liors du com- 
bat to 10,000, to be subtracted from the original 40,000. 
There was trouble, too, from the want of ammunition and 
rations. 

By half-past five, Nelson and Crittenden were both moving 
their main lines, with soldierly precision, upon the Confeder- 
ate position. As the troops passed the interval, the profuse 
battle-wrecks, the plundered camps, the dead and wounded 
friend and foe, instructed, as says Rousseau, "the most 
ignorant soldier that the army had been driven in by the 
enemy till within a few hundred yards of the river." While, 
on the march, it could be seen how the gun-boat shells had 
fired the underbrush wherein the maimed and dying of both 
sides lay, and how the rain from heaven had at length merci- 
fully quenched the flames when help from man there was 
none. Nelson quickly flushed the covey of Confederate 
pickets, and at six developed the main line. In the ensuing 
halt, Crittenden got up on Nelson's right and the division 
lines were dressed, while the batteries of Mendenhall and 
Bartlett woke up and amused the Confederate artillery. The 
formation made, McCook's advance brigade, Eousseau's, 
ajjpeared and drew up on Crittenden's right, soon followed 
by Kirk's, on Rousseau's right, and later, after a rapid 
march, by Gibson's, on the right of Kirk. On the opposite 
side of the plateau, near Owl Creek, Lew Wallace was 
forming his full division, composing the Union right, while 
between Wallace and Buell the forces engaged on Smiday 
were brought up. McClernand very promptly rallied his 
men, and moved them forward so far as to be engaged even 
in the early skirmishes. Later, at ten o'clock, Sherman put 



126 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

what was left of his two remaining brigades, Buckland's and 
Stuart's, and of his batteries, between McClernand's right 
and Wallace's left, while, half an hour earlier, Hurlburt sup- 
ported McClernand on the left by Williams's brigade and a 
battery, and on the right by Veatch's and Laumann's. But 
all these troops were chiefly relied upon for support ; and, 
though the gallantry of the men got them hotly engaged 
during tlie day, they were not pushed beyond endurance : 
tlie stress fell upon Buell and Wallace. The former, arrang- 
ing his line between six and seven o'clock, "found upon the 
ground parts of two regiments, perhaps 1000 men, and sub- 
sequently a similar fragment came up of General Grant's 
force." He put the first on McCook's right, and the second 
on his left, and afterwards "sent other stragglhig troops of 
General Grant's force " to McCook's right. These disposi- 
tions made, skirmishers thrown out, and reserves to each 
brigade provided, the whole of Buell's three divisions went 
forward. For a short mterval the line progressed rapidly. 
Then, at seven o'clock, it reached Beauregard's main front, 
and met a determined resistance. 

The ground on which tlie Confederates stood was substan- 
tially that of the camps of Prentiss, Sherman, and McCler- 
nand, which having been occupied in bivouac the night pre- 
ceding, now lay a little in rear of the line of battle. This 
line stretched in front of Lick and Owl Creeks, and across all 
the roads so often described. The dawn of day found the 
Confederates very much disorganized. No time, however, 
was lost. The early advance of Nelson caused a rapid gather- 
ing and assorting of the disordered and shattered fragments of 
Beauregard, who met the onset with so firni a front that Nel- 
son found himself checked. At length Crittenden's division 
came up to Nelson's right, and JNIendenhall's battery, hurrying 
across, enjyao^ed the Confederate batteries, and staved the in- 
fantry advance . Despite their fatigue , Beauregard was already 
hurlinc: his concentrated columns to an attack on his riirht : he 



SHILOH. 127 

had engaged all of Nelson and Crittenden, and before eight 
o'clock had also fallen upon Rousseau's brigade of McCook's 
division, Avhich had just then completed its formation on Crit- 
tenden's right. At eight o'clock, Cheatham's division, which 
had been posted hitherto, awaiting orders, in the rear of Shiloh 
church, was thrown in, in front of Buell, on Breckinridge's line. 
The fire on the Confederate right which had before been hot, 
was now redoubled, and rolled across all three of Buell's divis- 
ions. So severe was the artillery fire that Hazen's brigade was 
thrown across the open field into the fringe of woods where 
two batteries Avere posted, in order to dislodge them. Buell 
WMS then at Hazen's position, and in person gave the com- 
mand *' forward ! " which ran echoing along the line, and was 
obeyed with a cheer. These troops had never before been in 
battle, but were in splendid drill and discipline, and moved 
forward in the best possible order. They soon caught the 
enemy's volleys, but did not slacken their pace ; for it was a 
novel experience, and they did not resort, like veterans, to 
trees or cover. Driving in some outlying infantry supports, 
of whom not a few were sent as prisoners to the rear, Hazen, 
after half a mile of advance, got upon the batteries themselves. 
But at this moment the gallant brigade received a cross fire 
from both flanks from the rallied enemy, and being without 
support on either hand, was forced to fall back, with a loss of 
one third of its men. The sally had been a little too impet- 
uous, so much so as to break up the organization ; but it w^as 
one quite natural at so early a day in the war, and was a mis- 
take in the right direction. 

Meanwhile, the Confederates had fiercely engaged, by nine 
o'clock, all Nelson's line, and despite the rough ground on his 
left, succeeded in turning that flank, it being unprotected by 
artillery. But Ammen's brigade held on stubbornly, till 
Terrill's guns, not long before landed, dashing down the 
Hamburg road, went into battery on Nelson's left, silenced the 
Confederate pieces, and relieved the position. Angry at be- 



128 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ing baffled, the Confederates quickly charged Terrill and dis- 
lodged and drove in his battery with the loss of a caisson. 
But the effort was amongst the last which the Confederates 
could endure in this corner of the field. Moreover, Lew 
Wallace and Grant's other forces on the right had so pressed 
upon the Confederate left, endangering the line of retreat, 
that Beauregard moved Cheatham's entire division by the left 
flank back past Shiloh Church, to form on his left, where Bragg 
was briskly engaged, xibout ten o'clock, accordingly. Nelson 
found the pressure in his front relaxed, and no longer at a halt 
or receding as before, he began to gain ground. Beatty's regi- 
ment from Boyle's brigade, hitherto held in reserve behind Crit- 
tenden, was quickly thrown in by Buell to turn the scale ; while 
the Union batteries and men ran to the front, and at length 
successively silenced the battery which had annoyed Buell's 
left, and then those playing upon his centre. At the same time 
Crittenden's left got to the woods in its front and drove out 
the Confederates. In a word, Buell at length rolling heavily 
upon the Confederate right, Beauregard abandoned his ground 
in that direction, and shortened and concentrated his line across 
the two Corinth roads . Eight hundred yards in rear of his first 
position, Breckenridge halted on a new line and opened artil- 
tery fire ; but Crittenden, emerging from the woods, fell on 
the battery, and seized a part of it before it could be run off. 
However, the ground beyond was subsequently so hotly con- 
tested, that the Confederates recovered their lost guns in an 
advance which swept back all of Buell's line ; but again they 
they were captured. As for Nelson, by one o'clock his left 
had swung easily around the Confederate right, moved at 
trail arms in the douljle quick over the ridges, and took pos- 
session of that part of the field. 

Let us turn now to McCook. On Crittenden's risfhtEous- 
seau's brigade was early engaged sustaining the attack of 8 
o'clock, and the heavier succeeding ones. Meanwhile, Kirk's 
brigade and a part of Gibson's, had been ferried across from 



SHILOII. 129 

Savannah, hurried to the ground, and were deployed by Me- 
Cook in short supporting distance to the right and rear of 
Rousseau. Willich's regiment he held in reserve behind his 
second line. McCook shared the varying fortunes of the 
morning, till the gradual giving way of the Confederate right 
by 10 o'clock. Then Rousseau, finding his advance no 
longer checked, moved onward till he encountered the troops 
withdrawn to the Corinth road from Nelson's front. Here a 
fierce and long contested engagement took place, the Con- 
federates forming in McClernand's camp to which they clung 
with desperation ; but which at length they were forced to 
abandon to Rousseau, together with a battery captured the 
day before, of Avhich one section had been playing on Rous- 
seau's advance. But as the Union line swept forward, 
McCook and Crittenden had become separated, and a coun- 
ter-attack on McCook's left threatened to turn it, and 
was the signal for a fierce struggle. There then came a 
lull, and at one o'clock the battle began with fresh fury. 
McCook had reached a key-point in the Confederate line, 
a green wood about five hundred yards east of the church. 
Two batteries, one next the church and the other nearer 
the Hamburg road, swept the open space with grape and 
canister in front of the green wood, and the musketry 
fire was very severe. Grant hurried forward what aid ho 
could to McClernand, Hurlljurt putting in the remainder 
of his division, and Sherman appearing with his brigades. 
"Here," says Sherman, "at the point where the Corinth road 
crosses the line of General McClernand's camp, I saw for the 
first time, the well-ordered and compact Kentucky forces of 
General Buell, whose soldierly movement at once gave confi- 
dence to our newer and less-disciplined forces. Here, I saw 
Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and 
thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, 
and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest mus- 
ketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, 



130 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

when this splendid regiment had to fall back." Indeed, the 
conflict, arising on McCook's left, had spread all along his 
front and over that of Crittenden. "VVillich's regiment having 
passed through Kirk's brigade, to the front, was thrown across 
to the green wood, in double column on the centre, with the 
flank companies skirmishing in advance. Then it received 
the overpowering attack which Sherman witnessed. At this 
juncture. Kirk's brigade got into position on McCook's left, 
and Rousseau, who had expended all his ammunition in the 
morning's battle, retired through it to the rear for a fresh sup- 
ply. Gibson was next thrown in on Kirk's left. For an 
hour a terrific contest went on, the Confederates holding 
their position tenaciously, and sometimes even taking the 
ofiensive. Finally, at two o'clock, Rousseau's brigade again 
moved to the front, supported by one of Ilurlburt's brigades 
on the left, and by jNIcClcrnand on the right. McCook had 
no artillery ; but the three uncaptured guns of Wood's bat- 
tery and two of ^McAllister's were turned by McClernand and 
Sherman against the enemy. Finding the Confederates at last 
giving way before him, IMcCook ordered a general advance, 
and Rousseau's brigade "beautifully deployed,'' says Sher- 
man, " entered this dreaded wood, and moved in splendid 
order steadily to the front, sweeping everything before it." 
Indeed, the battle was already decided. At 1^ o'clock, 
Beauregard had issued orders to withdraw from the field. 
The last desperate fighting covered the attempt, and the final 
Union advance at two o'clock was comparatively unresisted. 
The withdrawal commenced on the Confederate right, in front 
of Nelson, and was transmitted to the left. At the latter 
point. Lew Wallace had steadily swung forward, partici- 
pating in the varying fortunes of the day. His division 
also, at two o'clock, finding the obstinate enemy giving way, 
burst through the woods, easily carrying all before them. 
The Confederate retreat was conducted with perfect order 
and precision. Half a mile distant from Shiloh Church, on 



SHILOH. 131 

a commanding ridge, a reserve, selected for that purpose, 
was drawn up in line of battle for the exi3ected attack. 

It did not come. Having waited half an hour, the Ime 
Avas withdrawn a mile further. Here the artillery played for 
a time upon a small Union column advanced in pursuit ; but 
no engagement took place, and even this desultory firing 
ceased by four o'clock. The Battle of Shiloh was over. 

in. 

RESULTS OF SHILOH. 

The story of the Southern war is filled with the records of 
great battles, whose immediate fortunes were divided with 
such equal hand that both sides claimed the victory — each 
protesting itself perfectly satisfied with the result. And 
certes, it must be conceded that an obvious indecisiveness 
stamps many grand battles of the war, whose duration there- 
fore they did not affect. In many cases, what were account- 
ed great victories by either antagonist did not alter the fight- 
ing "power of the vanquished, and merely led up to a really 
decisive action, which happening a little later, furnished in 
itself the best proof possible that the earlier struggle was but 
preliminary and preparatory, and not therefore the decisive 
action of the campaign. Such, for a single example, Avere 
the battles of Chantilly and second Bull Run, in a campaign 
which culminated on the decisive plains of Antietam ; such 
Burnside's assault on Fredericksburg, and Hooker's en- 
gagement at Chancellorsville, which preceded the decisive 
struggle at Gettysburg. Neither the fury of the contest nor 
the mournful catalogue of losses, nor the mere overrunning 
of territory, in such cases, is the question at issue, which 
turns, rather, upon the success or the failure of the attempt 
to permanently change the conditions of the war. In like 
manner, a great victory may be but the legitimate conse- 
quence of a decisive triumph preceding, as when Port Hud- 



132 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

son follo-vvcd the fall of Vicksburg ; and here, too, jt is not 
the mere corollary which must be pronounced the decisive 
action, since, though the fruit dropped, the bough had first 
to be shaken. 

Our present concern, however, is chiefly with that class of 
actions which, regarded at the time as drawn at best, came to 
show themselves at length so thoroughly decisive on the sub- 
sequent course of the contest, that we cannot figure to our- 
selves what the war miijht have been had these battles 
matured to opposite issues. 

Pre-eminent among such contests looms up the battle of 
Shiloh. In this famous action — the most terrific and deadly 
of the war up to that time — both parties claimed to be 
satisfied Avith the result. The Confederates, on the one hand, 
pointed to the fact that they had completely surprised the 
Union camps, had captured and possessed them, together with 
many guns and flags and trophies, and in an even fight from 
dawn till dusk had driven their enemy in demoralized mass 
to the shelter of his gun-boats, his siege-train, and his rein- 
forcements. And, though it was true that on the second day 
the fortune of battle was reversed, yet it was a credit rather 
than a disgrace — a victory of morale — to fall back stub- 
bornly and in good order before 25,000 fresh troops; and, 
finally, while the Confederate loss had been by official 
account 10,699, the Union loss on both days, including pris- 
oner's, was nearly 15,000. 

The Union forces, on their part, without seeking to conceal 
their chagrin over the first day's battle, justly claimed vic- 
tory in the second. Accordingly, thanksgivings went up all 
over the North for the timely arrival of Buell, and his final 
repulse of the Confederate army ; and never was gratitude, 
for what seemed a providential interposition, more fittingly 
rendered. 

It was not, however, until much later that the true import 
of the battle of Shiloh was discovered ; and it was found that 



SHILOH. - 133 

the immediate revelations of the battle-field were of small 
cousequeuce compared with subsequent developments. In 
order to comprehend the full significance of Shiloh, we must 
know, on the one hand, the great Confederate possibilities 
which were forever buried on that field, and, on the other 
hand, the great Union actualities which thence took rise and 
grew to maturity. 

It is difficult to picture the keen disappointment with 
which, on Monday afternoon, Beauregard having given the 
reluctant orders to withdraw from Shiloh, turned his horse's 
head towards Corinth and rode through the gloomy forest 
aisles. His hopes were entirely dashed to the ground ; and 
a well-founded expectation of carrying the war into the North 
was for him entirely gone. Called from Virginia to the 
West by a deputation of its despairing citizens, headed by 
Colonel Pryor, who fancied that in the hero of Sumter and 
Manassas, they saw their deliverer from the perils that com- 
passed them, he had promptly accepted the summons, and 
went to Tennessee with the purpose of setting afoot an ag- 
gressive campaign. Before he could accomplish this intent, 
fort Henry and fort Donelson fell, with all the superincum- 
bent defensive line. Annoyed, but not in despair, he com- 
menced afresh ; and, discovering that he had been shamefully 
deceived as to the force he would find ready to take the field 
in the West, he bent himself to creating those numbers Avhich 
in Virginia he had demanded as a prerequisite for starting. 
The disaster at Donelson he accounted severe, but not irre- 
parable. His original plan was to concentrate all available 
forces between Humboldt and Bowling Green, and fall on 
Buell, whose advance he then regarded as much more danger- 
ous than Grant's. The fall of Donelson and the prompt 
Union demonstrations up the Tennessee and Cumberland, left 
no doubt of the course to be adopted thereafter. It was clear 
that Grant was determined to push on to the Memphis and 
Charleston Railroad — a line of supply important to be kept 



134 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

intact. Beauregard therefore resolved that everything should 
be abandoned in Central Tennessee for the moment, and all 
concentrated on some point near the western terminus of 
the Memphis road. These forces, while gathering, would 
naturally defend the road (though that, in his plan, was of 
secondary importance), and, at the earliest moment should 
be hurled forward in an offensive movement through Ten- 
nessee and Kentucky, falling on each of the Union armies in 
turn, and crushing them both. This plan he suggested at 
once to General Johnston, proposing at the same time to 
serve as second in command. Beauregard's courier met 
Johnston before the latter had got to Min-freesboro', on his 
way from Nashville, and that officer, accordingly, continued 
his retreat south-easterly towards the Tennessee, to join 
Beauregard, with the view to march " onward to the Ohio." 

Thus weighty was tho purport of the battle delivered at 
Pittsburg Landing. The genius of Beauregard had effected 
a double change in Confederate policy, making concentration 
take the place of distribution, and the campaign no longer 
defensive, but offensive-. Before his day the Confederate 
popular idea of military defence had been primitive and 
juvenile. It was to ridge and stripe the broad valley with 
numberless lines of parallel earthworks, behind Avhich forces 
were to be deployed from flank to flank ; Avhen one line should 
be carried, retreat would be had to another and another, even 
to the last row of parapets. Both parties indeed began by 
planning campaigns in metaphor ; and if the one had its 
dream of an "anaconda coil," the other clung not less closely 
to its whimsical fancy of a "last ditch." But when Beaure- 
gard arrived, what he found marked out for a second offensive 
line, he cut short, strengthened and assumed as the base of 
an aggressive campaign. His inspiration was the true one ; 
and, with proper support, it had met success. As it was, it 
barely failed. So complete was the surprise, that General 
Grant himself writes that he had not thought an attack possi- 



SHILOH. 135 

ble until- several days later, and, when the assault began, 
" did not believe that they intended to make a determined 
attack but simply to make a reconnoissance in force." Sher- 
man, too, avers that he did not discover the enemy were 
attacking in force until long after he had sent back for rein- 
forcements. 

Such, then, was the dangerous movement, which, but for 
an unexpected turn of fortune, might have carried, in the 
words of Buel, " the remnant of Grant's army prisoners into 
the enemy's camps." What limit to its onward roll might 
have been opposed thereafter, it is hard to say. Being frus- 
trated at the start, tlie Confederate leaders concealed, as far 
as possible, the true intent of the campaign, and Beauregard, 
by adroit phrases, covered up the depth of his disappoint- 
ment ; but Bragg, less reticent, declared it, in his official 
report, a movement " which would have changed the entire 
complexion of the war." Such it indeed was. I symbolize 
Shiloh to myself as the representation of the South rampant 
and flaming in the house of Mars. It was a fierce massing 
and hurling forward of everything to gain a supreme object 
— the conquest of the Mississippi Valley. But it spent its 
fury and its force in vain ; and it is a notable fact, that never 
again in the Valley of the Mississippi were the Confederates 
able to take the offensive. 

I presume that my opinion of this action on the Union side 
will already have been disclosed in the recital of the battle ; 
but lest there should be any doubt touching this, I shall state 
in precise terms what judgments seem to be warranted by the 
facts. The retaining the troops on the left bank of the Toi- 
nessee River (unless for immediate advance, which was the ob- 
ject General C. F. Smith had in view when he placed the army 
there weeks before), and that, too, without any appliances of 
defence, was undeniably a great error on the part of General 
Grant. Nor can this verdict be regarded as traversed by a 
pungent •statement made by General Sherman: 'It was 



136 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

necessary," says lie, "that a combat fierce and bitter, to test 
the manhood of the Uvo armies, sliould come off, and that wasr 
as good a phice as any. It was not then a question of mili- 
tary skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck." Now, 
with the deference due the opinion of a soldier so eminent as 
General Sherman, I submit that this declaration is specious 
rather than sound ; for precisely in proportion to the import- 
ance of the result of this primal " test of the manhood of the 
two armies," was it incumbent on the Union commander to 
make such dispositions as would gain for his army the advan- 
taire in this "test." Of the tactics of the battle-field there is 
nothing to be said. The subordinate commanders acted on 
their own motion, according to the extent of their ability. 
The men fought stubbornly, and with no lack of solid 
pluck ; but nothing could repair the original faults of dispo- 
sition and the efiect of the surprise. It is impossible to over- 
rate the importance of Buell's arrival on the field at the close 
of the first day. And, as partizan malignity has tried to 
make it appear that Buell's oncoming was tardy, it is a simple 
act of justice to add that, on the contrary, his zeal in the 
previous marches caused him greatly to outstrip his orders. 
Moreover, not only did the weight he threw into the scale on 
the 7th redeem the field ; but his proximity on the 6tli — a 
proximity known to the Confederate commanders — relaxed 
the nerve of Beauregard's attack during the latter part of that 
well-nigh fatal day. 

It now remains to speak of the territorial results of this 
battle. As the fall of fort Donelson was the signal for a 
general abandonment of the first Confederate valley line of 
defence, so the repulse of Shiloli was followed by the aban- 
donment of the second. In order to concentrate troops at 
Corinth, Beauregard had been compelled to arrange the 
evacuation of Island No. Ten. On the morning after the 
battle of Shiloh, Gen. IMackall surrendered this famous 
but overrated position, with its remaining garrison. Its maga- 



SHILOH. 137 

zines, artillery, camps, and camp equipages — everything in 
short which had not been previously transferred to fort 
Pillow. Immediately thereafter, the^ Union fleets passed 
down the INIississippi toAvards the latter point, and simultane- 
ously Genenil Ilalleck moved cautiously upon Corinth, with 
the three columns of Buell, Grant, and Pope. But Beaure- 
gard was already convinced that the campaign was lost in 
the West, and only sought to delay his opponent by a show 
of resistance, compelling him to lose time in making siege 
approaches. The theatre of war, therefore, presented at 
either wing the spectacle of a Union army laboriously spad- 
ing its way towards the fortified position of its enemy, 
McClellan before Yorktown, and Halleck before Corinth. 
At length, however, the pantomime was over, and Beaure- 
gard, having held Corinth from the 7th of April to the 29th 
of JNIay, evacuated it on the night of the latter day. The re- 
treat had been made leisurely, and, under the cover of strong 
picket lines, Beauregard had sent south every possible thing 
that could be of value to him in Corinth. The remaining 
material he blew up in a tremendous explosion, which seiwed 
as a signal that the Union troops might enter In the cap- 
ture of Corinth, which Beauregard himself declared "the 
strategic point of the campaign," the success of Shiloh was 
now rounded out and complete. 

Even here, however, the results of that battle-field had not 
ceased. The fall of Corinth rendered fort Randolph and fort 
Pillow, river positions of great strength, and which had justi- 
fied Beauregard's selection by the repulse of the Union fleet, 
exposed to a land attack in the rear. Both these positions 
accordingly were surrendered to the triumphant Union col- 
umns. Deprived of its river defences on the one hand, 
and the army which covered it on the other, Memphis, the 
most important city yet unconquered on the Mississippi, was 
forced to capitulate, and thus, in fine, the mighty tide of 
Union triumph rolled adown the shores of the great river. 



138 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

The operations around Corinth and Memphis had been, more- 
over, of very great assistance to the magnificent stroke of 
Farragut at New Orleans. The gathering of troops from all 
the Gulf States to Corinth, the accumulation of gun-boats, 
naval supplies, artillery and handicraft-men to Memphis and 
its forts, had been loudly complained of at New Orleans ; and 
it had been with too much justice apprehended that the at- 
tention paid to barring the river at the north would result in 
leaving it unbarred at the south. 

Inland, however, as well as on the river banks, the results 
of Shiloh were of portentous magnitude. The concentration 
and defeat at Shiloh and Corinth had uncovered all Central 
and Eastern Tennessee to the Union columns. The latter, 
raiding in every direction, found their progress comparatively 
unopposed, and began for the first time to make acquaintance 
with the interior of the Confederacy. As for the Memphis 
and Charleston road, that great object of the campaign had 
long since been secured, and was penetrated and broken in 
many places. With great facility, Mitchell's column, pro- 
jected by Buell from Nashville long before Shiloh, reached 
and permanently broke up the railroad at Hunts ville, five 
days after that battle. This energetic officer and others now 
marched boldly hither and thither in Tennessee, Mississippi 
and Alal)ama. It was felt on all hands that vast as was the 
area to be reduced to the dominion of the Union, a great 
segment had already been overrun, and patience and stout 
hearts were all that the conquest of the remainder demanded. 




"Enfe* fry-J.B.raireat 



Pkoto. by DiimEy- 




ANTIETAAI. 139 



IV. 

ANTIETAM. 



PRELUDE TO ANTIETAM. 

At Chantilly, Lee sat alone in liis tent, revolving in his 
mind the events of that astonishing campaign which had wit- 
nessed the defeat of two Union armies whose broken fragments 
lay on the Potomac like the stranded wreck of a noble fleet. 
While thus the Confederate commander meditated, there 
dawned upon him the conception of a stroke more bold than 
all the deeds yet done — a stroke which seemed to make past 
performance tame by the plenitude of its promise. That for 
which he had assumed the offensive was already attained — 
the armies of McClellan and Pope had been hurled back to 
the point whence they set out in the campaign of the spring 
and summer, the siege of Richmond was raised, the war was 
transferred from the banks of the James and Rapidan to the 
borders of the Potomac. Why should he not now pass the 
borders, raise the standard of revolt on Northern soil, over- 
whelm the demoralized remnants of his adversary and dictate 
a peace in the capital of the Union ? The thought, assuming 
shape in his mind determined itself in a resolve, and hastily 
penning a despatch, Lee, from Chantilly on the night of the 
2d September, 1862, announced to the Chief of the Con- 
federacy in Richmond his purpose to move on the morrow 
into Maryland. 



140 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Such was the origin of that first Confederate invasion which 
culminated in the battle of Antietam — the memorable com- 
bat which forms the subject-matter of the present chapter. 
Let us review in rapid retrospect those antecedent operations 
in Virjyinia that allured the Confederate commander to this 
seductive but fatal adventure. 

The Spring campaign in Virginia opened with a bold stroke 
and high promise. The Union army, by a vigorous initiative, 
at once reduced the Confederates to an attitude of defence. 
Johnston fell back from Manassas behind the Rapidan, ]\Ic- 
Clellan moved to Fortress Monroe. 

But, from the moment the Army of the Potomac landed on 
the Peninsula, there arose in the minds of those who controlled 
the military councils at Washington a sense of insecurity 
touching the safety of the National capital, from the defence 
of which they had seen the nol)le army that had been created 
under its walls taken away in ships to a far distant base. 
This sentiment, entertained in all honesty but in ignorance of 
the true principles of war, by the President, by his Cabinet, 
and by Congress, gave the first blow to the success of the 
Peninsular campaign. The powerful corps of ISIcDowell, 
thirty thousand strong, when on the point of embarking at 
Alexandria to follow its comrades to Fortress Monroe, was 
arrested and retained in front of Washington. The measure 
added no real security to the capital, the safety of which 
rested less in the presence of a covering force _than in the 
vioror with which Richmond should be assailed. But it 
greatly weakened the Army of the Potomac. 

The second blow was still more fatal. The hope of the 
Peninsular campaign lay in the expectation of rapidly launch- 
ing forward the Union army against Richmond. It was in 
its conception essentially an oifensive manoeuvre, wherein, by 
a quick advance, McClcllan might fall upon the enemy's 
army before it could be strengthened, and on his capital ere 



ANTIETAM. 141 

yet it showed any bulwarks of defence. Should he be 
brought to a pause on the Peuhisula, the movement, ceasing 
to be an offensive manoeuvre, would become a mere transfer 
of base, followed by a long and laborious process of forced 
efforts — the enemy having on his side all the advantage of 
time. When the army of Napoleon, in 1800, debouched by 
the pass of Saint Bernard into the plains of Italy, it suddenly 
found its progress checked by the cannon of Fort Bard, 
guarding the valley of the Doria, through which the army 
must pass : so that at the very moment when it was fancied 
every difficulty was overcome, an obstacle presented itself 
that threatened to utterly defeat Napoleon's bold campaign. 
A like obstruction noAv arose before the Army of the Poto- 
mac. It found itself brought to a halt in front of the works 
of Yorktown — works the existence of which was indeed well 
known to McClellan, but the real nature of which proved to 
be different from all anticipation. Unhappily McClellan was 
not capable of the kind of stroke by which Napoleon over- 
came Fort Bard. The rivers on either flank Avere closed to 
the fleet ; the line of fortification was adjudged inassailable 
by a direct attack ; and the Union general deemed it neces- 
sary to undertake a siege. It was a great misfortune; for 
though Johnston, seeing the formidable offensive preparations 
of his antagonist, at length abandoned the lines of Yorktown, 
yet their tenure gained for the Confederates a month of pre- 
cious time that Avas employed in preparations which doubled 
the difiiculties the Army of the Potomac Avas doomed to en- 
counter. 

From YorktoAvn the Army of the Potomac advanced on the 
heels of the Confederates, AA'ho retired up the Peninsula to- 
Avards Richmond. Accident precipitated, on the way, the 
battle of Williamsburg (May 5), a combat which, though 
characterized by little of generalship, served to illustrate the 
superb fighting qualities of the troops. Johnston Avas forced 
to AvithdraAV in consequence of a flank movement by Hancock ; 



142 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

and the army, continuing its advance, reached the Chicka- 
hominy, astride of which the corps were established late in 
the month of ]\Iay. 

In retiring his army to Richmond, the astute strategist then 
in command of the Confederate forces acted in the predeter- 
mined purpose of passing from the defensive to a vigorous 
offensive as soon as circumstances should indicate a favorable 
moment to strike. Such an opportunity now presented itself. 
By a most fatuitous partition of strength, the Union force in 
Virginia had been divided into no less than three independent 
armies, in addition to the main Army of the Potomac. The 
"Mountain Department," of Western Virginia, had been 
carved out for General Fremont ; the " Department of the 
Shenandoah " had been constituted for General Banks ; and 
to General McDowell had been assigned the " Department of 
the Rappahannock," at the time his corps was detached from 
the Army of the Potomac. The army under command of 
McDowell had been raised to an effective of 40,000 men, and 
was thrown forward to Fredericksburg. When the Army of 
the Potomac reached the Chickahominy it was proposed to 
send forward McDowell's column to co-operate with it in the 
attack of Richmond. Discerning the menacing position of 
this force, Johnston determined on a plan of operations that 
would prevent McDowell's junction with McClellan, and at 
the same time neutralize all the remaining Union forces in 
Northern and Western Virginia. The execution of this plan 
was committed to Stonewall Jackson who, after the retire- 
ment of the main Confederate army to Richmond, had been 
retained in the valley of the Shenandoah. 

The point of attack was skilfully chosen. Instead of as- 
sailing the force of McDowell, with whom, having but 15,000 
under his command, he was too weak to cope, Jackson, after 
dealing a blow at Fremont's force, fell upon Banks, who held 
post at Harrisonburg in the lower part of the Shenandoah 
valley. Banks retreated up the valley, followed by Jack- 



ANTIETAM. 143 

son, as far as Hamper's Ferry, where he remained till May 
30th. 

The tidings of Jackson's apparition in the Shenandoah 
valley caused the wildest excitement at Washington and 
prompted measures that jumped exactly with the intent of 
the Confederate commander. McDowell Avas stopped in his 
march to join McClellan, and hurried off to the Shenandoah 
valley, there to unite with the forces of Banks and Fremont 
in an attempt to "bag" Jackson. But that wily officer, hav- 
ing already accomplished all that was desired, having neutral- 
ized forces that made an aggregate of 60,000 men, slipped 
through between his pursuers and escaped to his mountain 
lair in the lower part of the valley. The chaos that ensued 
presented to Johnston precisely the oiDportunity he desired, 
and he hastened to take advantajje of it. 

At this time two corps of the Army of the Potomac were 
on the right bank or Richmond side of the Chickahominy 
and three corps on the left bank. The means of communi- 
cation were very imperfect. "It was," said General John- 
ston afterwards to the writer, "a situation in which, by 
bringing the mass of my force against two fifths of that of 
my adversary, I might confidently hope to overwhelm that 
fraction." The experiment, tried on the last day of May, in 
the battle of Fair Oaks, did not, however, realize the expec- 
tations of the Confederate commander. The front attack 
was, indeed, successfid in overwhelming the Union force ; 
but a turning column, which, under Huger, had been 
assigned the duty of reaching the bridges of the Chicka- 
hominy and fatally severing communication between the two 
wings, failed in its purpose ; and Sumner, having, with 
admirable soldierly promptitude, crossed the Chickahominy, 
braced up the shattered fragments of the two corps and 
saved the day. During the action. General Johnston was 
severely wounded, and compelled to retire from the field for 
many mouths. The command then passed into the hands of 



144 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

General Eobert E. Lee, by whom it was retained until the 
close of the war. 

Of the officer into whose hands were thus committed the 
fortunes of the Army of Noi-thern Virginia little was known 
of a nature to mark him out for the remarkable career that 
awaited him. His military experience had been of no more 
extended scope than those of his brother officers of the 
regular army of the United States. He had never fought a 
battle ; and in his one campaign in "Western Virginia he had 
been signally outgeneraled by Rosecrans. After this he was 
reduced to engineer-duty and sent to a kind of military Cov- 
entry — to supervise the construction of defences on the 
South Carolina coast. Yet there was in this grave, high- 
minded, and respected son of Virginia that which inspired 
his fellow-citizens Vvith the belief that he was fitted for the 
greatest commands ; and the Virginia Legislature brought to 
bear on the Richmond Executive so weighty a pressure that 
Mr. Davis was compelled to recall Lee iu March, 18G2, and 
appoint him to the office of General-in-chief — an office Avhicli, 
in fact, was created expressly for him. The hurt received 
by Johnston brought Lee to the front as commander in the 
field. 

In the Army of the Potomac the month of June passed in 
elaborate preparations for the grand assault on Richmond. 
But meanwhile Lee also was resolved on taking the initia- 
tive, for the purpose of raising the siege of the Confederate 
capital. "The intention of the enemy," says Lee, "seemed 
to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. The 
strength of his left wing rendered a direct assault injudicious, 
if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to con- 
struct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to 
defend the city, and leave the other part free to cross the 
Chickahominy and operate on the north bank. By sweeping 
down the river on that side, and threatening his communica- 
tions with York River, it was thought that the enemy would 



• ANTIETAM. 145 

be compelled to retreat or give battle out of his eiitrencli- 
ments. The plan was submitted to his Excellency the Pres- 
ident, who was repeatedly on the field in the course of its 
execution." 

In carrying out this plan of operations, Lee determined to 
unite Jackson's force with the main body. As, however, it 
was necessary to efiect this with great secresy, he masked 
Jackson's withdrawal by ostentatiously sending a division 
from Richmond to reinforce that officer, and caused it to be 
given out that he designed a renewal of operations in the 
Shenandoah valley. This ruse had the desired effect, and 
Jackson, marching rapidly in the direction of Richmond, 
reached Cold Harbor on the Chickahominy, on the 27th of 
June. This stroke instantly threw McClellan on the defen- 
sive, and that at the very moment when he was " advancing 
his picket lines, preparatory to an attack." At this time the 
right of McClellan's line rested on Beaver Dam Creek, where 
a part of the corps of Porter held an entrenched position. 
This force, after inflicting a severe repulse on the troops of 
Longstreet and Hill that had moved from the south bank 
of the Chickahominy, found its right flank turned by Jackson, 
and withdrew to the vicinity of Gaines's Mill, where Porter 
with his corps took up a position covering the bridges of the 
Chickahominy. Here Lee delivered battle on the afternoon 
of the 27th, and compelled the retirement of Porter's com- 
mand to the right bank. 

It is easy to see how thoroughly compromised McClellan's 
position had now become. Lee already laid hold of his com- 
munications with White House. McClellan therefore deter- 
mined to transfer his army, by a change of base, to the James 
River. In what manner and jvith what entire success this 
difficult manoeuvre was conducted, is known to all the world. 
Stoutly holding his adversary in check by a rear-guard, he 
withdrew his immense trains and material safely to the 
James, and then forming the army on the slopes of ]\Ialvern, 

10 



146 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

gave the Confederates so bloody a repulse that Lee was fain 
next day to retire towards Richmond. The result of the 
campaign was no material gain to Lee, for his losses surpassed 
those of McClcllan, and when the army reached the James 
River, it was in a position that was in fact more menacing to 
Richmond than that it held on the Chickahominy. Neverthe- 
less, the moral advantage remained with the Confederates. 

From the chequered experiences of the Army of the Poto- 
mac we must now look away to another field. 

After the retirement of Jackson to join Lee, the rumps of 
armies that had been scattered over Northern Virginia, under 
Banks and Fremont and IMcDowell, were united into one 
body, with the title of the " Army of Virginia," and placed 
under the command of General J. Pope. With this force, 
that officer advanced along the line of the Orange and Alex- 
andria Railroad, and took position in the vicinity of Culpep- 
per, where he threatened Gordonsville and Charlottsville and 
the westward communications of the army at Richmond. Lee 
could not fail to see the great advantage which his central 
position between the armies of ISIcClellan and Pope gave him 
for a stroke against the latter. Howbcit, so long as the Army 
of the Potomac remained on the Peninsula, its presence was 
too threatening to permit the Confederate general to move 
against Pope, lie therefore contented himself with sending 
the corps of Jackson to hold the Army of Virginia in check. 
Jackson, moving to Gordonsville, advanced against Pope, 
and on the 9th of August assailed his advanced cor23s under 
General Banks, who held post near Cedar INIountain. Al- 
though Jackson was compelled to retreat to Gordonsville, 
such was the alarm for the»safety of Washington which his 
presence awakened in the breast of General Halleck, now 
General-in-Chief of the Union forces, that he ordered Mc- 
Clellan to embark his army and transport it back to Alexan- 
dria. This movement was no sooner disclosed by the ship- 



ANTIETAM. 147 

ment of the sick, than Lee, discerning the turn of aJSairs, 
resolved to advance with his whole force against Pope. "A 
part of General McClellan's army," says he, "was believed 
to have left Harrison's Landing. It therefore seemed that 
active operations on the James were no longer contemplated, 
and that the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any 
danger of attack from that quarter would be to reinforce 
General Jackson and advance against General Pope." The 
execution of this plan was begun on the 13th August, when 
Longstreet was put in motion for Gordonsville. The re- 
maining divisions of Lee's army followed a few days after. 

So soon as Longstreet joined Jackson, the two advanced 
towards the Eapidan, with the view of attacking Pope ; but 
the latter avoided an encounter by retreating behind the Rap- 
pahannock, where he w^as joined by Burnside's command, 
that had moved from the James River to unite via Fred- 
ericksburg with the army of Pope. The Confederates then 
pressed northward to the Rappahannock, on the opposing 
banks of wdiich several days were passed in maixeuvres, 
while Stuart, with fifteen hundred troopers, w^s sent on an 
expedition to cut the railroad in Pope's rear. Then, on the 
25th of August, Lee, masking his front along the Rappahan- 
nock with Longstreet's force, directed Jackson to make a 
turning movement on his adversary's right, and place him- 
self on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad between Pope's 
army and Washington. Jackson by forced marches had ac- 
complished this purpose by the following night, striking the 
railroad at Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction. 

It is manifest that Lee did not regard his opponent as a 
man to be feared ; for in detaching Jackson he severed his 
army in twain and presented Pope an excellent opportunity 
to make a decisive stroke. The means at the disposal of that 
officer would certainly have warranted vigorous action. He 
had already been joined by three corps of the Army of the 
Potomac and the remaining two were e/i route from Alexan- 



148 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

dria. But Pope showed himself incapable of appreciating his 
advantage, and after a series of shiftings and turnings that 
were very mal apropos, he found himself, on the 29th, con- 
fronting Jackson on the battle-field of Bull Run. Unhappily 
the opportunity had passed : Lee had gained time to hasten 
forvard with the remainder of his army and had joined his 
lieutenant during the forenoon of the 29th. Pope acted on the 
offensive on the 29th, but was repulsed. Next day, Lee took 
the initiative. After a warm enrao^ement he turned his antajj- 
onist's left, and by night had carried the field of battle and 
swept Pope's whole force, with great loss, across Bull Run. 
The pursuit was continued during the two following days as far 
as Chantilly, where an engagement took place on the afternoon 
of the 2d September. It was unimportant in its results, but 
cost the sacrifice of two of the ablest officers of the service — 
General Stevens and Phil. Kearney, that bright ideal of 
a soldier, who was wont, grasping the sword with his 
single hand and placing the reins between his teeth, to 
lead his men in charges that were irresistible, and whom 
his division loved as the soldiers of the Tenth Legion 
loved Caesar. At Chantilly Lee cried a halt, while the broken 
battalions of the once proud Union army reeled and staggered 
back to the fortifications of Washington. 

Such, then, were the circumstances under which Lee, 
sitting alone in his tent at Chantilly the night of the 2d 
September, formed the audacious resolve of invasion. It 
must be confessed there was much to prompt this course. 
The astonishing success that had crowned his first campaign 
had given Lee a sense of confidence in his own powers and 
his army a contempt for its adversary. The Union army, 
shattered physically, but still more shaken in morale, he 
might well conclude could offer but a feeble resistance, while 
Maryland, in passionate songs, had invoked deliverance from 
what, with an overstretch of poetic license, was called the 



ANTIETAM. 149 

"tyrant's foot." How these facts, •working together in the 
mind of Lee, determined themselves in a resolve, let that 
General himself state. "The armies of Generals McClellan 
and Pope had now been brought back to the point from which 
they set out on the campaigns of the spring and summer, and 
the objects of their campaigns had been frustrated. The 
war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and 
the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible 
to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way 
desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations 
to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the 
enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of the 
army into Maryland. The condition of Maryland encouraged 
the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to 
that of the enemy, would induce the Washington government 
to retain all its available force to provide against contingen- 
cies which its course towards the people of that State gave it 
reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that 
military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the 
citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to 
make to recover their liberty. Influenced by these considera- 
tions, the army was put in motion." 

It must be left to the imagination of the reader to conceive 
what disorder and alarm meanwhile reigned in "Washington. 
With dismay those who controlled the military councils saw 
the legitimate fruit of their own devisings come back upon 
them ; for, in removing the army from the Peninsula, they 
had, of their own accord, unloosed Lee and invited the de- 
struction of the forces in Northern Virginia. They had sown 
the wind : they now reaped the whirlwind. The structure of 
the army was completely dislocated : half the men had aban- 
doned their colors, not through fear, but from the knowl- 
edge that they were without a head. And only these broken 
battalions lay between Lee and Washington ! Never before 
had the national capital been in such peril — not even when, 



150 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the year before, the fugitive mob of McDowell rushed in 
panic under its walls. That was before the Confederates had 
developed a definite military policy ; this was after a campaign 
which, having commenced w^ith the raising of the siege of 
their own capital, naturally inflamed their minds with the 
desire of capturing the capital of their adversary. 

In this dark hour the President turned for help to that 
officer Avho, during the last disastrous days of the campaign, 
had been reduced to the duty of playing quartermaster to 
Pope. He turned to General IVIcClellan as the only man 
who could bring order out of the chaos into which affau-s had 
fallen. And it is certain that whatever may have been the 
estimate the Government put upon his ability, it knew at 
least that he alone had the power to restore cohesion and 
confidence to the Army of the Potomac. On that same 2d 
of September, when Lee from Chantilly Avas telegraphing to 
Richmond his purpose of moving mto Maryland, Mr. Lin^ 
coin, accompanied by General Ilalleck, went to beg INIcCleK 
Ian to go out, meet, and take command of the retreating 
army for the defence of the capital. Getting at once into 
the saddle, he hastened forth to seek the disorganized forces, 
applied himself with vigor to his task, and soon wrought an 
astonishing moral transformation in the army. The troops 
who had learnt by experience the difference between general- 
ship and military incapacity, hailed with joy his restoration 
to command. Thousands of absentees rallied to their stand- 
ards, discipline recovered its sway, and the shapeless mass 
became the Army of the Potomac once more. 

The rehabilitation of the army was for the time the para- 
moimt consideration, excluding all others ; but this happily 
being soon accomphshcd, McClellan turned his attention 
to the duties imposed upon him by the presence of the 
enemy. Lee did not long leave his opponent in doubt touch- 
ing his intentions ; for, turning aside from the " high up- 
reared and abutting fronts" that defended Washington, the 



ANTIETAM. 151 

Confederate commander passed the Potomac by the fords 
near Leesburg, and concentrated his columns at Frederick, 
Maryland. Thither McClellan immediately directed the 
Army of the Potomac, on routes covering Washington and 
Baltimore. The right wing was under Burnside, the centre 
under Sumner, and the left under Franklin. 

The Confederate van, composed of Jackson's divisions, 
made its entry into Frederick on the 6th of September. The 
" liberating army " was now on Northern soil, and confidently 
awaited the expected rising on the part of the citizens of Mary- 
land, who were admonished, in a proclamation issued by Gen- 
eral Lee, to " throw off the foreign yoke.'"' But the Confeder- 
ates soon discovered they were doomed to disappointment in 
this expectation. There was found to be not only little se- 
cessionist sentiment in Western Maryland, but it proved that 
those who were willing to join the revolt dared not do so un- 
til Lee should show his ability to maintain himself in the 
State. The spectacle of Jackson's unkempt and unclean sol- 
diers, shoeless, and clad in tattered butternut or gray, awak- 
ened no enthusiasm ; loyal women dared to throw out the 
flag of the Union from their windows, and the recruiting . 
offices established by Leo stood empty. In fact the invasion, 
so far as it was based on the hope of exciting insurrection, 
was, from the start, a failure. In addition, McClellan was 
approaching. Lee, therefore, evacuated Frederick on the 
10th and 11th, moving westward beyond the mountains. The 
van of the Union army entered the town the next day amid 
the hearty plaudits of the people. 

What now was Lee's design ? what his plan of operations ? 
Let him tell us in his own words : " It w^as proposed to move 
the army into Western Maryland, establish our communica- ft 
tions with Richmond through the valley of the Shenandoah, 
and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, 
and draw him from his base. Now it had been supposed that 
the advance upon Frederick would lead to the evacuation of 



152 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of com- 
munications through the valley. But this not having occured, 
it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from these posi- 
tions before concentrating the army west of the mountains. 
To accomplish this with the least delay, General Jackson was 
directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg, and, 
after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the 
south side of the Potomac upon Haqier's Ferry. General 
McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson's divisions, was 
ordered to besiege Maryland Heights, on the north side of 
the Potomac, opposite Harper's Ferry, and Brigadier-General 
Walker to take possession of Loudon Heights, on the east 
side of the Shenandoah, where it unites with the Potomac. 
These several commands were directed, after reducing Har- 
per's Ferry and clearing the valley of the enemy, to join the 
rest of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown." 

This plan of operations was embodied in an order of march, 
of which copies were distributed to the several division com- 
manders ; but, by accident, one of these fell into the hands 
of the very man whom of all others in the world it was to Lee 
most important it should not reach. It appears that through 
some negligence the copy of this order sent to General D. H. 
Hill was left behind at Frederick when the Confederates 
moved westward ; and when ]\IcClellan reached that city on 
the 13th, the paper was placed in his hands. Certainly one's 
adversary is not the person a General most desires to take 
into his confidence when executing such an entei-prise as that 
upon which Lee was now bent ! 

The advantage which the possession of this order gave Mc- 
Clellan was, of course, immense. Nor did he delay availing 
• himself of his opportunity : the army was immediately pressed 
forward in vigorous pursuit. From Frederick the Union col- 
umns wended their way through the picturesque region of 
Western Maryland, over tlie Catoctin Mountains, and across 
the lovely Middleton valley, then arrayed in the glory of a 



ANTIETAM. 153 

golden harvest, till they confronted the massive buttress of 
the South Mountain range. Where, meanwhile, was Lee? 

Respecting his hopes and purposes at this time, the Con- 
federate commander in his official report, makes a very frank 
statement. "The advance of the Federal army," says he, 
'*was so slow, at the time we left Frederick [no wonder, 
considering General Halleck's constant remonstrances that 
McClellan was moving too far from Washington], as to jus- 
tify the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry would be 
accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be 
called on to meet it. In that event it had not been intended 
to oppose its passage through the South Mountains, as it 
■was desired to engage it as far from its base as possible." 
Accordingly, wdiile Jackson and McLaws and Walker had 
proceeded towards Harper's Ferry, Lee's remaining divisions 
under Longstreet and D. H. Hill had passed quite west 
of the South Mountains, the former to Hagerstown, the latter 
to Boonsboro', there to await the reduction of Harper's Ferry, 
when the divisions engaged in that enterprise were to unite 
with them. Stuart, with his troopers and a couple of batteries 
of horse artillery alone remained to cover the rear. Now, 
on the afternoon of the 13th, Lee was surprised by a message 
from Stuart informing him that the Union column was ap- 
proaching the South Mountain on the great road from Freder- 
ick to Boonsboro', which traversed the ridge by a gorge named 
Turner's Gap. This information was the more alarming, 
seeing that the operations against Harper's Ferry had not 
been conducted as rapidly as had been expected. If now 
in this state of facts the Union force should penetrate the 
Soiith Mountain, it would find itself in Pleasant Valley, di- 
rectly in the rear of the Confederate force that under McLaws 
was co-operating with Jackson in the reduction of Harper's 
Ferry from the side of Maryland Heights. The consequence 
could not fail to be disastrous to Lee. It would in feet break 
up his whole plan of campaign. 



154 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

To prevent this result it only remained for Lee to make 
such dispositions as would cover the siege of Harjoer's Ferry .- 
In this nature greatly favored him, for the South Mountain 
range running northward from the Potomac, played the part 
of a natural curtain and furnished an excellent line of defence. 
As it could be penetrated only by Turner's Gap and by an- 
other pass, five miles nearer the Potomac named Crampton's 
Gaj), it was simply requisite to firmly guard these debouches, 
and the whole Union army would be held off at ami's length, 
as it were, with one hand, while with the other the Confederate 
commander was securing the rich prize of Harper's Ferry. 
Accordingly McLaws was directed to divert part of his force 
from the operations against Maryland Heights in order to 
guard Crampton's Gap in his rear while D. H. Hill was in- 
structed to hasten back from Boonsboro' to look after Turner's 
Pass, and Longstreet was commanded to countermarch from 
Hagerstown to the latter's support. It happened that the left, 
wing of the Union army under Franklin Avas moving on the 
road leading to the former pass, while the right wing under 
Burnside followed by the centre under Sumner was advancing 
by the Boonsboro' road towards the latter pass ; but both 
McLaws and Hill had time to dispose their troops for the 
defence of the gaps, for the force that Stuart had met nearing 
the South Mountain on the afternoon of the 13th, was but the 
van guard of cavalry under Pleasonton : the infantry, being 
yet considerably behind, did not arrive before the passes until 
the morning of the 14th, and then only with the heads of 
columns. 

It needs not go beyond the facts of the situation already 
presented to apprehend the course of conduct which duty 
now imposed on McClellan. He knew that behind that 
mountain wall, at Harper's Fcny, twelve thousand men were 
helplessly environed by the enemy, and he was bound if pos- 
sible to relieve them. It is true their presence there was no 
fault of his ; for he had urged on General Halleck, as soon as 



ANTIETAM. 155 

he learned Lee had crossed the Potomac, the necessity of with- 
drawing the garrison from Harper's Ferry as a point at once 
useless and untenable from the moment the Confederates were 
in Maryland. It matters not that official pedantry, disregard- 
ing this sage counsel, had retained those men in a trap until 
every avenue of escape was cut off. McClellan was bound 
by every consideration of honor and duty to do his utmost to 
succor them. 

McClellan certainly appreciated the weight of the obligation 
imposed upon him ; but it will be always a matter of regret 
that more impetuosity could not have been thrown into the 
execution of tlie task. It required a considerable part of the 
day to bring up the troops, to reconnoitre and to make dispo- 
sitions : so that it was not till late in the afternoon that after 
many tentatives, the crests of the mountain were carried by 
Franklin's charge at Crampton's Gap, and by that of Burnside 
at Turner's. Finding their positions thus compromised, Long- 
street and D. H. Hill, during the night retired ten miles 
westward to Sharpsburg near the Potomac. Next mornmg 
the Union troops debouched by the passes into Pleasant Val- 
ley. Would they still be in time to relieve Harper's Ferry ? 
It was so hoped, and for two days past McClellan, by frequent 
discharges of artillery had endeavored to convey to Colonel 
Miles tidings of his approach. Now that the South Mountain 
was passed it was a march of no more than six miles for the 
force that issued through Crampton's Pass to reach Harper's 
Ferry, whence the booming of guns announced that it still 
held out. But by a tragic conjuncture, just as the army had 
burst the barrier that separated it from the beleagurcd gar- 
rison, an ominous cessation of firing announced that Harper's 
Ferry had fallen ! Let us now see in what manner this un- 
toward event fell out. 

Ere yet the Union army had reached South Mountain, 
Jackson on the 13th, having passed the Potomac at Williams- 
port, had approached Harper's Ferry from the south, and drew 



156 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

up his force fronting Bolivar Heights on which the main body 
of the garrison had taken post. While Jackson was to attack 
Harper's Ferry from that direction, McLaws's division was to 
occupy Maryland Heights, and Walker's Loudon Heights. 
As the Potomac separated him from the former and the Shen- 
andoah from the latter, it was a matter of vital importance to 
establish communication and co-operation between the different 
bodies of the investing force. Jackson therefore signaled the 
heights opposite him in order to ascertain if the forces had 
yet come up. No reply was received. McLaws had not been 
able to gain possession of Maryland Heights, and the reason 
of this is now to be given. While Colonel Miles retained 
the bulk of his force in Harper's Ferry, he assigned a 
part of the garrison under Colonel Ford to the defence 
of the heights on the Maiyland side. In this disposition 
of his troops, the vital error was that he did not with- 
draw everything from Harper's Ferry, and concentrate all on 
Maryland Heights — an extremely defensible position, and 
completely commanding Plarper's Ferry, which lies in the 
bottom of a funnel formed of the three mountains named re- 
spectively Bolivar, Maryland, and Loudon Heights. The 
presence of Ford's force on Maryland Heights, and the natu- 
ral difficulties of the ground, obliged JMcLaws to consume the 
greater part of the 13th in preparations for the attack ; but 
when in the afternoon his troops moved forward to scale the 
heights. Ford, after a brief and unskilful resistance, abandoned 
the mountain and fled across the Potomac to Harper's Ferry. 
The Confederates during the night dragged more artillery up 
the rocky sides of Maryland Heights and crowned the crest. 

On the morning of the 14th, McLaws, from his eyrie, was 
able to send response to Jackson's renewed and eager signals ; 
Walker, on Loudon Heights, gave the like sign : the invest- 
ment was complete — the garrison was at the mercy of the 
besiegers. Jackson himself shall tell us the sequel : 

"At dawn, SeiDtember 15th, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker 




^'' 16**'K17»> Sept. 1862. 



ANTIETAM. 157 

opened a rapid enfilade fire from all his batteries at about one 
thousand yards range. The batteries on School-house Hill 
attacked the enemy's lines in front. In a short time the 
guns of Colonel Crutchfield opened from the rear. Those 
of Pegram and Carpenter opened fire upon the enemy's right ; 
the artillery on Loudon Heights again opened on Harper's 
Ferry, and also some guns of General McLaws from Mar}-^- 
land Heights. In an hour, the enemy's fire seemed to bo 
silenced, and the batteries were ordered to cease their fire, 
which was the signal for storming the works. General Pen- 
der had commenced his advance, when the enemy again 
opening, Pegi-am and Crenshaw moved forward their bat- 
teries and poured in a rapid fire. The white flag was now 
displayed, and shortly afterwards Brigadier-General White 
(the commanding officer, Colonel D. S. IVIiles, having been 
mortally wounded) , with a garrison of about eleven thousand 
men, surrendered as prisoners of war. Under this capitu- 
lation, we took possession of seventy-three pieces of artillery, 
some thirteen thousand small arms, and other stores. Leaving 
General A. P. Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal 
troops and take the requisite steps for securing the captured 
stores, I moved, in obedience to orders from the commanding 
general, to rejoin him in Maryland, with the remaining divis- 
ions of my command." 

The denouement at Plarper s Feny restored Lee's fortunes ; 
for up to the time that he received tidings of its fall, it seem- 
ed probable that he would be compelled to re-cross into Vir- 
ginia and abandon the campaign. 

II. 
THE BATTLE OF ANTIETA^I. 

Descending the western slope of the South Mountain, one 
suddenly emerges into a lovely valley, spreading out in many 
graceful undulations and picturesque forms of field and forest, 



158 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

to the Potomac. This stream, turning sharply to the north 
at Harper's Ferry, forms the westward limit of the valley, 
whose breadth from the momitain to the river may be from 
eight to twelve miles. But before reaching the Potomac, at 
a distance of six or eight miles from the passes of the South 
Mountain, one comes upon the stream Antietam, which, 
flowing from the north in drowsy, winding course, empties 
into the Potomac a few miles above Harper's Ferry. As this 
brook makes with the Potomac an acute angle, and the Poto- 
mac forms a reentrant angle on itself, there is thus left be- 
tween the two streams an enclosed space of two or three 
miles broad and twice or thrice that lens^th. From the west- 
ern margin of the Antietam the ground rises in a slope of 
woods and cultivated fields to a bold crest, and then falls back 
in rough outlines of rock and scaur to the Potomac. The 
town of Sharpsburg nestles just behind the ridge, above 
which the steeples of its churches are visible from the east 
side of the Antietam, and in the rear of Sharpsburg is the 
Shepherdstown ford of the Potomac. 

It was upon this coign of vantage, his back towards the 
Potomac, his front covered by the Antietam, that Lee,- on the 
morning of the 15th of September, drew up his force, or 
rather w^hat of his force was with him — to wit : the divisions 
of Lonffstreet and Hill that durinsr the nicfht had been com- 
pelled to abandon the defence of the South Mountain passes. 
Jackson andMcLaws and Walker Avere still at Harper's Ferry, 
which did not surrender till the morning of the 15th, and 
from which Lee had yet no reports. Li taking post behind 
the Antietam, therefore, Lee was in position either to rej)ass 
the Potomac by the Shepherdstown ford, if he should be 
pressed too hard by IMcClellan, or to stand and receive battle 
if the conclusion of operations at Harper's should set Jack- 
son and his companions free to unite with him at Sharps- 
burg. While there anxiously awaiting the turn of events, 
Lee, during the forenoon of the 15th, received from Jackson 



ANTIETAM. 159 

tidings of the surrender of Harper's Ferry — tidings which 
he says "reanimated the courage of the troops." Forth- 
with he instructed his lieutenant to march with all haste by 
way of Shepherdstown ford and join him at Sharpsburg. His 
arrival was hardly to be looked for that day, but it was cer- 
tain next morning ; and in the interim Lee judged he could 
readily hold ]\IcClellan in check. 

Howbeit, it was now manifest to Lee that the terms on 
which he would be compelled to meet his antagonist were 
very different from those he had hoped to establish for him- 
self ere he should be brought to battle. In the revelation 
already made of his intent, it will be remembered that he had 
expected — the words are his own — " to move the army into 
"Western Maryland, establish our communications with Rich- 
mond through the valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threaten- 
ing Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and draAV him 
away from his base of supplies." Now if we may translate 
this very general statement into specific terms, it probably 
means that Lee designed to take position in the Cumberland 
valley as far north as Hagerstown, where, masking his move- 
ment by the mountains he would be able to send forward a 
raiding column towards the Susquehanna, and if this ma- 
noeuvre should prompt the Union commander to follow his 
impulse by an advance northward, east of the South Mountain 
range (as a like movement induced Meade to do during the 
campaign of the following year) , an opening would then be 
afforded him of moving upon Washington. It was otherwise 
decreed. The retention of the Union armies at Harper's 
Ferry obliged Lee to detach two thirds of his force to secure 
its capture, and by its capture his communications with 
Kichmond. The unwonted rapidity with which his opponent 
moved forward from Frederick made it necessary for him to 
use the remaining third of his strength in covering the siege of 
Harper's Ferry. Finally, the expulsion of this force from the 
South Mountain before yet Harper's Ferry had fallen, com- 



160 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAK. 

pelled him to retire towards the Potomac. Henceforth his 
movements were controlled by the prime and imperious 
necessity of effecting a concentration of his troops, rather 
than by his original purpose of manoeuvi-ing the Union army 
away from its base. He was no longer offensive but 
defensive. Strategically, he was already foiled. Why, 
then, did he resolve still to remain in Maryland? The 
answer is obvious. To have re-crossed the Potomac without 
a battle would have weakened him morally, investing the 
whole enterprise with the aspect of an aimless and Quixotic 
adventure. Besides, he believed himself to be able to worst 
his antagonist in a trial of strength, for he was elated by 
many successes, and he counted much on the supposed de- 
moralization of the army of the Potomac. In taking his 
stand, therefore, in that south-western corner of Maryland, 
he challenged combat that must in its very nature be deci- 
sive. If beaten, he would be compelled to seek safety in 
flight across the Potomac; if victorious, Washington and 
Baltimore would lie open to him. 

While Lee, awaiting anxiously the arrival of Jackson, oc- 
cupied his mind with these grave speculations, the Union 
army which, on the morning of the 15th, had defiled from the 
South Mountains and moved in long shining columns athwart 
the valley, reached the heights on the east side of the 
Antietam, across which, defined on the rim of the opposite 
crest, the hostile infantry and artillery were plainly visible. 
Unhappily, if McClellau, as is averred, had designed to assail 
Lee immediately on meeting, and thus take" advantage of the 
yet divided condition of the Confederate force, he lost the 
opportunity. In spite of his efforts to launch forward the 
army in rapid pursuit, much time had been lost ; Burnside 
delayed several hours beyond his appointed time of starting 
in the morning ; there was considerable confusion and cross 
purpose in the marches, and when, well on in the afternoon, 
McClellan reached the Antietam, no more than two divisions 



ANTIETAM. IgX 

— Eichardson's division of Sumner's corps, and Sykes' divis- 
ion of Porter's corps — had yet come up : so that, by the 
time a sufficient force was in hand to authorize his seizins: the 
offensive, the day had passed by, and with it the opportunity 
to take Lee in his sin. During the morning of the 16th, the 
whole of the Union army had arrived, saving Franklin's coni- 
mand, which was still in Pleasant Valley ; the corps were 
then posted behind the ridge on the east side of Antietam 
Creek — Burnside's corps on the left. Porter's in the centre 
Hooker's corps and the two corps under Sumner on the right. 
The crest was crowned with batteries so placed as to deliver 
a very effective fire. Let us now see the position of Lee's 
forces. 

From the town of Sharpsburg two main roads lead out — 
the one running eastward across the Antietam to Boonsboro' ; 
the other northward on the Avest side of the Antietam to Hagers- 
town. The distance from Sharpsburg to the stream is as near 
as may be a mile. Lee posted his troops between the town 
and the Antietam — Longstreet's command to the right 
(south), and D. H. Hill's division to the left (north) of the 
Boonsboro' road. Their line was nearly parallel to the An- 
tietam. Hood's division of Longstreet's command was, how- 
ever, placed on the left of Hill's line, where it was someAvhat 
*' refused " and ^ stretched across to the Hagerstown road. 
When Jackson came up with two divisions on the 16th, he 
was placed to the left of the Hagerstown road ; and as this 
part of the field was the scene of the most deadly encounters 
of the 17th, it will require a little speciality of description. 

If leaving the town of Sharpsburg the pedestrian walks out 
northward by the Hagerstown road, he will, at the distance 
of a mile, reach a small edifice, known as the "Dunker 
Church," situate on the road, hard by a body of woods. 
This wood, which has a depth of about a quarter of a mile, 
runs along the Hagerstown road for several hundred yards, 
entirely on the left hand side as you proceed from Sharpa- 
11 



162 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

burg. Then there is a field, the edge of which runs at right 
angles to the road for about two hundred yards, thus making 
an elbow in the woods. The field then turns to the right, 
and runs along the woods parallel to the Hagerstown road 
for a quarter of a mile, when the wood again turns square to 
the left and extends back about half a mile, making at this 
point again an elbow with the strip of woods running along 
the road from the church. The timber-ground is full of 
ledges of limestone and small ridges, affording excellent cover 
for troops. It was here that Jackson's troops were posted. 
The field from the timber to the Hagerstown road forms a 
plateau nearly level, and in higher ground than the woods 
which slope down abruptly from the edges of the plateau. 
The field, however, extends not only ^o the Hagerstown road, 
but for a considerable distance to the east side of it, when it 
is again circumscribed by another body of timber, which we 
may call the "cast woods." The woods around the Dunker 
Church, the "east woods," and the open field between them 
formed the arena whereon the terrible wrestle between the 
Union right and Confederate left took place — a fierce flame of 
battle which, beginning in the " east woods," swept back and 
forth across the field, burst forth for a time in the woods 
around the Dunker Church, and which left its marks every- 
where, but in most visible horror on the open plain. 

Lee stood on the defensive. In order, therefore, to assume 
the offensive it was necessary for McClellan to pass the An- 
tietam. That stream is in this vicinity crossed by several 
stone bridges, of Avhich one is at the crossing of the Keadys- 
ville and AVilliamsport road ; a second, two and a half miles 
below on the Boonsboro' road ; a third, about a mile below 
the second on the Eohrersville and Sharpsburg road. It has 
a few fords, but they are difficult. The last of these bridges, 
which was opposite the Union left, under Burnside, was found 
to be covered by marksmen protected by rifle trenches. The 
second, opposite the Union centre, under Porter, was un- 



ANTIETAM. 163 

obstructed save by the fire of the hostile batteries on the crest. 
The first, or upper bridge, beyond the Union right, was en- 
tirely unguarded, and a ford hard by was also available. 
The plan formed by McClcllan was to cross at the upper 
bridge, assail the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and 
Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by 
Franklin's, and as soon as matters should look favorably '^^'^'"'^'^^ 
there to move the corps of General Buruside across the lower 
bridge against Lee's extreme right, upon the ridge running to 
the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried his 
position to pierce along the crest towards their right ; finally 
whenever either of these flank movements should be success- 
ful to advance the centre with all the forces then disposable. 
The execution of this plan was begun on the afternoon of 
the 16th, when Hooker's corps was ordered to cross the An- 
tietam by the upper bridge and ford. The passage was 
eflfected without opposition, and Hooker, moving to the west 
and south penetrated, amid slight skirmishing, as far as the 
woods on the east of - the Hagerstown road. Thus far he 
advanced, but no farther that night; for Hood's two brigades 
which had lain in the edge of the timber near the Dunker 
Church, were, on the approach of Hooker, marched across the 
open fields to the east woods, and there joined combat. As, 
however, it was dark when the encounter took place, no result 
was reached. Each party occupied the woods ; but, before 
midnight Hood's brigades were relieved by two of Jackson's 
command. During the night Mansfield's corps made the 
passage of the Antietam, and lay a mile in rear of Hooker, 
Sumner held his corps in readiness to cross at daylight. 
McClellan had now plainly revealed his intent ; it was mani- 
fest that morning must precipitate decisive action — an un- 
welcome reflection to Lee, for four divisions of the Confederate 
forces had not yet returned from Harper's Ferry. 

The light of day, the 17th of September, broke with ten- 
der beauty over the lovely valley of the Antietam, and 



164 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

da^vlled upon the mighty hosts that there confronted each 
other in battle array, conscious that the issue not only of a 
campaign but of the War itself hung on what should that 
day be done. The collision was not delayed, and with early 
light the morning stillness was broken by the rattle of mus- 
ketry and the hoarse clamor of two hundred guns. 

McClellan opened the conflict by seizing the initiative and 
hurling his right (the corps of Hooker) against the left of 
his antagonist. It will be remembered that in the east 
woods Hood's division had the night before been relieved by 
two brigades of Ewell's division of Jackson's corps. These 
were early in the morning strengthened by another brigadei*. 
In addition to this division, there was at this time present 
with Jackson only the Stonewall division, imder General 
Jones, for the division of A. P. Hill had not yet returned 
fi'om Harper's Ferry. But while Ewell's division was thus 
thrown forward in advance, the Stonewall division was held 
in hand behind out-cropping ledges of limestone in the wood 
near the Dunker Church : so that the attack at first fell alone 
upon the three brigades in the east wood. The assault was 
made by Hookers centre division, which, as it happened, 
was the division of Pennsylvania Reserves under Meade — ^ 
Doubleday's division being on its right, Ricketts' on its lefl. 
It was marked by wonderful impetuosity on the Union side, 
and by stubborn resistance on the part of the Confederates. 
However, after an hour's fighting, such was the vigor with 
which the attack was pressed, and so destructive to Jackson's 
troops was the fire of the numerous batteries on the east 
side of the Antietam (placed, says Jackson, so as to enfilade 
his line), that the Confederate brigades gave back with great 
loss across the ojicn field and over the HagerstoAvn road to 
the woods beyond — the woods around the Dunker Church, 
where Jackson's reserves lay. If it had occurred to General 
Hoolccr at this time to bring up the corps of Mansfield, form 
it on his right, and with this well-developed front assail the 



ANTIETAM. l5§ 

Confederate left, there is no doubt that the whole of that 
wing might have been swept away. There is a commanding 
eminence, to the right of where Hooker's flank rested, which 
would thus have been occupied, and as it is the key of the 
field, taking en revers the woods with the out-cropping ledges 
of limestone where Jackson's reserves lay, its possession 
would, in all likelihood, have been decisive of the field. 
Hooker failed to perceive this ; but he advanced his line to 
reap the fruit of his first advantage — thrusting forward his 
centre and left over the open field towards the woods west of 
the Hagcrstown road. No sooner, however, liad the troops 
approached the crest of the plateau than Jackson's reserves, 
with the re-formed battalions of Ewell's division, emerged 
from the woods and joined issue Avith the advancing line in a 
combat of extraordinary ferocity. Equal in mettle, the 
combatants faced each other on the open plain Avithiu short 
range, neither side yielding, and both plying their deadly 
work with such desperate ardor, such inflexible determina- 
tion as fcAy battle-fields have witnessed. The mortal strug- 
gle was only ended when at length the opposing froiits had 
torn each other to shreds. Then both sides retired ; but 
even when the broken fragments went back, the spectators 
from the distant stand-point of the east side of the Antietam 
could trace in the dead that covered the ground where lines 
had stood — dreadful witness of a struggle whose character 

CO 

may be gathered from the following statement of the mortal- 
ity it tsntailed : 

Of the Confederate losses, Jackson thus writes in his official 
report : "The carnage on both sides was terrific. At an early 
hour General Starke (commanding the Stonewall division) 
Avas killed, and Colonel Douglas (commanding Lawton's 
brigade) was also killed. General Lawton, commanding divis- 
ion and Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, were severely 
wounded. More than half of the brigades of Lawton and' 
Hays were either killed or wounded, and more than a third 



166 TIIE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

of Trimble's and all the regimental commanders in those bri- 
gades except two, were either Tcilled or wounded. Thinned in 
their ranks, and exhausted of their ammunition, Jackson's 
division and, the brigades of Lawton, Hays and Trimble, re- 
tired to the rear, and Hood, of Lougstreet's command, took 
th6ir place." On the Union side. Hooker's corps had been 
completely shattered, and indeed the men even when with- 
drawn from under fire were so shaken in morale that the 
corps may be said to have been completely broken up : so 
much so that General Sumner testifies that when he soon 
after vv^ards came upon the field, he " saw nothing of Hooker's 
corps at all." 

When the stress had become heaviest upon him, but before 
yet he had been compelled to give way, Hooker summoned 
uj) the corps of Mansfield, Avhich Avas in the rear, and w'hich, 
arriving about half past seven a. m., was formed with the 
division of Williams on the right and that of Green on the 
left. This force, brought !nto action later than it should have 
been, was immediately met by the division of D. H. Hill, 
which had meanwhile been called up from the position in 
Avhich it had lain behind the Dunker Church, to brace up the 
shattered corps of Jackson. The events that succeeded are 
thus recounted by Hood's two brigade commanders. Says 
Goloncl LaAv : "On reaching the HagerstoAvn road, I found 
but fe\v of our troops on the field, and these seemed to be in 
much confusion, but still opposing the advance of the enemy's 
dense masses with determination. Throwing the brigade at 
once into lino of battle, facing northward, I gave the order 
to advance. The Texas brigade, Colonel AVofFord, had in tho 
meaiUinic come into line on my left, and the two brigades 
had now moved forward together. The enemy, who had by 
this time advanced half way across the field, and had i>lanted 
a heavy battery at the north end of it, began to give way 
before us, though in vastly superior force. The fifth Texas 
regiment, which had been sent over to my right, and tho 



ANTIETAM. 167 

fourth Alabama, pushed into the "wood in "svhich the skirmish- 
ing had taken place the evening previous, and drove tho 
enemy through and beyond it. The other regiments of my 
command continued steadily to advance in tho open ground, 
driving the enemy in great confusion from and beyond his guns. 
So far we had been successful, and everything promised 
a decisive victory." Says Colonel Wofford : "IMoving for- 
ward in line of battle, the brigade proceeded through the 
woods into the open field towards the cornfield, where the 
left encountered the first line of the enemy. . . By this 
time, tlie enemy on our left having commenced falling back, 
the first Texas pressed them rapidly to their guns, which now 
poured into them a fire on their right flank, centre and left, 
from three different batteries, before which their well-formed 
line was cut down and scattered. Being two hundred yards 
iu front of our line, their situation was most critical. Riding 
back to the left of our line, I found the fragment of the 
eighteenth Georgia regiment in front of the extreme right 
battery of the enemy, located on the pike running by tho 
church, which now opened upon our thinned ranks a most 
destructive fire ; the men and officers were gallantly shooting 
down the gunners, and for a moment silenced them. At this 
time the enemy's fire was most terrific, their first line of 
infantry having been driven back to their guns, which now 
opened a furious fire together with their second line of in- 
fantry, upon our thinned and almost annihilated ranks." 

These extracts detail with sufficient accuracy what may bo 
called the second round in the combat betAveen the Union 
right and Confederate left. It resulted in driving back both 
the remnants of Hooker's corps and the divisions of Mansfield's 
command from the open field to the woods in which the con- 
test opened in the morning. So complete indeed was the 
repulse that for a time the hostile camp was only held in 
check by a single battery, which unsupported, maintained ita 
ground on the Ilagerstown road. The brave veteran. General 



168 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Mansfield had been killed while examining the ground in his 
front ; Hooker, severely wounded in the foot, had to be carried 
from the field, and only disaster seemed imminent, when most 
opportunely, at nine o'clock, Sumner came upon the field with 
his corps. Let us now see in the narratives of Hood's brigade 
eommanders how sudden a change now fell on their thus far 
victorious advance. Says Colonel Law : " So fur we had been 
entirely successful, and everything promised a decisive victory. 
It is true that strong support was needed to follow up our 
success, but this I expected every moment. At this stage of 
the battle, a powerful Federal force, ten times our number, 
of fresh troops was thrown in our front. Our losses up to 
this' time had been very heavy ; the troops now confronting 
the enemy w^ere insufiicient to cover properly one fourth of 
the line of battle ; our ammunition Avas expended, the men had 
been fighting long and desperately, and were exhausted from 
want of food and rest. It was evident this state of affairs 
could not long continue. No support Was at hand. To re- 
mairi stationary or advance without it would have caused a 
useless butchery, and I adopted the only alternative — that 
0f falling back to the wood from which I had first advanced." 
Says Colonel Wofford : " By this time, one brigade had 
suffered so greatly that I was satisfied they could neither ad- 
Vance nor hold their position. Presently our line commenced 
to give way, when I ordered it back; under cover of the' 
woods to the left of the church, when we halted and waited 
for support. None arriving, after some time , the enemy com- 
menced advancing in full force . Seeing the hopelessness and 
folly of making a stand with our shattered brigade, and a 
remnant from other commands, the men being greatly ex- 
hausted, and many of them out of ammunition, I determined 
to fall back to a fence in our rear, where we met the long- 
looked for reinforcements." 

' Such was the result of Sumner's attack, and it was made 
solely by his right division under Sedgwick — French's: 



*S5 



ANTIETAM. 1G9 

division being disposed to hold the ground where before Hook- 
er's left had been, and Richardson's division being thrown still 
further to the left, confronting the Confederate centre under 
D. H. Hill. Sedgwick, by his impetuous attack, not only 
cleared the open field, but following up his success, seized 
and held possession of the woods west of the Dunker Church. 
It was the farthest advance yet made, and bade fair to secure 
victory to the Union arms, when fortune once more gave the 
preponderance of force to the enemy. Just as Plood's troops, 
thoroughly beaten in the encounter with Sumner's command, 
were retiring from the field, and Sedgwick's division had gained 
the woods around the Dunker Church, the Confederate divi- 
sions of McLaws and Walker, which had that morning arrived,- 
assailed Sedgwick, whose position, by reason of the very 
success that had rewarded his attack was a critical one, 
being separated- by a wide, unguarded interval from all suj)- 
port on the left. The story of the onset of McLaws, and 
what thereby resulted to the Union force, is thus told by that 
officer himself: " Just in front of the line was a large body 
of woods, from which parties of our troops, of whoso com- 
mand I do not know, were seen retiring [the body of woods 
was that already so frequently noted as the wood around 
Dunker Church, and the Confederate troops seen retiring 
by McLaws were those of Hood, driven back by Sedgwick's 
attack] , and the enemy I could see, were advancing rapidly, 
occupying the place. My advance was ordered before the 
entire line of General Kershaw could be formed. As the 
enemy were filling the woods so rapidly, I wished my troops 
to cross the open space between us and the woods [the open 
space in rear of the woods near the Dunker Church, not the 
open space between the body of woods and the " east woods"] j- 
before they were entirely occupied. It was made steadily and 
in perfect order, and the troops were immediately engaged, 
driving the enemy before tliem in magnificent style, at all 
points, sweeping the woods with perfect ease, and inflicting 



170 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

great loss on the enemy. They were driven not only through 
the woods, but over the field in front of the woods, and over 
two high fences beyond and into another body of woods over 
half a mile distant from the commencement of the fight." In 
a word, the Union force was compelled to fall back to the 
same woods in which the battle had begun in the morning ; 
but the Confederates were unable to push their advantage any 
further, and finding themselves exposed to a biting fire on the 
open plain, they also Avithdrew to thoir vantage ground in the 
woodland west of the Dunker Church. 

Such was the course of the eventful action between the Con- 
federate left and Union right — an action into which half of each 
army had been drawn in successive installments, and which, 
marked by a scries of fierce encounters, ended at eleven o'clock 
by leaving the combatants in the secure positions they had oc- 
cupied in the morning. Both sides were greatly exhausted, 
and showed little disposition to resume the offensive, at least 
over ground that had proved so fatal to each. The Confeder- 
ates, however, descrying^ the great interval remaining between 
Sumner's right division, under Sedgwick, and his centre divi- 
sion, under French, sought to work their way through the 
woods, and penetrated this interval, which was protected only 
by one or two batteries, that had been left without infantry 
support. At this critical moment Franklin, with the divisions 
of Smith and Slocum, reached the ground, and under the di- 
rection of Colonel Taylor of the staff of General Sumner, 
formed his troops so as to cover the threatened point : then, 
throwing forward the brigade of Colonel Irvin in a vigorous 
sally, he forced the Confederates back to their own place. 
General Sumner, however, did not esteem it prudent to haz- 
ard full attack with the divisions of Franklin, judging that the 
repulse of these, the only available reserves, would imperil 
the safety of the whole army. 

While yet the combat raged between Sumner's right and the 
forces of McLaws, the former instructed his left divisions, 



ANTIETAM. 17X 

under French and Richardson, to attack as a diversion in favor 
of Sedgwick. This purpose was vigorously executed by 
both commanders — the former driving Hill from liis first 
position to the cover of a sunken road, where he was assailed 
by the divisions of Kichardson, and thrown back to the 
Hagerstown road. Unfortunately, however, the success was 
not pushed to a conclusion — Richardson contenting himself 
with taking up a position to hold what he had won. On the 
left of Richardson, Pleasonton's division of cavalry and horse 
artillery held the centre of the Union line, and repulsed 
several assaults. During the whole afternoon, however, 
comparative quiet reigned both at the right and in the centre. 
If, now, we recur to the original plan of battle, it may be 
asked wdth some surprise, "Where, meanwhile, was Burn- 
side?" It has been seen that McClellan dcsio^ncd to attack- 
with his left in support of his right ; and at eight a.m. he 
ordered Burnside to carry the lower stone bridge, near -which 
his corps was massed, and then gain possession of the 
Sharpsburg heights. A glance at the map will serve to reveal 
the supreme importance of the duty entrusted to Burnside ; 
for a successful assault of the Sharpsburg crest must not only 
have relieved the excessive pressure brought to bear against 
Hooker and Sumner on the right, but must have menaced 
Lee's line of retreat to the Shcpherdstown ford of the Poto- 
mac. The progress of Burnsidc's movement was accordingly 
awaited with much anxiety ; but after some time had elapsed 
the commander, not hearing from him, dispatched an aid to 
ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with tho 
information that but little progress had been made. McClel- 
lan then sent him back with an order to G'eneral Burnside to 
assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. The 
aid returned a second time wdth the report that the bridge 
was still in possession of the enemy ; whereupon jMcClellan 
commanded Burnside to carry the bridge at the point of the 
bayonet. But by hesitation and uncertain efforts that officer 



172 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

allowed himself to be held in check during the entire fore- 
noon hy a few hundred riflemen : so that Lee was free to 
concentrate nearly his whole force at the decisive point on 
the left ; and in fact the main action was decided on the right 
before Burnside succeeded in forcing a passage. This was 
effected at one V. m. — five hours after the bridsre should have 
been carried by a coup de main. A halt was then made by 
General Burnside until 3 P. M. ; upon hearing which, 
McClcllan dispatched a message, desiring him -r- I use the 
General's own words — to " push forward his troops with the 
utmost vigor, and carry the enemy's position on the heights ; 
that the movement was vital to our success ; that this was a 
time when we must not stop for loss of life if a great object 
could thereby be accomplished ; that if, in his judgment, his 
attack would fail, to inform me so at once, that his troops 
might be withdrawn and used elsewhere on the field." Urged 
by such imperative messages, Burnside pressed forward to the 
attack of the heights, and meeting but little opposition to his 
advance, he succeeded in gaining them and crowning the, crest. 
Two hours earlier this success would have been deci- 
sive of the whole field. But one of the results of the fatal 
delay was, that it gave A. P. Hill, who had that day been 
marching from Harper's Ferry, time to reach the field. 
Approaching Sharpsburg from Shepherdstown, he arrived 
just as the heights had been carried, and forming his divis- 
ion so as to apply it on the left flank of Burnside's line, he,, 
in a few minutes, swept the Union force back to the protec-^ 
tion of the bluffs at the bridge of the Antietam. But the 
Confederates did not pursue. As all the reserve corps of 
Porter had been brought into action on the west side of the 
Antietam, with the exception of a force of less than four 
thousand men held to protect the centre, McClellan, fearful 
of an attack against that important pait of his line, was 
unable to comply with General Burnside's request for 
reinforcements, and contented himself with charging that. 



ANTIETAM. 173 

officer to hold the bridge at least. The Confederates; how- 
ever, were in no condition to take the offensive, and night 
soon ended this bloody but thus far indecisive battle. 

The morning of the 18th found both commanders standing 
at bay — each thinking more of making his own position 
secure than of assailing his adversary. During the day, how- 
ever, McClellan received an accession to his strength of two 
divisions under Couch and Humphreys, and he then deter- 
mined to resume the attack on the following day. General 
Lee also received a reinforcement of one division, the last of 
those that had been operating against Harper's Ferry. But 
as, on the previous day, he had not been able to brnig into 
action more than 40,000 men, and as the fresh force was far 
from making up for his losses, he resolved to retreat — a pur- 
pose that he carried into execution the night of the 18th, 
passing the Potomac into Virginia by the Shepherdstown 
ford. An attempt at pursuit, which was made on the 19th, 
failed — part of Porter's corps that crossed the Potomac 
suffering a considerable loss. After this, both armies 
remained for several weeks quiescent — the Confederates in 
the Shenandoah Valley near Winchester, and the Union army 
in South western Maryland in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. 



m. 

RESULTS OF ANTIETAIM. 

In entering upon the historical interpretation of the battle 
of Antietam we are constrained, more perhaps than in the 
case of any other action in the war, to look away from the 
mere phenomena of the field itself to those larger considera- 
tions in which its true significance is to be sought. 

Had a battle marked by the characteristics and attended 
with a result similar to those of Antietam been fought between 
the armies of North and South on the Kappahannock or the 

W 



174 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Peninsula, it would certainly have differed in no respect from 
the many indecisive actions in Virginia. Indeed in respect 
of that important test of success — the comparative material 
loss and gain — the advantage was with the Confederates ; for 
McClellan's losses exceeded 12,000, while those of Lee were 
not above 9000. But we are all conscious that the memor- 
able combat in that corner of South-western Maryland would 
be ill judged l)y au}^ such comparison ; and assuredly to those 
who remember how oppressive a load of doubt and fear was 
lifted from the public mind by the intelligence that Lee had 
been forced across the Potomac, it needs no argument to 
prove that a logic, larger and more liberal is needed for the 
right measure of the value of the victory of Antietara. 

This measure is to be sought in the extraordinary train of 
events already narrated as the antecedents of the Maryland 
campaign. We must recall the overwhelming disasters that 
befcl Pope, the blows under which he reeled back from the 
Rapidan to the Potomac. We must conceive the utter de- 
moralization into which the Union army had fallen in conse- 
quence of these untoward experiences of bad generalship, and 
reflect that only this panic-stricken mob stood between Wash- 
ington and Lee's victorious legions. We must form to our- 
selves an image of the terror and dismay that overcame the 
Government, and the inexpressible humiliation brought home 
to the heart of the people of the North. We must take into 
account what fearful augment these sentiments received when 
it was knoAvn that Lee had actually passed tKfc barrier of the 
Potomac and stood on the soil of the loyal States. We must 
estimate, not in the light of subsequent events but in the light 
of existing probabilities, how strong was the likelihood of a 
secessionist uprising in Maryland, should Lee be able to 
maintain himself north of the Potomac. We must remember 
the boldness and vigor of the Confederate movements in 
Maryland, and the i^rcstigc acquired by the capture of Har- 
per's Ferry, with its twelve thousand men. Finally, we must 



ANTIETAM. 175 

add to all the images of dread and fear (vague in- 
deed, and indefinable, but from that very circumstance, all 
the more powerful) raised in the public mind by the very 
thouofht of invasion. "With these considerations as the data 
of a judgment, let the reader say of what and of how much 
was that sanguinary field decisive which saw the insurgent 
army, after being shattered in the conflict, compelled to 
abandon the invasion of the North, and with its arrogant 
assumptions of superior valor brought low, seek refuge behind 
the barrier of the Potomac. 

Nor would it be beyond the warranty of sound reason if 
wc should enlarge the scope of our induction by the reflec- 
tion of what would have been the result upon the issue of the 
war, had McClellan suftered defeat at AntiCtam. It is very 
certain that had that fate befallen the Union army, there was 
nothinjr between Lee and "Washington and Baltimore. And 
even had the national capital not fellcn a prey to the Confed- 
erate advance, who shall say how dilForent a reception Lee's 
ragged, hatless, and shoeless soldiers might have met in 
Eastern Maryland from that they experienced in the loyal 
section within Avhich their manoeuvres ■were circumscribed. 
It is not worth w hile now to discuss how far the mistakes of 
the national government gave a tinge of plausibility and a 
flavor of force to the Confederate commander's lofty recita- 
tion of the wrongs inflicted upon "down-trodden" Maryland. 
But imagine the language of Lee's proclamation, held not in 
the little city of Frederick, before the ordeal of battle, but 
in the great city of Baltimore, after a defeat of the Union 
army, and wdio would venture to forecast what under the 
circumstances might have been the ultimate upshot of the 
audacious foray ? If the country was spared the experience 
of wiiatevcr of reality might have lain behind the curtain of 
contingency, it was because Antietam intervened to thrust 
aside that horror. And under whatever category the pedan- 
try of military classification may range that action, it is very 



176 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

certain that to the present generation of men it can never 
appear otherwise than as a signal deliverance and a cro>yning 
victory. 

Nor can we overlook the association which is known to 
have subsisted between this great battle and that decisive 
political stroke, the promulgation of the policy of Emancipa- 
tion by the Executive of the United States. Of this asso- 
ciation an interesting memorial in Mr. Lincoln's own words 
has lately been made public. " It had got to be," said he, 
"mid-summer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, 
until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the 
plan of operations we were pursuing; that we had about 
played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the 
game. I now determined upon the emancipation jjolicy ; 
and without consulting with or the knowledge of the Cabinet, 
I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after 
much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting on the sub- 
ject. This was the last of July or the first part of the month 
of August, 1862. This Cabinet meeting took place I think 
upon a Saturday. . . Nothing was offered that I hiid not 
already fully anticipated and settled in my mind, until Secre- 
tary Seward spoke. He said, in substance : ' Mr. President, 
I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency 
of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public 
mind consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that 
I fear the efiect of so important a step. It may be viewed 
as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for 
help ; the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, 
instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the govern- 
ment.' His idea," said the President, "was that it would be 
considered our last shriek on the retreat. ' Now,' continued 
Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, 
that you postpone its issue, imtil you can give it to the coun- 
try supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as 
would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the 



ANTIETAM. 177 

war.' " Mr. Lincoln continued : "The wisdom of the view of 
the Secretary of State struck me with great force. The 
result Avas that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, 
waiting for a victory. Well, the next news we had was of 
Pope's disaster at Bull Run. Things looked darker than 
ever. Finally came the week of the battle of Antietam. I 
determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on 
Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then 
staying at the Soldiers' Home. Here I finished writing the 
second draft of the jiroclamation ; came up on Saturday ; 
called the Cabinet together to hear it, and it was published 
the following Monday. I made a solemn vow before God,"]" 
THAT IF General Lee was driven back from Maryland, I 

WOULD CROWN THE RESULT BY THE DECLARATION OF FREEDOM 

TO THE SLAVES." [Carpenter's Six Mouths in the AVhite 
House.] 

If the Army of the Potomac, instead of retaining the 
ascendancy it acquired over its enemy in this great action, 
was afterwards doomed to many defeats ; if the victory was 
very far from being made to fulfil the conditions it should 
have fulfilled ; if Antietam was a name " writ in water," it 
was on account of causes that are only too well known. Too 
well known for this result ever to be ascribed to the fault 
of the noble AiTny of the Potomac ; too well knoAvn for it 
not to be laid to the door of that evil policy which, by com- 
mitting the army to incompetent hands, left it to pour out its 
blood in unavailing efibrts in two disastrous campaigns on 
the Rappahannock. 



178 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 



• V. 

MURFREESBORO'. 



PRELUDE TO MURFREESBORO'. 

In the cedar -brakes that border the sluggish stream of 
Stone River, in Northern Tennessee, was fought on the last 
day of 18G2 an action that must always be memorable in the 
history of the war. "VVTien first its story was flashed over 
the land, men only saw that a battle, fierce and terrible 
beyond all previous example in the West, had been deliv- 
ered ; and the North rejoiced with exceeding great jo}-- that 
in the mighty wrestle the enemy had been hurled discomfited 
from the field. But when the true relations of this contest 
came to be apprehended, it was perceived to have a weight 
and meaning beyond that which attaches to any mere passage 
at arms — it was seen that it bore upon the whole life of the 
rebellion. And now that, in the light of history, we can 
contemplate this victory as it stands related to all that went 
before and all that came after it, we readily discern that it is 
one of those few pivotal actions upon which, in very truth, 
turned the whole issue of the war. This fierce, far-reaching 
fight in the cedar-brakes of Stone River is known as the 
battle of Murfreesboro'. 

To gain a point of view from which we may justly esti- 
mate the place of Murfreesboro' in the history of the Western 




£<y^ ^ ^< 



Jick &H.tz4eralii, Hew-Tork, 



MTJRFREESBORO*. 179 

campaigns, let us regard Chattanooga as the key of the 
mountain resrion of the centre zone. Thus reo^ardins' it, we 
shall see that the battle of Murfreesboro' is at once the sum- 
mation of the whole series of military events that succeeded 
Shiloh and the condition precedent of the possession of 
Chattanooga. 

When the campaign in the ^Mississippi Valley that com- 
menced with Fort Donelson and rose to a climax in Shiloh was 
brought to a close in the occupation of Corinth, the massive 
concentration of strength which both belligerents had foraied 
on that theatre fell asunder, and each turned his efforts 
towards a campaign on the Chattanooga line. 

To this common aim diverse motives prompted the oppos- 
ing parties. * 

The possession of Corinth put into the hands of the Union 
commander the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as a direct 
line of advance towards Chattanooga, which is some two 
hundred miles to the eastward of Corinth ; and so soon as he 
had established himself at the latter place, General Halleck 
commanding the united armies of BucU and Grant, deter- 
mined to throw one of these armies into East Tennessee, the 
possession of which had long been coveted both for military 
and political reasons. Retaining, therefore, the army of 
Grant to operate in the Valley of the Mississippi, he de- 
tached the Army of Ohio, under Buell, to move by the 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad against Chattanooga, 
which, as the citadel of the mountain fastness of Tennes- 
see and the point d'appui for operations towards Atlanta, 
was a strategic point of the first importance. Corinth was 
occupied by the Union army May 30th, 1862 ; on the 11th 
of June Buell's force was put in motion from that jjlace 
towards Chattanooga. 

But while the Union commander thus planned, the 
Confederate commander also had turned his thou2:hts to- 
"vyards Chattanooga as a base of operations for an oflFensiv© 



X80 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES Oj' THE WAR. 

campaign through Tennessee and Kentucky ; and at the same 
time that Buell began to move eastward, Bragg who had su- 
perseded Beauregard in command of the army of the Missis- 
sippi, commenced to withdraw the mass of his force from 
Tupelo, where the Confederates had taken position after the 
evacuation of Corinth, and concentrated it upon Chattanooga, 
leaving the commands of Price and Van Dorn to confront 
Grant in the valley of the Mississippi. The Union com- 
mander aimed to take advantage of the concentration of the 
Confederate forces on the Mississippi line by seizing Chat- 
tanooga ; the Confederate commander aimed to take advan- 
tage of the concentration of the Union forces on the same 
theatre by an advance towards the Ohio. Out of this mutual 
resolve arose an extraordinary'series of movements which it 
behooves as to sketch in outline, as the background of the 
canvas on which the mighty combat of Murfreesboro' is 
drawn. 

Buell, as already stated, began his march from Corinth to 
Chattanooga on the 11th of June, 18G2. The movement Avas 
initiated by McCook's division, which reached Florence the 
15th. It was followed closely by Crittenden's division ; while 
Wood's division was advanced to and beyond Tuscumbia to 
repair and guard the road, and Nelson's division took its 
place between luka and Tuscumbia. The divisions moved 
forward in close succession by marches of fourteen miles a 
day — Nelson's and Wood's as soon as they were relieved 
from the road by other troops. Wood's division finished cross- 
ing the Tennessee at Decatur the Gth of July ; the other 
three divisions, having made the passage at Florence, were 
positioned in the vicinity of Athens and Decatur by the end 
of June. If this advance has the appearance of tardiness it 
is to be explained by the conditions under which it was made. 

The line of operations against Chattanooga prescribed to 
Buell by General Ilalleck was the direct route through North 



JfTURFREESBORO'. 181 

Alabama by way of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 
which he was to repair as he advanced, with the view of re- 
ceiving his supplies thereby. 

The distance from Corinth to Chattanooga by this railroad 
is two hundred miles ; and for eighty miles, that is from 
Corinth to where it crosses to the north bank of the Tennes- 
see at Decatur, this line runs parallel with the enemy's front^ 
The design of using this road as a line of communications for 
an army advancing upon Chattanooga, was therefore chimer- 
ical, unless indeed we suppose the enemy capable of pas- 
sively permitting it. Nevertheless General Ilalleck made it 
a condition of the movement that this road should be employ- 
ed ; so that until the end of June Buell's troops were engaged 
in opening it and Thomas's division was detained a month 
longer in guai'ding it. The inexpediency of attempting to 
keep open this line then became so manifest that it was aban- 
doned ; and Buell began repairing the railroads that run north- 
ward from the Tennessee Kiver to Nashville and Louisville. 

When Buell had crossed the Tennessee, he added to his 
army the force under General Mitchell, whom he had left be- 
hind to guard Middle Tennessee at the time he moved west- 
ward to make a junction with the army of Grant previous to 
the battle of Shiloh. Mitchell, during this time had taken 
advantage of the absence of the Confederates in the Missis- 
sippi Valley to advance into North Alabama, and had occupied 
Florence and Decatur. Another Union column under General 
Morgan had seized possession of Cumberland Gap. These 
commands numbered about 16,000 men, and, united with the 
four divisions of 25,000 men that Buell had brought from 
Corinth, raised his force to above 40,000 men. 

The problem of an advance on Chattanooga was now fairly 
before Buell — a problem beset with difficulties, and re- 
quiring many complicated conditions for its solution. Of 
these the most important was the opening of an assured line 
of communications, by means of the Nashville and Decatur 



182 THE TWELVE DECISIVE r.ATTLES OF THE AVAK. 

and Xashvillc and Chattanooga Railroads, with his base on the 
Ohio, a base distant from his front of operations by three 
hundred miles. East of Iluntsville to Chattanooga, the roads 
for the whole distance (above a hundred miles) traverse the 
Alpine region of the Cumberland Mountain, the spurs of 
which run down nearly to the Tennessee River, leaving only 
here and there a narrow valley or " cove " of arable land. 
The whole country is rough and barren, and east of Stevenson 
as for as Chattanooga it is almost destitute both of popula- 
tion and supplies. For subsistence, therefore, it was neces- 
sary to look solely to the far distant base on the Ohio. But 
the work of opening the railroads proved much more formid- 
able than had been anticipated : it required the whole month 
of July to put them in running order. In the mean time 
Buell had thrown forward two divisions under McCook and 
Crittenden to Battle Creek, within twenty-five miles of Chat- 
tanooga ; and by the end of July, 1862, all the preparations 
for an advance against that place were complete. 

But while Buell was thus establishing his communications 
for the movement upon Chattanooga, Bragg had been rapidly 
transferring his army from Mississippi to East Tennessee. 
He arrived in person at Chattanooga on the 28th of July, by 
which time he had his whole force well iu hand, and held the 
mountain line from that point eastward. Covering his right 
at Knoxville was a Confederate force of 13,000 men, named the 
"Army of East Tennessee," under Kirby Smith. This, with 
his own command, gave Bragg an army of about 50,000 men 
for the bold offensive movement he was soon to initiate. 
jNIeanwhilc, he employed a very effectual means of gaining 
time for his own preparations and obstructing those of his 
antagonist, by a series of persistent and destructive raids on 
Buell's long line of railroad communication. This service was 
entrusted to two eirterprising partizan leaders, Forrest and 
IMorgan, who with bodies each of one or two thousand troop- 
ers, were let loose into Tennessee and Kentucky. Morgan 



MUllFliEESBORO*. 183 

]iad iilready begun his operations early in July. Ho threat- 
ened Bowling Green and Munfordsvillc about the 8th ; he 
then defeated three companies of cavalry at Barkeville, de- 
stroyed the depot at Lebanon, proceeded north through Lex- 
ington as far as Paris, and finally, toward the close of July, 
recrossed the Cumberland near Mill Spring, and made his 
way to Knoxville. Morgan had not yet disappeared 
from Kentucky when Forrest made a foray into Tennessee. 
The loth of July he suddenly appeared at Murfreesboro', 
where he surprised and captured the garrison, consisting of 
some fourteen hundred men, and did such serious damage to 
the railroad, that Buell was compelled to send back Nelson's 
division to Murfreesboro' for its protection. Forrest then 
threw himself between Murfreesboro' and Nashville, destroy- 
ing several important bridges, and effected a safe retreat. 
He was immediately succeeded by Morgan, who once more 
appeared on the scene in August, and gave the finishinor 
touches to the work of destruction. 

Everything was now in readiness for an offensive move- 
ment on the part of the Confederates, and this was begun 
about the middle of August by the column under Kirby 
Smith. From Knoxville this force moved northward, de- 
bouching from the Cumberland Mountains by jDasses to the 
west of Cumberland Gap. By this movement Smith laid 
hold of the connections of the Union columns at the latter 
place, and compelled it, after it had remained until its supplies 
were exhausted, to retreat on an eccentric line towards the 
Ohio. He then advanced into Central Kentucky, defeated 
and routed the Union force of General Nelson, at Richmond, 
on the last day of August, and pushed towards the Ohio in 
the direction of Cincinnati, which he threatened, thus draw- 
ing all the Union levies to that point for its jjrotection, and 
clearing the way for the advance of the main army. This 
Bragg initiated the 21st of Aujrust. Crossinij the Tennessee 

CO o o 

at Chattanooga and Harrison, he debouched from Waldrou 



184 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Ridge into the Valley of the Sequatchy, turned Buell's left, 
and menaced his line of communications. 

If we examine the direction of the "Treat Cumberland ransre 
in its strategic relations to the theatre on which the oi:)posing 
armies were operating, Ave shall see at a glance the extraordi- 
nary facilities it gave the Confederates for such a movement as 
Bragg now set on foot. The commimications of an army 
occupying, as did the army of Buell, Southern Tennessee 
and Northern Alabama, are the Louisville and Decatur and 
Louisville and Chattanooga Railroads, which run due north 
and south. But to these lines the Cumberland Mountains, 
which trend but slightly to the east of north, are throughout 
their whole length nearly parallel. It is clear, therefore, 
that an army holding, as did the army of Bragg, this moun- 
tain fastness as a base of operations could act at will against 
the communications of the Union army. The positions occu- 
pied by Buell were in fact mere points in space, of no military 
importance whatever, and quite at the mercy of the enemy. 
Indeed, even had Buell had i^ossession of Chattanooga at this 
time, he could not, under the circumstances, have maintained 
himself there. Experience has shown that the tenure of that 
position is only possible with an army large enough to guard 
the debouches of the Cumberland range, to hold both banks 
of the Tennessee as far west as Stevenson, where the Chat- 
tanooga Railroad crosses that river, and to secure its railroad 
communications with the Ohio by means of fortified depots 
well garrisoned, and a movable column to check the opera- 
tions of raiders. Now, for this service the resources of Buell 
were entirely inadequate. Less in all thtm 40,000 men, it 
required more than half this force to hold his depots, while 
necessity obliged him to cover the whole front, several hun- 
dred miles in extent, from Decatur to Cumberland Gap. His 
communications were in depth from two to three hundred 
miles, and entirely exposed to disturbance by even insignifi- 
cant bodies of hostile cavalry — an arm in which he was almost 
wholly deficient. But it must be remembered that Buell did 



MURFREESBORO'. 185 

not hold Chattanooga — that point, already in possession of 
a hostile force superior in numbers to his own, was made the 
objective of an offensive operation under circumstances in which 
it has been seen that even a defensive attitude was difficult of 
maintenance. In fact, the whole scheme of campaign against 
Chattanooga, projected without the means of insuring the 
conditions essential for its tenure, was chimerical, and mani- 
fested on the part of General Halleck, who planned it, a gross 
lack of appreciation of the theatre of war. Of the truth of 
the principles here laid down; Bragg gave a palpable demon- 
stration the moment he crossed the Tennessee. 

We have seen how, up to the time the Confederate com- 
mander seized the initiative, Buell, still looking to the cap- 
ture of Chattanooga, was engaged in busily pushing forward 
his preparations to that end by insuring his communications, 
accumulating supplies, and getting in readiness the means 
of crossing the Tennessee. But on the first motion of his 
antagonist he was thrown on the defensive, and the moment 
he learnt Bragg had debouched through the mountains, Buell, 
seeing his left turned and his communications menaced, was 
compelled to retreat. Accordingly, on the 30th of August, 
He issued orders to the various commsinds and guards distrib- 
uted over about one hundred and fifty by one hundred miles 
of territory and some three hundred miles of railroad, to 
concentrate at Murfreesboro' on the 5th of September. The 
Confederate force, however, by moving to the eastward of 
that place, by way of McMinnville and Sparta, compelled 
the Union army to retreat on the 10th of September to 
Nashville. Brdgg, masking his purpose by threatening Nash- 
ville with a small column, passed the Cumberland wath his 
main body at Carthage and Gainesboro', from sixt}' to eighty 
miles east of that place, and marched straight upon the Nash- 
ville and Louisville road. This compelled Buell to evacu- 
ate Nashville for the purpose of covering Louisville, though 
he left at the former place a garrison under General Negley, 



186 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

who successfully resisted the force, under Breckinridge, sent 
against it. 

In the relative situations of the opposing armies, the Union 
force retreating upon Louisville had to describe an arc, 
whereas the Confederate force marching to lay hold of the 
former's line of communications, moved upon the chord. 
The point at which Bragg resolved to strike this line was 
at Munfordsville, Kentucky, where the Nashville and Louis- 
ville Railroad crosses Green River. The distance to this 
place by the route on which the Confederates advanced is 
sixty-eight miles ; from Nashville it is one hundred and five 
miles. Bragg's division on the 14th September reached 
Munfordsville, the surrender of which was demanded but 
refused by Col. Wilder, commanding the Union garrison. 
The enemy then attacked* the j^lace, but met a severe repulse. 
The main body, however, arrived before the place on the 
16th, and Colonel Wilder then surrendered with four thou- 
sand men. 

When the Confederates had reached Munfordsville, the 
Union army had only been able to attain Bowling Green on 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, fifty miles south 
of that place. Bragg, therefore, was now between Buell 
and the Ohio, and planted directly upon his line of retreat. 
The goal was immediately in view. Louisville lay open. 

Howbeit, in the hour of his triumph he grew timid, and 
turned away from the prize. 

That Louisville was the objective of Bragg's movement is 
sufficiently indicated by the direction of liis march, and by 
the great intrinsic importance, moral as well as military, 
of the capture of that city. At Munfordsville he was, on the 
16th, within sixty miles, or three marches, of that place, 
while his opponent was three marches l)ehind. Yet he delayed 
till the 20th at Munfordsville, and then, in place of advanc- 
ing upon Louisville, he diverged eastward to Bardstown. 
Next day his rear guard was driven out of jNIunfordsville by 



MURFREESBORO'. 187 

the van of Bucll's army, which, the way to Louisville being 
now open, marched immediately on that place — the head of 
the column reaching it on the 25th and the last division on 
the 29th of September. Bragg reached Bardstown the 26th, 
and thence moved to Frankfort, where he joined Smith's 
column. This marks the termination of the campaign, so far 
as regard the enemy's offensive movement. It will be in 
place now to briefly consider it as a whole. 

The choice of the line of manoeuvre Avas skilful on the part 
of the Confederates. Without striking a blow, but by 
simply launching forward against the communications of the 
Union army, Bragg compelled it to abandon North Alabama, 
the whole of Tennessee, and the Avhole of Kentucky. It is 
evident also that he so combined the marches of his columns 
that they could not be attacked in detail by his antagonist. 
Finally, by grasping Buell's line of retreat at ^lunfordsville, 
he was in position to force the Union commander to fight a 
battle facing northward. But, just at this point, Bragg, 
abandoning his advantage, drifted eastward. We are left 
to surmise his motive, but there are, probably, facts enough 
known to lead conjecture up to the door of truth. 

Bragg knew that there had been assembled at Louisvillo 
a considerable force of newly-raised troops. These numbered 
about 20,000 men, but they were perfectly raw, undisciplined, 
and, in a measure, unarmed. General Buell testifies that they 
could not have withstood the veteran army of the enemy for 
two hours. It is probable, however, that the Confederate 
commander greatly exaggerated both their strength and effi- 
ciency, and this will supply one reason for his conduct. 
Another was that his own rations were nearly exhausted, and 
to quickly replenish his store he judged it best to move into 
Central Kentucky, where Kirby Smith, who preceded him in 
the invasive movement, had collected at Bardstown, and other 
points large depots of supply. Moreover, in marching on 
these, he marched straight towards reinforcements. It may 



188 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

also bo considered that he was apprehensive of the peril in 
which he would place his own rear, if in marching against 
Louisville he should fail to take the town by coxip de main; 
and from what he learnt of the force that had been gathered 
there he probably feared it could not be taken by a coup de 
main. Such, in all likelihood, are the considerations that 
controlled the conduct of the Confederate commander. They 
were certainly not without weight. Nevertheless, that ho 
was in position to crown his campaign by a decisive blow, and, 
at the same time was unable to take advantage of his oppor- 
tunit}^ proves that there was somewhere a fatal error either 
in the conception or the execution of his movement. This 
error it will not be difficult to discover. 

Two ideas prompted the Confederates in this campaign of 
invasion — the one, the recouquest by arms of the territory 
of Tennessee and Kentucky ; the other, the political recon- 
struction of those States in the Confederate system. If it be 
conceded that the latter design w\as in its very nature con- 
ditioned upon the achievement of the former purpose, we shall 
touch at once the root of the mistake that baulked this am- 
bitious scheme. Bragg confounding cause and effect, seems 
to have acted on the supposition that the end could be accom- 
plished without the means. Hence, in place of first crushing 
the Union army, he contented himself with manoeuvring it 
back upon its base on the Ohio, and then fell off into Central 
Kentucky, where he and Kirby Smith began to issue absurd 
proclamations, and amused themselves with the comedy of 
setting up a Confederate governor in the capital of the State. 
As, at the same time, Lee, under the same circumstances, 
was doing the same thing in Mar^dand, it is probable that 
both acted in accordance with a predetermined policy — a 
policy, however, that indicates very little practical wisdom 
on the part of its framers. To believe that the inhabitants 
of border states, like Maryland and Kentucky, pressed upon 
by the massive power of the North, would linlv their for- 



MURFREESBORO'. 189 

tunes ■with the revolt before the formidable Union armies on 
their soil had been beaten, and before the so-styled " liberat- 
ing " armies had given any proof of their ability to maintain 
themselves, was to suppose human nature very dilfcrent from 
what it is in actual experience ; and the utter failure of both 
invasions demonstrated the futility of the scheme upon which 
they were based. 

It would involve considerations too purely military to 
attempt to say where Bragg could or should have struck the 
Union army ; enough to establish the principle that until that 
army was beaten there was no surety for the possession of 
any of the territory gained. It may indeed be said that 
Eragg's force was not sufficient to risk a decisive battle ; but 
it is certain that it equalled, if it did not exceed, that of his 
opponent. Moreover, if Bragg's army was inadequate to a 
real offensive, the Confederates showed a misuse of their 
forces in the centre zone : for they undertook to act offensive- 
ly at the same time upon two lines in the same theatre of 
operations. While Bragg was moving into Kentucky the 
armies of Price and Van Dorn took the initiative against 
Grant in Mississippi. This was contrary to coiTcct principle : 
the main body of the Mississippi army should have been 
united to the Chattanooga force while Grant was merely con- 
fronted by a small corps. The result was that the Confed- 
erates were on both lines too weak. Price and Van Doru 
■were beaten both at Corinth and luka ; and they did not even 
prevent Grant from forwarding to Buell, a reinforcement of 
two divisions, of which one reached him the 1st, and the other 
the 12th of September. 

Bucli's conduct of the retrograde movement from the Ten- 
nessee to the Ohio was marked by great skill. It does not 
appear that any opportunity was afforded of attacking the 
enemy in detail. Consequently in withdrawing to Louisville 
where he united with the army there, and was in position to 
assume a vigorous offensive, he did what was best under the 



190 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

circumstances. It is true, he was bitterly reproached for 
"allowing" the enemy to invade Kentucky ; but it is not by 
the excited clamor of a panic-stricken population that great 
military movements are to be adjudged in history. 

And now there devolved upon General Buell the weighty 
duty of marching forth to overthrow Bragg and drive the 
Confederates from Kentucky, where they had established 
themselves seemingly with the intent of remaining en perma- 
nence. This he hastened to do ; but first of all it was neces- 
sary to effect a reorganization of the army, which after its 
arduous campaign and long marches was much worn, though 
the matchless discipline established by Buell, a master in that 
science, had wonderfully preserved the integrity of the army. 
The last division reached Louisville the 29th of September. 
On the same day the incorporation of the new troops under 
General Nelson was comjjleted, and on the morning of the 30th 
the consolidated army was prepared to march against the Con- 
federate forces which occupied the principal part of Kentucky. 
The columns Avould have been put in motion that day, but in 
the mean time an order arrived from Washington rclievinsr 
General Buell from the command of the army, and appointing 
General G. IL Thomas in his stead. Thomas, however, 
refused to supersede Buell, for whose military talent he cher- 
ished the highest respect, and the conmiand was therefore re- 
stored to the latter officer. The army marched on the 1st of 
September in five columns. The left moved towards Frank- 
fort to hold in check the force of the enemy, which still re- 
mained at or near that place. The other columns, marching 
by different routes, fell respectively into the roads leading 
from Shepherds ville, Mt. Washington, Fairfield, and Bloom- 
field to Bardstown, where the main force of the Confederates 
under General Bragg was known to be. On reaching that 
point, however, it was found that the rear of the enemy's 
infantry had retired eight hours before, and all the informa- 
tion indicated that Bragg would concentrate cither at Harrods- 



MURFREESBORO'. 191 

burg or Perry ville. The centre under Gilbert, and the left 
under McCook, were therefore directed on the latter place, and 
the right underCrittenden, was sent by the Lebanon road, which 
passes four miles to the south of Perry ville. The afternoon of 
the 7th the centre corps had arrived within three miles of Perry- 
ville, and was drawn up in order of battle. As the enemy 
was apparently in the act of concentration for battle at that 
point, orders were sent to Crittenden and McCook respect- 
ively to move forward early in the morning into position on 
the right and left of the centre. Buell had expected an 
attack early in the morning on the centre corps while it was 
isolated, but as it did not take place, no formidable attack 
was apprehended after the arrival of the left corps, which 
took place about 10 a. m, Considerable cannonading had 
been going on during the morning between the centre corps, 
and the firing extended thence to the left, and became brisker 
as the day advanced, but it was not supposed to proceed from 
any serious engagement. At four o'clock, however, an aid 
from McCook arrived and reported to Buell, who was with 
the centre, that the general was sustaining a severe attack, 
which had been going on for several hours, and which he would 
not be able to withstand unless reinforced ! This action, thus 
precipitated, is known as the battle of Perryville, or Champion 
Hills. It was fought on the part of the Confederates by two 
divisions against the left corps under McCook, and as the 
enemy caught that corps isolated and in the act of formation, 
he was able to inflict heavy damage upon it, the casualties 
numbering about four thousand. Though the corps was much 
shaken in the first event, it afterwards recovered itself, and 
maintained its ground so stubbornly that at nightfall the 
Confederates were compelled to draw off without any material 
advantage. 

No doubt was entertained that Brasfsr would endeavor to 
hold his position at Perryville, and accordingly Buell issued 
orders to the commanders to join battle next morning. Day- 



192 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

light, however, revealed the fact that he had retired towards 
Camp Dick Robiuson. Buell then advanced in pursuit ; but 
Bragg, constantly refusing battle, retired southward in the 
direction of Cumberland Gap. The pursuit was pushed as 
far as Loudon, where Buell called a halt, not being minded 
at that season of the year to attempt a campaign in the rough, 
barren, and difficult mountain region of East Tennessee. 
When, therefore, it was clear that the enemy had abandoned 
tlie invasion, Buell turned his columns south-Mcstward into 
Middle Tennessee, with the purpose of removing the line of 
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. By the end of Octo- 
ber the army reached Bowling Green and Glasgow, Avhence 
Buell designed pushing forAvard immediately to Murfrecsboro.' 
But, on the 30th of October, he was superseded by Rosecrans. 

The circumstances under which General Rosecrans assumed 
command of the Army of the Ohio committed him to an im- 
mediate offensive, as well for moral as for material reasons. 
The events of the extraordinary summer campaign, Avhereof I 
have presented the outline in the preceding chapter, were 
thought to have been highly favorable to the Confederates, 
who had been able to throw back the Union army from the 
Tennessee to the Ohio, and had, after ravaging Kentucky, 
succeeded in making good their escape to whence they 
came. Now, though these events were in no wise out of the 
ordinary tenor of war, and may now be studied with a per- 
fectly philosophic composure, they must be estimated, not in 
the " dry light " of histor}'-, but in the effect they, at the time, 
produced on an excitable, patriotic, and unreasoning public. 
The invasion itself created profound alarm — a sentiment 
which, by one of those rapid transitions that come over masses 
of men in time of war, changed into deep disgust and humili- 
ation when it was seen that the enemy " escaped " with im- 
punity. This feeling found official expression in the removal 
of General Buell from the command of the army. Judging 



MimrREESBOEO'. 19^ 

this act ill the catholic spirit that should be brought to the 
interpretation of the war, we may not be disposed to censure 
the Administration for a measure that undoubtedly was 
prompted by a well-meaning motive ; but it is at the same 
time incumbent on us to render equal justice to one who has 
been the object of most unmerited obloquy. 

Buell, like McClellan, was unfortunate in attaining a great 
command at a time when the country's experience of war made 
it certain that many victims must fall. But he was an eminent 
soldier, of a grave, high order of mind, distinguished for the 
breadth of his military views, the soundness of his combinations, 
and the vigor, but not brilliancy of his execution. His theory 
was to fight only for important objects, to manoeuvre so as to 
gain strategic advantages, and to make success as certain as 
possible. He would do nothing for jjopular effect, and had 
not that pliability and those arts that are so useful for a com- 
mander in the early stages of a popular war, and that often 
enable mediocre men who possess this talent to attain 
success. He was a good disciplinarian, and the army was 
never at any subsequent period in such condition of efficiency 
as it was under his command. Also, it must be remarked, 
that he never lost the confidence of his army, which always 
cherished unbounded respect for his ability. 

It will thus have sufficiently appeared that the very cir- 
cumstances under which the command fell to General Rosc- 
crans implied that he should speedily assume the offensive, 
and the enemy very soon took such a course as made the 
Government tenfold more urgent that he should do so. 
When Rosecrans assumed command the army Avas in the 
vicinity of Bowling Green and Glasgow ; and the gamson 
which General Buell had left at Nashville, under Negley, was 
closely beleaguered by Forrest's cavalry and Breckcnridge's 
division of infantry. Rosecrans, therefore, determined first 
of all to relieve Nashville, which he did by sending forward 
McCook's corps to that place. But, before he could throw for> 

13 



194 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ward the rcmMining corps, it was absolutely essential to re- 
pair the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which was badly 
broken. This work consumed the irreater part of Xovember, 
by the end of which mouth the railroad was put in repair, 
and the whole army concentrated at Nashville. 

Now, while Rosecrans was engaged in this necessary pre- 
liminary duty, Bragg, who, on his retirement from Kentucky, 
had passed by Cumberland Gap to Knoxville, and thence to 
Chattanooga, put his army again in motion northward. 
Passiug np the railroad to within forty miles of Nashville, he 
assumed an intrenched joosition at IMurfreesboro', whence 
he began to demonstrate in many motions of offence. It was 
plain, therefore, that the campaign which had been left in- 
decisive was about to be forced to an issue in a battle that 
must decide the fate of Kentucky and central Tennessee. 
Both sides energetically joushed forward preparations for 
aijOTcssive action ; but Rosecrans was beforehand with his 
antagonist, and having, by the last week in December, 
succeeded in accumulating sufficient supplies for a campaign, 
he began the manoeuvres that resulted in the battle of Mur- 
freesboro'. The events of this great action noAV remain to be 
told. 

n. 

THE BAJTLE OF MURFREESBORO'. 

Christivias-day of the year 1862 passed amid festivities 
that smoothed the wrinkled face of war and lent a wholly 
peaceful air to the rival camps at Nashville and Murfreesboro'. 
But before daybreak next morning Rosecrans, having com- 
pleted all his preparations, put his army in motion amid a 
drenching rain. It advanced in three coknnns, and skir- 
mishing began almost from the start, for Bragg's superiority 
in cavalry enabled him to confine his adversary almost within 
his infantry lines. By the night of the 30th Rosecrans had 



Map 

OF THE BATTLEFIE LD OF 



/ 'nioii Forces 
('oriji'jlemte - 




Scale 



MURFKEESBOEO'. 195 

fought his way into position, facing the army of Bragg, 
which was posted in front of IMurfrcesboro'. The manner in 
which the opposing lines were drawn will be readily appre- 
hended from a study of the accompanying map. 

Stone Eiver, rising in the high country south of Murfrees- 
boro', runs nearly north, passes that town a mile to the west, 
and empties into the Cumberland a few miles above Nash- 
ville. Bragg placed his force on the west side of that 
stream, with his line running nearly west and south, but he 
prolonged his right flank across the river to the east bank, 
where one division (that of Breckinridge) held the ap- 
l^roaches to Murfrcesboro' from that side. All the rest of the 
Confederate force, embracing four divisions, was placed on 
the west side of Stone Eiver. 

The Union array was disposed entirely on the west side 
of Stone River — the left wing consisting of three divisions 
under General Crittenden, the centre of two divisions under 
General Thomas, and the right of three di\'isions under Gen- 
eral McCook. The left wing rested on the river, and the 
line then stretched nearly south for a distance of four miles, 
the right flank being thrown across the turnpike that runs 
westward from Murfreesboro' to Franklin, and is known as 
the Franklin Pike. The Nashville turnpike and the Nash- 
ville Eailroad, which formed Rosecrans's communications, ap- 
proach in this vicinity very close to Stone River, which, 
indeed, they cross a short mile above Murfreesboro', into 
which they conduct. In the narrow interval between the Nash- 
ville road and the river were placed the divisions of Wood 
and Van Cleve of the left wing — the latter in reserve in 
rear of the former. Palmer's division of the left wing was 
deployed on the right of the Nashville road ; and the line 
was continued southward by the two divisions of the centre 
under Thomas, of which two divisions that of Negley held 
the front line, and that of Rousseau was in reserve in rear 
of the left centre. The three divisions of the right wing, 



196 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

respectively under Sheridan, Davis, and Johnson, were de- 
ployed and continued the line southward across the Franklin 
turnpike, where th<j^ right flank was refused in a crotchet. 
The cavalry, two brigades, was equally divided upon the 
flanks. 

If this disposition of the Union forces be noted, it will 
appear that there was a heavy concentration of troops on the 
left ; for a line cutting the Union front in two equal parts 
would place the right wing, under McCook, alone on the one 
side, while the centre and left, under Thomas and Critten- 
den, would appear on the other. Tliis disposition Avas made 
for attack, and Rosecrans's plan was as follows : — Two divis- 
ions of the left wing — those of Wood and Van Cleve — 
were at da^vvn to cross Stone River and overthrow Bragg^s 
right, consisting of the division of Breckenridge, which was 
discovered to be alone on that side of the sti'eam. On the 
east side of the river are commanding heights which, when 
taken possession of and crowned with artillery, would enable 
the left to see in reverse the enemy's works fronting the cen- 
tre of the Union line. It was expected that the artillery fire 
would so shake the Confederates that the Union centre under 
Thomas and the remaining division of the left wing under 
Palmer, would be able to carry their front, while the left 
wing, continuing its movement, would swing into Murfrees- 
boro', and then moving westward by the Franklin road attain 
the flank and rear of the Confederates and drive them west- 
ward off their line of retreat. To the right wing, mean- 
while, was assigned the duty of holding the hostile left in 
check. 

The plan was bold, brilliant, and in many respects calcu- 
lated to inspire sanguine hopes. For the assurance of success 
in the essential feature, the offensive movement by the left 
wing, ample provision was made in the great pre2:)onderance 
of force there brought to bear on the enemy ; but the entire 
operation was conditioned on the ability of the Union right 



MURFREESBORO'. 197 

meanwhile to buffet hostile assault. With such a procedure 
no fault can be found, for if a commander cannot rely on 
holding the enemy with one arm, while he strikes with the 
other, bold combinations of battle and decisive results are out 
of the question, ^Nevertheless, in proportion as ulterior 
results depend on the conduct of a force to which is assigned 
a special duty must be the adequacy of the provision looking 
to that end. Now if we examine critically the disposition of 
the Union right, it is easy to see that there was some ground 
for apprehension touching its ability to perform the task given 
it to do. That wing, consisting of the corps of McCook, 
was disjjosed from right to left in the order of the divisions of 
Johnson, Davis, Sheridan, and first of all it is to be remarked 
that as each division presented two brigades deployed in front 
and one in reserve, the line was unduly long, and therefore 
somewhat thin and weak. Secondly, it was rather too much 
advanced, that is, faced too much eastward ; whereas it would 
have been more secure in being more refused and facing more 
southward. Thirdly, it exposed an almost naked flank, the 
right division having but one brigade thrown back in a crotchet. 
That Rosecrans could fail to appreciate the danger to 
his right is not likely, for as he knew that his antagonist 
held all his divisions save one on the west bank of Stone 
River, the contingency of Bragg's acting offensively against 
the Union right was not to be overlooked. In point of 
fact, Rosecrans appreciated the danger, and was solicitous 
regarding his right. When informed by General McCook, 
at the time the troops were placed in position, that his 
corps was facing strongly to the east, he told that officer 
that such a direction to his line did not appear to him a 
proper one, and that it ought with the exception of his loft 
to face much more nearly south, with the right division en- 
tirely in reserve. " Still," the commander added, "this must 
be confided to you, who know the ground better." However, 
when the corps commanders had assembled that night, Rose- 



198 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

crans having set forth his i^lan of battle as above given, re- 
curred once more to the question of the right wing; and, 
addressing General INIcCook, said ; " To-morl"ow there will 
be a battle. You know the ground. You have fought over 
it. You know its difficulties. Can you hold your present 
position for three hours ? " " Yes, I think I can," replied 
McCook." The commander then added: "I don't like the 
facing so much to the east. If you don't think your present 
the best position change it. It is only necessary for you to 
make thinsrs sure." No chansre was made however: the 
officers separated, and the troops lay on their arms awaiting 
the morrow. 

While Rosccrans thus planned, Bragg, too, had foniied his 
resolution ; and it is worthy of note that the Confederate 
general als6 had not only determined to act offensively, but 
he had determined to act with his left against the Union 
right, in the same manner as the Union general had resolved 
to act with his left against the Confederate right. On the 
west side of the river, the left of the Confederate line was 
held by two divisions under Hardee, and the centre, Avith its 
right resting on the stream, by two divisions under Polk ; on 
the east side the division of Breckinridge held post. Breck- 
inridge's duty was to cover the approaches to Murfrcesboro* 
against menace of the Union force, Avhile the offensive was 
to bo taken up by the extreme left, continued by the whole 
line in succession to the right — the move to be made by a 
constant wheel to the right on Polk's right as a pivot. The 
aim of Brairg was to force the Union right and centre back 
against its left and Stone Eiver, and lay hold of its line of 
communications with Nashville. The plan was not less 
daring than that of Kosecrans. Both forces lay on their 
arms that night, conscious of the mighty struggle that the 
dawn must bring. The Union army numbered forty-seven 
thousand ; and the Confederate army thirty-five thousand 
men of all arms. 



MURFREESBORO*. 199 

Morning of the last day of the year, dawned in unwonted 
mildness, and with early light each army began the execution 
of the plans formed by the opposing chiefs. Eosecrans had 
established his head-quarters in rear of the left which, as 
already seen, was to cross Stone River aiid swing into Mur- 
freesboro'. This, the initial movement, being ordered by 
the commander, was immediately begun. Van Cleve's 
division took the lead. Two brigades made the passage 
without interruption. Wood, filing his division down to the 
river brink, prepared to follow. 

The movement commenced auspiciously. It is true that 
from the right some sounds of fight had been heard, l>ut they 
indicated nothing of moment and they excited only satisfac- 
tion, for if the enemy's attention was fixed on the right, the way 
would be all the more open for the decisive stroke on the left 
— McCook, meanwhile, holding his opponents over there for 
" three hours." The troops accordingly continued to pass the 
stream with joyful haste, when suddenly from the fiu'-off right 
there came an outburst of battle that gave pause to the mov- 
ins: column, for it was of such volume and fierceness as be- 
trayed a crisis risen at the very outset of the fight. It was, 
in fact, the enemy's initiative. 

It has been noted that Brao-o; also had resolved to attack 
w^ith his left, and while the Union troops were crossing Stone 
Eiver to swing into Murfreesboro', he too was preparing his 
stroke. It was found that the left Confederate division under 
McCown exactly fronted the right Union division under John- 
son, but as it was discovered that this flank was somewhat 
thrown back, McCown moved still further to the left so that 
he might quite overlap the Union right before moving for- 
ward, the space vacated being filled up by the division of 
Cleburne which had been in reserve. He then advanced and 
carried the position of the Union right by an impetuous rush, 
Johnson's division being swept in a few minutes from the 
field. It is claimed in the reports of the Confederates that 



200 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the initial movement was a surprise. But -wrongly, for the 
advance was observed for half a mile, being in great part 
over open ground. Yet the affair reflected no credit on the 
officers of the Union division, among whom there appears to 
have been great want of vigilance. Indeed, one of the bri- 
gade commanders. General Willich, who had gone to the head- 
quarters of his divisional general, Johnson, was captured be- 
fore he could rejoin his command ; and when Johnson moved 
forward his remaining brigade, it speedily shared the fate of 
the other two. The division lost eight guns. Then the Con- 
federates, surging round their left, poured doAvn upon the un- 
covered flank of the next division, thatof Davis, which was at 
the same time assailed by Cleburne in front. Davis made 
better resistance, and stubbornly repelled several attacks ; but 
his position had become already too thoroughly compromised ; 
he also retired after a mournful loss of life and abandoning 
several pieces of artiller3^ The enemy then pouring in, be- 
iran to surj2;e a2:ainst the remaininsf divisions of the ricfht wins:, 
and the two divisions of Polk, which had thus far been silent, 
also opened in savage volleys against that division and 
against the Union centre, and against the right of the left wing. 
Such was the dread meanini:: of the clamor that checked 
the movement of the left, and held the filing column in breath- 
less suspense — such the result achieved in less than an hour. 
It was long, however, before the full extent of the disaster 
was known at head-quarters. The first message from Mc- 
Cook said only that he was pressed and needed assistance ; 
it did not tell of the rout of Johnston's division, nor yet of the 
consequent withdrawal of that of Davis. Rosecrans determined, 
therefore, to continue his own offensive movement ; and he 
dispatched word to McCook to make stubborn fight. lie 
was loth to give up his own well-considered plan ; loth to be 
compelled to follow the enemy's initiation. Nor did there 
seem to be any need. lie still held a mighty force in his left 
hand ; if McCook would only maintain his ground, or contest 



MUEFREESBOEO'. 201 

it with such stubborn resistance as to afford " three hours " 
of time, he would hurl forward that wing, lay hold of his 
enemy's communications, and take in flank the enemy that 
was flanking him. So to McCook he returned this message : 
''Tell him," said he, flaming out vehemently, "to contest 
every inch of the ground. If he holds them we will swing 
into Murfreesboro' with our left, and cut them off." Then to 
his staff — for there was in this commander that highest array, 
that courage that can coolly bear to risk partial loss for 
greater gain — " It is working right." 

But hoAV far it was from "workins: riofht" soon became 
known. A second message arrived from McCook, announc- 
ing fhat the right wing was being driven — a fact that was 
only too manifest, for from the thickets that bound the open 
plain west of the Nashville road, the debris of the broken 
divisions began to pour forth in alarming volume. Then, 
bitter as it was to abandon his own movement, Rosecrans saw 
plainly that necessity so obliged him to do. To throw for- 
ward his left was noAV impossible : that was predicated on 
McCook's ability to hold the enemy for " three hours." But 
the issue was now entirely changed : it was not a question of 
lighting to lose with the right for the purpose of fighting to 
gain Avith the left — it Avas a question of saving the right, now 
breaking in pieces, of covering his vital lines, menaced by 
the enemy, of guarding them in such a manner thq,t hostile 
effort should not prevail against them at least. His resolution 
was instantly formed. He drew back his left from across the 
river, ordered all of Wood's division, saving the regiments 
guarding the ford, to the support of the right wing, and then 
calling on his staff to mount, hurried to the right to pre- 
pare a new line, to hold together the dissolving masses of his 
forces, to maintain a stout defensive front, since after the dis- 
aster to his right he might no longer hope to execute his bold 
offensive stroke. 

Happily an event occurred to second this purpose, and 



202 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

jjivc the commaudcr the needed time to establish his new 
lines. 

The difTerence between troops is great : the difference be- 
tAveen officers is immensely greater. While the tAvo right 
divisions of McCook were being assailed and brushed away, 
an equal hostile pressure fell upon his left division. But here 
a quite other result attended the enemy's efforts ; for not only 
were the direct attacks repulsed with great slaughter, but 
when the flank of the division was uncovered by the with- 
drawal of the troops on its right, its commander effecting a 
skilful change of front, threw his men into position at right 
angles with his former line, and having thus made for himself 
a new flank, buffeted with such determined vigor and such 
rapid turns of offence, that for two hours he held the Confed- 
erates at bay — hours precious, priceless, wrenched from fate 
and an exultant foe by the skill and courage of this officer, 
and bought by the blood of his valiant men. This officer was 
Brigadier-General P. H. Sheridan : the details of his splendid 
exploit are of too much moment to be overpassed in the re- 
cital of the eventful struggle of Stone River. 

When the Confederate divisions of McCown and Cleburne 
had fully engaged Johnson and Davis, the division next to- 
wards the Confederate right, Avhich was the division of 
Withers, assailed Sheridan, whose front was held by the 
brigade of Sill and Roberts, with the brigade of Shaeffer in 
reserve. The hostile approach was over an open cotton-field, 
and as the Confederates advanced in column closed in mass 
with a depth of several regiments, they received a heavy fire 
from three batteries advantageously posted along Sheridan's 
line. This, though destructive in its eflects, did not, how- 
ever, stay the enemy's onset, and the mass steadily approach- 
ed to within fifty yards of the edge of timber in Avhich lay 
Sheridan's troops. Then upstarting, the infantiy poured in 
the faces of the Confederates a fire before which they paused, 
and then new volleys, before which they wavered, broke, and 



MUEFEEESBORO'. 203 

ran. Sill, seizing the opportunity, advanced with his bri- 
gade, charged home on the assailants, and drove them in 
confusion across the open field and behind their intrench- 
ments. The discomfiture of the enemy was complete ; but 
it was not purchased without heavy cost. The young and 
chivalrous Sill fell Avhile leading this charge. Such was the 
first act of Sheridan's fiijht. 

The time consumed in the occurrences here nan-ated had 
sufliced to accomplish the rout of the divisions on Sheridan's 
right, which caused that ofiicer's position to be completely 
turned, and exposed his line to a fire from the rear. The 
conventional procedure would have been for Sheridan to 
have then retired, justifying the motive on the ground that 
his flank was uncovered. He did much better. Hastily 
retiring his right and reserve brigades, he caused the left 
brigade, under Colonel Rol^erts, to charge with the bayonet 
into the woods from which ho had withdrawn the two former 
brigades. This caused the enemy to recoil and gave Sheridan 
time to form his right and reserve brigades on a new line, to 
which, drawing back the left brigade from its charge, he joined 
it also. Sheridan's new front was at ris^ht ano'les with his 
former line. That had been faced east, this faced south ; 
that had been at right angles with the Nashville road, this 
was parallel to it, and advanced, perhaps, a mile in front of 
it. Parallel to it, and yet how little of this vital line he 
could cover, for when the two Confederate divisions that had 
swept Johnson and Davis from the field, had wheeled to the 
right and fiiced westward, looking towards the Nashville road, 
these divisions overlapped, by nearly their whole length, the 
right of Sheridan ! But points on a battle-field are not pro- 
tected merely by the direct presence of troops. "Whatever 
upon a flank causes the assailant to break there, and obliges 
him to overcome that obstacle, covers that flank. It may be 
a height, stream, or morass. It may be the breasts of valiant 
men, Sheridan's division was such an obstacle. The Con- 



204 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

federate divisions to his right were free to pass on beyond 
him ; but in doing so they fatally severed themselves from 
that part of their line he held in his front, and exposed them- 
selves to be taken in flank and rear. It was clear, therefore, 
that Sheridan must be driven off before they could safely 
advance. So they doubled in towards their right, and he, 
gathering his troops and batteries about him like a sheaf of 
spears, prepared to receive the shock of the mighty mass, 
and make time for the new dispositions the commander was 
pressing forward. All to his right had gone like sea-weeds 
torn by waves from jutting crags ; but the swelling surges 
dashed in vain as^ainst the rock-like resistance of this divis- 
ion. Such was the second act in Sheridan's fight. 

The resistance offered by Sheridan's division in his second 
position gained an hour's respite. At the end of that time 
the enemy had accumulated so heavily on his flank that he 
was compelled again to make new dispositions. Once more 
he effected a change of front. Throwing forw^ard his left to 
support it on the right of Negley's division of the centre, 
under Thomas, he drcAV back his two right brigades so as to 
face westward, covering the rear of Negley's line, and planted 
his batteries on the salient of his front. In this position, in 
the thicket of cedars, he w^as again savagely assailed, and the 
most terrible and sanguinary conflict of the day occurred. 
The full weight of the four divisions of Hardee and Polk 
was hurled against the two divisions of Sheridan and Neg- 
ley. Three times they moved forward in impetuous assaults, 
and thrice they received such a biting fire that they reeled 
and recoiled. Another hour of infinite price was thus gained. 
But then there came an end to the power of resistance of 
the Union line — Sheridan's men had spent all their ammu- 
nition, and no fresh supply could be obtained, for the dis- 
comfiture of the troops of the right wing had allowed the 
enemy's cavalry to break through to the rear and capture its 
ammunition-train. Nor was this all : he had lost Sill in the 



MUEFREESBORO'. 205 

first onset ; he now lost Roberts, soon afterwards Shaeffer — 
all his brigade commanders killed. It only remained to use 
the steel in order to gain time to retire his line : so the 
reserve brigade charged foi-ward, and under cover of this 
audacious sally, Sheridan retired the fragments of his division 
through the cedar thicket, and out into the open plain west 
of the Nashville road. No sooner had this withdrawal taken 
place thanNegley, whose men had hitherto been covered by 
Sheridan, found himself enveloped by the enemy, and he was 
compelled to cut his way through their swarming ranks back 
to the open space. The right was gone, the centre gone, the 
army hung by a single jDoint on the left. Happily, this point 
was of a diamond quality, and, as will presently appear, gave 
time to bring order out of the wi'eck of a stranded army. 
It was eleven o'clock when Sheridan's division, with compact' 
ranks and empty cartridge-boxes, debouched from the cedar 
thickets to the open plain, stretching along the Murfreesboro' 
turnpike. He had lost seventeen hundred and ninety-six 
men ; and with the cost of their heroic lives had won three 
hours, which Rosecrans, to whom he now reported, had been 
using to the best advantage. "Here is all that are left," said 
he, sadly, as he joined his chief. It is now time to look at 
what had been the procedure of that commander. 

When at length Rosecrans comprehended the full extent 
of the calamity, he hastened to suspend the movement of the 
left wing, and then, followed by his staff, galloped to the 
scene of conflict. Two things were immediately to be done : 
one, to sustain the division of the right wing that solitarily 
stood at bay to hold back the enemy ; the other, to form a 
new front covering his line of communications. It was, 
indeed, a moment of terrible trial, for it seemed that the 
army was going all to staves. But the moral courage of the 
commander was equal to the occasion. "It was now," says 
an eye-witness, "a series of commands too often delivered in 
person to superior or subordinate, it mattered not, while his 



206 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

staff galloped at his heels in mute anxiety lest he should 
fi'ill." He heard of the rout of the right wing : he said, "We 
shall beat them yet." The report of the death of General 
Sill was confirmed. "We cannot help it," replied he; 
"brave men must be killed in battle." Of the capture of 
General Willicli, and the hurt that had befallen General 
Kirk. "Never mind," he exclaimed, "we must win this 
battle." On another occasion, when about to dash forward 
under the enemy's fire, a young aid expostulated with him ; 
"Ah, my boy," said the commander, who is a devout Catho- 
lic, " make the sign of the true cross, and let us go in." 

Eosecrans's first impulse was to support Sheridan ; but the 
troops with which to do this ? At length he found Thomas 
the lion-hearted, calm amid the fury of battle. One of his 
divisions under Ncgley was stoutly sustaining Sheridan's left ; 
but he had another one in reserve, that of Rousseau. "Push 
that into the cedar brake in rear of Sheridan," said the chief, 
and Thomas, in person, went to see it done. Eousseau, ad- 
vancing into the cedar brake, disappeared as completely in 
the thick brush as if a wall had been built around him. 
lie went in by the right flank, and had partially deployed his 
leading brigade (the brigade of regulars) , when he was struck 
by the enemy, and in ten minutes the division came out again 
a cloud of broken battalions. 

Meanwhile, to establisll a new line along the Murfreesboro 
pike, towards which "the enemy was working his way, Rose- 
crans withdrew two thirds of the left wing under Crittenden. 
Upon a commanding knoll overlooking the open plain west 
of the Murfreesboro' road — a plain which the enemy would 
have to traverse when they should debouch for the cedar 
thicket — he massed his batteries as Napoleon at Auster- 
litz. Thus a firm j^oint d'aj^pui was gained, and when 
Rousseau withdrew from the cedars he Avas formed in the 
open plain along the railroad as a nucleus on which the new 
formation of the army was established. Yet notwithstanding 



MURFREESBORO'. 207 

the vigor of the resistance presented by Sheridan and Negley, 
it is doubtful if this could have been eifected, such was the 
necessarily unjointcd condition of the army in the process of 
passing from one formation to another, had it not been for the 
extraordinary tenacity with wdiich the left clung to its posi-; 
tion. In order to grasp clearly the situation, let it be under- 
stood that the entire right and centre have gone out and are 
confusedly striving to get into position on the new line ; and 
that t^vo divisions of the left wing have also been taken toi 
patch it out. It will result that there remained on the origi- 
nal front onl}^ the right division of the left wing — the division 
of Palmer ; and that the shape of tlie army was that of a 
crotchet, the short side being Palmer's division facing south- 
ward ; the long side being the rest of the army facing west- 
ward — indeed not yet facing any whither, but getting into 
position to face westwards, if only the short side hold on 
long enough to afford time, and do not give way, thus exposing 
the army to lire in front, flank, and rear before its formation is 
completed. Of the division of Palmer, the left brigade 
imdcr Colonel W. B. Hazen, now the left of the army, was to 
the east, and at right angles, with the Nashville pike in a scanty 
grove of oaks covering an inconsiderable crest between the 
pike and the railroad, which intersect at an acute angle about 
four hundred yards in front ; the other two brigades (those of 
Cruft and Gross) were posted on the west side of the pike in 
the skirt of a cedar wood. The ground was open in front of 
the division. During the earlier events of the day. Palmer had 
already sustained successfully a severe attack ; but now that 
everything was gone except this force, the enemy began to 
assail it with a ferocity that showed he fully understood the 
advantage which success would there give him. The Con- 
federates forming in the position which will be found marked in 
the accompanying map, as " Cowan's burnt house," poured like 
an avalanche on the front of Palmer, carrying away the two 
right brigades, and leaving only Hazen with his brigade of 



208 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

twelve hundred men to foil the enemy's ardent efforts against 
this vital point. Less skilfully manoeuvred this force would 
have been an insignificant oljstacle to the hostile masses that 
surged against it ; but Hazen proved himself, like Sheridan, 
equal to theemergency. The two right brigades having been 
partially reformed, were sent to him, and these Hazen formed 
in the grove to the left of the turnpike known as the " Round 
Forest," where with his left flank well screened by Stone 
River, he jcpulsed a series of repeated and desperate at- 
tacks. In the final assault, the Confederates met a fire 
so destructive, that when within three hundred yards they 
broke to the rear. One of the enemy's battalions alone 
adventured a nearer approach, but that with every mount- 
ed officer and half its men shot down, threw itself flat 
upon the ground within one hundred and fifty yards, 
unaljle to advance and not daring to retreat. So the vital 
point was held, though it cost the sacrifice of one third of 
Hazen's heroic brigade. The service rendered by that gallant 
officer was of the most extraordinary character, for there 
were many times during the forenoon when a momentary 
slackeninof of his efforts would have lost the field. AVhile 
thus Hazen rebuffed the enemy, the army drifted into its new 
position ; and scarcely was the fresh formation completed 
when the Confederates, with that shrill slogan in which the 
men of the South were wont to utter their passion in battle, 
debouched from the cedar thicket and faced the Union array, 
drawn on the side along the Kashville and Murfreesboro* 
road. 

Marvellous as had been the success that had thus far 
attended Bragg's efforts, it was yet of no effect until it should 
be crowned by a decisive stroke against the Union force now 
standing at bay. The Confederate chieftain, full well aware 
of this, and unwilling to see his advantage melt away in an 
incomplete achievement, made his dispositions for a renewed 
assault. However, his army was in very unfit condition for 



MUIirREESBORO'. 209 



f 



the task before it : the mixed fight and pursuit through several 
miles of dense forest had greatly disorganized the commands, 
and no time was afforded to adjust the alignments, since the 
orders were imperative to press on without halting : so that 
the supporting and advancing lines had become inextricably 
mingled. Moreover, Bragg's losses already counted by thou- 
sands, and he had no reserves. 

When the enemy broke from under cover, Rosecrans's line 
presented a scene of portentous grandeur. For instantly the 
massive concentration of artillery opened a prodigious clamor, 
and the figures of the cannoneers, defined on the rim of the 
hill, were seen through a pall of fire and smoke to labor and 
leap in frantic energy, while from the long lines of infantry 
such volleys of musketry went forth as smote the hostile 
front, and caused it to bend and break in confusion into the 
depths of the woods. If charge was designed by the enemy, 
it was quenched in the first volley, for none was made ; .and 
it needs only to cite this unwilling testimony of General 
Cleburne, the ablest of Bragg's division commanders, to show 
how thorough and decisive was the check that befel this last 
efibrt against the centre and right : " Following up the suc- 
cess," says Cleburne, "our men gained the edge of the 
cedars, and were almost on the Nashville turnpike, in rear of 
the original centre of Rosecrans's army, sweeping with their 
fire his only line of communication with Nashville ; but at 
this critical moment the enemy met my thinned ranks with 
another fresh line of battle, supported by a heavier and closer 
artillery fire than I had yet encountered. A report also 
spread, which I believe was true, that we were flanked on the 
right. This was more than the men could stand. Smith's 
brigade was driven back in great confusion ; Polk and John- 
son's followed. As our broken ranks went back over the 
fields, before the fire of their fresh line, the enemy opened 
fire on our right flank, from several batteries which they had 
concentrated on an eminence near the railroad, inflicting a 
11 



210 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

heavier loss on Polk's brigade than it had suffered in all the 
previous fighting of the day. The division was rallied on the 
edge of the opposite woods, about four hundred yards in rear 
of the scene of the disaster, though some of the men could 
not be stopped until they reached the Wilkinson pike." Like 
evidence is given by the officers of all the Confederate corps* 
Such a change had come over the morale of the men who had 
fought so determinedly in the morning, and such a renewed 
outburst of spirit was displayed by the Union army when it 
found itself advantageously placed, and its energies directed 
in person by its skilful commander ! 

Foiled in his efforts to further prevail against the new and 
powerful front of his adversary, Bragg determined upon a 
renewed effort against the left flank. In order to give assur- 
ance of success in this design, he recalled from the east side 
of Stone River the division of Breckinridge, which, as it had 
been relieved of all menace by the withdrawal of the whole 
Union force to the west side, and had not been engaged dur- 
ing all the action, was during the afternoon transferred across 
the river, and united with the right of Polk's line — a rein- 
forcement of four brigades, seven thousand fresh men. 
The key and salient point of this flank was still held by 
stout Hazcn, though his own command was now well braced 
up, both on the left and the right. When at four o'clock the 
Confederate attack was commenced, it developed in such de- 
termined ferocity, that Rosecrans himself, solicitous touching 
this vital point of his line, hastened hither to sustain it with 
his own magnetic presence. Colonel Garesche, his chief of 
staff, was at his side ; and, as the two careened across the 
fiery field, a shell grazing the person of Rosecrans, carried off 
the head of his lieutenant, the devoted and chivalrous Gar- 
esche, model of all that is pure and lovely andj^of good 
report. 

But not for grief over nearest or dearest was there then 
time — the fate of a mighty conflict hung trembling in the 



MUEFREESBORO*. 211 

balance ; and the captain, hastening to the front, addressed 
the soldiers with that kind of plain and savage Saxon, "vvhich 
comes first to the lips of men in battle, "Men," said he, "do 
you wish to know how to be safe ? Shoot low. Give them 
a blizzard at their shins ! But do you wish to know how to 
be safest of all? Give them a blizzard, and then charge with 
cold steel ! Forward, now, and show what you are made 
of! " The injunction was obeyed with a will, and after meet- 
ing a repulse in his first ordered attack, Breckenridge ad- 
vanced his second line ; it broke to the rear at the first vol- 
ley. Thus the action ended, and the two hosts lay on their 
arms. That night the moon shed its lustre into the dark 
depths of the cedar brake, where the debris of battle and many 
thousand bodies of valiant men, dead or moaning in agony 
worse than death, attested the bloody work done on that last 
day of 1862. 

The action of the 31st of December was in every respect 
a drawn battle. Both sides failed to make good their tactical 
plan. It was, therefore, thus far, decisive of nothing, the 
issue must depend on the sequel. 

That Bragg expected to make it decisive for the Confeder- 
ates, ultimately forcing the retreat of the Union army, is not 
doubtful. He had quite driven it from the field with a loss of 
twenty-eight pieces of artillery, more than one third its en- 
tire force in that arm, and a very large part of its train ; he 
had practically severed its communications with Nashville by 
an active cavalry, and he was in position by thrusting for- 
ward his left to lay hold of its line of retreat. But Bragg, in 
this surmise, misjudged the temper of his antagonist. Rose- 
crans had planted himself there to stay, and when in an as- 
semblage of his officers that night, some ofiered the kind of 
timid counsels so readily engendered among small bodies of 
men, the commander declared his purpose in one shining sen- 
tence, " Gentlemen, we fight or die right here ! " 



212 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

When dawn of the 1st of January, 1863, came, both armies 
were found in position ; but the Union army so*" far from dis- 
covering any sign of a purpose to retreat, was seen preparing 
its vantage ground by improvised defences as if for a perma- 
nent stay. The day was passed by Bragg in mute expect- 
ancy, in an attitude which seemed to say, " Why don't you re- 
treat? Do you not know that you were beaten yesterday?" 
Eosecrans knew no such thing. He only knew that "we 
must win this battle" ; his only resolve was "we shall fight 
or die riffht here." It was found that there was ammunition 
enough for another battle. " The only question," says Eose- 
crans, "was where it was to be fought." 

In his original plan of offensive action, it had been Eose- 
crans's desiim to swing with his left into Murfreesboro' and 
upon the rear of the enemy. It would appear that he still 
held to this purpose ; for having now established his position 
so securely as to be in condition to invite rather than fear at- 
tack, he, on the 1st, threw a force again to the east side of 
Stone Eiver ; and followed uj) the movement by transferring 
the division of Van Cleve and a brigade of Palmer's division 
to crown the heights on that bank. His manoeuvre was so 
obviously menacing to Bragg's position that he hastily re- 
turned Breckinridge's division to its original position on the 
eastern side of the stream, and on the afternoon of the 2d, he 
ordered that officer to dislodge the Union force. To this 
end, a spirited attack was begun by Breckenridge at 3 p. m. 
Van Cleve's division manifested a great want of steadiness, 
and retired across the river after an insignificant resistance. 
Grosse's brigade of Palmer's division, however, maintained 
its ground ; and when Hazen's brigade was sent across in 
support, the enemy fled precipitately, a result that was due 
less to the resistance the Confederates encountered from the 
Union infantry, than to the fearful havoc made in their ranks 
by the artillery fire from the opposite bank of Stone Eiver, 
by which in half an hour, Breckinridge lost seventeen 



MUKFREESBOEO'. 213 

hundred men, or one-third of what remained of his divi- 
sion. 

This was the last offensive effort of Bragg, and after re- 
maining another day in a kind of dazed expectation that his 
opponent would retire, he resolved to do so himself. He 
accordingly withdrew his army during the night of the 3d, 
and passing through Murfreesboro', betook himself southward 
into Central Tennessee, establishing his shattered forces at 
Shelby ville and Tullahoma. Murfreesboro' was at once occu- 
pied by Rosecrans ; but his army was in no condition to un- 
dertake an immediate pursuit. 

This was the issue of the famous battle in the cedar brakes 
of Stone River, wherein were put hors de combat near twenty- 
five thousand men, of which appalling aggregate the sum of 
above ten thousand was from the Confederate, and of about 
fourteen thousand from the Union army. 



in. 



RESULTS OF MURFREESBORO'. 

If there be any force in the exposition I have already made 
of the circumstances attending the battle of Murfreesboro', 
it will not be difficult to determine the degree of decisiveness 
that belongs to that action. The Union army had been thrown 
back froni the front of Chattanooga to the Ohio River. Brajrir, 
with much booty, had retired unmolested to Northern Ten- 
nessee, where he took up a position which at once covered 
the great grain-growing belt of that State, and threatened 
Nashville. Moreover, not only did he confine the Union 
army almost within the limits of that city, but he made its 
tenure very doubtful by the damage which, by means of a 
cloud of enterprising cavalry, he was constantly able to inflict 
on the single line of railway upon which the army was de- 
pendent for its subsistence. It was necessary therefore that 



214 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

" a battle should be fought that would decide the possession of 
Middle Tennessee. Whether or not the battle of Murfrees- 
boro' had this effect, let the sequel show. 

Had General Bragg succeeded in making good his intent, the 
action of the 31st of December Avould have been decisive for 
the Confederates — as decisive as Frederick's battle of Prague, 
which it closely resembled in its conception. Had General 
Kosecrans succeeded in making good his intent, it would 
have been decisive for the Union army, since it would have 
forced the enemy from his line of retreat. But both parties 
having foiled in their tactical plans, and the position of Mur- 
freesboro' being per se of no strategic importance, the advan- 
tage would obviously rest with the side which longest main- 
tained its ground. This advantage, with all the moral pres- 
tiijG attending? it, was at length surrendered to Rosecrans. 

Such to all appearance was the sum of what Murfreesboro' 
determined. Men indeed rejoiced at the result, and with 
justice ; for if we consider the train of evils that came upon 
the army in consequence of the first day's fortune to the 
right wing, if we consider how nearly the day was lost, we 
shall see how much it was to have even saved the army from 
amid such perilous environment — how much more it was to 
have, in addition, inflicted a repulse upon an exultant ene- 
my, and finally compelled him to leave the field. 

It behooves us, in the estimate of results in war, to take 
into account, not merely the ills that actually befall us, but 
the worse ills that might have befallen us, had they not been 
averted (and which are therefore to be esteemed a positive 
good) ; and thus judging, it is plain that the victory at Mur- 
freesboro' takes additional lustre from the dangers out of 
which it was plucked, and the enemy's discomfiture, addi- 
tional completeness from the triumph so confidently antici- 
pated, and so nearly attained. Moreover, the result was 
doubly grateful to the country, coming at the time it did. 
The summer campaign had shown the enemy everywhere on 



MURFREESBOEO'. 215 

the offensive, both east and west, and though the Confeder- 
ates had been compelled to retire both from Virginia and 
Kentucky, yet the impunity with which they escaped in each 
case left a deep sting in the minds of the people of the North. 
To these events succeeded in the army of Grant a series of 
unfortunate checks, and in the army of the Potomac the 
bloody repulse of Fredericksburg. It was while the heart 
of the North was lacerated with the story of that frightful 
slaughter, that the tidings of Murfreesboro' were flashed over 
the land. What a relief those tidings brought ! Men saw 
indeed how costly was the sacrifice ; but they saw also that 
the sacrifice was not in vain. They saw an army which, 
receiving a terrible blow, yet not only did not retreat, but 
was able to give so weighty a counter-stroke as to force the 
enemy from the field ; and they saw the steadiness of the 
troops matched by the most ins23iring qualities of generalship 
on the part of the commander. It was a daj-spring of hope 
and courage ; and when President Lincoln, on receiving the 
news of the battle, telegraphed to General Rosecrans, " God 
bless 3'ou and all of you — please tender to all, and accept 
for yourself, the nation's gratitude for your and their skill, 
endurance, and dauntless courage," and when the General-in- 
chief, in words of unwonted warmth, thus greeted him : 
*'The victory was well earned, and one of the most brilliant 
of the war ; you and your brave army have won the gratitude 
of the army and the admiration of the world," — they only 
expressed a sentiment which all the North felt in its heart of 
hearts. 

But it is not alone or even chiefly in what were the patent 
and ostensible results of Murfreesboro', that we discern the 
true degree of decisiveness that marks that action. Eather 
is it in those larger consequences which it prepared and made 
possible. The blow there dealt Bragg's army proved to be 
one of those deep-seated hurts that disclose themselves and 
develop their fnll effect only after a certain lapse of time. 



216 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

The gravity of the damage lay not in the material loss of ten 
thousand men (the Union loss was fully as great) , but in the 
shock which the Confederate army received in its vital part. 
For the Union army never lost the ascendancy which at Stone 
Eiver it acquired over its antagonist ; and when a few months 
after that action Rosecrans initiated his grand movement on 
Chattanooga, the feebleness of the resistance he encountered 
gave the best evidence of how thoroughly the morale of 
Bragg's army was shaken. This movement, the worthy sequel 
of Murfreesboro', and a signal epoch ill the history of the 
war, I now proceed to sketch in outline. 

The advance from Murfreesboro' was begun the 24th of 
June, 1863 — as early a period as the necessity of awaiting 
the season of favorable weather, the formation of an adequate 
cavalry force, the accumulation of supplies, and a due regard 
for operations in other parts of the theatre of war, would 
permit. Bragg's army at this time occupied a strongly forti- 
fied position north of Duck Eivcr — his infantry extending 
from Shelbj^ville to Wartrace, and his cavalry on the right 
to McMinnville : the line was covered by a range of high, 
rough and rocky hills, that ran east and west between Mur- 
freesboro' and Shelby ville, and were only practicable by a few 
passes held by the Confederates. Rosecrans determined to 
dislodge the Confederates from this stronghold on the Duck 
River, by threatening their line of retreat. This manoeuvre 
was successfully executed, though with immense difiiculty, 
owing to a storm of great severity, which, continuing for 
many days, rendered the roads almost impassable. Having 
first threatened direct attack on Shelby ville, Rosecrans, by a 
rapid ma)iceuvre of concentration, massed his corps at INIan- 
chester, when Bragg, seeing his line of retreat compromised, 
withdrew to Tullahoma, eighteen miles further south, on the 
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. Here the Confederates 
had a stronghold that they had been long And elaborately 



MURFREESBORO'. 217 

fortifying. But Rosecrans, by a second turning movement on 
Bragg's right, forced him to fall back, and the Confederates, 
having crossed tlie mountains and the Tennessee River, re- 
turned to Chattanooga, whither also he drew Buckner's force 
from East Tennessee. This enabled the column of Burnside, 
which was acting in concert with the army of the Cumber- 
laud, to seize possession of Knoxville. Rosecrans followed 
in pursuit across the Elk River to the base of the Cumber- 
land range, which he proposed to cross as soon as the rail- 
road should be repaired and supplies accumulated. The 
conduct of this preliminary act of the campaign was, in the 
highest degree, brilliant and completely successful. In nine 
days the enemy was driven from two fortified positions, and 
compelled to give up the possession of the whole of Middle 
Tennessee. The operation was accomplished in the midst of 
the most extraordinary rains ever known in that part of the 
country, and the result was achieved with a loss of five hun- 
dred and sixty men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The 
Confederate army showed great demoralization, and mani- 
fested the strong ascendancy which the Union army had gained 
over it in the battles of Murfreesboro.' 

The railroad having been put in repair by the middle of 
August, and opened forward to the Tennessee River, it next 
remained to undertake the arduous operation of crossing the 
Cumberland Mountains, a lofty mass of rocks separating the 
waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow 
into the Tennessee. 

The movement was begun August 16th, and completed 
20th, when the column had reached the Tennessee River, 
which it was necessary to cross in order to attain Chatta- 
nooga, where the main body of Bragg's army was encamped. 
As this was an operation of great delicacy, and as it was 
therefore very important to conceal to Jhe last moment the 
point of crossing, Rosecrans disposed his coi^ps so as to cover 
a very extended front, stretching from Harrison's, ten miles 



218 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "\YAIl. 

above Chattanooga, to Bellefonte, fifty miles below. While 
Hazen made dexterous feints in the former direction, Rosecrans 
caused bridges to be prepared at Bridgeport and Caperton's ; 
and upon these, between the 29th of August and 4th of Sep- 
tember, he threw the whole army across the Tennessee. The 
distance from Bridgeport to Chattanooga is twenty-eight 
miles, and from Caperton's Ferry to Chattanooga about forty 
miles ; but the country is one of excessive difficulty, as the 
following description will show. 

On the south side of the Tennessee Eiver a series of Alpine 
ridges run southward from the river in a direction parallel 
with each other, leaving between each mountain vale a valley 
or cove. The first of these, and the one next the Tennessee, 
is Sand Mountain, the sides of which are very precipitous, 
and over which a few, and these very difficult roads, lead 
into Lookout Valley, which is shut in between Sand Moun- 
tain and Lookout Mountain, the next ridge to the eastward. 
Lookout Mountain is a vast palisade of rock, rising two thou- 
sand four hundred feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt 
rocky clifis, from a steep, wooded base. It is practicable 
for a distance of forty-two miles by only three roads. East 
of Lookout Mountain runs Mission Ridge, and between the 
two is Chattanooga Valley, a valley which follows the course 
of Chattanooga Creek. Finally, to the east of Mission Ridge, 
and running parallel with it, is another valley — Chickamauga 
Valley, following the course of Chickamauga Creek — which 
has, with Chattanooga Valley, a common head in McLemore's 
Cove, enclosed between Lookout Mountain on the west, and 
Pigeon Mountain to the east. At the mouth of this valley, 
upon the south bank of the Tennessee, stands Chattanooga, 
which, shut in by these well-nigh impassable mountain bar- 
riers, fully merits the appellation of " Hawk's Nest," which 
the word signifies in the aboriginal Indian. 

To force his way through these barriers was the task under- 
taken by Rosecrans. And first in order was the crossing of 



MUEFREESBOEO'. ^ 219 

Sand Mountain — an enterprise that was successfully effected. 
Thomas crossed to Trenton and occupied Frick's and Stevens's 
Gaps on Lookout Mountain ; Crittenden followed, and took 
post at Wauhatchie, while McCook (with the exception of 
Sheridan's division, which was to cross at Bridgeport and 
move via Trenton to "Winston) was put on march to Valley 
Head and Winston Gap. These movements were completed 
by Crittenden's and McCook's coi'ps on the 6th, and by 
Thomas's corps on the 8th of September. The enemy was 
found occupying the Point of Lookout Mountain, and in 
order to dislodge him from Chattanooga it was necessary 
either to carry Lookout Mountain, or manoeuvre so as to 
compel him to quit his position. The latter plan was chosen, 
and its execution set on foot by sending a body of cavalry 
and a division of McCook's corps south-eastward to the 
vicinity of Alpine, thus threatening the railroad in Bragg's 
rear. Meantime, Thomas was to cross Lookout Mountain by 
Trick's and Stevens's Gaps, to McLemore's Cove, and Critten- 
den was to move by roads near the Tennessee into Chatta- 
nooga, in case the enemy should evacuate it. These move- 
ments were begun on the 8th ; but next day Crittenden dis- 
covered that the enemy, fearing for his communications, had 
abandoned Chattanooga, which was immediately occupied by 
Crittenden. 

Up to this time nothing could be more admirable than the 
strategy by which Rosecrans effected his purpose. "We shall 
now have to follow him in a procedure to which the same 
praise cannot be given. Two courses were now open to 
Rosecrans — either to concentrate his forces at Chattanoosra, 
ending the campaign there ; or to follow up Bragg with the 
view of first dealing him a damaging blow, and then establish 
himself in Chattanooga. That the former course was feasible 
will readily be perceived, from a statement of the positions of 
the several corps. On the 9th, when Crittenden threw his 
force into Chattanooga, Thomas's corps was in Lookout Val- 



220 THE' TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ley, near Stevens's Gap, twenty miles to the south, and Mc- 
Cook's corps in the same valley, about twenty miles further 
south. Between the Union army, thus jDositioned, and the 
Confederate force in McLemore's Cove, was the rocky barrier 
of Lookout Mountain, " a perpendicular wall of limestone." 
This could only be forced by an enemy seeking to penetrate 
between Thomas and Crittenden, by the single pass of 
Stevens's Gap, which was held by Thomas. It was, therefore, 
perfectly feasible to direct two of Thomas's divisions to 
follow Crittenden into Chattanooga, while the remaining 
division was held at Stevens's Gap, until McCook's corps 
could be called up and marched past that point, when the 
whole army could have been concentrated at Chattanooga, 
without its being in the power of Bragg to have jDrevented, or 
even molested the movement. This would have been a judi- 
cious course. 

The second course was not only judicious — it was brilliant ; 
for it is manifest that much greater security Avould be given 
to the possession of Chattanooga by first beating Bragg in the 
plain, and crippling his strength before establishing the army 
in the mountain fastness. This plan Rosecrans determined 
to adopt. It must be stated, however, that the method of its 
execution violated military principles, and that although he 
escaped with impunity, it was purely owing to the imbecility 
of his adversary. 

When on the night of the 9th. of September, it was dis- 
covered that Chattanooga had been abandoned by the Con- 
federates, the weight of testimony led Rosecrans to believe 
that Bragg was retreating to Rome, sixty-five miles south of 
Chattanooga. The Union commander inunediately took 
measures for pursuit. He directed Crittenden to hold Chat- 
tanooga with one brigade, to recall Hazen's forces from the 
north side of the Tennessee, and with his corps follow up 
Bragg by way of Ringold and Dalton ; Thomas to move across 
to the east side of Lookout Mountain, and occupy the head 



MURFREESBORO'. 221 

of McLemore's Cove ; McCook to march his whole corps 
upon Alpine and Summerville, for the purpose of interrupting 
Bragg's retreat and taking him in flank. These movements 
were predicated on the hypothesis that Bragg was retreating 
on Rome, and with that view, were well devised to make a 
decisive stroke. But in point of fact he had only fallen back 
a few miles from Chattanooga, and taken jDosition with his 
main body at Lafayette, and his right at Gordon's Mills, on 
Chickamauga Creek. Therefore, the farther the movements 
ordered by the Union commander progressed, the more did 
each column become compromised, and the more was the 
safety of the whole army put in jeopardy. The real situation 
of the Confederate force was not discovered until the 12th ; 
and it then became with Rosecrans a matter of life and death 
to effect a concentration of his army. 

It would be diiScult to conceive a situation of greater peril 
than that in which the Union columns were now placed. 
Crittenden's corps was on the east side of Chickamauga Creek ; 
Thomas was at Stevens's Gap ; ]\IcCook was at Alpine — a 
distance of fifty-seven miles from flank to flank. Concentra- 
tion could not possibly be effected in less than three days, 
Bragg held position opposite the centre of the Union army, 
with his adversary, whose isolated fractions he was free to 
strike at pleasure, quite at his mercy. It was only necessary 
that he should fall upon Thomas with such a force as would 
crush him ; then turn down Chattanooga Valley and throw 
himself between the town and Crittenden, overwhelming him ; 
then pass back between Lookout Mountain and the Tennessee 
Eiver into Lookout Valley, and cut off McCook 's retreat to 
Bridgeport. In fact, Rosecrans voluntarily lent his opponent 
the same opportunity which, only after infinite manoeuvring, 
Napoleon obtained over the Austrians when debouching from 
the Alps, he burst upon the plahis of Italy in the campaign 
of Marengo. 

Bragg could not fail to see so obvious an opportunity. 



222 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

But he was incapable of availing himself of it. He passed the 
succeeding six days — all of which time was required to bring 
about a junction of the Union corps — in a series of feeble 
tentatives ; and on the 18th of September, Rosecrans, by 
great good fortune, had effected a concentration of his army 
in McLemore's Cove, on the west side of Chickamauga 
Creek. In this position he covered Chattanooga, which, if 
the Confederates wished to repossess, they must first fight 
for it. 

If the exposition of this conduct of the Confederate com- 
mander has shown that, in point of generalship, Bragg was 
not a man to be greatly feared, it is now due to state that, 
since the Union army crossed the Tennessee, circumstances 
had been materially changed. The Confederates had mean- 
while received three considerable accessions to their streniJ^th 
— the East Tennessee force of Buckner, the remnants of the 
Mississippi army, and, above all, two highly disciplined divis- 
ions of Lee's army, brought by Longstreet from Virginia. 
These reinforcements gave a considerable preponderance to 
Bragg, who, assuming the offensive, precipitated the bloody 
combat of two days, known as the battle of Chickamauga. 

It does not come within the scope of this work to enter 
into any detailed recital of the events of this action, which 
indeed are well known. The issue of the 19th September 
was a dra"v^^l battle ; that of the 20th was a grave defeat to 
the'Union army — a defeat only saved from being utter dis- 
aster by the rock-like firmness of Thomas who, with portions 
of all the corps, checked the enemy's victorious advance, and 
permitted the withdrawal of the army to Chattanooga. Bragg's 
purpose was to compel the retreat of the Unioi^ army across 
the Tennessee ; but the result did not at all realize this in- 
tent, for the falling back was only into Chattanooga, which 
was the original objective of the campaign. Although, there- 
fore, Chickamauga was tactically a defeat to the Union army, 
yet the strategic result of the campaign, as a whole, was a most 



' MURFREESBOEO". 223 

substantial and crowning victory — the secure occupation of 
the fastness of East Tennessee, and of Chattanooga, the cita- 
del of that great mountain sj^stem which ran like a wedge 
into the heart of the South. This possession was never after- 
wards relinquished : it became the scene of new triumphs for 
Grant, and the base whence Sherman moved to Atlanta. 

As General Rosecrans was deposed from command soon 
after the close of this campaign, I cannot terminate this 
sketch without a brief analysis of his capabilities as a com- 
mander. While I shall have no difficulty in avoiding those 
cruel slanders that have been heaped upon this officer, it may 
not be so easy for me, who, during two months at Murfrees- 
boro', enjoyed an intimate converse with that brilliant and 
highly cultivated mind, and afterwards accompanied him on 
the triumphal campaign to Chattanooga, to escape some pre- 
possessions in his favor. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to 
judge him with that impartiality and candor which it is my 
habit to bring to the estimate of military men. * 

Rosecrans's connection with the Army of the Curtiberland, 
as its chief, lasted just a year. His great field engagements 
during that period were two — Murfreesboro' and Chicka- 
mauga : the one fought two months after he took command, 
and the other in the eleventh month of his commandership — 
the one being oiFensive, a drawn battle tactically, and a vic- 
tory in its results ; the other defensive, and technically a 
defeat, though under circumstances that did not allow it to 
baulk a great strategic success previously won. But " pitched 
battles are the last resort of a good general," and if Rosecrans 
had few battles, he had many triumphs, and a sure title to 
fame in that great series of operations by which he forced 
the powerful army of the Confederates to abandon the whole 
State of Tennessee, and by which he advanced the Union stand- 
ard from the Cumberland to the Tennessee River, planting it 
upon the rocky bulwark of Chattanooga. This campaign 



224 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

bears an analogy to that of Sherman from Chattanooga to 
Atlanta — the distance traversed being the same, and the 
result in each case being largely due to a system of "well- 
combincd manoeuvres. But the means at the disposal of 
Eosecrans were greatly inferior to those of Sherman, and it 
must be borne in mind that as Rosecrans's march was prior to 
Sherman's, the difficulty was enhanced by the novelty of the 
operation. Indeed, Rosecrans's campaign from ISIurfreesboro' 
to Chattanooga furnishes the type of those great movements 
over large spaces that were made with such success at a later 
period of the war. 

This fact will, perhaps, enable us to fix upon the salient 
quality of Rosecrans's military talent. It is as a strategist 
that he chiefly distinguished himself; for in the fashion of his 
mind there were some peculiarities that would often mar his 
success. He was, for example, always too weak to dismiss 
from command a number of very incompetent subordinates. 
In the conduct of battle, though extremely brilliant, he lacked 
calm, and was capable of measures that were egregiously 
bad. Of this his conduct at Chickamauga will aiford an illus- 
tion, and it will at the same time give me an opportunity of 
explaining an act which at the time was by some . cruelly at- 
tributed to a want of courage — a quality which might as well 
be denied Julius Ceesar as Rosecrans. 

When at Chickamauga the enemy pierced the right wing, 
Rosecrans and staif were forced back in the rout, and by the 
intervention of the Confederates separated from the centre 
and left of the army. In order to reach the centre and left, 
Rosecrans had to climb Mission Ridge, and make a detour of 
seven or eight miles. "When he had gotten as far as Ross- 
ville, the point at which he might either turn southward and 
make towards the centre and left, or northward, and make 
to Chattanooga, word was brought him that Negley's division 
was routed. Now Negley held the extreme left. Unfortu- 
nately, there was at the same time a lull along the whole 



MUKFREESBORO'. 225 

battle-front : so that to Rosecrans's apprehension, every cir- 
cumstance conspired to raise the conviction that the whole 
army had been routed, and that the best thing he could do 
was to return to Chattanooga, reorganize its shattered masses, 
and prepare for a defensive battle. He did so, and on reach- 
ing Chattanooga telegraphed to Washington his belief that 
the army had been beaten and routed. 

Now, the question as to how we are to judge this conduct, 
is so intimately connected with tlie peculiarities of Rosecrans's 
mind, that it may be said to turn on a point of metaphysics. 
Eosecrans is a man, who, in his mental powers, is incapable 
of staying at those half-way houses of impression and belief, 
in which men ordinarily rest when they have not the means 
of judging with certainty. He is by constitution an absolutist 
in thought. He knows only convictions, and when he has 
made up his mind to a conclusion, he cannot be moved from 
it. Hence, he is either tremendously right, or tremendously 
wrong. Unhappily, it was the latter at Chickamauga. If 
he had been correct in his theory as to the fortune of tlie day, 
he did the best thing that could possibly be done in returning 
to Chattanooga. He was not right in his theory, and his 
action in accordance with that theory was a great error. 

But, whatever deduction may be made in consideration of 
such things from Rosecrans's title to complete commander- 
ship, no candid mind who shall review the course of the 
war can forget that it was he who, in the "winter of our 
discontent," brought an outburst of summer hope in the tri- 
umph of Murfreesboro', and who, by a giant leap, clutched 
the crown of victory in the mountain fastness of Chatta- 
nooga. 



22G THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 



VI. 

THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 



PRELUDE TO HAMPTOX ROADS. 

Could we fancy some ancient monarch of the quarter-deck, 
some Blake, DuQuesne, Tromp, Ruyter, nay, even a Jervis 
or a Nelson of our own century, risen from his bed of fame 
and escorted to a modern ship of war, what would not be 
Ills bewilderment at the scene ! Amazed at his surroundings, 
he would accuse his own eyes of treachery, and declare him- 
self delirious or dreaming: and when, after infinite wonder, 
the truth became clear to him, he would no louirer recoOTiize 
his profession, and would confess that he was but a novice in 
naval combat. In place of that majestic structure of oak and 
canvas, perfected by the elaboration of centuries, and beauti- 
ful in the form and finish of its multitudinous details, over 
which his admiral's pennant once floated, he beholds under 
his feet a long, low, iron-bound raft, rising but a few inches 
out of the water, and, fixed thereon, a stumpy iron cylinder. 
No cunningly-carved stern or quarter-gallery, no magnificent 
figure-head, no solid bulwarks surmounted with snowy ham- 
mocks, no polished and shining capstan, no neatly-coiled 
cables, nothing of all the paraphernalia of that holy-stoned 
deck he was wont to pace in great glory, now meets his eye : 
there is only a rusty, greasy, iron planking, stript of all 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 227 

adornment, and indeed of everything once familiar. At each 
larger swell the ocean rushes over the deck, a result which 
his astonished gaze finds to be a matter of design. Instead 
of those clouds of canvas he was wont to see stretchino- far 
up into the sky, with all their attendant complexity of rope 
and spar, there is not only no sail visible, but no yard for a 
sail, nor a single mast for a yard. That vast apparatus of 
timber and rigging which marked the sailing-craft of less 
than twoscore years ago, is shorn clean to the hull, so that 
for this modern nondescript the whole art of navigation seems 
to be useless. Yet, since the structure moves, and with 
stead}' rapidity, our spectator searches, but in vain, for the 
motive powder. When instructed that it is buried deep under 
water, safe from the reach of hostile shot, that it consists 
of a new agent, steam, operating a new instrument, the 
screw-propeller, his mystery redoubles : but when he extends 
his glance beneath the deck, and for himself descries the 
wondrous machinery collected there, toiling with its awe-in- 
spiring strength and precision, his astonishment passes all 
bounds. 

Nevertheless, a greater shock of surprise is in store. This 
imcouth marvel steams straight into the centre of a vast fleet 
of those enormous, three-decked Avooden floating gun-boxes, 
such as might have won or lost the fight off" Trafalgar, and 
instantly opens fire. Thunderstruck at her audacity, our 
resurrected admiral finds every one of her numerous oppo- 
nents greater in bulk, with thrice her complement of men, 
and twenty or fifty times her number of guns. But the 
miracle is soon explained : the missiles of the whole fleet, 
pattering against the iron fortress- Avails, break Avith the impact, 
or glance off", leaving a shalloAV dent in jjroof of their harm- 
lessness. He misses the familiar music of battle, Avith shot 
flying through port-hole or crashing through hull, tearing 
rigging and bringing doAvn masts, Avith guns dismounted and 
gunners slain by scores, Avith cockpit full and scuppers run- 



228 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ning with blood : the crew are as safe behind an impregnable 
rampart as if on their pillows at home ; and indeed most of 
them, no longer sailors but stokers, in lieu of manning the 
tops or standing at the deck batteries, are assigned the 
huralile functions of tranquilly shovelling coal, far down below 
the water-line ! Meanwhile, from within the ugly cylinder, 
a pair of monstrous guns, which to our astounded on-looker 
appear even more fabulous by their gigantic dimensions than 
aught else he has witnessed, hurl forth huge spheres, as the 
machinery of their wondrous gun-shield revolves them to 
every quarter of the compass. Each shot crashes a yawning 
cavern through the sides of some adversary, into which the 
waves pour in torrents ; while, by another modern device, 
that of " horizontal shell-firing," such of the ill-starred wooden 
navy as are not sunk outright, are blown up, or clothed in 
flames. Confounded beyond measure at each moment's reve- 
lations, "what engine of destruction," at length he exclaims, 
"can this be, at once invulnerable itself, and annihilating to 
all aroimd it ? and what is this type of the war-ship of the 
nineteenth century ? " The answer is quickly returned, — 
"It is the American Monitor." 

It is chiefly within the last quarter of a century that naval 
warfire has been revolutionized by new inventions and de- 
vices, and the crowning act of progress, the introduction of the 
monitor iron-clad, dates from the AVar of the Rebellion. 
Under our own eyes have been consummated innovations 
which make all previous naval history merely the object of 
antiquarian research, and previous naval science profitless 
knowledge. The early annals of naval warfiire have now 
little that is practically worthy of record. At a bound, the 
science of ship-fighting leaps to the heroic battles of immortal 
Greece. In two regards, at least, the naval contests of 
Greece and Rome are more worthy of our notice now than the 
ship-fighting of nearly twenty centuries thereafter ; for those 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 229 

ancient people give us in their galley-beaks the exemplars 
and models of the ram, revived in our day, after so long dis- 
use : they, too, were wise enough to protect from hostile 
missiles the motive-power of their war-ships, nameh', the 
banks of oars and the slaves who sat and worked them. 
When sails came into vogue on war ships, the motive-power, 
especially after the introduction of gunpowder, was always 
exposed to the enemy's shot, and only the screw-propeller 
accomplished, in this respect, what the fleets of classic ages 
had achieved ; so it happens that, for us, two thousand years 
of experience dwindle to a span, and Cape St. Vincent and 
Trafalgar are as old and as far off as Salamis and Actium. 

With the introduction of gunpowder, five hundred years 
ago, came the arming of war vessels with artillery, and there- 
with the first noticeable epoch in maritime warfare. It im- 
mediately wrought a change in the form of vessels, and in the 
art of ship-building ; for, whereas, during the centuries pre- 
ceding, the hulls bore up wondrous superstructures, including 
pent-houses and protections for the knights and archers Avho 
thence flung their spears and put in flight their arrows, now, 
being swept by the fire of cannon, the decks were stripped by 
degrees of these extra shields and adornments. The masts, 
the sails, the rigging, as well as the hulls, Avere thenceforth 
gradually modified, in view of the destructive Aveapons to 
which they were exposed. Nevertheless, Avar vessels Avere 
vulnerable, and not only as floating forts for combatants, but 
in their OAvn motive-poAver. IIowcA^er, nearly five centuries 
passed Avithout adding much cither to the science of naval 
construction or to that of naA'al manoeuvring in battle. Then, 
at length, in our time, a grand discoA^ery AA^as made in the 
use of steam as a motor, Avhich opened a ncAv era in ship- 
building, and Avrought wonders in the navigation of the globe. 
But it AA'as long after this novel locomotive had been tamed to 
the uses of commerce, and famous progress had been made 
in steam machinery, that the ncAV ageiit Avas applied to naval 



230 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE ^Y\U. 

warfare. This tardiness may have been somewhat due to the 
peace then reigning over the greater part of the civilized 
world, which accordingly distracted inventive genius from 
the arts of destruction to those of traffic and national wealth ; 
but it chiefly sprang from an intrinsic mechanical difficulty of 
application. The cumbrous paddle-wheels on the one hand 
interfered with the battery-power of the ship, and also with 
the employment of her sails, which for economy's sake it was 
desirable to use, Avhenevcr no emergency required steam ; on 
the other hand, the steam machinery itself, and the whole 
motive-power, presented a fair target to the enemy, and the 
ship might lie a helpless log on the water from receiving a 
single hostile shot. This difficulty was overcome by the 
genius of Ericsson, who made the screw-propeller an instru- 
ment of practical utility. Then crossing from the old world 
to the new, that engineer built for America, in the year 1842, 
the ilrst scrcAv-propeller war vessel ever constructed, the 
admirable U. S. steamer Princeton. It was the forerunner 
of a mighty change in the armaments of maritime nations, and 
was the model on which all the screw navies have been con- 
structed ; all the great naval powers, the world oyer, destroy- 
ing or revamping their sailing vessels, substituted the ncAV 
motor. In England, this work was officially reported as 
complete only two years before the Southern insurrection. 
Thus, under our eyes, and as if but yesterday, modern war- 
fare on the seas was thoroughly revolutionized, and, history 
repeating itself, once more as in the elder days, the motive- 
power of war vessels was shielded from the weapons of the 
enemy. It yet remained, however, for two screw-propelled 
vessels to mananivre in actual combat ; and that memorable 
spectacle took place for the first time in the battle of Hamp- 
ton Roads. 

Meanwhile another great change had occurred in naval 
warfare, of which this same matchless contest whereof I 
write, furnished, if not the very earliest, at least the fullest 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 231 

and most instructive example. This was the practice of liori- 
zontal shell-firing, whose terrible destructiveness in wooden 
ships was instantly apparent from the time of its proposed 
introduction. In this, the American Colonel Bomford suc- 
cessfully disputes with Paixhan, to whom the honor is gen- 
erally ascribed, 'the merit of priority of invention. But we 
come down to very recent days for the practical use of shell- 
guns in hostile combat. The Russians first demonstrated 
their value by firing with them the Turkish fleet at Sinope 
during the Crimean war. But it was the shell-firins: of the 
Merrimac in Hampton Roads against the ill-fated Cuml^erland 
and Congress, as contrasted with the harmless discharges of 
the same guns next day against the impregnable Monitor, that 
first pointed the great moral taught by horizontal shell-firing 
from the batteries of war-vessels. That battle rang the knell 
of Avooden navies the world over, and all maritime nations 
bent themselves to building armored ships. 

At the outbreak of the Rebellion, an enormous disparity 
was visible between the naval strength of the Union and that 
of the Confederac3^ The regular war-steamers of the United 
States, though scanty in numbers, contained some of the finest 
ships' in the world. But on this navy was imposed the task, 
Herculean in proportion, of maintaining a stringent blockade 
along a sea-line of three thousand miles of American coast, 
stretching from Cape Henry to the harbor of Galveston ; and 
the Navy Department went busily to work, hooted mean- 
while by the people, who, too excited then to see the enor- 
mous difllculties in the way, chafed at the open coast, and 
groaned afresh over each story of successful blockade running. 
The department bought up, right and left, in every port, and 
wherever it could find them, the vessels of the mercantile ma- 
rine, and every floating object propelled by steam which could 
by hook or crook be turned into a war-vessel, was purchased 
at an inflated price ; so that peaceful transports and ferry-boats 
were soon swarming the "Western waters and the Atlantic coast, 



232 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

armed and equipped as gun-boats. Meanwhile, of course, the 
keels of many new war-vessels were laid. The first essay at 
construction embraced twenty-three gun-boats of the Wissa- 
hickon class ; and the next, at least in the wooden nav}^ were 
ten sloops of the Lackawanna class — but the steam machinery 
of most of these was generally considered as defective : four 
of them, however, the Kearsarge, Oneida, "Wachusett, and 
Tuscarora, were favored with machinery like that of the 
excellent vessels of the Iroquois and Wyoming class, and 
accordingly proved successful. 

McauAvhilc, the Confederates had their naval problem also 
before them, but with scantier means of solution. Their 
object Avas to break up the blockade, to repel naval forays 
on their rivers and coasts, and to send out ocean guerillas to 
cripple the vast commerce of the Union. For this latter pur- 
pose, as indeed for most of the blockade-runners, they relied 
on friendly aid from transatlantic dock-yards, and received 
it in the Alabamas, the Shenandoahs, the Sumters, and all 
the famous English cruisers which, built, furnished, armed, 
equipped, and manned in English ports, were rather Cosmo- 
politan than Confederate, since they rarely or never touched 
on Southern shores. To pause, however, in naval operations 
with the exploits of these English ships would have been to 
render the " Confederate States Navy " a misnomer, and the 
office of its Secretary a sinecure. There was work enough to * 
do in breaking the blockade and mectinsr the incursions of 
Union gun-boats. Desperate as was the outlook, the Confed- 
erate Navy Department made such elForts as it could : it 
promptly seized all luckless craft Avhich could be snapped up 
in its rivers and harbors ; and it began to build many new 
gun-boats at various points in the South, though such was 
the lack of material and of trained mechanics, that the work 
dragged, and even when complete made but a sorry show. 
Two agents were sent from Montgomery to New York, iu 



THE JIERRIMAC AND MONITOR. 233 

March, 18G1, to purchase steamers for war vessels, and a 
third, ill May, to Europe. 

Recovered from the first excitement, the navy departments, 
both at IMontgomcry and Washington, looking across the 
ocean saAV that iron-clad ships were to play the leading part 
henceforth in naval warfare. It was in July, 18G1, that Sec- 
retary Welles recommended Congress to appoint a board to 
study into this matter. The Secretary's words were cautious, 
for he believed that it was " a subject full of difficulty and 
doubt," and that both the English and French experiments, if 
not "absolute failures," were of questionable success. The 
Confederate Navy Department had arrived at an earlier and 
l^rofounder faith in armed vessels. On the 8th of May, 1861, 
it addressed a letter to the Congressional Naval Committee, 
reviewing the whole history of armored ships, and adding, 
with no little prescience that " such a vessel at this time could 
traverse the entire coast of the United States, prevent all 
blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of success, 
their entire navy. If to cope with them upon the sea, we 
follow their example, and build wooden ships, we shall have 
to construct several at one time, for one or two ships would 
fall an easy prey to their comparatively numerous steam frig- 
ates. But inequality of numbers may be comj)ensatcd by in- 
vulnerability, and thus not only does economy but naval suc- 
cess dictate the wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron 
against wood without regard to first cost." This letter, like 
the Union Secretary's recommendation, was doubtless inspired 
by some ofiieer who felt the significance of the iron-clad ques- 
tion as few men in America, north or south, then felt it, and 
what is still more crcdital)le, grasped the naval situation of 
the hour. Whatever its origin, this letter, instead of keeping 
on in the commonplace rut which both the combatants were 
pursuing, proposed to strike out in a new path, and by one 
brilliant stroke level the enormous naval disparity between the 
Union and the Confederacy. Indeed, it would have been 



234 THE TAYELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

hopeless to build Avoodeii ships against those of the North, 
since in addition to the start the latter already had, she was 
flowing with materials and skilled labor, of which, on the 
other hand, the South was wofully destitute. This plan 
aimed to introduce a new engine of warfare which at its ap- 
parition would, as with a magician's wand, Avave the accumu- 
lated navies of the enemy into nothingness. 

Such was the origin of the iron-clad Virginia, or, as she is 
known in history, the Merrimac ; for, Avhile the Confederate 
Congress hastily dispatched an agent to Europe to buy or 
build an iron-clad, the Navy Department, eager to lose no time, 
and fearful of a failure in the European project (as fail it did) , 
set itself to building iron-clads at home. As might have been 
expected, this endeavor ran counter to the opinions of nearly 
all the leading officers of the Confederate navy, as well as of 
such improfessional people as gave the subject a thought. 
Indeed there were few persons not wedded to the common- 
place idea of the shallow .Commander Maury, which was to 
build small wooden gun-boats to match those of the Union. 
In June, Commander Brooke (formerly Lieutenant Brooke, 
of the U. S. Navy) drew a plan of an armored vessel, which 
was doubtless suggested by the well-known plan which R. 
L. Stevens had oficred to the United States government as 
early as 1842. 

Thus far all M'as well : but, now, no suitable engines could 
be had anywhere, even from the Tredegar works. In this 
dilemma, resort was had to the INIerrimac, which lay aban- 
doned in the Norfolk Navy Yard. It was at once seen that 
there, ready to hand, Avere a hull and engines complete, and 
that it was only needed to razee the famous frigate to the 
water-line, and to build thereon an iron casement for the 
protection of the battery to be put in her. Indeed, in the 
frigate Merrimac was already complete what the Confeder- 
ates with their scanty rcsom-ces could not hope to match, 
it being the vessel which had astonished English ship- 



THE MONITOR AND MEREIMAC. 235 

Wrights by her magnificence, and by the tremendous pow^r 
of her battery. She had been but partially burned and 
scuttled, and, it being resolved to make her substantially like 
the original Stevens battery, the order was, on the 23d day 
of June, 1861, given to commence the work. The Merrimac 
was soon raised and docked, at trifling cost, and was imme- 
diately cut down to her second streak of copper, about tAventy 
feet from the under side of the keel. The hull was now two 
hundred and eighty feet long and fifty-six feet wide, and ob- 
viously buoyant enough to allow a heavily-armored casemate 
to be built upon her deck. This casemate was estimated, by 
observers in the subsequent battle, to be from one hundred 
and thirtj^-five to one hundred and fifty feet long. The iron 
plates designed for it were rolled in Richmond, and over 
seven hundred tons Avere thence sent down to Norfolk for her 
construction. The projection beyond the submerged shield 
was designed to act as a ram ; but, when the shield was on, 
a cast-iron beak was added. 

The foundation of the shield or casemate consisted of 
heavy timbers, resting on the sides of the hull, and risino- 
therefrom in the shape of a roof: it corresponded to the 
wooden backhig of broadside ships. One thickness of iron 
plates, each six inches broad and and one and a half inches 
thick, was then laid diagonally upon this frame, and bolted 
thereto ; to this was, in like manner, fastened a second thick- 
ness of plates, two and a half inches thick, but laid diagonally 
in the opposite direction, the whole iron armor consisting of 
four inches. The casemate was in the form of a roof whose 
sides rose at an angle of but thirty-five degrees from the hori- 
zon; they did not meet in a ridge, but on the top was a flat 
platform which acted as a convenient deck. The beams of 
the old INlerrimac extended some distance beyond the sides, 
and from the ends of these beams to a consideraljlo distance 
below the water line, heavy timber was bolted in so as to form 
massive guards for the protection of the hull. Both the ends 



23G THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

of the vessel and the eaves of the casemate were submerged 
two feet, and a light false bow was put on to prevent the 
water from banking upon the casement, when the vessel was 
in motion : the submerged ends Avere to serve also as tanks 
into which the water would be admitted to regulate the draft ; 
a large smoke pipe rose from the peak. 

It only remained now to put in her battery, which was of 
a formida1)le character. It consisted of eight 9-inch Dahlgren 
guns, Avith four heavy 7j--inch rifles, of Commander Brooke's 
pattern, in which latter the service charge was twenty-one 
jDounds of powder. The rifled guns Avcre designed either for 
solid bolts or shells, but in the actual combat it so happened 
that, not expecting an iron-clad for an antagonist, tlie Mcrri- 
mac was furnished, for her rifled guns, Avith shells only. She 
was pierced Avitli six ports on each side, so arranged that six 
guns could be used in each broadside, of Avhich one could be 
pointed ahead, and one astern, and tAvo others diagonally : 
the ports Avere provided Avith suitable port-stoppers and clos- 
ing-gear. HoAvever, since the ports Avere but five feet above 
the level of the Avater, the battery could operate only Avhen 
the sea was very nearly smooth. Like all broadside iron- 
clads, she had a great draft of Avatcr, it being tAventy-two 
and a half feet, and this made her liable to get aground Avhen- 
ever manceuA^ring in tlio limited space to Avhich her career 
was restricted. The Avork upon her Avas hurried as much as 
the scanty Confederate resources Avould alloAV, but it Avas not 
till the 5th day of March, 18G2, two days before she sallied 
out, that she AA-as completed. Meanwhile, for this deadly 
bane to Northern navies, there had been found an antidote. 

The not-oA^er-confidcnt suggestion of Secretary Welles con- 
cerning iron-clad steamers, already quoted, Avas immediately 
taken up by Congress, and the Secretary Avas authorized to 
appoint a board of three naval officers to receive and report 
upon proposals for such A'cssels, a million and a half dollars 
being appropriated for the instant construction of such as 



THE MONITOR AND IMERRIIMAC. 237 

might be approved. The proper advertisement was issued, 
specifying, among other things, as one is amused to see, that 
the vessels must " carry an armament of from eighty to one 
hundred tons weight," and must "be riffijed with two masts." 
The board consisted of Commodores Smith and Paulding, 
and Commander Davis. Their report was modest even to 
diffidence, and confessed their "scanty knowledge in this 
branch of naval architecture." They declared that " opinions 
differ amongst naval and scientific men as to the policy of 
adopting the iron armature for ships of war ; " but upon the 
whole they recommended it for coast and harbor defence, 
" but not for cruising vessels " : and they assert confidently, 
"that no ship or floating battery, however heavily she may 
be plated, can cope successfully with a properly constructed 
fortification of masonry." They also announce that "it is 
assumed that 4i-inch plates are the heaviest armor which 
a sea-going vessel can carry." In fine, of seventeen 
propositions, for one reason or another but three were ac- 
cepted. One of these turned out to bo that of the Galena ; 
another, that of the New Ironsides ; while the third Avas the 
plan of one J. Ericsson, an engineer not altogether obscure, 
since the time when, with the Princeton, he revolutionized 
the navies of the world : it seems that he now proposed once 
more to reconstruct them by his iron-clad Monitor. 

" This plan of a floating battery is novel," say the board, 
rather dubiously, but upon the whole, they "recommend that 
an experiment be made with one battery," and, reminded 
afresh of that element of "novelty," they add, "with a guar- 
antee and forfeiture in case of failure in any of the proper- 
ties and points of the vessel as proposed." Looking further 
into the contract, we find the inventor contemplating a ves- 
sel one hundred and seventy-two feet long, forty-one feet 
beam, eleven and a half feet depth of hold, ten feet draft, 
twelve hundred and fifty-five tons displacement : her speed 
shall be nine statute miles per hour, her price $275,000, her 



238 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

time of construction one hundred days. The plan "was in- 
deed novel, but such, perhaps, as might be expected from 
one who, having in early days been a rival and competitor 
of Stephenson in steam locomotion, had afterwards achieved 
many valuable triumphs, both in steam and in caloric, vrhich, 
during a career of forty years, had proved him one of the 
most accomplished engineers of his age, and that not only 
by reason of his originative genius, but also by his extraor- 
dinary executive ability and a perfect mastery of details 
which guaranteed success in practical working, even to his 
initial experiments. But, not to pause upon the professional 
minutire of his busy life, in the science of naval construction 
America had had cause for confidence in him ; since it was 
he who had first successfully introduced the screw-propeller ; 
he who had built for the United States, twenty years before, 
the Princeton, the first war steamer witli her motive power 
protected, ever launched ; he who constructed for it the first 
of the direct-acting engines now in general use ; he who built 
the first wrought-iron twelve-inch gun ; he who invented the 
valuable compressor-gear for taking up the recoil of heavy 
jruns. Nor was America alone indebted to the cenius of 
Ericsson, since he built for England the war steamer Amphion, 
into which he put direct-acting horizontal engines of his own 
invention, of a style not even yet surpassed. For France, 
Ericsson's ajrent built the Pomone, the first screw war steamer 
ever constructed in Europe ; and, let us add, the A^ery device 
of a Monitor w^hich he was now giving to America, he had 
ofiered to the Emperor Napoleon, just seven years previousljs 
in September, 1854, for the Crimean War. Sucli was the 
man, who now proposed an invention to his government, 
which, little comprehended, luckily was not on that account 
set aside. 

Immediately upon the report of the board, the Secretary 
of the NaAy directed Captain Ericsson to go on with his 
work, so that, to use the latter's language, "while the clerks 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. ' 239 

of the department were engaged in drawing np the formal 
contract, the iron which now forms the keel plate of the Mon- 
itor was drawn through the rolHng mill." AYlicn the problem 
of an impregnable vessel presented itself to the mind of 
Ericsson, instead of taking the track of his predecessors, and 
loading down a vessel of the conventional type with an enor- 
mous iron cuirass, he resolved, as his grand aim, upon a con- 
centration of armor, — a matter impossible Avith a high-sided 
vessel. With a ship of given size, in order to carry the 
thickest armor possible, which was the point desired, the 
parts above water must obviously be made to present the 
least possible area requiring protection ; hence, Ericsson iirst 
contrived a hull which retained the proper buoyancy, and yet 
exi^osed the minimum surface aliove the water ; and this was 
the famous monitor hull. Nor did this hull possess a single 
advantage only, but a combination of many. It offered to 
the enemy a target so small as to make his hitting it once in 
many times a mere piece of good fortune ; it allowed a thick- 
ness of iron and timber to be concentrated there absolutely 
impregnable to the heaviest modern artillcr}^, malcing the rare 
shot which should strike it of no avail, so that it would be a 
matter of perfect indifference to those within whether the 
ship were struck or not ; by dismissing all superfluities, it 
reduced the expense of construction to a small fraction of 
that of broadside iron-clads of inferior power ; and finally, 
being low in the water, the Avaves, instead of dashing against 
her sides, or rising upon her as on the ^Icrrimac's casemate, 
could glide over her, doing no harm. The great question of 
buoyancy Av^ith impregnability, thus settled, the next jiroblem 
Avas to furnish a battery-poAver Avhich Avould render impreg- 
nability impossible in any adA'crsary of a different type. 
Here, again, since the greatest things arc the simplest, 
Ericsson resorted to concentration in guns, or the offensive 
power, as he had to concentration in armor, or the defensive 
poAver ; and indeed the use of armor in naA'al Avarfiire forced 



240 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the employment of very heavy artillery to pierce it. Ac- 
cordingly, in the centre of his raft-like vessel, Ericsson fixed 
a revolving cylinder of wrought iron, just large enough in 
diameter to contain a pair of heav}^ guns, and just high 
enough for the gunners to stand up in it without discomfort. 
Within this turret he jDurposed to place guns of a calibre 
never before dreamed of; so that even those carried by the 
first ]Monitor by no means approached his standard. Simple 
and single as the present iMonitor appears to the unprofes- 
sional eye, it is a perfect cluster of inventions, including 
hull, turret, revolving machinery, the turret supports, the 
rings on which it turns, the gun-carriages, the devices for 
aiming and moving the guns, the compressor-gear, the port- 
stopper, the construction of the side armor, the contrivance 
for perfect -ventilation, the anchor-well, the rudder and steer- 
age contrivance, the details connected with the engines and 
propeller, and many other things, all beyond our province to 
describe. 

The urgency of the times spurred the executive ability of 
Ericsson into full play. With his OAvn hand he made all the 
working drawings of the Monitor, though it was, in popular 
phrase, wholly " cut from new cloth," lie so arranged the 
details as to achieve the greatest dispatch in their construc- 
tion, giving out first the parts which required the longest 
time in building ; and he employed various constructors for 
this purpose. The hull was built at Greenpoint, the turret- 
engines and their gearings at Schenectady, the turret itself at 
one New York shop, the motive machinery and propeller at 
another, and all from the inventor's OAvn drawings. All the 
parts, being collected and put together, fitted with the nicety 
of a dissecting map, and they formed the iron-clad jNIonitor. 
The origination of the idea was not less marvellous than the 
thorough engineering capacity which elal)orated the minute 
details, on Avhose perfection the success even of the most 
brilliant invention depends. The INIonitor's keel was laid on 



THE MONITOR AXD MERRIMAC. 241 

the 25tli of October, 1861 ; steam was applied to her engines 
on the 30th of December ; she was lamiched on the 30th of 
January, 1862 ; and was practically completed on the 15th 
of February : it was the most remarkable feat of naval con- 
struction on record. When finished, her total length, over 
armor and "overhang," was 172 feet, and the length of the 
hull proper, 124 feet ; her total beam, over annor and back- 
ing, was 41^ feet, the beam of the hull proper being 34 feet ; 
her depth, 11 feet; her draught, 10 feet; her total weight, 
with everything on board, 900 tons : the diameter of her 
turret, inside, 20 feet; its height, 9 feet; its thickness, 8 
inches ; the vessel's armor, 5 inches of iron and 3 feet of oak. 
It only remains to say that, both at the inception and during 
the progress of the Monitor, the project was jeered at as 
chimerical. How prejudice and slavery to conventionalities 
may warp the judgment even of practical men, was seen, 
when eminent ship-builders attended the launch, expecting to 
see the little craft, destined to an immortality of fame, go to 
the bottom as soon as she should slide from mpther earth. 
But Ericsson only smiled at the ignorant ridicule cast upon 
his new nondescript. A few weeks later was to be fought a 
battle, not only the first between iron-clad s, but the first 
between screw-propelled ships, embracing two revolutionary 
naval agents, the product of the brain of one man. 

II. 
THE BATTLE OF HAIMPTON ROADS. 

An hour after noon of the 8th of March, 1862, a fleet of 
steamers was discovered by the Union lookout in Hampton 
Roads, descending the Elizabeth River, rounding Sewall's 
Point, and standing up towards Newport News. The signals 
were promptly made to the blockading squadron in that 
neighborhood, whereof two sailing vessels, the frigate Con- 
gress and the sloop-of-war Cumberland, were anchored off 

16 



242 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE VTAU. 

Newport News, and the remainder of the fleet near and about 
Fort IMonroe, six miles distant. So soon as the tidings 
spread, the fine frigates Minnesota, Koanoke, and St. Law- 
rence got under way, slipped their cables, and, Avith the aid 
of tugs, moved up towards the approaching enemy. The 
gale of the previous day had abated, and there was but little 
wind or sea. As the Confederate fleet steamed steadily into 
view its character became apparant ; the central figure was 
the long-expected Men-imac, whose advent had been the 
theme of speculation through days and nights for many 
weeks, not only in the squadron which waited to receive her, 
but throughout the country. The cry of " the Merrimac ! 
the Merrimac ! " speedily ran from shij) to fort, and from fort 
to shore. To the curious eyes of the thousand spectators 
gazing intently from near, or peering through telescopes from 
afar, she seemed a grim-looking structure enough — like the 
roof of an immense building sunk to the eaves. Playing 
around her, and apparently guiding her on, were two well- 
armed gun-boats, the Jamestown and Yorktown, formerly 
New York and Richmond packets, which seemed to act like 
pilot-fish to the sea-monster they attended. Smaller tugs 
and gun-boats followed in her wake, some of which had 
emerged from the James Eiver. On she came, the Cumber- 
land and Congress meanwhile bravely standing their ground ; 
and, as the Merrimac approached the latter vessel she opened 
the battle with the angry roar of a few heavy guns. The 
Congress ansAvered with a full broadside, and when the Mer- 
rimac, passing her, bore down upon the Cumberland, the 
latter, too, brought to bear upon her every available gun, in 
a well-delivered fire. To the chagrin of both vessels, their 
heaviest shot glanced as idly from the flanks of their antago- 
nist as peas blown at the hide of a rhinoceros. Hot and 
terrific as was the firing that now took place, the contest 
could only be of short duration. "With fell intent, the huge 
kraken, unharmed by the missiles rained upon her, bore down 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 243 

upon the Cumberland, and, striking that ill-fated vessel with 
her iron beak, nnder terrific momentum, rent a great gaping 
cavern in her side. In an instant it was seen that all was 
over with the Cumberland. But, while the waters rushed 
into the yawning chasm, and while the ship sank lower and 
lower, her gallant crew, led by their heroic commander, 
Lieut. Morris, refused to quit their posts, and with loud 
cheers continued to pour their broadsides upon the gigantic 
enemy. As the guns touched the water they delivered a last 
volley : then down to her glorious grave went the good Cum- 
berland and her crew, with her flag still proudly waving at 
the mast-head. 

Meanwhile, the consorts of the Merrimachad furiously en- 
gaged the Congress with their heavy guns. Warned by the 
horrible fate of the Cumberland, she had been run aground in 
an effort to avoid being rammed by the Merrimac. But the 
latter, at half past two, coming up from the destruction of 
the Cumberland, took deliberate position astern of the Con- 
gress, and raked her with a horrible fire of heavy shells. 
Another steamer attacked her briskly on the starboard quarter, 
and at length two more, an unneeded reinforcement, came up 
and poured in a fresh and constant fire. Nevertheless, until 
four o'clock the unequal, hopeless contest was maintained ; 
and with each horrible crash of shell, the splinters flew out, 
and the dead fell to the deck of the dauntless Congress. She 
could bring to bear but five guns on her adversaries, and 
of these the shot skipped harmlessly from the iron hump of 
the dread monster who chiefly engaged her. At last, not a 
single gun was available ; the ship was encircled by enemies ; 
her decks were covered with dead and dying, for the slaughter 
had been terrible ; her commander had fallen ; she was on 
fire in several places ; every one of the approaching Union 
vessels had grounded ; no relief was possible ; then, and then 
only, was the stubborn contest ended, and the flag of the 
Congress hauled down. 



244 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

And now, witli the waters rolling over the Cumberland 
and with the Congress in flames, the Confederate dragon, still 
belching her fiery, sulphurous breath, turned greedy and 
grim to the rest of the Union Squadron. Arrived within a 
mile and a half of Newport News, the ISIinncsota grounded 
while the tide Avas running ebb, and there remained a helpless 
spectator of the sinking of the Cumberland and the burning 
of the Congress. The Roanoke, following after, grounded in 
her turn ; more fortunate, with the aid of tugs, she got off 
again, and, her propeller being useless, withdrew down the 
harbor. In fine, the St. Lawrence grounded near the Min- 
nesota. At four o'clock, the Merrimac, Jamestown, and 
Yorktown , bore down upon the latter vessel ; but the huge 
couching monster, which in a twinkling would have visited 
upon her the fate of the Cumberland, could not, from her 
great draft, approach within a mile of the stranded prey. 
She took position on the starboard bow of the Minnesota, and 
opened with her ponderous battery ; yet with so little accu- 
racy, that only one shot was effective, that passing through 
the Union steamer's boAv. As for her consorts, they took po- 
sition on the port bow and stern of the Minnesota, and with 
their heavy rifled ordnance played severely upon the vessel, 
and killed and Avounded many men. The IMerrimac, mean- 
Avhile, gave a share of her fiuors to the St. LaAvrence, AvhicK 
had just grounded near the Minnesota, and had opened an in- 
effectual fire. One huge shell penetrated the starboard 
quarter of the St. Lawrence, passed through the ship to the 
port side, completely demolished a bulk-head, struck against 
a strong iron bar, and returned unexploded into the Avard- 
room ; such Avere the projectiles Av^hich the Merrimac was 
flinging into wooden frigates. Very soon the St. Lawrence 
got afloat by the aid of a tug, and Avas ordered back to Fort 
Monroe. The grounding of the Minnesota had prevented the 
use of her battery, but at length a heaAy gun was brought to 
bear upon the two smaller Confederate steamers, AA'ith marked 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 245 

effect. As for the lO-iuch pivot gun, its heavy shot were 
harmless against the Mcrrimac. Thus the afternoon wore on ,tiil 
with the parting day died the fury of battle ; at length at seven 
o'clock, to the great relief of the Union Squadron, all three 
Confederate vessels hauled off and steamed back to Norfolk. 

So ended the first day's battle in Hampton Roads. "What 
■wild excitement, what grief, what anxiety, what terrible fore- 
boding for the morrow possessed the Union Squadron when 
night fell, cannot be described. All was panic, confusion, 
and consternation. That the i\Ierrimac» would renew the bat- 
tle in the morning was too evident, and the result must be the 
destruction of a part of the fleet, the dispersion of the rest, 
and the loss of the harbor of Hampton Roads. Her first vic- 
tim would be the Minnesota, now helplessly aground off New- 
port News ; next, whatever vessel might be brave or rash 
enough to put itself in her way ; whether she would then 
pause to reduce Fort Monroe ; or, passing it by, would run 
along the Northern coast, carrying terror to the national cap- 
ital, or making her dread apparition in the harbor of New 
York, was uncertain. The commander of the Fort, General 
Wool, telegraphed to "Washington that probably both the 
Minnesota and the St. Lawrence would be captured, and that 
"it was thought that the Merrimac, Jamestown, and York- 
town will pass the fort to-night." Meanwhile, that ofiicer 
admitted that, should the Merrimac prefer to attack the fort, 
it would be only a question of a few days when it must be 
abandoned. 

It was upon such a scene that the little Monitor quietly 
made, her appearance at eight o'clock in the evening, having 
left the harbor of New York two days before. Long before 
her arrival at the anchorage in Hampton Roads the sound of 
lieaAy guns was distinctly heard on board, and shells were 
seen to burst in the air. The chagrined ofiicers of the Moni- 
tor conceived it to be an attack upon Norfolk, for which they 
were too late, and the ship was urged more swiftly along. 



246 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

At length a pilot boarded her, and, half terror-stricken, gave 
a confused account of the Merrimac's foray. The response 
was a demand upon him to put the INIonitor alongside the Mer- 
rimac ; terrified at which, the moment the Roanoke was reached 
he jumped into his boat and ran away. The appearance of 
the IMonitor did little to abate the consternation prevailing. 
That so insignificant a structure could cope with the giant 
Mcrrimac Avas not credited ; and those who had anxiously 
watched for her arrival, for she had been telegraphed as having 
left New York, gazed with blank astonishment, maturing to 
despair, at the puny affair before them Her total weight 
was but nine hundred tons, while that of the Merrimac was 
five thousand ; — what had yonder giant to fear from this 
dwarf? A telegram from Washington had ordered the IMon- 
itor to be sent thither the moment she arrived ; but this of 
course was now disregarded, and the senior oiEcer of the Squad- 
ron, Captain Marston, of the Roanoke, authorized Lieutenant 
Worden to take the Monitor up to the luckless Minnesota and 
protect her. 

It was a memorable night. In fort, on shipboard and on 
shore, Federals and Confederates alike could not sleep from 
excitement : these were flushed with triumph and wild with 
anticipation, those were oppressed Avith anxiety or touched 
the depths of despair. Norfolk was ablaze with the victory, 
and the sailors of the Merrimac and her consorts caroused 
with its grateful citizens. In Hampton Eoads, amidst the 
bustle of the hour, some hopeless preparations were made for 
the morrow. The Monitor, on reaching the Roanoke, found 
the decks of the flagship sanded and all hands at quarters, 
resolved, though destruction stared them in the face, to go 
down in a hard fight. Her sister-ship still lay aground ofi" 
Newport News, tugs toiling all night painfully but uselessly to 
set her afloat again : meanwhile, a fresh supply of ammunition 
was sent to her. As for the ofiicers and crew of the Monitor, 
though v/orn out by their voyage from New York, they had 



, THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 247 

little mind for sleep, and passed much of the night in forecast- 
ing the issue of the coming day. The stories poured into 
their ears respecting the armor and battery of the Merrimac 
had not dismayed them, or weakened their confidence in their 
own vessel ; yet, as the officers had not been long enough on 
her to learn her qualities, nor the men to be drilled at the 
guns and at quarters, the guns, the turrets, the engines, 
the gear, and everything else, were carefully examined, and 
proved to be in working order. 

While thus in toil and expectation the night-hours passed, 
an entrancing spectacle illumined the waters around. Tlie 
landscape, a short distance oif, in the direction of Newport 
News, was brilliantly lighted by the flames of the burning 
Congress. Ever and anon a shotted gun, booming like a 
signal of distress, startled the air around the ill-fated ship, 
when its charge had been ignited by the slowly-spreading 
flames. Ten hours now, the ship had been burning ; and at 
one o'clock in the night, the fire reached the magazine, which 
blew up with an explosion heard more than fifty miles away. 
At once, in a gorgeous pyrotechny, huge masses of burning 
timber rose and floated in the air, and strewed the waters far 
and wide with the glowing debris of the wreck : then suc- 
ceeded a sullen and ominous darkness, in which the flicker- 
ing of the embers told that the course of the Congress was 
nearly run. Meanwhile, the dark outline of the mast and 
yards of the Cumberland was projected in bold relief on the 
illumined sky. Her ensign, never hauled down to the foe, 
still floated in its accustomed place, and there swayed slowly 
and solemnly to and fro, with a requiem-gesture all but hu- 
man, over the corpses of the hundreds of brave fellows who 
went down with their ship. 

At six o'clock on the morning of March 9th, the officer on 
watch on the Minnesota made out the INIerrimac through the 
morning mist, as she approached from Sewall's Point. She 
was up betimes for her second raid, in order to have a long 



248 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR, 

day for the work. Quickly the Monitor was notified, and 
got up her anchor ; the iron liatches were then battened down, 
and those below depended on candles for their light. It was 
a moment of anxiety on the little craft, for there had been no 
time for drilling the men, except in firing a few rounds to test 
the comj)ressors and the concussion, and all that the ofiiccrs 
themselves, who were now to fight the ship, knew of the 
operation of the turret and guns, they learned from the two 
engineers who were attached to the vessel, and who had 
superintended her construction. When the great smoke-pipe 
and - sloping casemate of the Confederate came clearly into 
view, it was evident that the latter had been smeared with 
tallow to assist in glancing off the shot. As she came 
down from Craney Island, the Minnesota beat to quarters ; 
but the Merrimac passed her and ran down near to the Rip 
Raps, when she turned into the channel by which the ]\Iinne- 
sota had cbme. Her aim was to capture the latter vessel, and 
take her to Norfolk, where crowds of people lined the Miiarves, 
elated with success, and waiting to see the Minnesota led 
back as a prize. "When the Merrimac had approached within 
a mile, the little Monitor came out from under the Minnesota's 
quarter, ran down in her wake to within short range of the 
Merrimac, " completely covering my ship," saj-s Captain Van 
Brunt, " as far as was possible with her diminutive dimensions, 
and, much to my astonishment, laid herself right alongside 
of the ]\Ierrimac." Astounded as the Merrimac was at the 
miraculous appearance of so odd a fish, the gallantry with 
which the Monitor had dashed into the very teeth of its guns 
was not less surprising. It was Goliath to David ; and with 
something of the coat-of-mailed Philistine's disdain, the Mer- 
rimac looked down upon the pigmy which had thus under- 
taken to champion the Minnesota. A moment more and the 
contest began. The Merrimac let fly against the turret of her 
opponent two or three such broadsides as had finished the 
Cumberland and Congress, and would have finished ihe ISIin- 



THE MONITOR AND JIERRIMAC. 249 

nesota ; but her heavy shot, rattling against the iron cylinder, 
rolled off even as the volleys of her own victims had glanced 
from the casemate of the Merrimac : then it was that the word 
of astonishment was passed, "the Yankee cheese-box is made 
of iron!" 

The duel commenced at eight o'clock on Sunday morning, 
and was waged with ferocity till noon. So eager and so con- 
fident w^as each antagonist, that often the vessels touched 
each other, iron rasping against iron, and through most of 
the battle they were distant but a few yards. Several times, 
while thus close alongside, the Merrimac let loose her full 
broadside of six guns, and the armor and turret of the little 
Monitor were soon covered with dents. The Merrimac had, 
for those days, a very formidable battery, consisting of tAvo 
7^-inch rifles, employing tw^enty-one pound charges, and four 
9-inch Dahlgreus, in each broadside. Yet often her shot, 
striking, broke and were scattered about the Monitor's decks 
in fragments, afterwards to be jDicked up as trophies. The 
Monitor was struck in pilot-house, in turret, in side armor, 
in deck. But, with their five inches of iron, backed by three 
feet of oak, the crew were safe in a perfect panoply ; while 
from the impregnable turret the 11-inch guns answered back 
the broadsides of the Merrimac. 

However, on both sides, armor gained the victory over 
guns ; for, unprecedented as was the artillery employed, it 
was for the first time called upon to meet iron, and Was un- 
equal to the task. Even the Monitor's 11-inch ordnance, 
though it told heavily against the casemate of the Merrimac, 
often driving in splinters, could not penetrate it. So excited 
were the combatants at first, and so little used to their ffuns, 
that the latter were elevated too much, and most of the mis- 
siles were wasted in the air ; but, later in the fight, they be- 
gan to depress their guns ; i\nd then it was that one of the 
j\Ionitor's shot, hitting the junction of the casemate with the 
side of the ship, caused a leak. A shot, also, flying wide, 



250 THE TV^ELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

passed through the boiler of one of the Merrimac's tenders, 
enveloping her in steam, and scalding many of her crew, so 
that she was towed off by her consort. But, in general, on 
both ships the armor defied the artillery. It is this fact 
which contains the key to the prolonged contest of that 
famous morning. The chief engineer of the Monitor, Mr. 
Newton, questioned afterwards by the War Committee of 
Congress, why the battle was not more promptly decided 
against the Merrimac, answered: — "It was due to the fact 
that the power and endurance of the 11-inch Dalilgren guns, 
with which the Monitor was armed, were not known at the 
time of the battle ; hence the commander would scarcely have 
been justified in increasing the charge of powder above that 
authorized in the Ordnance Manual. Subsequent experi- 
ments developed the important fact that these guns could be 
fired Avith thirty pounds of cannon powder, with solid shot. 
If this had been known at the time of the action, I am clearly 
of opinion that, from the close quarters at which Lieutenant 
Wordcn fought his vessel, the enemy would have been forced 
to surrender. It will, of course, be admitted by every one, 
that if but a single 15-incli gun could possibly have been 
mounted within the Monitor's turret (it was planned to carry 
tho heaviest ordnance) , the action would have been as short 
and decisive as the combat between the monitor Weehawken, 
Captain John Rodgers, and the rebel iron-clad Atlanta, w^hich, 
in several respects, was superior to the Merrimac." He 
added that, as it was, but for the injury received by Lieut. 
Worden (of which hereafter), that vigorous oflicer would 
very likely have " badgered " the Merrimac to a surrender. 
T'he Minnesota lay at a distance, viewing the contest with 
imdisguised wonder. " Gun after gun," sa3's Captain Van 
Brunt, " was fired by the Monitor, which was returned with 
whole broadsides from tho rebels, with no more eficct, appar- 
ently, than so many pebble stones thrown by a child, 
clearly establishing the fact that wooden vessels cannot con- 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 251 

tend with iron-clad ones ; for never before was anything like 
it dreamed of by the greatest enthusiast in maritime warfare." 
Despairing of doing anything with the impregnable little 
Monitor, the Merrimac now sought to avoid her, and threw a 
shell at the Minnesota which tore four rooms into one in its 
passage, and set the ship on fire. A second shell exploded 
the boiler of the tug-boat Dragon. But by the time she had 
fired the third shell, the little Monitor had come down upon 
her, placing herself between them. Angry at this interrup- 
tion, the Merrimac turned fiercely on her antagonist, and 
bore down swiftly against the Monitor with intent to visit 
upon her the fate of the Cumberland. The shock was tre- 
mendous, nearly upsetting the crew of the Monitor from their 
feet ; but it only left a trifling dent in her side armor and some 
splinters of the Merrimac to be added to the visitors' trophies. 
It was now that a shell from the Merrimac, strikinsf the 
Monitor's pilot-house, which was built of solid wrought-iron 
bars, nine by twelve inches thick, actually broke one of these 
great logs, and pressed it inward an inch and an half. The 
gun which fired this shell was not more than thirty feet oS, as 
the JNIerrimac then lay across the Monitor's bow. At that 
moment Lieut. Worden, the commander, and his quarter- 
master, were both looking through a sight-aperture or con- 
ning-hole, which consisted of a slit between two of the bars, 
and the quartcraiaster, seeing the gunners in the Merrimac 
training their piece on the pilot-house, dropped his head, call- 
ing out a sudden warning, but at that instant the shot struck 
the aperture level with the face of the gallant Worden, and 
inflicted upon him a severe wound. His eyesight for the 
time and for long after was gone, his face badly disfigured, 
and he was forced to turnover his command to Lieut. Greene, 
who hitherto had beeaifiring the guns. Chief Engineer Sti- 
mers, who had been conspicuously efficient and valuable all 
day by his skilful operation of the turret and by the encour- 
agement and advice he gave to the gunners, thereby increas- 



252 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ing the effective service of the guns, now personally took ' 
charge of the latter, and commenced a well-directed fire. \ 

However, with the wounding of Worden, the contest 'was -, 
substantially over, a few well-depressed shots rang against \ 
the cuirass of the ^Merrimac, and the latter despairing of subdu- 
ing her eager and obstinate antagonist, after four hours of 
fierce efibrt, abandoned the fight, and with her two consorts, 
steamed away for Norfolk, to tell her vexation to the disap- 
pointed throng of spectators, and then to go into dock for f 
repairs. 

The great misfortune the Monitor had experienced in tha 
loss of her determined commander prevented her from pur- : 
suing, and forcing the battle to a surrender. But, left in . 
possession of the field, the little vessel could hardly believe 
at first that her enemy had beat a retreat ; but greater were 
the surprise and relief of the Minnesota, which, unable to ex- : 
pect a successful issue to the contest, had made all the usual 
preparations for abandoning the ship, and had laid a train to 
her magazine. The rest of the squadron in whose cause this 
timely champion had flung down the gauntlet and entered the 
lists, together with the troops in the forts, found equal cause 
for gratitude. Cheers and congratulations rose up on all 
hands, and the enthusiasm was as great as had been the de- 
pression of the previous day. The joyous news was flashed 
through the North, and now from Congress, noAV from Cham- 
bers of Commerce and Boards of Trade, now from public 
meetings and societies convened for the purpose, thanks and 
laudations were poured upon the Monitor, Ericsson, her in- 
ventor, Worden, her commander, Greene, her executive ofli- 
cer, Newton, her chief engineer, Stimers, the engineer de- 
tailed to accompany and report on her, and who worked the 
turret, all the ofiicers in short, and tl^e crew shared the hon- 
ors. The President, members of his cabinet, many of the 
diplomatic corps, officers of both services and many ladies 
too, crowded to see the new engine of warfare and to view 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 253 

with their own eyes the place of the conflict of Hampton 
Roads. 

III. 
RESULTS OF HAJklPTON" ROADS. 

The Monitor and the Merrimac have long since run their 
course, and shared the fate of the Cumberland and Congress; 
but the influence of their desperate struggle in Hampton 
Eoads, ever-widening from that day onward, has extended all 
over the globe. The results of this battle were both national 
and international, belonging on the one hand to the Southern 
insurrection, but on the other hand to the naval science of all 
nations, the ratio of whose maritime supremacies it read- 
justed. 

Had the Merrimac continued the triumphant career which 
she began, it is difficult to compute her possible devastation. 
During the present generation at least, the emotions which 
thrilled America, north and south, at the receipt of the tidings 
of Hampton Roads cannot be forgotten ; the surprise, the joy, 
the triumph, the measureless hopes which filled the South, 
the anxietv, the consternation, the dread forebodingfs which 
swept over the North. Beginning with the Minnesota, which 
she would quickly overcome, the Merrimac, let loose among 
the Union fleet in Hampton Roads, would have burst through 
it like an avenging fury, destroying everything in its course, 
and scattering all that it did not destroy. How j)owerless 
indeed the wooden fleet would have been against this one 
mailed monster, the story of the first day's battle tells. With 
the Union fleet dispersed or led captive to grace its triumphs, 
the Merrimac would have remained the monarch of Hampton 
Roads. The blockade would have been raised, and a great 
ocean highway thrown open at the very thresliliold of the 
Confederate capital. The tenure of Fort Monroe would have 
been insecure ; for it was generally declared that, at that 
time, with the whole Union fleet, transports and all, driven 



254 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

off, the reduction of the fort by the Merrimac and her various 
consorts, armed as they were "svith very heavy ordnance, would 
be but a question of days. What loss of men and material, 
Avhat loss of strategic position, and above all prestige, would 
have ensued to the Union arms from such a disaster, it is easy 
to appreciate. Moreover, the possession of Hampton Roads 
and by consequence of the James and York Rivers would 
have ruined the campaign set afoot by General McClellan for 
the capture of Richmond, and by forcing the choice of a dif- 
ferent line of operations, would have changed the whole mili- 
tary as well as the whole naval history of the war. Nor is it 
McClellan's campaign alone which would have been thwarted, 
but all subsequent campaigns, requiring a base on the James, 
or the York, or the Appomattox, as long as those waters were 
in Confederate keeping. In other words, it would have 
blocked up the chief or the only practicable line of operations 
against the Confederate capital ; for as to overland camj^aigns, 
their errors were illustrated by a series of experiments grow- 
ing more sangumary and more fatal, from first to last, until 
they were forever abandoned : what, then, if the water ap- 
proaches to Richmond had been kept open to its use ? 

Such would have been the possibilities had the Merrimac 
found no Monitor to dispute the mastery of Hampton Roads, 
even had she been content to stay within the confines of the 
watery realm she had conquered. Suppose, however, that, 
after achieving her other conquests, she had run out to sea? 
In a northerly course, what had prevented her from steaming 
up the Potomac, to the terror of the National Capital, or 
barred her from the harbor of New York itself, there to sweep 
through the shipping, capturing or destroying at her fancy, 
and laying under contribution the chief commercial city of the 
Union ? Or, turning southward, what had hindered her from 
breaking the blockade of other ports, as she had broken that 
of Norfolk, and in such a stroke what decisive triumph 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 255 

was there not for the South, what depth of disaster for the 
North? 

The circle of possible results again enlarges ; for, with such 
Confederate naval successes, foreign nations must have ulti- 
mately inclined to recognition and support of the Confeder- 
acy. The Merrimac's operations would, as their least result, 
have supplied the Confederacy with whatever arms or muni- 
tions of war or other products or fabrics she might require ; 
but, beyond that, the blockade itself would have been so com- 
promised, as no longer to command the respect of nations 
which, hostile from national policy to the Union, waited no 
aggravated pretext for turning the scale against it. Never were 
the prospects of the Confederacy for foreign aid brighter than 
in the spring of 1862 ; and so strongly was this truth felt at 
the North, as well as at the South, that the mere presencie of 
Admiral Milne's British fleet in the St. Lawrence was looked 
upon with distrust and trepidation, and with many prophecies 
that it was stationed there to take advantage of the first suc- 
cessful breaking of the blockade. Angry words must have 
been exchanged with France and England, words would have 
been followed by blows, the Confederacy would have received 
the alliance of one or both of those countries, and the republic 
have been forever rent in twain. 

Thus much of what might have been the issue of the battle 
of Hampton Roads but for the Monitor. This aspect seems 
the graver on reflecting that, had the North resorted to the 
broadside system of iron-clads, of which the New Ironsides 
was an example, then, not to speak of draft, or thickness of 
armor, or calibre of battery, or expense of construction, or 
any other of those respects in which the Monitor system pro- 
claims its excellence, the mere time required in their building 
would have been fatal to the cause of the Union. Not only 
would the Merrimac have accomplished all that was expected 
of her, but she would have been reinforced by other iron- 
clads, to double or treble her work of destruction; for the 



256 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Confederate Government started in advance of the National 
Government in iron-clad construction, and the success of the 
Merrimac would have caused the hurrying to completion of 
the other similar craft already begun. Thus, long before a 
fleet of broadside iron-clads, long before a single one even 
could have been made ready, the sceptre of naval supremacy, 
and therewith Kational Independence, would have passed 
into the hands of the South. But now we must turn to the 
actual issue of the battle of Hampton Roads. 

The immediate result of the conflict between the Monitor 
and the INIerrimac was obviously enough the overthrow of 
the great projects conceived by the latter vessel, the salvation 
of the Union squadron, and the preservation of the blockade 
and of Fort Monroe. Its wider result was to furnish to the 
Union a new engine of warfare, which, rapidly and cheaply 
constructed, proved impregnable in defence and irresistible 
in attack. The Confederate vessels, ingenious, formidable, 
and fatal to any but the monitors, wore yet hopelessly inferior 
to these. While the principle on which the original monitor 
was constructed, remained fixed, and was reproduced in her 
successors, her defects in details were easily noted and 
avoided in the subsequent copies, and such larger experi- 
ments on a more generous scale were made, as the country, 
grateful for the services rendered on the 9th of March, was 
willing to authorize. Soon, therefore, the Union navy pos- 
sessed a full fleet of Monitors. With these it maintained a 
blockade which otherwise could not have been maintained, 
as at Charleston and Savannah ; with them it conquered again 
and again powerful Confederate casemated iron-clads, like 
the Atlanta and the Tennessee ; with them it withstood the 
fire of some of the heaviest artillery known to modern war- 
fare, and in return, silenced the enormous earthworks in 
which that artillery was planted, as at Fort Fisher. In 
fine, the Monitor met to the full all the requirements of the 



THE MONITOR AND MEEKIMAC. 257 

war, whether in the passive duty of blockade, or in the active 
one of sinking hostile ships and capturing hostile citadels. 

There was another office, too, besides the overthrow of its 
immediate enemies, which the Monitor performed for the 
Union. The 15-iuch gun in the impregnable Monitor turret, 
mutters with its deep voice, "hands off," to whatever transat- 
lantic nation might before have meditated an interference in the 
American War. Before the rapidity of the achievement was 
comprehended, a squadron of monitors patrolled the Atlantic 
seaboard, capable of destroying any fleet that might challenge 
entrance to its harbors. The lesson was not lost upon forei^'-n 
ministers, who inclined to think twice before encounteriu"' 
this new and terrible engine of defence. 

The story of the battle in Hampton Roads created the pro- 
foundest sensation in the court of every maritime nation. For 
months, not only the scientific but the popular journals were 
filled with the discussion of its merits and its meanin^'- : the 
professional naval world was profoundly agitated ; Admiralty 
Boards and Ministers of Marine conned its details ; in fine, 
Russia and Sweden promptly accepted the Monitor as the so- 
lution of the naval problem of the age, and followed the lead 
of America in reconstructing their navies on that system. 
France and England had, unfortunately for themselves, been 
committed to the broadside iron-clad before the introduction 
of the Monitor, and the enormous sums already laid out, 
(enough to build many squadrons of Monitors), joined to 
some national pride, and, in the case of England at least, re- 
enforced by a wondrous obstinacy of depreciation only to be 
understood when one reads such histories as that of the screw- 
propeller — these causes prevented the renunciation in France 
and England of their iron-clad navies already built, and the 
substitution of the turreted Monitor. However, in both 
countries, the combat of the 9th of March was received with 
the profoundest study, and was regarded as the death-stroke 
to wooden war-vessels. In England, on hearing the news of 

17 



258 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the battle, the House of Commons, in obedience to general 
sentiment, stopped at once the great military project of build- 
ing forts at Spitheadfor the defence of Portsmouth. The De- 
fence Commission, too, was hastily reassembled for the spec- 
ial purpose of considering the effect of the " recent engage- 
ment that has taken place in the Chesapeake between the na- 
val forces of the United States and the Confederates," on the 
erection of these forts. The Koj-al Commission found " the 
expression of opinion Avhich followed the action of the Mer- 
rimac and Monitor," and the " doubts that took possession of 
the public mind " thereupon to be "not unreasonable." But 
when, notwithstanding these doubts, the Commission had the 
hardihood to recommend the construction of the forts, the 
government, again menaced by the House of Commons, was 
forced to abandon this position, and the proposed Spithead 
forts were given up, reliance being had for defence, in the fu- 
ture, upon iron-clad vessels. 

The War of the Rebellion ended, America found that in 
her Monitor system she had gained an advantage over every 
other nation on the globe. While the enormous outlays of 
Great Britain and France had produced a series of vessels 
which, according to simple scientific calculation, could not 
attempt to withstand a first-class Monitor, she, at trifling cost, 
had secured an iron fleet, which, having performed inestima- 
ble service in quelling the insurrection, now furnished an 
impregnable defence to her coast from hostile invasion. The 
heavy rolling of broadside iron-clads, even in comparatively 
smooth seas, exposes their hulls below the armor to a hostile 
shot in a vital point ; and, in addition, not only subjects the 
gun-ports to a liability of water rushing into them, but 
obviously renders accurate gunnery impossible. Again, it is 
impossible to build a broadside iron-clad of any practicable 
size which can be covered with armor sufficient to resist 
modern artillery, and the result is the adoption of the 
"central fort system," which covers the vessel with iron only 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 259 

amidships, and leaves the rest to be shot through and 
through : yet, even the thickest parts can be penetrated by 
the Monitor's guns. Finally, there comes the difficulty 
of working in broadside anything like the heavy guns used 
in the Monitor. In a word, to say nothing of the monstrous 
size and unwieldiness, of the enormous cost, of the imprac- 
ticable draft, of the English broadside ships, the Tery best 
of them could be shot through in their most heavily-armored 
parts by the tremendous ordnance of the Monitors, whilst a 
great part of them is not protected at all. On the other 
hand, their heaviest missiles would rattle idly from the im- 
pregnable Puritan or Dictator as if they were but pebble- 
stones. 

The Monitor is, in its nature, one of those radical expres- 
sions of a scientific idea which do not admit further chancre 
in principle, though, of course, permitting improvements in 
detail. It was not the result of a ship-builder's experiment, 
no lucky guess or happy accident, but a calculated product, 
wrought out in the endeavor to solve a problem then engag- 
ing the mind of the chief naval powers of the world. The 
transatlantic methods employed on that intricate question do 
not complete the requirements of the problem. "We have 
already seen how, in order to produce the maximum impreg- 
nability, the hull of the Monitor was permitted to protrude 
but a few inches above water, and her decks were stripped 
of bulwarks and all other unnecessary appendages. Thus, 
while the Warrior, a vessel of 10,000 tons total displace- 
ment, can only support about four and a half inches of armor, 
and that for only about half her length, the little harbor- 
monitors of the Passaic class, designed simply for coast 
defence, though only about one-fifth the Warrior's size, carry 
armor nearly twice as thick from stem to stern. As for the 
heavy Dictators and Puritans, though but half as large as the 
Warrior, their armor is more than thrice as thick as that of 
the English ship in its thickest part, and that throughout 



260 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

their entire lengths. Then, on the other hand, it was de- 
sirable to mount heavier guns in the new vessel than had ever 
before been carried, or had ever before been provided 
against, or could be provided against except on the Monitor 
system. Thence sprang the device of the cylindrical turret 
which, being revolved on its perii^hery by steam-power, 
could adroitly turn its port-holes to any point in the horizon. 
Nor was this turret complete in its operation till so built that 
it formed a water-tight joint with its deck. Within this im- 
pregnable floating castle the power of the enclosed artillery 
is only limited by the genius of the gun-maker ; for the turret 
is an impervious gun-cari'iage, which, operated by mechan- 
ism, can carry ordnance of any size, and only awaits for the 
limit to which the art of gunsmithery shall go. 

Should it happen that, while the United States adoj)ts the 
monitor war-vessels, her maritime rivals remain content with 
those of the broadside pattern, the successful initiation of the 
former in the battle of Hampton Itoads will have resulted in 
giving to America the supremacy of the seas. But should it 
happen, as is far more likely, that sooner or later, and by 
gi'adual steps, England and France shall be forced to copy 
the Monitor, with such petty modifications as may soothe 
national pride, then, as iron-clad vessels have revolutionized 
naval warfare, so monitors in turn will revolutionize the war- 
fare of iron-clads ; and the pigmy warrior of Hampton Eoads 
will have dictated reconstruction to the navies of the world. 

In these modern days of ours, mechanism has made vast 
inroads on the domain of morale, and nations which once 
ruled the seas by virtue of the courage and skill of their sail- 
ors, and by national pride and training in marine enterprise, 
have found their prestige swept away. Mechanism usurps 
the offices once performed by men. In this era of mechani- 
cal warfare, it is idle to expect moral excellence to supply 
the lack of material strength. With equal advantages, in- 
deed, the former will pluck victoiy from any battle, but 



THE MONITOR AND MERRIMAC. 261 

material superiority itself supplies confidence, and however 
brave the assailant, he may find he is dashing his head against 
a rock. Naval war still more than war on the land is a ques- 
tion of science, and we cannot expect bravery to accomplish 
miracles or to reverse the conclusions of natural laws. So 
found the Niagara, when off Lisbon she encountered the 
Stonewall. Nor is it always enough to have iron hearts iu 
wooden walls. It is a curious speculation what might have 
been the result of the Southern insurrection, had the Con- 
federacy possessed, and the Union lacked, mechanical geni- 
uses who would have furnished her novel implements and 
cnsrines of destruction. Had some skillful brain armed her 
troops with a cheap breech-loading rifle ; had some Ericsson 
equipped her with a fleet of monitors, while the North was 
laboring at tardily-constructed broadside iron-clads ; or sup- 
plied her with batteries not the less terrible in power because 
they iivoided the use of expensive engines ; or protected her 
rivers and so the great cities lying thereon ; or given her 
some perfect torpedo capable of clearing all her blockaded 
harbors : in short, had scientific devices made up for want of 
resources, by inventions suited to the humble capacities of the 
South, what might not have been the issue ? "War grows to 
be each day an exacter science. A nation, arming itself with 
a needle-gun, confidently rushes upon its neighbor twice as 
strong in ifumbers and resources, and, at a thought, brings 
the great rival's knee to the dust. Nations can be made or 
undone at the desk of an engineer. 



262 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OE THE WAE. 



vn. 

VICKSBURG. 



I. 

PRELUDE TO VICKSBURG. 

In the miuds of the hardy freemen who dwell upon the 
hundred tributaries of the Father of Waters, there arose, at 
the very bejriuning of the war, a grandiose aspiration, that at 
once determined the objective of military operations in the 
West, and supplied, as from an unfailing resen^oir, the in- 
spiration and moral stimulus to make their bright ideal an 
actuality. This aspiration was the opening up of the Missis- 
sippi. For the streams on which the men of the West dwelt, 
did not more surely go to swell the tide of the great river, 
than did the current of their interests and affections flow 
adown its course to the Gulf : and they would not brook hos- 
tile jurisdiction over that continental highway of commerce 
and inter-communication. They resolved that the Mississippi 
should run "unvexed to the sea." 

The colossal conception of the conquest of the Mississij^pi 
valley shaped the earliest military efforts of the West, and asso- 
ciated itself with the most brilliant triumphs in that theatre 
of war. It was for this express work that the first army and 
fleet of Grant and Foote were formed at Cairo. Now, when 
in the early months of 18 G2, this army and fleet were pre- 
pared to move, the insurgents held control of nearly the whole 
of the great river. By means of the forts below New Orleans, 



VICKSBUEG. 263 

they commanded its outlet in the Gulf of Mexico. By 
means of the fortifications of Columbus, they closed naviga- 
tion from the North up to within twenty miles of where, at 
Cairo, the Ohio and Missouri coming together, form the main 
artery of the Mississippi. 

The Confederate defence of the Mississippi included a 
double problem. It was necessary, first of all, to obstruct 
navigation to the Union fleet, which could best be done by 
fortified batteries erected at chosen points where the river's 
banks swell into bluffs. But in order to make such intrenched 
camps secure against capture from the land side, it was re- 
quisite that they should be covered by a force i30werful enough 
to meet the Union army in the field. Unless the latter pur- 
jDOse could be realized, it was vain to suppose that any point 
could be held ; for while such fortified stronjjholds miirht 
readily avail to bar the advance of a fleet, they must, unless 
protected l)y an army, fall an easy prey to a force in condi- 
tion to invest them from the rear. This the Confederates, 
after one rude lesson, learnt ; and if we briefly review the 
course of Union conquest in the basin of the Mississippi, we 
shall see that the fate of the great river was nearly ahvays 
dependent, not on the attack or defence of sj^ecific fortified 
points, but on the issue of actions waged between the rival 
armies in the field. 

The first position taken up by the Confederates on the 
Ujjper Mississippi, was Columbus. It completely realized 
that part of the jjroblem that concerned the obstruction of 
the river to navigation. No efforts Avcre made against it ; 
but it is certain that it could have effectually resisted all naval 
attacks. When, however. Fort Donelson fell, Columbus was 
entirely uncovered ; and being without the jDrotection of an 
army, it was exposed to certain capture from the rear. 
Beauregard, into whose hands the defence of the Mississippi 
Valley then fell, undoubtedly did the best that was to bo 
done, when he ordered its evacuation, thus saving the garri- 



204: THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

son and the siege guns, which were removed to Island No. 
Ten, forty-five miles below Cairo, and twenty-five miles 
below Columbus. 

The theory of action formed by Beauregard, showed an 
appreciation of the correct method of defending the Missis- 
sippi. This was to accumulate a force large enough to 
assume the offensive against the Union army in the field. 
If successful, Columbus would be easily regained ; but as he 
might be unsuccessful, he resolved to prepare a powerful 
system of river-works at Fort Pillow, one hundred and thirty 
miles below Island No., Ten — obstructinsr the river mean-- 
while at the latter place, until the fortifications of Fort Pillow 
should be completed. Against Island No. Ten, the flotilla of 
Foote and the army of Pope proceeded immediately after 
the reductit>n of Donclson, the army of Grant meanwhile 
moving to Pittsburg Landins: on the Tennessee. But neither 
the army nor navy made any impression against the defences 
of Island No. Ten, which successfully withstood a three 
weeks' bombardment, and gave the Confederate engineers 
ample time to construct the works of Fort PilloAV. This 
being accomplished, the island Avas evacuated the 7th of 
April, the date of the battle of Shiloh. 

After the disastrous upshot of Shiloh, Beauregard retired 
to Corinth. He there covered Fort Pillow ; and until the 
Confederates should be forced from Corinth, Fort Pillow could 
not be assailed save by t!ie navy. Foote, immediately after 
the evacuation of Island No. Ten, steamed down to assail the 
new stronghold, and began a bombardment which was kept 
up six or seven weeks without any eflect whatever. But, 
when at the end of iSIay, Beauregard's army was compelled 
to retire from Corinth, Fort Pillow, entangled in the evil for- 
tunes of that army, had to be abandoned also. This left the 
^Mississippi open to Memphis, sixty-five miles below. The 
Union fleet immediately lorocceded against that place, and 
after a decisive engagement with the Confederate gun-boats, 
secured its caiDture. Thus, in four months from the opening 



VICICSBURG. 265 

of the campaign in the West, by virtue mainly of the two 
decisive victories at Donclson and Shiloh, the Mississippi was 
loosed of hostile jurisdiction through all the stretch from 
Cairo to Memphis — a distance of two hundred and forty 
miles, comprising the whole shore of Kentucky and Tennes- 
see on the left bank, and the whole shore of ^lissouri, and 
nearly one half of that of Arkansas on the right bank. 

While thus the flotilla of Footc was steadily advancing 
down the course of the j\Iississippi, the brilliant victory of 
Farragut, who carrying his fleet through the inferno of hostile 
craft, Are rafts, obstructions and forts, laid his ship alongside 
the wharfs of New Orleans, wrested from the enemy the ]Missis- 
sippi's outlet in the Gulf. Shortly after the surrender of New 
Orleans, Farragut dispatched a part of his squadron, imder 
Commander Lee, to ascend the jNIississippi. The expedition 
was of the nature of a reconnoissance ; for it was unknown 
what batteries or obstructions the enemy might have above 
in the long stretch of many hundred miles between the lower 
fleet, and that of Foote which at the time was still bombard- 
ing Island No. Ten. For many days the fleet steamed up 
stream without interruption, taking possession of Baton 
Rouge, Natchez, etc. ; and at length, on the 18th of May, 
1862, arrived before that town whose name, then first leaping 
to light in the history of the war, was destined to associate 
itself with one of the most memorable sieges on record. The 
fleet, in f\ict, arrived before Vicksburg. 

It was at this time unknown what defensive preparations 
the Confederates might have at Vicksburg. Indeed, how- 
ever, they were slight, and had but recently been initiated 
by General M. L. Smith who, under directions of Beaure- 
gard, bcijan the erection of batteries on the hiixh bluffs that 
overlook the Mississippi. When Smith took command on the 
12th of May, three batteries had been nearly completed ; and 
he energetically prosecuted the erection of others : so that, 
when the Union vessels arrived on the 18th, and demanded 



266 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the surrender of Vicksburg, the Confederate officer felt 
able to reply that, "having been ordered here to hold these 
defences, his intention was to do so as long as it was in his 
power." Commander Lee, judging his naval force too feeble 
to cope Avith the batteries, awaited the arrival of additional 
vessels, which soon began to reach him from New Orleans, 
and by the 28th of May, ten gun-boats lay before Vicksburg, 
and a bombardment Avas begun. But meanwhile the Confed- 
erates had not been idle. " These ten days," says General 
Smith, in his official report, "I consider the most critical 
period of the defence of Vicksburg. Batteries incomplete, 
guns not mounted, troops few, and both officers and men 
entirely new to service. Had a promjjt and vigorous attack 
been made by the enemy, while, I think, the dispositions 
made would have insured their repulse, still the issue would 
have been less certain than at any time afterwards. It was 
not long before they apparently came to the conclusion that 
no impression could be made on our works by their gun- 
boats, nor the erection of new batteries prevented, wherever 
attempted ; and the remaining six batteries, of the ten first 
mentioned, were constructed under their eyes. From the 
28th of jNIay to the middle of June the firing was kept up 
at intervals, and more or less heavy the latter part of the 
time, directed mainly at the town, and at localities where they 
apparently thought troops were encamped." 

While the Confederates labored at their defences^ new 
accessions of strength came to the fleet, till finally, towards 
the close of June, Farragut, with his entire squadron of gun- 
boats, and the mortar-fleet of Porter, lay off Vicksburg, An 
infimtry force of four regiments, under General F. "Williams, 
had also come up in transports, and begun to cut a navigable 
canal accross the sharp bend which the Mississippi here 
makes. Finally, for in the mean time Fort Pillow and Mem- 
phis had fidlcn, the upper squadron, under flag-officer Davis, 
Foote's successor, was able to descend the river to Vicksburg, 



VICKSBURG. 267 

whose batteries alone divided the two fleets. "With the por- 
tentous armament thus gathered against Vicksburg from above 
and below, it was resolved to make a determined effort for its 
reduction. A furious bombardment was begun on the after- 
noon of the 27th of June, and renewed at daylight of the 28th, 
when the lower fleet was put in motion. Steaming up stream » 
in front of the city, the gun-boats delivered broadside after 
broadside at the batteries, while the mortar-ketches from be- 
low filled the air with bombs. The cannonade was kept up 
with prodigious firing for two hours ; but, though seven of 
the gun-boats succeeded in running the gauntlet and joining 
the upper fleet, yet no damage whatever was inflicted upon 
the defences. The vessels, however, continued to pour their 
fire into the batteries until the 15th of July, when the Arkan- 
sas, a powerful iron-plated ram Avhicli the Confederates had 
just completed, descended from the mouth of the Yazoo, 
twelve miles above Vicksburg, and, after disabling two of the 
Union gun-boats, escaped under protection of the Vicksburg 
works. As the passage of this craft threatened the destruc- 
tion of the mortar-fleet below, Farragut was compelled to 
descend with such of his vessels as he had taken above Vicks- 
burg. This he did by running the guantlet of the batteries 
on the night of the 15th; and finally, on the 27th of July, 
after several days of continued firing, both the upper and 
fleets disappeared from in front of Vicksburg. 

The canal also proved a total failure ; and, at the end of 
July, General Williams returned with his force to Baton 
Rouge. Thus ended what may be called the first siege of 
Vicksburg. It had continued for seventy da3'^s — from the 
18th of May to the 27th of July, 1862 — during a con- 
siderable part of which time Vicksburg was under a bom- 
bardment, the severity of which may be judged from the 
fact that 25,000 shot and shell Avere, from first to last, 
thrown into that place by the fleet. No impression what- 
ever was made on the defences : not a single gun was dis- 



268 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAli. 

mounted, and the Confederate casualties numbered but seven 
killed and fifteen wounded. 

If it required any demonstration of the impotence of float- 
m<x armaments in the reduction of well-constructed and 
adequately-defended water batteries, such demonstration was 
certainly given by the seventy days' bombardment of Vicks- 
burg. But it needed no such proof. The fleet had already 
failed in its efforts ajfainst each of the strongholds on the 
Mississippi ; and these in succession, from Columbus down, 
bad fallen only in consequence of the defeat of the army cov- 
erins: them on the land side. Columbus fell when it was 
uncovered by the capitulation of the army at Donelson ; 
Island No. Ten fell when Beauregard lost Shiloh ; Fort Pillow 
jind ]Memphis fell when the evacuation of Corinth left them 
without protection. Vicksburg, which had laughed to scorn 
the persistent efforts of two mighty fleets, was manifestly safe 
so long as the Confederate army, that stood between it and the 
Union force, was able to maintain itself in the field. Let us 
now see what was the situation in this rejrard. 

It will be remembered that in a previous chapter we have 
seen how, after the occupation of Corinth by the armies 
under General Ilallcck, the Army of the Ohio, under General 
Buell, was directed upon Chattanooga, and how the main 
body of the Confederate "Army of Shiloh" was, under 
Bragg, transferred to that mountain fastness, and from there 
initiated the strtvtegic moves that, during the month of Sep- 
tember, 18G2, threw Buell's army back to the Ohio River. 
This mutual reduction of the rival forces operating in the 
basin of the Mississippi left on both sides comparatively 
small armies to act in that region. The Union force remained 
under General Grant ; the Confederate force under Price and 
Van Dorn. But as it had been arrangeji by Bragg that these 
officers should, as a diversion in favor of his campaign in 
Kentucky, assume the offensive against the Union force, 
Grant was, by their enterprising operations, diverted entirely 



VICKSBURG. 269 

from a proper offensive, and, until the month of October, 
was kept too busily engaged in foiling their designs to give 
any heed to ulterior plans of campaign. These, however, so 
soon as he was relieved a little from pressure, came again 
prominently into the foreground of his purpose. 

Of the objective now to be aimed at in the theatre of oper- 
ations controlled by General Grant there could be no possi- 
ble doubt. It was obviously that river stronghold that had 
arrested the progress of the ascending and descending Union 
fleets, and against which these fleets had, during the previous 
months of May and June and July, in vain expended all their 
fury. Manifestly, it was Vicksburg which, with its outpost 
at Port Hudson, formed the sole remaining barrier to the 
free navigation of the Mississippi. 

The line at this time held by General Grant was substan- 
tially the line of the INIemphis and Charleston * Railroad 
between Memphis and Corinth — his right flank on the Mis- 
sissippi at the former place, his left at Corinth. But in front 
still lay the forces of Price and Van Dorn, which, in Novem- 
ber, 1862, were consolidated under the control of Lieutenant- 
General Pemberton. This army, occupying the line of the 
Tallahatchie, two liundred miles to the north of Vicksburir, 
was Vicksburg's real defence — the real barrier to Grant's 
advance against that place. Till this force should be elim- 
inated, the solution of the problem could not even be begun. 
And that it was a problem in other regards beset with diffi- 
culties, a brief exposition will easily show. 

In the debatable strip of territory between the two rival 
armies, whereof that of Grant held the southern border of 
AVest Tennessee, and that of Pemberton the northern border 
of West Mississippi, there flow southward from the trans- 
verse ridge that crosses this zone many small streams, which, 
form the Tallahatchie and the Yalabusha : and these rivers, 
in turn commingling, constitute the Yazoo, which, flowing 
nearly parallel with the Mississippi for two hundred and 



270 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAK. 

ninety miles, at length empties into the great river six miles 
above Vicksburg. This stream, with its numerous estuaries 
making into it from east and west, gives its character to the 
country through which Grant was to attempt an advance 
towards Vicksburg from Memphis and Corinth — a country 
intricate, amphibious, and cut up by numberless bayous and 
swamps. From Memphis to Vicksburg the distance, to fol- 
low the turnings ana windings of the sinuous Mississippi is 
390 miles. By land, as the crow might fly, from Memphis, 
or say from Grand Junction on the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad, where Grant's centre lay, it is not much above 200 
miles ; or, if we follow the course of the Mississippi Central 
Railroad, which is about as direct as the path of the crow, 
and which was to be Grant's line of advance, the distance 
from Grand Junction to Jackson is 205 miles, and at 
Jackson»it is but "one side-step to the right" — or forty-six 
miles due westward — to Vicksburg. Now, Pemberton held 
the line of the Tallahatchie, and covered all the country in 
his rear to Vicksburg, with Avhich point also he had direct 
railway communication by the ISIississippi Central Railroad. 
Holly Springs on that same railroad, a few miles south of 
Grand Junction, he held as an advance post. To force 
Pemberton from the line of the Tallahatchie, and then to 
throw him back over all the intervening country to Vicks- 
burg, was the task undertaken by Grant. Let us signalize 
this as the first of his numerous attempts against the Mis- 
sissippi stronghold. We shall now see how, ojjening brill- 
iantly at the end of November, the campaign in a month 
closed in most total failure. 

The plan of operations devised by General Grant for the 
purpose of forcing Pemberton from the line of the Talla- 
hatchie, embraced a double or rather a triple combination of 
moves — the main force to press upon the Confederate front, 
Sherman to march from Memphis to threaten their left flank 
on the Tallahatchie, while a cavalry force was to cross from 



VICKSBUEG. 271 

the west side of the Mississippi below that line, and threaten 
their railway communications. The execution was begun the 
27th of November. The force destined to make the demon- 
stration on the enemy's rear, consisting of a body of about 
seven thousand cavalry from the Union army of the trans- 
Mississippi, under Generals Washburne and Ilovey, crossed 
the ISIississippi from Helena, and advanced towards the Talla- 
hatchie, destroying the railroad behind Pemberton's front. 
This menace immediately caused the Confederate commander 
to fall back from his advanced positions and from the line of 
the Tallahatchie to Grenada, 100 miles south of Grand Junc- 
tion, where the railroad from Memphis southward (the Mis- 
sissippi and Tennessee) strikes the Mississippi Central road. 
The effect of this move made it unnecessary long to continue 
the development of Sherman's sally from Memphis, for Grant, 
with the main body of the army was immediately able to 
press on over the path cleared for him by Pemberton's re- 
treat. The advance was pushed steadily southward through 
Holly Springs, along the railroad line, beyond the Talla- 
hatchie, till the 3d of December when the head-quarters were 
established at Oxford, and the cavalry thrown well forward 
towards Grenada, where Pemberton had taken post. The 
success thus far had been brilliant, had cost next to nothing, 
and had resulted in carrying forward the Union front fifty 
miles nearer Vicksburg. To repeat the leap, it was only 
necessary for Grant to secure his line of supplies by repair- 
ing the railroad back to his great depot at Holly Springs. 
This Avork was pushed forward with such energy, that by the 
middle of December the army Avas ready for a new advance ; 
and for this advance a plan more bold than that already 
wrought out Avas elaborated. 

It Avas an obvious inconvenience attaching to the line of 
operations chosen against Vicksburg, that the army must de- 
pend for its supplies on the single thread of railway connect- 
ing it Avith its depot at Holly Springs — a line Avhich must 



272 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

become more and more lengthened and precarious as the army 
penetrated deeper and deeper into the hostile country, and 
which, if Grant at length should be able to plant himself in 
the rear of Yicksburg, would have a depth of above two hun- 
dred miles. There was, however, one mode in which this 
difficulty might be entirely overcome. If, instead of attempt- 
ing to repair and hold the raih-oad in the long and difficult 
advance, a force descending the Mississippi to the mouth of 
the Yazoo, six miles above Vicksburg, could open up this 
water line, it was evident that not only would the Confeder- 
ate force opposing Grant be constrained to fall back, but that 
the Union army might cut itself entirely loose from the rail- 
road, in the assurance that by the Yazoo supplies would await 
it to the Viery gates of Yicksburg. Such was the conception 
of Grant, and the execution of the plan Avas intrusted to 
General Sherman, who, at Memphis, commanded his right 
wing. It was arranged, that while Sherman Avas thus operat- 
ing on the Yazoo, Grant was to press forward the left to 
Jackson, when the two, uniting, would invest Yicksburg from 
the rear. 

Sherman having embarked his divisions in transports, 
steamed down the Mississippi from jNIemphis the 20th De- 
cember, 18G2. On Christmas day, he was otf the mouth of 
the Yazoo ; on the 26th, the transports, convoyed by a fleet 
of gun-boats under Acting Rear Admiral D. D. Porter, as- 
cended the Yazoo to the distance of about twelve miles, 
where the troops disembarked on the south bank of the river, 
near the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. Here, on a range of 
blufis, the Confederates showed batteries defending the river 
and a line of defence covering the approaches to Yicksburg, 
which lay seven miles to the south. 

If we now recur to the relative situation of the opposing 
forces, the reflection will spontaneously suggest itself that the 
condition of Pemberton at Grenada could not fail to be very 
critical, what with Grant pressing his front and now Sherman a 



VICKSBUKG. 273 

hundred miles in bis rear and at the very door of Yicksburg. 
The total military strength of the Confederates in the depart- 
ment of Mississippi and East Louisiana was 39,000, and the 
force with which Pemberton himself confronted Grant was 
not above 25,000, scarcely more than half that of his oppo- 
nent, while the garrison of Vicksburg consisted but of a few 
brigades under General M. L. Smith, opposed to Sherman's 
forty thousand men. It resulted that even should he take 
advantage of his interior position, and unite both his detach- 
ments against the one or the other Union force (Grant or 
Sherman) , Pemberton would find his aggregate outnumbered 
by either singly. 

But in jDoint of fact Pemberton's condition was not in the 
least critical, for by a bold initiative he had in the meanwhile 
succeeded not only in neutralizing Grant, but had compelled 
him to beat a rapid retreat : so that by the time Sherman's 
force disembarked on the bank of the Yazoo Pemberton was 
able to confront it there with nearly his whole force. This 
imtoward turn of fortune befel the Union arms in this wise. 

After Pemberton had been compelled in consequence of 
Grant's first move to give up without a blow the line of the 
Tallahatchie, and fall back upon Grenada, he began to consider 
how he might thwart his adversary's manifest design of press- 
ing his advantage by a renewed advance towards Vicksburg, 
and with this view he resolved to dispatch a cavalry column 
to operate against Grant's railroad communications. The 
whole of the Confederate mounted force under General Van 
Dorn accordingly moved around the Union flank by a wide 
detour, and on the 20th of December struck Holly Springs, 
Grant's main depot of supplies. The dispositions for the se- 
curity of this place were little proportioned to its vital im- 
portance. It was, in fact, wholly destitute of defences, and 
was merely held by a force of from twelve to fifteen hundred 
men under an incompetent commandant. Van Dorn seized 
the place Avithout opposition, made prisoners of the garrison 



274 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. ' 

and destroyed the immense accumulations of quartermaster's, 
commissary and ordnance stores destined to supply Grant's 
force in its contemplated advance. The blow was decisive. 
Grant was compelled to fall back to Holly Springs, abandon- 
ins: all that had been o-ained in his first initiative. 

The surrender of Holly Springs took place on the 20th of 
December, just as Sherman was dropping down the INIissis- 
sippi towards Vicksburg ; and it was in entire ignorance of 
the disaster which was to deprive him of the co-operation of 
Grant, that Sherman on the 26th, having, as we have seen, 
disembarked on the south bank of the Yazoo, prepared to 
grapple with the duty that there met him. Let us see what 
this was. 

To the Confederates it had since many a month l)ecome 
obvious that Vicksburg must sooner or later become the ob- 
ject of strenuous attack, and that not merely as before by the 
fleet, but by the Union army approaching from the rear. To 
provide against the day when this should come, General j\I. L. 
Smith, the same energetic officer who had supervised the 
defence of the place Avhen first assailed by the gun-boats of 
Farragut, and who still remained in command, had constructed 
a system of earthworks enveloping Vicksburg from the north 
and east and south. But as a landing on the Yazoo was a 
contingency to be apprehended, and a movement which if ef- 
fected by the Union force would enable it to place Vicksburg 
immediately under siege, Smith had prepared an outer line 
of defence to cover the approaches from the Yazoo — a line to 
which the configuration of the country added great strength. 

The heights upon Avhich the " Queen City of the Bluff " is 
built are the abutment upon the Mississippi of a broken ridge 
of hills that stretches far into the interior, in nearly a direct 
line, and in a direction at about right angles with the general 
flow of the river. The Yazoo in its course southward and 
eastward finally touches the base of these hills at a point 
known as Snyder's Mills, or Haynes's Bluff, twelve miles from 



VICKSBUEG. 275 

its debouchure in the Mississippi, and thirteen miles north of 
Vicksburg. There is thus between the hills and the Yazoo 
a triangular-shaped area of bottom-land densely wooded, with 
the exception of one or two plantations on it, and intersect- 
ed with bayous and low swampy ground. Skirting the hills 
from Snyder's Mills, down to near the Mississippi, is first a 
swamp, then an old bed of the Yazoo containing considerable 
water and only to be crossed without bridging at three points 
whither torrents from the hills have borne along sufficient 
matter to fill up the bed, and finally down to the Mississippi 
a heavy belt of timber which had been felled into abatis. 
There was thus a continuous obstacle, twelve miles long, 
formed of abatis and water, skirting the base of the hills and 
but a short distance from them, terminated at one end by fixed 
batteries and a fortified position at Snyder's Mills ; at the 
other end hy the heavy batteries and field-works above Vicks- 
burg. So long as the works at Snyder's Mills were held, the 
whole Yazoo Valley was defended. The Confederate com- 
mander believed he could hold these works even with a slight 
force, provided the Union army was compelled to make a 
direct assault upon them from the river, and was not permit- 
ted to disengage itself from the bottom described : so having 
determined upon the base of the hills as the proper line, he 
prepared in advance to guard the three natural approaches by 
throwing up earthworks, felling timber, etc. 

It was against this position that Sherman, having effected 
his landing on the 26th December, foimd himself compelled 
to advance. The point of debarkation was in the vicinity of 
Chickasaw Bayou, which was about the centre of the enemy's 
line of thirteen miles from Vicksburg on the left to Haynes's 
Bluflf on the right. From this point the troops were in 
the morning thrown forward in four columns, and pressed 
back the enemy's pickets to the lagoon or bayou, which, as 
already mentioned, was passable only at three points. Steele's 
division on the left, moved out above the mouth of Chickasaw 



276 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Bayou ; Morgan's below the same bayou ; IVIorgan Smith's on 
the main road to Vicksburg, and A. J. Smith's still further 
to the right. The more the gi'ound was examined, the more 
difficult it was seen to be ; and both the 27th and 28th passed 
in reconnoissances and skirmishes, attended with no great 
loss. It was then resolved to make on the following day a 
concentrated attack with the view of passing the bayou, and 
carrying the intrenched heights beyond. In front of the 
right, under A. J. Smith, opposite the enemy's left, were the 
heavy abatis stretching towards Vicksburg : it was deter- 
mined only to demonstrate there. In front of the right centre, 
under Morgan Smith , was a passage across the lagoon by a sand- 
bar two hundred yards wide. In front of the left centre, 
below Chickasaw Ba^^ou, was a good levee or dry part of the 
lake. In front of the left, above the bayou, whei'C Steele 
had gone on the 28th, the ground proved so impracticable 
that his division was brought back and put in support of 
Morgan's. It resulted that it became necessary for Sherman 
to try his fortunes in attack at the positions occupied by 
Morgan and Morgan Smith. The attemjjt was not a promising 
one ; but it was the best that could be done. The interval 
of several days that had elapsed since the expeditionaiy force 
had appeared on the bayou, had sufficed for Pemberton to 
reinforce the Confederate officer of Vicksburg with some six 
or eight brigades ; and although the force was much inferior 
to that of Sherman, it bad the advantage of occupying a 
seemingly impregnable position. 

The morning of the 29th the left stonning column was 
formed of Morgan's division, strengthened by the brigades- of 
Blair and Thayer, about noon moved foi-ward to traverse the 
dry part of the lake, under cover of a furious cannonade. 
The story is brief and bloody. " When within four hundrcd 
yards," says tbe Confederate General S. D. Lee, who com- 
manded the brigade at this point, "our infantry opened — 
the enemy coming to within one hundred and fifty yards of 



VICKSBURG. 277 

my lines. Here our fire was so terrible that they broke, but 
in a few moments rallied again, sending a force to my left to 
turn my left flank. This force was soon met, and handsomely 
repulsed. The force in my front was also repulsed. Our 
fire was so severe that the enemy laid down to receive it. 
Seeing their confusion, the twenty-sixth Louisiana, and a part 
of the seventeenth Louisiana, were marched on the battle- 
field, and under their cover twenty-one commissioned offi- 
cers, three hundred and eleven non-commissioned officers and 
privates, were taken prisoners, four stands of colors, and five 
hundred stand of arms captured. The enemy left in great 
confusion, leaving their dead on the field." 

The attack of the Union general, Morgan Smith, across the 
sand-bar on the right, was no more successful than that* of 
Morgan. It was observed that the bank of the bayou op- 
posite this sand-bar was about fifteen feet high, and it was 
further increased by an embankment or levee of three feet in 
height. It was very steep, and, the soil being sandy, the 
sides had caved in, so that the brow overhung about a foot 
and a half. To ascend it was utterly impossiljle without 
digging a road, and this would have to be done under a 
deadly fire from the enemy. The path across the sand-bar 
was about two hundred yards in length, exposed to a double 
cross-fire, and the only approach to it was over a flat bottom 
covered with fallen trees. It was, however, resolved to 
attempt the enterprise, and the sixth Missouri regiment was 
detailed to lead the van. Of this regiment two companies 
volunteered for the perilous duty of digging away the bank, 
so that when the storming-coluran came, it might be able to 
pass ahead unobstructed. Rushing forward, these brave 
fellows reached the shelter of the bank, and set to Avork at 
the excavation — the enemy's sharpshooters being over their 
heads, within a few feet, and so near that when the Confed- 
erates reached their guns over the bank and depressed them, 
the Union soldiers below could readily have crossed bayonets 



278 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

with tlicm. The remainder of the sixth Missouri then went 
forward in aid of their comrades ; but for some reason the 
assault was long delayed, and after the failure of Morgan's 
attack it was too late, and Sherman ordered the regiment 
back under cover of darkness. 

The failure was consj)icuous, and entailed a loss of 1929 
killed, wounded, and missing ; the Confederate casualties 
were 209. The result left in the mind of General Sherman 
no hope of being able to force the Confederate line by a 
direct attack ; but it was surmised that something might be 
gained by another combination. This was to throw ten 
thousand men in transports up the Yazoo, to eflect a landing, 
under cover of the navy, at the extreme right of the Con- 
federate line, where the range of hills abuts at Haynes's Bluff, 
and assail the batteries on that flank, while the rest of the 
force preserved its position at Chickasaw Bayou and attacked 
to hold the enemy there. This movement was to have been 
made durins: the niirht of the 31st December, but a dense 
fog rendered it im.practicable then, and for other reasons it was 
afterwards abandoned. Sherman, accordmgly, re-embarked 
his troops on the 2d of January, 1862, dropped down the 
Yazoo to the Mississippi, where he was met by General 
McClernand, who had been sent down to assume command 
of the expedition. By that officer the force was ordered to 
Milliken's Bend, a great elbow made by a curve in the Mis- 
sissippi, twelve miles above Vicksburg. The four divisions 
were formed into two corps — the Thirteenth under General 
Morgan ; the Fifteenth under General Sherman. 

Not till he had abandoned the Yazoo attempt as hopeless 
did Sherman learn the ill fortune that had overtaken Grant, 
compelling that officer to renounce his part of the co-opera- 
tive effort against Vicksburg, and fall back to his old line on 
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. And now Grant 
learnt also the ill fortune that had overtaken Sherman. The 



VICKSBURG. 279 

whole scheme against Vicksburg had failed ; and the baffled 
commander was forced to find out some new device. 

The foilure of this campaign, by narrowing the circle of 
possibilities, made one conclusion manifest. It was evi- 
dently impracticable for Grant to attempt to move his force 
overland from the line of the Memphis and Charleston 
Railroad to the rear of Vicksburg ; for even should he, in a 
renewed effort, succeed in forcing Pemberton back to Vicks- 
burg, an advance by that line would be of no avail, and 
would not enable him to apply his force in the Avork of siege, 
since, until the Yazoo could be opened up, he would be 
without communication and without supplies. It would be 
merely to make a laborious and aimless march to the vicin- 
ity of Vicksburg, when the same end might be attained 
by transferring the army by water to Millikcn's Bend, 
there to make a junction with the two corps under 
McClernand. Perceiving this, Grant resolved to make this 
transfer by water : so leaving merely sufficient force to hold 
important points in Southern Tennessee and Northern Mis- 
sissippi, he, during the month of Januaiy, 1863, sent forward 
the bulk of his force from Memphis in transports down the 
Mississippi. McClernand advantageously employed the inter- 
val in making an expedition, attended by Porter's fleet, up 
the Arkansas River to Fort Hindman, which he reduced, com- 
pelling the surrender of the garrison of several thousand 
men. By the end of January the whole array found itself on 
the west bank of the Mississippi, in the vicinity of Milliken's 
Bend, and at Young's Point, a few miles above Vicksburg. 
Grant, having arrived at Young's Point the 2d of February, 
applied himself to see what was next to be done. Let us 
mark this as the initiation of the second scries of effoi-ts 
against Vicksburg. 

When Grant sat down to study thus close at hand the 
problem of the capture of Vicksburg, it was soon manifest 



280 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

that the circle of jDOSsible operations was in reality very re- 
stricted. The army was on the west side of the Mississippi : 
it was necessary to cross to the east side, and then, by 
swinging round in the rear of Vicksburg, either beat Pember- 
ton in the open field, or (if he should retire within the 
defences) place that stronghold under siege. This transfer 
of the army might be made either above Vicksburg or below 
it ; but in both cases the thought of how the operation could 
be effected was most perplexing. If the army should cross 
the Mississippi below, it would wholly sever itself from a 
base, seeing that the Vicksburg batteries barred the naviga- 
tion of the river. The movement above, by the Yazoo, was 
an inviting one, for that river presented an excellent line of 
supplies. But the Yazoo, too, was closed by the batteries at 
Haynes's Bluff, and the approaches to Vicksburg were — what 
Sherman had found them ! Unless, therefore, the obstruction 
to the navigation of the Mississippi presented by the Vicks- 
burg batteries, or of the Yazoo by the Haynes's Bluff batte- 
ries, could be in some way obviated, it seemed impossible to 
move a step in any plan of operating against Vicksburg. The 
months of February and March were spent in a series of ex- 
periments to obviate this difficulty. They were protracted 
and arduous : but as they were also wholly futile, I shall 
confine this recital to a very brief statement of their nature 
and object. 

Of the five expedients to which Grant resorted during 
the months of February and March, three were designed to 
overcome the obstacles to the navigation of the Mississippi 
presented by the Vicksburg batteries, and two to overcome 
the obstacle to the navigation of the Yazoo, prevented by the 
batteries at Haynes's Bluff. The first was the canal expedient. 
This project was a renewal of the attempt which had been 
made by General Williams in July of the previous year, 
when the fleet first went up to Vicksburg from New Orleans, 
and consisted of a cut-off, a mile across the peninsula, formed 



VICKSBURG. 281 

by a sharp elbow in the Mississippi, opposite the town. If 
successful in forming a new channel for the Mississippi, it 
w^ould isolate Vicksburg, and enable transports to pass safely 
to the new base of operations below. The work was prose- 
cuted for many weeks with great energy and under many 
difficulties, the chief of which resulted from a raj)id rise in the 
river, that threatened to inundate the camp and •le canal. 
It seemed likely, however, that success would crown the 
effort, when finally, on the 8th of March, the rise of the river 
brought so great a pressure upon the dam across the canal 
near the upper end, at the main Mississippi levee, that it 
gave way, and let through the low lands back of where the 
Union camps were a torrent of water that separated the north 
and south shores of the peninsula as effectually as if the Mis- 
sissippi flowed between them. The canal project was aban- 
doned. 

The second expedient was the opening a practicable route 
through the bayous which run from near Milliken's Bend, and 
through Roundabout Bayou and Tensas River into the ISIissis- 
sippi, near New Carthage, below Vicksburg. This also was 
tried : dredge boats were put to work clearing a passage, and 
a few small craft were finally able to pass through. But as the 
river began to fall in April, and the roads between Milliken's 
Bend and New Carthage grew passable, it became unneces- 
sary to continue work on this route. 

The third project was the Lake Providence route. This 
lake, situated seventy-five miles north of Vicksburg, on the 
Louisiana side of the Mississippi, is but a mile west of that 
river, and this opening a canal between the two would afford 
a navigable route through the lake, Bayou Boele, Bayou 
Macone, and the Tensas, Wachita, and Red Rivers, into the 
Mississippi. This project was not greatly esteemed, and after 
some time it was abandoned. 

The fourth expedient and the one that promised best, had 
for its object to open a route to the rear of the Haynes's Bluff 



282 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

batteries, on the Yazoo. The method in which it was pro- 
posed to reach this position, will illustrate the extraordinary 
hjdrographic characteristics of the region in which the army 
was operating. Far north of Vicksburg, Yazoo Pass, a nar- 
row toi-tuous channel, runs eastward from the Mississippi 
into Moon Lake, whence again issuing eastward, it flows into 
ColdwatH- Eiver which empties into the Tallahatchie, which 
debouches into the Yazoo. This was the course the expedi- 
tionary force was to take. It consisted of one division of 
McClernand's corps, with two Missouri regiments of Sher- 
man's corps or sharpshooters — the right kind of transporta- 
tion could not be obtained for more force — and it started at 
the end of February, the transports being preceded by a num- 
ber of Porter's gun-boats. With immense labor the fleet suc- 
ceeded in reaching the Coldwater, the 2d of March, and after 
this it was expected the course to the Yazoo would be much 
easier. "But," says General Grant, "while my forces were 
opening one end of the Pass the enemy was diligently closing 
the other." The Confederates some time previously had skill- 
fully chosen and fortified an excellent position to obstruct such 
a movement. Near where the Tallahatchie empties into the 
Yazoo, they had constructed Fort Pemberton, a powerful 
work of earth and cotton bales, that perfectly commanded the 
angle of junction of both rivers ; and they obstructed the 
former stream by a raft and sunken vessel. The Union expe- 
ditionary force arrived before the work on the 1 1th of March ; 
but from the first, difficulties beset it. It was found that the 
low ground around the fort was entirely overflowed ; so that 
no movement could be made by the army to reduce the work 
mitil the gun-boats should silence the enemy's guns. But 
this, after protracted trial, they were unable to eflect, and 
after remaining until March 21st, and being joined by 
Quimby's division of McPherson's corps, the expedition 
returned. 

There was now remaining the fifth and final preliminary 



VICKSBUEG. 283 

expedition. While this force was still before Fort Pember- 
ton, Admiral Porter had reconnoitred another route by 
which it was hoped a descent might be made above the 
Haynes's Bluff batteries. This route was still more intricate 
than the other. Seven miles above the mouth of the Yazoo, 
Steele's bayou empties into that river ; thirty miles up Steele's 
bayou, Black bayou enters it from Deer Creek, six miles dis- 
tant ; and descending the Big Sunflower forty-one miles, one 
finds himself again in the Yazoo, sixty miles from its mouth. 
So many difficulties, however, Avere encountered from over- 
hanging trees and other causes, that the project also was given 
up after prodigious labors spent in the endeavor to carry it 
out. "The expedition," sa3^s General Grant, " failed prob- 
ably more from want of knowledge as to what would be re- 
quired to open this route than from any impractibility in the 
navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was 
proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedi- 
dition on and difficulties were encountered, and then it would 
become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the 
means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to 
move forces to effectually checkmate further progress, and 
the exijedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred 
yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo." 

Thus five-fold failure rested on the operations against Yicks- 
burg. But through these very failures the mind of the com- 
mander had wrought its way out to clearness of vision, and 
at that very stage when an intellect of less determined fibre 
would have been resigning itself to a seemingly implacable 
fortune, Grant, overleaping fiite and failure, rose to the 
height of that audacious conception on which at length, he 
vaulted into Vicksburg. 



284 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OP THE WAR. 

II. 
THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG. 

It was apparent to General Grant from the moment he 
went in person to Young's Point tliat the true line of opera- 
tions against Vieksburg was from the south ; but if he was 
prompted first to exhaust every other expedient, it was be- 
cause the difficulties seen to beset that mode of action were 
in reality appalling. It would be necessary first of all to 
march the army for thirty or forty miles down the west bank 
of the Mississippi, so as to gain a point where the passage 
might be made below the enemy's works. It would be requi- 
site that the gun-boats and transports should run the gauntlet 
of the batteries, in order to cross the army to the east bank 
and cover the passage. It would then remain to make the 
crossing of that great and difiicult river in face of all the 
opposition the enemy could bring against the operation. And 
when these three conditions should be fulfilled, the perils 
that in the very nature of things attended the execution of the 
plan, would only have begun. For it would then be neces- 
sary for Grant to cut himself entirely ofi" from his base, and 
launch into the interior of the land, without a new base se- 
cured in advance — with the promise of any base at all con- 
tingent upon his beating the enemy in the open field, swing- 
ing round in rear of Vieksburg, and so operating with his 
right as to force open the line of the Yazoo. 

These considerations serve to fix the character of the plan 
of operations. It cannot be called a brilliant strategic inspi- 
ration, for the move was an obvious one, and had suggested 
itself even to the rank and file of the army. But if the con- 
ception was easy, the execution involved difficulties that 
miijht well affriijht the stoutest heart. Of this there could 
be no more striking proof than is presented in the fact that 
the high-vaulting and audacious mind of Sherman shrank 



VICKSBUEG. 285 

from tliG Gnter}5rise ; and on the 8th of April, after the move- 
ment below had been initiated, that officer, in a written com- 
munication to General Grant, suggested that the army should 
be transported back to the line of the Tallahatchie and Yalla- 
busha, as a base of operations against Vicksburg. It can 
only be said that there was that in the composition of General 
Grant's mind that prompted him to undertake that which no 
one else would have adventured. Unmoved by all the perils 
of the operation, he resolved to go below. 

The movement was initiated on the 29th of March, 1863, 
when the Thirteenth Corps, under General McClernand, was 
put in motion to cross the peninsula opposite Vicksburg from 
Milliken's Bend to New Carthage. The march was made 
with much difficulty, and in face of many obstacles, and 
finally, when New Carthage was reached, the region was 
found to have been converted by inundation into an island : 
so that the advance had to be pushed twelve miles farther 
south, making the distance to be traversed from Milliken's 
Bend thirty-five miles. McClernand's corps was followed, 
as fast as supplies and ammunition could be transported- over 
horribly bad roads by the Seventeenth Corps, under Mc- 
Pherson. 

This the initial op^ation being completed, it next fell to 
Admiral Porter to execute the perilous enterprise of run- 
ning the gauntlet of the batteries for the pui*pose of affording 
the force below the means of passing the Mississippi, and 
protection in the operation. This exploit was performed in 
the most brilliant manner, the fleet of gun-boats, together with 
three transports laden with stores, and protected in their 
vulnerable parts with hay and cotton, were prepared on 
the IGtli to make the trial trip. The expedition was readily 
manned by eager volunteers, and under cover of the dark- 
ness, the vessels succeeded in passing safely through the fiery 
ordeal, with the loss of but one of the transports, which was 
set on fire by a shell. These boats succeeded in getting by 



286 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

SO well, that General Grant ordered six more to be prepared 
in like manner for running the batteries ; and on the night 
of the 22d of April five of them made the passage, one be- 
ing lost. The damage suffered by the transports was soon 
repaired, and five were found available for service, as were 
also six barges out of twelve that had been sent in tow of 
the last six boats that ran the blockade. 

It now remained to make the passage of the Mississippi. 
This operation it was resolved to execute at Grand Gulf, 
where the lowest of the Vicksburg system of works was lo- 
cated. This point is seventy-five miles below Milliken's 
Bend, and as the water transportation was insufficient for the 
conveyance, they made the march overland to Hard Times, 
opposite Grand Gulf. For the reduction of this latter place, 
a combined land and naval force was jDrepared, and on the 
29th of April, Porter, with the fleet and so much of McCler- 
nand's corps as could be embarked on the transports, moved 
against it. With his wonted energy, Porter commenced the 
attack, which was continued for several hours. But the 
Grand Gulf batteries, erected on high bluffs, proved too 
strong for the navy, and Grant, fearing to risk his men in an 
attempt at storming the works, determined to turn them by 
landing at a point lower down the river. To carry out this 
object, he directed the army to march by the right bank, and 
to be prepared to cross opposite Bruinsburg ; whilst the trans- 
ports should, as soon as it became dark, run the fire of the 
batteries at Grand Gulf, and so take up positions in readiness 
to ferry the army across. These movements, both by land 
and water, were accomplished without loss. The 30th, 
McClernand's corps was safely ferried across and landed on 
the east bank of the Mississippi, and started out on the road 
to Port Gibson, twelve miles north-east of Bruinsburg, and in 
the rear of Grand Gulf. McPherson's corps followed as 
rapidly as it could be put across the river. The initial 
movement was thus in every respect a success — a result due 



VICKSBUEG. 287 

to the vigor of the execution and the skill with Avhich the 
enemy's attention was called off to another quarter. The 
latter operation was entrusted to General Sherman, whose 
corps, while the others were marching southward, remained 
at Milliken's Bend. While McClernand and McPherson were 
crossing at Bruinsburg, Sherman was directed " to make a 
demonstration on Haynes's Bluff, and to make all the show 
possible." Accordingly on the morning of the 29th, he em- 
barked Blair's division on ten steamers, and, preceded by 
several iron-clads and gun-boats, the expedition steamed up 
the Yazoo and lay for the night at the mouth of Chickasaw 
Bayou, the scene of the repulse the previous December. 
Next morning the fleet proceeded up within easy range of 
the enemy's batteries, and for four hours kept up an ener- 
getic demonstration. Waiting till towards evening, Sherman 
caused the troops to disembark in full view of the enemy, 
and seemingly prepare to assault; "but," says he, "I knew 
full well that there was no road across the submerged field 
that lay between the river and the bluff." This produced the 
desired effect on the Confederates, who could be seen bestir- 
ring themselves to meet a forceful attack, which, however, 
was quite off the purpose of Sherman, who, keeping up ap- 
pearances till dark, re-embarked his troops. Next day simi- 
lar movements were made on both sides of the Yazoo, and 
Sherman then received orders to hasten forward to Grand 
Gulf. 

The ruse had succeeded admirably ; for while, on the last 
day of April and the first day of May, Sherman was menac- 
ing the approaches to Vicksbui^g from the Yazoo, the other 
two corps of the army, seventy-five miles below, had made 
the passage of the Mississippi, and gained a firm footing on 
the "high plateau in rear of Vicksburg." Let us now follow 
the movements of this force. 

Havina: crossed to Bruinsburs: durins: the forenoon of the 
30th of April, the van corps under McClernand, after wait- 



288 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAll. 

ing only long enough to draw and distribute four days' 
rations, was directed by General Grant to move out on the 
road to Port Gibson, and attain the bluffs some three miles 
back from the river. The hisfhlands Avere reached without 
opposition some time before sunset, and McClernand, deem- 
ing it important to surprise the enemy if he should be found 
in the neighborhood of Port Gibson, pushed on by a forced 
march that night. An hour after midnight, the vanguard, on 
arriving within four miles of Port Gibson, was accosted by a 
light fire of infantry that revealed the presence of the enemy. 
The troops were then rested on their arms during the short 
remnant of the night, and at dawn. May 1st, found a Con- 
federate force drawn up to dispute the advance. This proved 
to be a part of a division which, under General Bo wen, had 
been stationed at Grand Gulf, the left of Pcmberton's line. 
When, on the previous afternoon. Bo wen discovered that the 
Union force was crossing the Mississippi at Bruinsburg, he 
moved out from Grand Gulf towards Port Gibson, eight 
miles to the southward, and took position three or four miles 
in advance of that place to dispute its possession with the 
Union corps. His division numbered about five thousand 
men. 

The nature of ground in this region makes it extremely 
defensible, seeing that the roads usually run on narrow, 
elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines 
on either side. Aided by this circumstance, the Con- 
federates made a very stubborn defence, and succeeded in 
protracting the contest throughout the day, during Avhich, 
however, they were driven 'from successive positions with 
heavy loss, all the four divisions of McClernand's corps and 
Logan's division of McPherson's corps being brought into 
action. The Union casualties numbered nearly a thousand ; 
but the success was worth what it cost. During the night 
Bowen withdrew from Port Gibson, and, having burnt the 
bridge over the south fork of Bayou Pierre opposite the 



VICKSBURG. 289 

town, retired across the north fork of Baj-ou Pierre and took 
position between that stream and Grand Gulf. Hero he 
was joined the 2d of May by Loring's division from Jack- 
son ; but as, during that day, the Union engineers had 
rebuilt the bridge, and Grant pressed forward to cut off the 
Confederate force, Bo wen and Loring retired northward, 
crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's Ferry, and thence were 
ordered by Pemberton to the vicinity of Vicksburg. As, at 
the same time, the Confederate garrison holding the fortified 
position of Grand Gulf withdrew. Grant shifted his base of 
supplies from Bruinsburg to that place. Leaving now the 
Union army, its banners gilded by the success of the initial 
operations, to pursue its advance on the rear of Vicksburg, 
let us review the situation as a whole, and inquire what prep- 
arations had been made by the Confederate general to resist 
the threatened attack. 

Towards the close of the year 18G2, the Richmond authori- 
ties had put into the hands of General J. E. Johnston the 
military control of the entire western theatre of war — a com- 
mand embracing both the army of General Bragg in Tennes- 
see, and the army of General Pemberton in Mississippi. At 
this period he made his head-quarters with General Bragg at 
TuUahoma, where he Avas in constant communication with 
General Pemberton. Now, up to the middle of April, all the 

■ dispatches that Johnston received from General Pembei-ton 
conveyed the opinion of that officer that Grant would abandon 
his attempts against Vicksburg — an opinion which, consider- 
ing the constant failure of the many efibrts, was certainly not 
devoid of plausibility. But he soon found out how greatly 
he had misinterpreted the purpose of his adversary, for on 
the IGtli of April the fleet passed the batteries, and imme- 
diately afterwards the concentration of the army opposite 
Grand Gulf revealed the real intent of the Union commander. 
Kudely undeceived by this manifestation, Pemberton, on the 

•29th telegraphed to Johnston : " The enemy is at Hard Times 

28 



290 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

in large force, with barges and transports, indicating a pur- 
pose to attack Grand Gulf with a view to Vicksburg." Scarce- 
ly however had this dispatch reached Johnston than Grant, 
slipping below Grand Gulf, rapidly launched his army across 
the Mississippi, and before there was time for reply, Pember- 
ton enveloped in the toils of his adversary's bold manoeuvres, 
found it was no longer a question of how to prevent Grant's 
crossing but how to save Vicksbui'g. Ilis dispatch of May 
1st told the dread story in these words : "A furious battle 
has been going on since daylight just below Port Gibson . . 
Enemy can cross all his army from Hard Times to Bruinsburg. 
I should have large reinforcements. Enemy's movements 
threaten Jackson, and if successful cut off Vicksburg and 
Port Hudson." To this Johnston replied immediately, urg- 
ing Pemberton to " unite all his troops and beat Grant " — ex- 
cellent advice, no doubt, but of little avail in the actual cir- 
cumstances of the case. 

The situation in which Pemberton found himself when 
Grant had gained a foothold on the cast bank of the Missis- 
sippi, was one that demanded a decisive stroke. For the 
question forced upon him for solution was not one of tactics, 
but of grand strategy — a question that could be rightly an- 
swered only by a mind capable of rising above the letter of 
war to the spirit of war. This question was, shall Vicksburg 
be abandoned ? 

Now, what was Vicksburg? Assuredly nothing but a 
water-battery for the obstruction of the Mississippi. But 
when on the night of the IGth of April, the fleet ran the 
blockade and passed below Vicksburg, that stronghold had 
ceased to fulfil its functions. In this new shift of aiTairs, the 
duty of the Confederate commander changed with it. This 
did not concern the defence of a post that had become useless : 
it Avas his business now to see to the safety of his army, 
and to foil his antagonist. The communications of the Con- 
federate force at Vicksburg ran eastward by the railroad 



( 



VICKSBURG. 291 

through Jackson : so that it was only by retiring to that point 
or beyond, or to a position on the flank that the commander 
could preserve his interior lines, and the means of being rein- 
forced by Johnston. Grant, the moment he landed on the east 
bank, menaced to lay hold of this line of retreat, and in fact 
made Vicksburs: untenable. That stronjjhold mis:ht be the 
tomb of an army, but was of no imaginable utility to the Con- 
federates. 

Pemberton, a brave man, and, spite of the sinister views 
of the people of Yicksburg, devoted heart and soul to the 
insurgent cause, was nevertheless not capable of comprehend- 
ing such considerations. He had been put to defend Yicks- 
burg, he had gained whatever reputation he had won in its 
defence, and he had come to regard it in the same manner 
as General Halleck regarded Harper's Ferry — as a place 
that could lose its importance by no conceivable change of 
fortune. He had within its lines supplies for sixty days, he 
had of troops thirty odd thousand, and he resolved to " hold 
Vicksburg as long as possible." Accordingly, with this in- 
tent, he caused the division of Bowcn, after it had been 
compelled to abandon Port Gibson, and the troops that had 
been forwarded from Jackson for his reinforcement, to cross 
the Big Black, and uniting his command, took position behind 
that river, on the railroad to Jackson, a few miles east of 
Vicksburg. There he awaited Grant's movements, which 
were as decided as those of the Confederate were unsure and 
vacillating. 

The region in the rear of Vicksburg, by which Grant was 
now moving from the south, derives its main military charac- 
teristics from the Big Black and its numerous affluents. This 
stream, rising in Northern Mississippi, flows south-westward, 
passes Vicksburg at the distance of ten or twelve miles to 
the east, and empties into the Mississippi River at Grand 
Gulf. From Grand Gulf, the temporary base of the army, 
a line drawn north-east for the length of sixty miles, will 



292 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

strike Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, forty-six miles due 
east of Vicksburg, with which place it is connected by a line 
of railroad. 

The Confederate force that was driven from Port Gibson 
had been followed northward to where the direct road from 
that place to Vicksburg crosses the Big Black at Hankinson's 
Ferry. Here Grant waited from the 3d to the 8th of May 
for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's corps. Meantime he 
sent detachments across the Big Black to make demonstra- 
tions of advancing directly upon Vicksburg, which is but 
about twenty miles north of Hankinson's. But he had no 
real intention of operating by that line, and only designed to 
retain Pembcrton near Vicksburg while he made a great 
detour eastward, to guard against any hostile menace to his 
rear when ho should turn westward towards the Mississippi 
stronghold. Specifically, his purpose was with the left and 
centre (corps of McClernand and Sherman), to hug close the 
left or east bank of the Big Black, striking the Vicksburg 
and Jackson Railroad about midway between these two 
points, in the vicinity of Edward's Station and Bolton, while 
he thrust out the right (McPherson's coips) eastward via 
Raymond to Jackson, w^here it was to destroy the railroad, 
public stores, etc., and then turning westward, rejoin the 
miain force. The four days from the 8th to the 12th of May 
were employed in executing these marches. By the latter 
day Sherman and McClernand had approached nearly to the 
railroad, at the designated points, which would have been 
attained in another march. But developments in the region 
where McPherson was operating caused a slight change of 
orders. That officer had on the 12th of Ma}^ when ncaring 
Raymond, been met by a force of two Confederate brigades, 
which he overthrew after a two hours' combat. They then 
retreated upon Jackson, against which McPherson had been 
directed to march. Now, no solicitude would have been felt 
touching McPherson's ability to deal with this force ; but that 



VICKSBURG. 293 

same night, General Grant received tidings that reinforce- 
ments were daily arriving at Jackson, and that General John- 
ston was hourly expected there to take command in person. 
Determining, therefore, to make sure of that place, and leave 
no force in his rear, Grant altered the previous orders to 
Sherman and McClernand to strike the railroad at Edward's 
Station, and directed the whole army upon Jackson. By 
the morning of the 14th of May Sherman and McPherson 
had neared Jackson, and ISIcClernand was within supporting 
distance, at Clinton and Raymond. 

On the night of the 13th General Johnston reached Jack- 
son. He found there the brigades of Greirg and Walker that 
had the day before fallen back before McPherson from Ray- 
mond, learnt that Pemberton was at Edward's Station and as- 
certained that Grant was approaching Jackson. He knew that 
fragments of Confederate forces were coming towards Jack- 
son from the east and south that would swell the command he 
would have in hand to eleven thousand, and hoped they might 
arrive in time to enable him to make a stand at Jackson. 

It took little time for that acute strategist to discern how 
false was the situation in which the two Confederate detach- 
ments were placed, with the Union army planted between the 
force under Pemberton and the command he was gathering 
at Jackson ; and instantly comprehending the importance of 
concentration, he that night directed him to move up to Clif- 
ton in rear of the Union force — which, however, he was mis- 
taken in supposing to be a mere detachment. He added : 
" To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. 
The troops here could co-operate. All the strength you can 
quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important." 
But Johnston was doomed to be disappointed in one case and 
disobeyed in the other. General Pemberton did not heed his 
instructions to move towards Clinton, and the detachments 
he was expecting did not reach Jackson : so that when Sher- 
man and McPherson neared that place on the morning of the 



294 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

14tb Jolmston had no more than the two brigades of Gregg and 
Walker. With these he made a rear-guard fight of two hours, 
in order to gain time for the removal of the public stores, and 
then retreated six miles northward on the Canton road. The 
town was then occupied by the Union force, and Grant, leav- 
ing Sherman in Jackson to destroy the railroads, bridges, ar- 
senals, etc., about-faced the remainder of the army to march 
westward, parallel with the railroad, to Edward's Station, 
Vicksburg- wards . 

Let us now see with what fatal certainty Pemberton, by 
his ill-judged motions, Avas entangling himself in toils from 
which at length there was no escape. When on the morning 
of May 14th he received Johnston's order to march out and 
attack Grant's rear at Clinton, Pemberton, with his main field 
force of seventeen thousand men, held jjosition at Edward's 
Station. Had he obeyed the order, though it is wholly un- 
likely that he could have carried out the intent of making 
head against Gran(, yet by moving by the left he would at 
least have been in position to reach Johnston. But Pember- 
ton Iiad preconceived another plan of action. Incapable of 
ridding himself of the notion that Vicksburg was his base, 
he circumscribed all his manoeuvres within such limits as 
would enable him to cover that position. Still it was obviously 
necessary for him to do something ; so he called a council of 
war. A majority of the officers approved the movement in- 
dicated by General Johnston — the others preferred a move- 
ment aiming to cut off Grant's supplies from the Mississippi. 
"My own views," says General Pemberton, "were expressed 
as unfavorable to any movement which would remove me 
from my base, which was and is Vicksburg. I did not, how- 
ever, sec lit to place my own judgment and opinions so far 
in opposition as to prevent the movement altogether ; but be- 
lieving the only possibility of success to bo in the plan pro- 
posed, of cutting off the enemy's supplies, I directed all my 



vicivSBimG. 295 

disposable force — say seventeen thousand five hundred — 
toward Raymond." 

Now, what was the nature of the manoeuvre which Pem- 
berton thus proposed ? In advancing upon Jackson from the 
Mississippi, the base of the Union army was Grand Gulf, 
whence it drew its supplies ; but when the movement was so 
completely developed that Grant had reached Clinton (where 
he was at the time of Johnston's order to Pemberton) , he of 
course exposed his whole line of communications to the Con- 
federate force at Edward's Station. To Pemberton, there- 
fore, it appeared a bold and decisive stroke to march south- 
eastward from Edward's Station towards Raymond, and thus 
lay hold of this vital line. 

Let us do justice to what of merit there was in this 
conception : in other circumstances it would have been a 
correct move. But in the actual facts of the case, the 
luckless Pemberton was sallying forth to assail a wind-mill, 
not a real giant. Grant had ceased to have any line of 
communications. As early as the 11th, five days before 
this time, he had caused the haversacks of the men to 
be filled with rations, had telegraphed that he "would com- 
municate no more with Gi-and Gulf," and having cut his armv 
entirely loose from the Mississippi, marched it forth as a 
movable column, relying on what supplies were on hand, 
and what could be obtained from the country, until, having 
completed his movement, he should burst open the line of 
Yazoo, and thereby gain a new base on the Mississippi. 
Little, therefore, recked he of the obsolete depot at Grand 
Gulf, or any line connecting him therewith — let the enemy 
swoop down upon it at will — it would only play into his 
hands ! 

Big Avith this doughty puq:)ose, Pemberton — not hastily, 
but taking thirty hours to ruminate his mighty intent — set 
his column in motion the afternoon of the 15th south-eastward 
from Edward's Station towards Raymond. After an advance 
of four or five miles, night came on, and put a pause to the 



296 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

march. But while he had been dallying, Grant, clear of 
purpose, had all that da}', since early morning, been hasten- 
ing forward the column by forced marches from Jackson, 
westward : so that by night the troops lay within a few miles 
of Edward's Station, the pickets being in contact wuth those 
of Pcmberton, where he lay on the middle Raymond road. 
It was now apparent to Pemberton that his march to the 
south of the railroad, far from harming his adversary, had 
already compromised his own safety. Next morning, May 
IGth, this became still more manifest, and as at the same 
time he received a despatch from Johnston, reiterating anew 
the order to move north-eastward, so as to make a junction 
Avith him, he was willing enough at last to obey. He there- 
fore gave the order to countermarch on Edward's Station, 
and thence move on Brownsville, fifteen miles to the north- 
east — an excellent move that would have permitted a Union 
with Johnston, who av^jIs edging constantly westward to be 
near Pemberton. But this good resolution came too late. 
Pemberton would have to cross the front of the Union army, 
already near at hand, and as Grant, on the morning of the 
16th launched forward to Edward's Station, Pemberton was 
caught in his sin, and compelled to form line of battle to 
meet a collision now become inevitable. The Confederate 
troops were hastily disposed upon the strong position of 
Champion Hills, a short distance in the rear, and the rival 
forces Avcre presently precipitated into an action that decided 
the fate of Vicksburij. 

As the Union force approached, it was with no more than 
the heads of columns — Ilovey's division of McClernand's 
corps, followed by McPherson's corps of two divisions, being 
on the direct road from Jackson to Vicksburg, while McCler- 
nand with the three remaining divisions of his command, and 
Blair's division of Sherman's corps Avas on the roads to the 
soutliAvard, the roads from Raymond to EdAvard's Station. 
Sherman's two other divisions Avere still in the vicinity of 



VICKSBURG. 297 

Jackson. But as Grant early in the morning saw that battle 
was inevitable, he ordered Sherman forward in all haste. 

The position of Pemberton was one of great natural strength. 
His left (Stevenson's division) occupying Champion Hill, a 
thickly wooded height to the south of the road, on the right 
of which the timber extends a short distance down the hill 
and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope and into 
a valley extending for a considerable distance ; his centre (Bow- 
en's division) extended across Baker's Creek, and his right 
(Loring's division) still farther southward in a thick wood which 
covered a seeming chaos of abrupt hills and yawning ravines. 

Hovey's division brought up against the enemy's left 
and was disposed for the attack in the wooded ravine 
and on the hill-side. McPherson's two divisions and Logdn 
and Crocker wore thrown to the right of the wood so 
as to envelop completely the Confederate flank. The four 
divisions of McClernand were comiiig into line opposite the 
enemy's right and centre. While the latter was bringing up 
and disposing his troops, skirmishing had gi'OAvn so hot be- 
tween Hovey's division and the Confederate left that at eleven 
it swelled into a battle. The commander had not desired to 
bring on the conflict until the heavy force of McClernand on 
the left should have come up ; but the enemy in front of that 
officer presented a front of artillery and infantry where it was 
impossible from the nature of the ground and the density of 
the front to discover his numbers, so that no headway was 
made there. Thus Plovey made the attack alone, and though 
it was executed with great gallantry it was repulsed with se- 
vere loss, and two brigades of Crocker's division had to be 
thrown in to brace up this front. All the time Logan's di- 
vision was working on the enemy's left flank and the nature of 
the ground was such as to develop the happiest results from 
this manoeuvre. It was afterwards found that the Vicksburg 
road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for 
about one mile, and to where it intersects one of the Raymond 



298 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

roads, turns almost due west down the hill, and across the 
valley in which Logan was operating. From this circum- 
stance it came about that Logan's manoeuvre threatened di- 
rectly the enemy's rear — a fact that soon wonderfully weak- 
ened the front attacks. Pemberton, however, by drawing 
troops from his right, restored the equilibrium and was able 
to take the offensive against Hovey's division, which after 
struggling bravely against the adverse tide, was overborne, 
as were also the supports drawn from McPherson's corps. Yet 
the troops retired stubbornly, and having found partial cover 
re-formed : an enfilading fire of artillery Avas then gained 
upon the enemy, and the hostile line recoiled. back to its own 
place. 

Meanwhile Logan, who having worked well round to the en- 
emy's rear, had taken in the full importance of the menacing 
position ho held, rode up to Grant and told him that " if 
Hovey could make another dash, he would come up from 
where he was and capture the greater part of the enemy." 
This was executed as soon as the dispositions could be 
made ; but as Pemberton had now apprehended how thor- 
oughly his position was compromised, he began to draw off. 
Hovey and Logan and McClernand then pressed forward and 
the Confederates, completely ])rokcn up, fled in panic rout 
from the field. Indeed, so rapid was the disintegration and 
so quickly did the Union force press forward in pursuit, that 
when the right Confederate division and Loring's came to fol- 
low the others from the field, it found the crossing already 
commanded by Grant and its retreat cut off. It was with 
difficulty that Loring succeeded imder cover of darkness in 
extricating his force, but being unable to cross the Big Black, 
he could not join Pemberton and was compelled to make a 
great detour by the south and east to Jackson, where he re- 
ported to Johnston three da\'s afterwards. The Confederates 
lost many guns in the action of Champion Hill and also heavily 
in casualities. Nor was the victory purchased without a sac- 
rifice of above two thousand men on the Union side — of 



VICKSBUEG. 299 

which number Hovey's division lost above twelve hundred. 
The pursuit was continued till after dark — the Union force 
taking possession of Edward's Station. 

The following day, May 17th, McClernand's corps took the 
advance, with McPherson in support, Avhilst Shermau, with 
the pontoon train, was directed to cross the river at Bridge- 
port. No opposition was encountered until reaching the Big 
Black, distant six miles. The greater part of Pemberton's 
army had already been transferred to the west side, but a 
considerable force had been left on the east bank, and had 
taken position to dispute the passage of the Big Black, behind 
a line of intrenchments, both flanks of which rested on the 
river, and in front of which was a miry slough. After several 
hours' skirmishing, it Avas discovered by General Lawler 
that, by moving under cover of the river from the right flank, 
a position could be gained from which the line might be 
successAiUy assaulted. This was accordingly ordered, and 
the charge, executed with great spirit, resulted in carrying 
the whole work, with all its artillery, eighteen guns. Flee- 
ing towards a stream which formed a bridge across the Big 
Black, many of the Confederates escaped to the west side ; 
but some fifteen hundred were cut off and captured. The 
enemy, however, succeeded in burning the bridge over which 
he had passed, two other steamers, and the railroad bridge. 
This compelled a halt to construct the means of crossing — 
a task which was accomplished during the night. Sherman, 
at the same time, passed the Big Black by a pontoon bridge 
at Bridgeport. 

That same Sunday afternoon, the citizens of Yicksburg 
were startled by the influx of a mob of demoralized ingitives, 
the wreck of the Confederate army. For two weeks that 
hapless body had been marched and countermarched in aim- 
less adventure, brought constantly into action in fractions, 
only to be as constantly overthrown, and now, depressed and 
disheaitened by two weeks of accumulated disaster, it turn- 



/ 



300 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

bled into the lines that engirdled the city of a hundred hills. 
Too plainly the citizens saw that evil days awaited them. 
Their confidence in the commander was completely shaken, 
and it was with many a sad foreboding that they looked back 
on all tlieyhad suffered during the time since — just a twelve 
month asfo — Farrajjut had fired his first shot into the town. 
As for the unfortunate Pemberton, deluded still by his one 
fixed idea of defending Vicksburg, he threw away the last 
opportunity presented to him of saving his army. Had he, 
after the retreat from the Big Black promptly withdrawn the 
\ garrison from the town, and directed his column north- 
\ westward on the Benton road, he might readily have marched 
\ to Vernon, and made a junction with Johnston, who had 
1 moved thither. There is not even for him the excuse that 
the abandonment of Vicksburg would have been an unwar- 
rantable stretch of responsibility on his part ; for, as soon as 
Johnston received tidings of Pemberton 's having fallen back 
to the Big Black, he not only allowed, but ordered him to 
evacuate Vicksburg. '•' If Haynes's Bluff," wrote he, " be un- 
tenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and cannot be held. If, 
therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately 
surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both 
troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. K 
it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, 
and march to the north-east." 

These prescient words — this clear trumpet-sound — came 
to Pemberton the morning after he had retired within the 
lines of Vicksburg. There was even yet, perhaps, oppor- 
tunity to obey the summons, for Grant, having been com- 
pelled during the night to bridge the Big Black, was only 
then putting his columns in motion, and could not arrive be- 
fore afternoon. Pemberton hesitated, and was lost. He 
called a council of war : the ofiicers were unanimous for the 
rejection of Johnston's order ; but the reason was a most 
strange one — " it was decided that it was impossible to with- 



VICKSBUEG. 30t 

draw the army mth such morale and material as to be of 
ftirther service to the Confederacy." Pemberton, therefore, 
replied : " I have decided to hold Vicksburg as long as pos- 
sible, with the firm hope that the Government may yet be 
able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's 
free navigation of the Mississippi River. I still conceive it 
to be the most important point in the Confederacy." While 
yet the debate went on, it was suddenly interrupted by the 
booming of guns from without the works ; and the Union 
army, spreading out in quick deployment before the lines of 
Vicksburg, laid the city under siege. ' 

Thus terminated, in eighteen days from the time the army 
crossed the Mississij^pi, the remarkable series of manoeuvres 
by which General Grant succeeded in shutting up the Con- 
federates within the defences of Vicksburg, whence they 
were not to issue save as prisoners of war. If it has been 
noted that this result was due in part to the extraordinary 
errors committed by the enemy, it must at the same time be 
conceded that the conduct of the Union commander was 
marked by great skill and energy — and that, if his motions 
were such as might have brought evil consequences under dif- 
ferent circumstances, they were justified by the inchoate con- 
dition of the enemy's military preparations ; for by such rapid 
strides had the campaign advanced, that Johnston had not 
time to gather force enough to make even a show of resist- 
ance, and Pemberton, by his disregard of his superior's orders, 
played directly into the hands of Grant in so acting as to 
insure his being shut up in Vicksburg. 

By the morning of the 10th of May, Grant had encom- 
passed the Vicksburg defences, which consisted of a system of 
detached redoubts, connected by rifle-trenches. The ground 
was difiicult, being composed of commanding ridges, with in- 
tervening ravines covered with a dense growth of cane and 
wild grape. The Union lines were drawn within musket 



302 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

range of the works, with Sherman's corps on the right, Mc- 
Pherson's in the centre, and jNIcClernand's on the left. 
Whatever peril had overhung the march in a hostile country, 
without a base, disappeared now that the Union army had 
attained a position in rear of Vicksbnrg — for Sherman, on 
first arriving, had launched forward his column to the Yazpo ; 
the Confederates abandoned the defences of Haynes's Bluff, 
and communication with the fleet being secured, the army 
drew abundant supplies by the Mississippi and Yazoo. 

Thus placed, the work that remained for the army to do 
was not difficult. A^icksburg was doomed. If the assault of 
the stronghold obviously promised little, and if the prosecu- 
tion of siege operations would be long and laborious, there 
was no need to have recourse either to open attack or the 
craft of the euijineer, seeinof that impress and es^ress were ef- 
fectually cut off to the garrison. What remained, therefore, 
was a mere blockade, and Grant could afford to wait the time 
when hunger having done its work, Pemberton would be 
forced to sue for terms of capitulation. 

There was, however, a consideration that prompted a dif- 
ferent course. It was known that Johnston still hovered 
between Jackson and Vicksbnrg, exerting himself to the 
utmost to gather a relieving force, and as it was incumbent 
on him to strain every nerve towards bringing relief to Pem- 
berton, it was fairly to be presumed that he Avould do so. 
Grant's line of investment was long and consequently every- 
where rather weak, and the result of Johnston's coming in on 
the rear of the army with a force of twenty-five or thirty 
thousand men, aided by a vigorous sortie on the part of the 
garrison, was not to be contemplated without some apprehen- 
sion. Grant, therefore, resolved to make an immediate as- 
sault — a stroke for which the better result was hoj^ed in con- 
sequence of the dispirited and demoralized condition of the 
garrison. This purpose was carried into execution the after- 
noon of the 19th ; but it issued in no more than pressing for- 



VICKSBURG. 303 

ward the left and centre to a position nearer the enemy's 
works, for night intervened before a fresh assault could be 
made. Sherman, on the right, who had secured a position 
already very close to the hostile line, assaulted with Blair's 
division, and succeeded in closing up with the Confederate 
intrenchments. The Thirteenth regulars, the Eighty- third 
Indiana and the One hundred and twenty-seventh Illinois, 
even planted their colors on the exterior slope whence they 
fired upon any head that presented itself above the parapet. 
But it was found impossible to force an entrance, and after 
nightfall Sherman witlidrew the troops under shelter. 

This trial, however, did not cut oil all hope of a better re- 
sult from a new effort made under more favorable circum- 
stances and with adequate means : so having passed the 20th 
and 21st in dispositions for a grand assault, the orders there- 
for were given in the afternoon of the latter day. It was to 
be made at ten of the following morning, and to be simulta- 
neous, each corps commander set his watch by Grant's. 
It was to be general along the whole line, and the licet was at 
the same time to ensrairc the batteries on the river front as a 
diversion. At the appointed time, on the morning of the 22d, 
the three corps moved forward. It was soon found that 
owing to the nature of the ground, only very narrow fronts 
could be brought into action. All was quiet in the enemy's 
lines — not a man being seen until the storming parties, hav- 
ing issued from the shelter of the woods, began to ascend the 
ridge. Then the Confederate troops, rising up, greeted the 
assailants with a deadly fire under which many wavered and 
sought shelter. Yet the bravest, disdaining to retreat, pressed 
on and portions of each command succeeded in planting their 
colors on the outer slope of the Confederate bastions — the men 
burrowing in the earth of the exterior slope to shield them- 
selves from the fire. A handful of men of INIcClernand's 
corps, headed by Sergeant Griffith, entered one of the bas- 
tions ; but the whole party saving the sergeant, was captured. 



304 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OE THE WAR. 

On the report of McClernand's success at this point, renewed 
sallies were made on other parts of the line ; but these re- 
sulted in nothing save a mournful loss of life, and the demon- 
stration, at a cost of twenty-five hundred killed and wounded, 
that, in the words of General Grant, " the enemy's position 
was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken i^ 
that way." 

It only remained to open a regular siege. Along the 
entire front batteries, earthworks, and covered-ways were 
erected, parallels and approaches were constructed, and 
mines were sunk ; but as it is doubtful if these artifices hast- 
ened the final denoueinent by a single day, and as the details 
are of a purely professional nature, these operations arc not 
here to be recounted. For an effective blockade. Grant's 
position presented great advantages, while his uninterrui^ted 
communication by the Mississippi furnished abundant sup- 
plies and ample reinforcements. Of the latter, six divisions, 
including two of the Ninth Coqis, under General Parke, 
arrived durin<r the siejje — an increase that enabled the com- 
mander to make the investment most complete, to thoroughly 
protect his flank and rear, and, at the same time, to hold a 
large reserve force to watch Johnston, of Avhose motions a 
word will now be in place. 

When General Johnston received tidings of the investment 
of Vicksburg, he sent word to Pemberton to hold out, and 
that he was trying to raise a force that might attempt to 
relieve the garrison. This hope served to restore somewhat 
the morale of the beleaguered troops, and it was constantly 
kept alive by the arrival of couriers, who succeeded in run- 
ning the blockade. By early in June Johnston had gotten 
together a body of four-and-twcnty thousand men ; but it 
was deficient in artillery, in ammunition for all arras, in trans- 
portation, and could hardly be called an army. At length, 
towards the end of the month, these deficiencies were par- 
tially supplied : so that on the 29th Johnston marched from 



VICKSBURG. 305 

Jackson towards the Big Black, and on the 1st of July he 
had taken position between Brownsville and the river, and 
begun to reconnoitre where he might best strike a blow in 
behalf of Pemberton, to whom on the night of the 3d he dis- 
patched a messenger bearing instructions for him to hold out, 
and that a diversion would be made about the 7th to enable 
him to cut his way out. 

But this reassurance never reached Pemberton till Ions: after 
the catastrophe. Inside the fated lines, despair had succeeded 
the delusive hope of assistance from without: the long-en- 
dured labors^ sufferings, and privations, had worn out the 
bodies and quenched the ardor of the defenders ; supplies of 
food and ammunition, though long carefully husbanded, were 
both nigh exhausted, and the citizens, living in caves and 
holes of the earth, passed their days in misery and dread an- 
ticipations of what of worse might remain behind. 

At length the end came. Early on the morning of Friday, 
July 2d, a white flag was seen displayed on the parapet in 
front of the right of the left wing, held by Smith's division 
of Ord's (late McClernand's) corps; and an officer being 
sent forward to learn its meaning, it was foimd that General 
Bowen, the commander of one of the Confederate divisions, 
and Colonel Montgomery, of the staff of General Pemberton, 
were the bearers of a message to General Grant. After 
being blindfolded, these officers were led over the interven- 
ing ridges and ravines to the head-quarters of General Smith, 
to await the reply of the Union commander. The message 
proved to be a formal proposition from the Confederate com- 
mander for an armistice, and the appointment of three com- 
missioners on each side to arrange terms for the capitulation 
of Vicksburg. General Grant answered that he did not 
favor the naming of commissioners, seeing that he had no 
other terms to offer than the cessation of hostilities by the 
unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. He stated, 
however, that if Pemberton should desire it, he would hold 

20 



306 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

an interview witli him, between the lines, in McPIierson's 
front, an}"" hour that afternoon. Three o'clock was accord- 
ingly fixed as the time of conference, and orders to suspend 
firing were at once sent along the whole line. 

At the hour named, General Grant, attended by several of his 
lieutenants, reached the ground. Pemberton was somewhat 
later, but after a few minutes he was seen descending the slope 
of the opposite ridge, and the commanders, being introduced, 
began the momentous conference , while thousands of the men 
of the opposing armies, crowning the sun'ouuding hills, with- 
out fear of hostile greeting, looked on, spectators of the scene 
that had so much of mystery and interest to them. 

The colloquy was begun by Pemberton's renewing his prop- 
osition for the appointment of commissioners — a proposition 
which he reinforced by stating that the surrender of Vera Cruz, 
at which he had been present, was managed in this way. 
Grant, however, again refused compliance with this request, 
which came near terminating the parley on the part of Pem- 
berton ; but the Confederate, realizing his actual condition, 
thought better of his half-formed purpose of continuing the 
struggle. The two commanders then walked oif a short 
distance, to where there stood some small trees and shrubbery, 
and which is now the site of a monumental stone : there seat- 
ing themselves on the grass, they remained in consultation for 
about three quarters of an hour. There was still disagree- 
ment in respect of details : and the conference was broken 
up with the statement from General Grant that he would that 
night send in his ultimatum in writing. This was accordingly 
transmitted before midnight, and answered by peep of day 
on the 4th, in a rejoinder from Pemberton, proposing some 
modifications. In an immediate replication, General Grant 
dissented from these modifications. He also stated that if 
no further communication was received from General Pem- 
berton, he would regard his proposition as rejected, and act 
accordingly ; but should it be accepted, the Confederates 
were to display white flags along their line's. 



VICKSBUKG. 307 

After a period of anxious suspense, the symbol of surrender 
appeared along the length of works. The terms were ac- 
cepted b}^ the Confederates. The long siege was over. The 
garrison stacked arms ; twenty-seven thousand Confederates 
received their paroles ; and the anniversar}'' of American inde- 
pendence was gilded with a new lustre, for at length, after 
two years of battle and siege, and such outpouring of blood 
as did in very deed incarnadine the Father of Waters, the 
great West made good its vow — the Mississippi went "un- 
vexed to the sea." 

ni. 

RESULTS OF VICKSBURG. 

The story of the fall of Vicksburg leaves its effect on the 
course of the war so plain and palpable as to require little 
exposition to bring it into clearer light. Most obviously it 
was one of those strokes the greatest and most decisive in 
war — the capture of an army. For this was not the surren- 
der of a mere garrison of a post. The thirty-seven thousand 
men that from the time of the crossing of the Mississippi by 
General Grant, fell captives into his hands, were an army — 
the army defending the valley of the Missigsijipi, made up 
of the same battalions that had barred the advance of the 
Union force from Shiloh down, and augmented by resources 
in men and material that, drawn from the well-nigh drained 
reservoir of the Confederacy, left the defence of other im- 
portant lines weak and inadequate. It was truly a loss irre- 
parable to the South. 

Of its direct military bearing, the first in importance was 
the fall of Port Hudson — a jslace which, though two hundred 
miles below Vicksburg, may be regarded as an outwork of 
that stronghold, destined to cover the flank of it from attack 
by the Lower Mississippi squadron, and to enclose with 
Vicksburg a sufficient stretch of the river for free intercom- 



308 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

munication between the right and centre zones. This post, as 
has already been seen, was invested by General Banks, with a 
force from New Orleans, about the same time that Grant 
drew his lines around Vicksburg. The commander of the 
post. General Gardner, was, like Pemberton, instructed by 
General Johnston to evacuate the place, but the Confederate 
officer was already under siege before the order came to hand. 
The besieging army was composed of five divisions, and to 
this Gardner could only oppose a force of about five thousand 
men. After essaying, on the 27th of May, an assault that 
was repulsed, Banks opened the siege in force, and after an- 
other unsuccessful attempt, made the 14th of June, to carry 
the place by storm, he confined himself to regular approaches. 
At length, on the 7th of July, General Gardner having mean- 
while heard tidings of the fall of Vicksburg, sent a communi- 
cation to General Banks asking for " official assurance whether 
this is true or not, and if it is, for a cessation of hostilities, 
with a view to the consideration of terms for surrendering 
this position." Banks, in reply, transmitted the official dis- 
patch in which General Grant communicated the fact of the 
fall of Vicksburg, and on this the Confederate commander 
accepted the terms of capitulation offiared — the formal sur- 
render being made the 9th of July. 

This double victory oj^ened the Mississippi through its 
mighty length to the Gulf. Finger by finger the hand of 
iron with which the Confederates had grasped the juris- 
diction of the great river had been unloosed, till the last hold, 
clutched the more nervously as the tenure became the weaker, 
had, with overmastering force, been w^-enched from them at 
Vicksburg. 

If we now take into account that the fate of that 
stronghold was not merely the capture of a specific fortified 
point of the Mississippi, but the elimination of the entire 
army for the defence of the Mississippi Valley, and therefore 
the extinction of all possibility of its further defence by the 
Confederates, we shall rise to the height of the appreciation 



VICKSBURG. 309 

of this colossal achieveinont. For, what is the possession of 
the Mississippi ? A great soldier shall tell us. "The pos- 
session of the Mississippi River is the possession of America, 
and I say that, had the Southern Confederacy held with a 
grip sufficiently strong the lower part of the Mississippi 
River, we would have been a subjugated people ; and they 
would have dictated to us, had we given up the possession 
of the Lower Mississippi. It was vital to us, and we fought 
for it, and won it." 

This is the language of General Sherman, and it does 
not overpass the far-reaching reality of this conquest. For 
the Mississippi plays a greater part than do, ordinarily, 
rivers. These commonly form only lines of defence ; 
but the Mississippi was the dividing line betwixt two zones 
of the continental theatre of war. Now, the right zone, 
comprising the vast territory lying westward of this river, 
though, in a military point of view less important than' the 
centre and left zone, comprised respectively between the 
Mississippi and the Alleghanies, and the Alleghanies and the 
Atlantic, was yet the store-house from which the belligerent 
South obtained a very large part of its supplies, and especially, 
was the corral whence it drew those great herds of cattle that 
went to feed the armies in Tennessee and Virginia. It need 
not be said that when the Confederates lost Yicksburg they 
lost their last means of communication with the Trans-Missis- 
sippi, and military operations in the right zone ceased thence- 
forward to be of any magnitude or importance. 

When in December, 1862, at the time General Grant was 
preparing to move against Vicksburg, Mr. Davis addressed 
the citizens of Mississippi at Jackson, he urged them to go to 
Vicksburg, and " assist in preserving the Mississippi River, 
that great artery of the country, and thus conduce, more than 
in any other way, to the perpetuation of the Confederacy, and 
the success of the cause." To say, therefore, that with such 
estimate of the importance of this stronghold, its fall must 
have been to the people of the South the gravest of blows, 



310 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

would be to state a mere truisim. So that, to its material 
effect we must also add its moral effect, accounting it, as we 
are bound, one of those disastrous strokes whict, rudely 
shaking the spirit of the South, threw gloomy doubts upon the 
possibility of their ever realizing "the success of the cause." 

Whatever Avork remained to be done in order to make the 
conquest of Vicksburg fulfil all the conditions it should in 
the process of the war, was soon accomplished. Immedi- 
ately on the surrender, Sherman, with his own corps, 
strengthened by the Fifteenth, was despatched to finish John- 
ston, who had retired to Jackson. The position taken up by 
the Confederate commander proved so strong, that Sherman, 
instead of wasting life in assaults, wisely resorted to the 
surer operations of the engineers. Appearing in front of 
Jackson on the 9th of July, he had by the 12th completely 
invested the place, so that both flanks rested on the Pearl 
Iliver. Johnston seeing the impossibility of further main- 
taining himself there, retreated on the night of the 16th, and 
soon afterwards his troops were returned to the quarters 
whence they had come. Sherman, after destroying the rail- 
ways, retraced his steps to the Big Black. Other expeditions 
were also sent out in various quarters to give the finishing 
touches to the great work, and Grant having a large surplus 
of men, sent the division of Steele to Helena to aid Schofield, 
then commanding the Department of Missouri, and Ord and 
Herron to Banks, to take part in new movements projected 
in the Department of the Gulf. • 

The army now had a long rest from its labors ; but when, 
in October, it again took the field, ^here was found in all the 
Valley of the Mississippi no foeman worthy of its steel. On 
the river line of the West, conquest had been pushed to its 
utmost limits, and for grand military operations in the centre 
zone, there only remained the mountain line of Tennessee, 
where RoseQrans, ensconced in Chattanooga, pointed the way 
to Atlanta and the sea. 




rr 



_JLju> — t.n^ 



^ ^ '/^X^AX-e^jL^-^ 



GETTYSBURG. 311 



vin. 
GETTYSBURG. 



PRELUDE TO GETTYSBURG. 

If, leaving the burial-place at Gettysburg from the south 
side, the pedestrian follow the crest of Cemetery Ridge, 
keeping before him the bold figure of Eound Top IVf ountain 
as a beacon, he will in a few minutes' walk reach a clump of 
woods which, so long as a tree thereof stands, must remain 
the most interesting memorial-spot of the greatest battle of 
the war. Into this bunch of woods a few — - it may be a score 
or two — of the boldest and bravest that led the van of 
Pickett's charging column on the 3d of July, 1863, attained. 
Thus far the swelling surge of invasion threw its spray, dash- 
ing itself to pieces on the rocky bulwark of Northern valor. 
Let us call this the high-water mark of the rebellion. 

But in another and larger scope Gettysburg itself is the 
real high- water mark of the rebellion. For not only was the 
invasion of Pennsylvania in a geographical sense the most 
forward and salient leap of the Confederate army, but it was 
upon that field that the star of the Confederacy, reaching the 
zenith, turned by swift and headlong plunges toward the 
nadir of outer darkness and collapse. It is with good reason, 
therefore, that upon this action, morally if not materially the 
most decisive of the war, an unexampled interest centres : 
that its incidents are garnered by the historian ; that the fields 



312 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

and roads and woods of Gettysburg are carefully plotted by 
the map-maker ; that its landscape challenges the pencil and 
canvas of the artist. 

There is, first of all, to be noted one characteristic feature 
that distinguishes this campaign from all other operations 
undertaken by Lee, whether before it or after it. This is that 
it was the first, last, and only campaign of invasion, formally 
designed as such. Anticipating that the reader will mentally 
traverse this statement by the objection that the Maryland 
campaign, culminating in Antietam, was also an invasive 
movement, I answer that it became so not by design but by 
accidental circumstances. A recurrence to the discussion of 
that campaign in a jDrevious chapter Avill show that it was not 
till Lee had driven Pope w^ithin the fortifications of Washing- 
ton that he conceived the project of moving into Maryland, 
and that even then the movement was made, not so much 
with any invasive intent as with the view of holding the 
Union army on the north side of the Potomac imtil the season 
of active operations should have passed by. 

The Pennsylvania campaign was planned with far other 
purpose. This was invasion pure and simple — a flight of 
the boldest quarry^ — an audacious enterprise, designed to 
transfer the seat of war from Virginia to the North country, 
to pass the Susquehanna, to capture Washington, Baltimore, 
and Philadelphia : in a word, to conquer a peace on the soil 
of the loyal States. If there has been hitherto any doubt 
touching the point, it disappears in the light of official 
records. The unpublished manuscript report of General Lee, 
now lying before the writer, sets this matter forever at rest. 

Two motives prompted the Confederates to launch out in 
the daring policy of invasion. Of these the one concerned a 
matter which is yet involved in great obscurity — to wit, the 
relations of the Richmond Government with European powers. 
If some day the secret history of Confederate diplomacy in 
Europe be laid bare, it will, beyond a doubt, be seen that 



GETTYSBUEG. 313 

the Southern agents near the leading governments of tlie old 
world, were, at this time, able to announce that, should Lee, 
after the astonishing successes he had achieved on the soil of 
Virginia, cany his army into the North, and there make a 
lodgment promising some degree of permanence, the South 
would receive the long-coveted boon of foreign recognition. 

This was the first motive to the movement, and it happened 
that it was closely connected with the other inducement to 
invasion, which was found in the condition of the Confederate 
force. Never, so runs on all hands the testimony, was Lee's 
army in such wonderful spirit, or so completely fitted to un- 
dertake a bold enterprise, as at the time the Pennsylvania 
campaign was projected. And this we may well believe, for 
the result of the entire series of events succeeding Antietam 
had been such as to raise the morale of the army of Northern 
Virginia to the highest pitch. Since the time when Lee was 
compelled to abandon IVIaryland and fall back on the line of 
the Rappahannock, tvvo great battles had been fought, with 
most disastrous issue to the Union arms. It needs but to 
recall the names of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, to 
recall with them the direful history they contain. In the 
former of these actions, fought in December, 18G2, the army 
of the Potomac, luider an incompetent leader, was hurled in 
reckless slaughter against a fortified position of impregnable 
strength, and after a fearful carnage was repulsed to the 
north bank of the Rappahannock, terribly shaken in morale. 
In the latter action, fought in May, 1863, Hooker, after a 
successful passage of the river, contrived by unskilful com- 
bination, to be thoroughly beaten in detail by a greatly infe- 
rior force acting on the offensive, and was forced to re-cross 
the Rappahannock, leaving his reputation as a general behind 
him. Now, it was not alone that the Confederates in these 
two encounters were able to kill and spoil nearly thirty 
thousand men, but their experience in these battles inspired 
them with a sense of invincibility — they had come to feel 



314 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

that they could not be conquered ; while the Union army, 
distraught by repeated disasters, and changes of commander, 
had sunk in energy, and lapsed from the faith of victory — a 
faith which, though long sustained, could not be expected to 
survive unaffected such accumulated shocks. 

These two causes, conspiring together, determined the 
Richmond authorities to assume the offensive, and the mot 
iVordre having been given Lee soon after the battle of Chan- 
cellors ville, that general immediately applied his mind to the 
framing a plan of campaign. At this time, the army of the 
Potomac lay on the Rappahannock, paralyzed by the effects 
of its late defeats, and rapidly losing its substance by the 
mustering out of a large body of two years' and nine months' 
troops, whose term of service expired about this time. The 
anny of Northern Virginia held position behind the impreg- 
nable line of earthworks that for thirty miles dotted the south 
side of the Rappahannock. It also lay in seeming idleness, but 
in reality portentous preparations for the projected movement 
were being pushed forward. The two veteran divisions of 
Longstreet's corps, which had some months before been de- 
tached to operate in North Carolina, and which had been 
absent at the time of Chancellorsville, were recalled to Fred- 
ericksburg ; the whole body of Confederates' horse was con- 
centrated under Stuart at Culpepper ; the equipment, trans- 
port service, and commUsariat^ere, brought up to a high state 
of efficiency, and by the first days in June Lee Avas ready to 
launch forward in his audacious adventure. He found he had 
a force of almost seventy thousand men, equal in strength to 
that of his antagonist, and of a mettle that, in the words of 
Longstrcet, made it " capable of anything." 

The stragetical procedure devised by the Confederate 
commander for the accomplishment of the scheme of invasion 
showed a masterly knowledge of the theatre of war. To dis- 
lodge the army of the Potomac from the line of the Rappa- 
hannock by a direct passage of the river was far from his 



GETTYSpUEG. 315 

thought. Such a project would not only have led to nothing, 
seeing that even if successful in throwing back the army to- 
wards Washington, he would, in advancing upon Washing- 
ton by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, have entangled 
himself in the narrow angle of North-eastern Virginia, with 
the fortifications of the Capital in his front ; but the entei*prise 
would have been so wasteful of his strength as to be fatal to 
his ultimate purpose, which was to plant his army fresh and 
entire north of the Potomac. But it was comparatively easy for 
him to manoeuvre Hooker from the Rappahannock by turning 
his riglit in the country lying cast of the Blue Ridge, and if 
by this motion he should throw his opponent back upon Wash- 
ington, he would have the Shenandoah Valley by which to 
issue upon the soil of jNIaryland. This line affords extraor- 
dinary advantages in such an operation as that contemplated 
by Lee, for by guarding the few passes of the Blue Ridge, an 
army moving northward by the Shenandoah Valley may 
march entirely free from interruption and at the same time 
hold its rival in entire uncertainty as to its design. The 
only Union force in the valley at this time was a corps of a 
few thousand troops that held position at Winchester under 
Milroy ; but this force Lee calculated on surprising or at 
least routing. 

In execution of his design, Lee during the first days of , 
June, transferred the corps of Longstreet and Ewcll by sc- ' 
cret marches westward to Culpepper Court House ; and to 
mask the delicate operation, so vital to the success of the 
movement, he left behind A. P. Hill's corps to occupy the 
heights of Fredericksburg. This was executed with such 
success that Hooker knew nothing of it. His aroused sus- 
picions did indeed cause him to throw Sedgwick's corps 
across the Rappahannock ; but the front presented by Hill 
jDrevented his penetrating aught of what was going on be- 
hind. By the 8th of June Loo had two thirds of his army 
massed at Culpepper, with the cavalry thrown forward to 



31 G THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Brandy Station, ready to cover the advance. This however "was (I 
interrupted for a moment by a movement made by Hooker^ ^v**^' 
who, in order to discover Avhat was passing in the direction of 
Culpepper, forwarded the main body of the Union cavalry to 
cross the upper Rappahannock and advance on Culpepper, 
where he was far from suspecting the presence of Lee's infantry. 
Pleasonton having crossed the Eappahannock at Kelly's and 
Beverly's ford, the 9th of June, advanced fighting Confeder- 
ate detachments of horse to Brandy Station, between the 
river and Culpepper, where a protracted combat was waged 
between the two cavalry columns. After gaining some ad- 
vantage, Pleasonton was compelled to recross the Rappahan- 
nock ; but he brought back the important intelligence that 
the main body of the Confederate army was in the vicinity 
of Culpepper. The disclosure left no doubt in the mind of 
Hooker that his adversary was meditating an ofiensive move- 
ment, and to the end that he might be in position to meet 
this, he advanced his right to the upper Rapi^ahannock so as 
to observe the fords of that stream. But while the Union com- 
mander had his attention called in this direction, Lee, by a 
wide detour westward, had turned his right, and threw out 
the head of a column into the Shenandoah Valley. Ewell, on 
the 10th, took the advance, skirting the eastern side of the 
Blue Ridge through which he passed at Chester Gap : he 
crossed the Shenandoah River near Front Royal , burst into 
the valley, and advanced rapidly towards Winchester, before 
which place he arrived on the evening of the loth. Next 
day the Union force at Winchester, under IMilrOy, was cap- 
tured or dispersed ; four thousand jirisoners were taken to- 
gether with twenty eight pieces of artillery and large stores. 
The Shenandoah Valley was completely cleared, and Lee was 
free to pass the Potomac into Maryland. 

Startled by this intelligence, Hooker, on the 13th, hastily 
abandoning his camp on the Rappahannock, began a rapid 
retrogade movement towards Washington, and Hill, who all 



GETTYSBURG. 317 

this time had remained at Fredericksbursr, seeiiiG: the Union 
arm}^ disappear, hastened to join the advance corps in the 
valley. This junction being effected, Lee, on the 22d, thrcAV 
Ewell's corps across the Potomac to advance into Penn- 
sylvania. Meanwhile, he held Longstreet and Hill in the 
valley, and Stuart's cavalry scoured the country east of the 
Blue Ridge. 

Hooker, who had drawn back the army to the vicinity of 
Fairfax and Manassas, was now in a position of distressing 
uncertainty. Doubtful as to Lee's purpose, he dared not 
cross the Potomac while yet the bulk of the Confederate 
army remained in the Shenandoah Valley, and yet his re- 
maining inactive left Ewell free to harry the north country, 
which was thrown into wildest consternation by the tidings 
of the invasion. By the 24th of June, the movement of the 
advanced Confederate corps had become so far developed, that 
Lee determined to follow to the north side of the Potomac 
with his remaining force. " The Federal army," says he, " was 
apparently guarding the approaches to Washington, and mani- 
fested no disposition to assume the offensive. In the mean time 
the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with 
Jenkins's cavalry, and had advanced into Pennsylvania as far 
as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the 
army should be within supporting distance ; and Hill having 
reached the valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west 
side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near 
Berryville* General Stuart was directed to hold the moun- 
tain passes, with part of his command, as long as the enemy 
remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to 
cross into Maryland and place himself on the right of Gen- 
eral EwelL On the 22d General Ewell marched into Penn- 
sylvania with Rodes's and Johnson's divisions, preceded by 
Jenkins's cavalry, taking the road from Hagerstown through 
Chambersburg to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. 
Early's division, which had occupied Boonsboro', moved by a 



318 THE TWELVE DECISIVE EATTLES OF THE WAR. 

parallel road to Greenwood, and, jn pursuance of instructions 
previously given to General Ewell, marched towards York. 
On the 24th, Longstrcct and Hill were put in motion to fol- 
low Ewell, and on the 27th encamped near Chambersburg." 

'\Ve left Hooker a few miles south-west of Washington, 
wholly uncertain of the motions of his antagonist, fearful of 
crossing the Potomac lest he should thus uncover Washing- 
ton, and fearful also of following the enemy out into the Shen- 
andoah Valley, lest he should expose his right flank to attack 
from the mountains. However, by the 25th, he learnt that 
the whole of Lee's column was jDassing the Potomac far 
above at Shepherdstown and Williamsport, and he therefore 
crossed the river, — not to Washington, but forward to Fred- 
erick, a stroke that, as I shall show, had an immense effect 
on the course of the campaign. 

The plan of operations devised by General Lee was far 
from having the character of a roving expedition. It was 
founded on a thoroughly methodical procedure, and assumed 
the preservation of his line of communications with Virginia. 
This line was through the Cumberland Valley, which may be 
regarded as a continuation of the Shenandoah Valley to the 
north of the Potomac, and was covered by the South INIoun- 
tains. Now, owing to the fact that it was so covered, and 
also to the fact that Lee supposed the Army of the Potomac 
w^ould manoeuvre entirely on the east side of the mountains 
(being governed in this by the importance of covering Balti- 
more and Washington) , the Confederate commander regarded 
his line of retreat and communication as quite free from 
menace. Having therefore on the 27th reached Chambers- 
burg with the corps of Longstreet and Hill, he turned his 
eyes northward towards the Susquehanna, where Early w\as 
operating at York and Carlisle, and he made his preparations 
to advance and join him. But one consideration gave him 
pause — namely, the whereabouts of the Army of the Potomac, 
anent Avhich he was in such ignorance, that, notwithstanding 



GETTYSBURG. 319 

Hooker had on the 27th, the same clay on wliich Lee with Long- 
street and Hill reached Chambersburg, concentrated his corps 
at Frederick, Lee was not even aware that liis opponent had 
crossed the Potomac — far less that from Frederick, where 
Hooker menaced the Confederate communications, the Union 
commander had thrown out a force to advance westward 
through the passes of the South Mountain to Harper's Ferry — 
a movement that would plant this force directly on Lee's rear 
and line of retreat. Pie knew nothing of all this on the 27th, 
\l/ nothing on the 28th, and still conceiving the Union army to 
^ be south of the Potomac, he on the latter day drew out orders 
fur the two corps with him to march the next morning north- 
ward to join Ewell on the Susquehanna. But late on the 
night of the 28th, a scout arrived at the Confederate head- 
quarters at Chambersburg, bringing tidings that the Army of 
the Potomac had reached Frederick, and was approaching the 
South Mountains. 

It would be difficult to find in military history a more 
striking exemplification of the eficct produced by " operating 
on the enemy's communications," than that of this move- 
ment of Hookers. No sooner had Loe received intelliirencc 
of the presence of the Army of the Potomac at Frederick, 
and its menacing movement towards Harper's Ferry, than 
grave apprehensions touching the safety of his line of retreat, 
caused him to suspend the forward movement he had ordered. 
Determined at all hazards to retain the Army of the Potomac 
on the east side of the South Mountains, he made a manoeuvre 
admirably adapted to accomplish this purpose. Instead of 
moving northward from Chambersburg by the Cumberland 
Valley to the Susquehanna, he resolved to turn eastward, 
pass the South ISIountain range which walls in the Cumber- 
land Valley on the east side, and by thus directly threatening 
Baltimore, compel his opponent to draw back from his ad- 
vance on Harper's Ferry, and hasten in the direction of the 



320 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Susquehanna to cover Baltimore. Tins movement was begun 
the morning of the 29th of June. 

As it may seem surprising that Lee was so ill informed of 
his antagonist's movements as to have been unaware until the 
night of the 28th that the Anny of the Potomac had crossed 
into Maryland (the passage having been made two days 
before), it will not be unimportant to point out the singular 
'^ circumstance by which this came about. It has been seen in 
the citation already made from General Lee's report that 
when the Confederate infantry moved into Maryland, Stuart, 
with the cavahy, was directed to hold the passes of the Blue 
Ridge leading into the valley of the Shenandoah as long as 
the Union army should remain south of the Potomac, when 
he also was to cross and place himself upcjn the right flank 
of the Confederate column moving northward. As, how- 
ever, Stuart suggested that he could damage Hooker's army 
and delay the passage of the river by getting in its rear, Lee 
authorized him to do so, and it was left to his discretion 
whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Eidge ; 
but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command 
on the riifht of the Confederate column as soon as he should 
see Hooker moving northward. In the exercise of this dis- 
cretion, Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the 
Union army, and cross the Potomac between it and Washing- 
ton, believing that he would still be able by that route to 
place himself on Lee's right in time to keep his chief advised 
as to his antagonist's movements. But in order to execute 
his purpose he was compelled to make a wide detour to the 
eastward by way of Fairfax Court House. Reaching the 
Potomac at the mouth of Seneca Creek, the evening of the 
27th, he found the river much swollen by recent rains, and it 
was only after prodigious exertions that he gained the Mary- 
land shore. Stuart then ascertained that the Federal army 
had crossed the Potomac the day before and was marching 
towards Frederick, thus interposing itself between him and 

n 



lr> x^i^ix;^ i-A^ 4 <«t<^ 



GETTYSBURG. 321 

Lee. He was accordingly forced to inarch northward through 
Westminster to Hanover in Pennsylvania, where he arrived 
on the 30th of June. But as will presently be seen, the army 
of the Potomac advanced with equal rapidity on his left, thus 
continuing to obstruct his junction with the Confederate army 
in the Cumberland Yalley : so that Lee, deprived of the ser- 
vices of his cavalry was all this time in comparative ignorance 
of the motions of the Army of the Potomac. In fact, it was 
only by accident that on the night of the 28th, he became ap- 
prised of the facts that admonished him to desist from his 
advance towards the Susquehanna, and move to the east side 
of the South Mountain as a diversion in favor of his menaced 
communications. 

Lest it should be doubted that Lee originally designed 
crossing the Susquehanna, I add in support of the assertion, 
the following extract from his unpublished official report : — 
"It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should 
cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its 
movements ; and nothing having been heard from liim since 
our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy 
had not yet left Virginia. Orders tcere therefore issued to 
move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of General Early to 
York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking, 
by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, 
and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. 
General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a num- 
ber of bridges above and below York ; but on the approach 
of the troops sent by him to Wrights ville, a body of mil- 
itia fled across the river and burned the bridire in their re- 
treat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps. The 
advance against Harrisburg Avas aiTested by intelligence re- 
ceived from a scout, on the night of the 28th, to the ejQcct 
that General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was ap- 
proaching the South Mountain. " 

Leavino: now the Confederate commander in the execution 



322 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

of his purjiose of concentrating his corps from Chambersburg 
to the Susquehanna, on the east side of the South Mountains, 
•with the view of calling off his opponent fram his threatening 
motion against his line of communications, we have to note an 
important change at the head-quarters of the Army of the 
Potomac, which not only (had they but known it) relieved the 
Confederates from this menace, but gave an entirely new 
complexion to the campaign. This event was the removal of 
General Hooker from the command of the Army of the Poto- 
mac. The cause of this change is well known. Hooker 
asked that the corps of ten thousand men at Harper's Ferry 
might be placed under his orders, with the view of adding 
this force to the corps of Slocum, which he had sent forward 
from Frederick towards'Harper's Ferry, and with this col- 
umn making a demonstration against Lee's rear by a move- 
ment up the Cumberland Valley. General Halleck, who 
then, for the country's sins, exercised the functions of Gener- 
al-in-Chief at Washington, would not consent to the evacua- 
tion of Harper's Ferry, whereupon Hooker requested that he 
should be relieved from the command of the army. His re- 
quest was granted, and General G. G. Meade, commander 
of the Fifth Corps, was nominated in his stead. The appoint- 
ment of this officer took the army by surprise, but it 
astonished no one more than General Meade himself, for he 
had spoken with such manly frankness his conviction of 
Hooker's incapacity at Chanccllorsville, that that officer had 
threatened to have him arrested, and when at a late hour of 
the night of the 27th of June, Meade was awakened from 
sleep in his tent, near Frederick, by the messenger from 
Washington, his first question to General Hardie, who brought 
the commission, was, whether he had come with the order for 
his arrest. Hardie, evading the question, told him to strike a 
light, and then placed in his hand a paper, which opening, 
he found it to be an order appointing him to the command of 
the Army of the Potomac, and committing to him all the 



GETTYSBURG. 323 

powers of the Executive and the Constitution, to the end that 
he miffht wield untrammelled all the resources of the nation 
to meet the emergency of the invasion. Though not what is 
called a popular officer, he was much respected by his com- 
rades in arms. He was an able commander, forty-eight years 
of age, in person tall and slim, with a long, grayish, thought- 
ful face, an excellent tactician, and imbued with sound mili- 
tary ideas ; and though he afterwards manifested an undue 
shrinking from responsibility, the gravity of the hour had the 
effect to quicken and elevate his powers, and he immediately put 
the army in motion, with the determination to speedily bring 
Lee to battle. Spite of the malicious detraction of his 
adversaries, who have tried to make it appear that he 
shrank from the issue of arms at Gettysburg, it Avas in 
reality the moral firmness of General Meade that deter- 
mined the great combat in the form in which it actually oc- 
curred. 

On the morning of the 29th of June, Meade put his col- 
umns in motion from Frederick. He renounced all thought 
of moving to the west side of the South Mountain, and re- 
solved to press northward on the east side of that range, as- 
cending the course of the Monocacy towards the Susquehanna, 
till he should compel Lee to loose his hold on the Susque- 
hanna, and turn and give fight. Mark, now, the curious 
conjunction of events that was bringing the two hostile 
masses, though quite ignorant of each other's movements, to- 
wards each other, till unexpectedly they found themselves 
grappling in deadly wrestle, in an obscure hamlet of Western 
Pennsylvania I Meade thought the Confederates were press- 
ing northward to the Susquehanna, where he knew of the 
presence of Swell's corps at York and Carlisle ; Lee thought 
the Union army was marching westward from Frederick. 
But in point of fact, Lee turned eastward the same morning 
of the 29th, on which Meade moved northward, and as the 
direction of the rival armies was at right angles with each 



324 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

other, it was inevitable that they should come to au encounter 
in the course of two or three marches. 

Eight miles east of Chambersburg, the great road to Balti- 
more debouches through the South Mountain ranjje at the 
furnace of Thad. Stevens. Thence, continuing eastward, 
it passes through the town of Gettysburg, which is a point 
of convergence of many roads leading as well northward to 
the Susquehanna as southward to the Potomac. Thither 
Lee, on the morning of Juno 29th, directed the Chambers- 
burg column, composed of the corps of Longstreet and Hill, 
and to that point also he ordered Swell's column to counter- 
march from the Susquehanna,. Gettysburg was not in any man- 
ner the ol)jectiveof this operation : the purpose Avas simply to 
move in that direction as a measure of concentration. To 
give battle there was the last idea Lee had in mind ; and the 
manner in which, contrary alike to his inclination and his 
desire, he y^as led to do so, forms one of the most remark- 
able illustrations of the absence of truth in that saying of 
Kapolcon, that "war is not an accidental science." 

After the army of the Potomac had made two marches, that 
is, on the night of the 30tli of June, Meade became satisfied 
that Lee was concentrating his forces east' of the mountains 
to meet him. Under these circumstances, he set "about to 
select a position on which by a movement of concentration, 
he might be prepared to receive battle on advantageous 
terms. With this vicAv, the general line of Fipe Creek, on 
the dividing ridge between the Monocacy and the waters 
flowing into Chesapeake Bay, was selected as a favorable po- 
sition, though its ultimate adoption was held contingent on 
developments that might arise. Accordingly orders were 
issued on the night of the 30th for the movement of the dif- 
ferent corps on the following day. The Sixth Corps (Sedg- 
wick) forming the right wing of the army, was ordered to 
Manchester, in rear of Pipe Creek ; head-quarters of the Sec- 
ond Corps (Hancock) were directed to Taneytowu ; the 



GETTYSBURG. 325 

Twelfth Corps (Slocum) and the Fifth Corps (Sykes) form- 
ing the centre on Two Taverns and Hanover, somewhat in 
advance of Pipe Creek; while the left wing formed of 
the First (Reynolds) , Third (Sickles), and Eleventh Corps 
(Howard), all under Gen. Reynolds, was ordered to Gettys- 
burg, which had that morning been occupied by General Bu- 
ford, who with a division of horse covered the front of the 
left wing of the army. 

Now the van of Lee's main column that, as has been seen, 
had started from Chambersburg, bivouacked on the night of 
the 29th at Cashtown, five or six miles west of Gettysburg; 
and on the following morning, the morning of the 30th, Gen- 
eral Heth commanding the advanced division, sent forward 
Pettigrcw's brigade to Gettysburg to procure some supplies. 
Pettigrew, on nearing the town, found it occupied by a hos- 
tile force — which was, in fiict, Buford's cavalry ; and fearing 
to risk an attack with his single brigade, he returned to Cash- 
town, after a mere far-ofi" reconnoissance of the Union force. 
Having reported to his corps commander. General Hill, that 
officer determined to move the next morning to Gettysburg, 
with a couple of divisions for the purpose of disposing of the 
body of cavalry. But Reynolds, with his corps, bivouacked that 
same night of the 30th of June, on the right bank of Marsh 
Creek, distant only some four miles from Gettysburg, which he 
was to make the next morning ; and though in Meade's plan of 
operations it was not proposed that Reynolds should stay at 
Gettysburg, or be followed thither by the other corps, his pres- 
ence there being indeed simply designed as a mask behind 
which the army should take position on Pipe Creek — still the 
movements of the opposing forces were such that though they 
knew it not, a collision was inevitable in the vicinity of Get- 
tysburg. On such turns of fortune hinges the issue of mighty 
campaigns ! 



326 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

n. 

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 

When Lee crossed the frontier to enter upon the invasion 
of Pennsylvania, he promised his lieutenants he would so act 
as to throw the cost and peril of attack upon the enemy. 
This resolution arose from a wise appreciation of the lesson 
of many an encounter between the rival armies in Virginia ; 
for to this day the largest logic to be drawn from the history 
of the hundred combats waged between the two great armies 
is that victory accrued to that side which secured for itself 
the advantage of fighting on the defensive (behind a fortified 
position. Exceptions there are indeed to this generalization, 
but they are only sufficient to give a greater prominence to 
the rule that repulse attended that army which was compelled 
to oppose its naked valor in the stonning of lines which its 
opponent had had a day or a night to fortify by the impro- 
vised works so readily and so constantly constructed. Pene- 
trated with this principle, and desirous of husbanding his 
strength for the execution of his ulterior purpose (since it 
was not a mere blow and return that the Confederates medi- 
tated, but a permanent lodgment on Northern soil), Lee had 
resolved so to manoeuvre as to compel his opponent to at- 
tack him — rightly adjudging that the prizes of Baltimore 
and Washington could only be snatched after the Army 
of the Potomac should have sufi:ered defeat in the open 
field. 

Now Lee was faithfully following out the line of this pur- 
pose in concentrating his columns on the east side of the 
South INIountain ; for, in so moving, he would soon, provided 
the motions of the Army of the Potomac were such as he sup- 
posed them to be, compel that army to turn and give battle 
for the safety of its own communications, seriously compro- 
mised by his manoeuvres. But he was not aware that Meade, 
by a rapid forward leap, had changed the whole situation ; 






^^^ . ^tdUi. "C^* j^». .elj /lA-A^t 




MAP OF THE BATTLE 
or 

showurg Positions held^ 
JULY l?T2?&3? 1863. 

==" UnwnJjines. 
Confkxienate •■ 

Scale of 1 Mile. 



GETTYSBUEG. 327 

above all, he was not aware of what was passing at the front 
that morning of the first day of July. Lee was not aware, 
and Meade was not aware. 

The pretty little old-foshioned town (5f Gettysburg nestles 
at the base of a series of heights and hills whose names have 
since been lifted to that historic immortality wherewithal 
grand battles consecrate the ground on which they are fought. 
The configuration of the terrain presents the character of 
a ridge with several detached hills, trending four or five 
miles south of Gettysburg — not in a straight line, how- 
ever, but curved back on the north end, giving in rough the 
form of a fish-hook. In this figure Wolf's and Gulp's Hills 
will represent the curved part. Cemetery Hill, that portion that 
rounds into the straight line, which latter is formed by Ceme- 
tery Ridge, running a couple of miles due south, when it 
abuts in a high conical hill, covered with a dense growth of 
oaks and pines, named Round Top. Round Top shoots up from 
a bald granite spur known as Little Round Top. On the west 
side the ridge falls ofi" in a cultivated, undulatiug valley, 
which it commands, and at the distance of a mile or less is a 
parallel crest named Seminary Ridge. This position was 
occupied by the Confederates in the great encounter that suc- 
ceeded the action of the first day. Still farther to the west, 
other parallel swells of ground stretch out like the lines in a 
musical score all the way to Sonth Mountain, which lies in 
blue beauty on the rim of the horizon, ten miles ofi*. 

From this direction came, on the morning of "Wednesday 
the 1st of July, General A. P. Hill, with two divisions of 
his corps, determined to dispose of the Union cavalry that 
Pettegrew had espied occupying the town of Gettysburg the 
day before. This cavalry, the troopers of the gallant John 
Buford, had that morning moved out from the town, beyond 
Seminary Ridge, to the next ridge to the westward, taking 
position on the hither side of Willoughby Run, about two 
miles west of Gettysburg. His line was drawn up across 



328 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the Chambersburg road, and as Hill approached Gettj'sburg 
by this road, the tAvo found themselves about nine in the 
morning precipitated into action. Buford alone on the Union 
side was present on the field ; but he knew that Reynolds, 
who had bivouacked the night before four miles off, was on 
his way to Gettysburg, whither indeed that officer, with the 
leading division of his corps under "Wadsworth Avas moving 
according to prescribed orders, though with little thought of 
battle in his mind. By skilful deployments Buford held in 
check the van of the Confederate force, which as yet consist- 
ed only of Hcth's division, till Reynolds's, with Wads worth's 
division arrived at ten o'clock. 

Reynolds had no orders to bring on a battle ; he had no 
orders to hold Gettysburg, which was a place concerning the 
military value of which neither Meade nor any one else in the 
army knew aught : indeed he had in his pocket a paper in- 
structing him to follow the movement of concentration on 
Pipe Creek. But to his mind, all instructions were now 
superseded by the actual facts of the situation. Buford was 
hard pressed, and he must support him. Perhaps, too, mys- 
terious influences, of which he himself knew little, moved 
him — some foreshadowing glimpse of the great glory of 
victory he was not permitted to live to see ; for having put 
himself at the head of his leadinij division to hasten forward 
its march to the field where Buford was skirmishing, he 
dispatched orders sending forward the Third and Eleventh 
Corps in all haste to Gettysburg. Doubtless his fine military 
eye took in at a glance the features of the rocky ridge of 
Gettysburg as an eminent vantage-ground for a defensive 
battle, and if he could only hold the head of the enemy's 
column in check on the plain beyond the town where the 
cavalry was essaying to arrest its advance, the army would 
have time to come up and base itself on the fastness of hills. 

"It was," says Wadsworth, "a matter of momentary con- 
sultation between General Reynolds and myself whether we 



GETTYSBURG. 329 

would go into the town, or take a position in front of the 

town. He decided that if we went into the town, the enemy 

would shell it and destroy it, and that we had better take a 

position in front of the town. We moved across the field to 

— and beyond — the Seminary Ridge. Before we had time 

to form our line, we were engaged with the enemy. The 

only battery in my division was placed in position by the side 

of the road leading to Cashtown. At the time only one 

brigade was up. General Reynolds told me to take three 

regiments to support the battery on the right, and he would 

go to the left and place the balance of the division there." 

The balance of the division consisted of the Fourteenth 

Brooklyn (Col. Fowler) and the Ninety-Fifth New York 

(Colonel Biddle), together with Meredith's "Iron Brigade." 

The former regiments were immediately thrown into a skirt 

of woods, and engaged in a warm skirmish with Archer's 

Confederate brigade, which was crossing Willoughby Eun ; 

the " Iron Brigade " was formed on the left flank. Being de- 
cs o 

termined to bring matters to an immediate issue, Reynolds, 
with animating words, gave the regiments in the skirt of 
woods, the command to charge. But scarcely was this begun 
when, struck by a bullet, he fell mortally wounded, dying 
ere he could be removed from the field. The loss of this 
brave officer, who died too early for his country's good but 
not for his own fame, might well have affected the behavior 
of his men most seriously ; but the impulse he had given his 
troops swept everything before them. All of Archer's bri- 
gade that had crossed Willoughby Run, including several hun- 
dreds, together with the commander, were captured ; and the 
Fourteenth Brooklyn and the Ninety-Fifth New York, joined 
by the Sixth Wisconsin, having made a change of front 
charged upon Davis's Mississippi brigade that was coming in 
on the right, and had, owing to the falling back of some of 
Wadsworth's regiments, nearly captured the battery. The 
Mississippians sought shelter in the cut of an unfinished rail- 



330 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAV.. 

way grading, hard by the Chambersburg road, and being there 
surrounded, were compelled to surrender "vvith their battle- 
flags. 

Pending these operations, the remaining two divisions of 
the First Union Corps (the divisions of Doubleday and Rob- 
inson), and Pender's division on the Confederate side arrived, 
thus giving a greater development to the still fiercely embat- 
tled lines. But the Union troojDS, inspired by the most de- 
termined spirit, held to their ground with unflinching tenacity ; 
and when the sun stood at high noon, the heroic First Corps 
was still opposing an unshaken front to the enemy. Though 
much reduced in numbers, it had inflicted yet heavier punish- 
ment on the foe, and it had yielded not a foot of ground. In 
fact, the action of the morning may be considered a decided 
success to the Union arms ; and there was good prospect of 
maintaining this unbroken, for an hour after noon Howard's 
Eleventh Corps arrived on the field, having been ordered by 
Reynolds before he fell to hasten forward to Gettysburg. 
Howard, leaving one of his divisions in reserve on Cemetery 
Hill, formed the divisions of Schurz and Barlow on a pro- 
longation of the right flank of the First Corps, thus covering 
a wide sweep of ground to the west and north of the town. 

But at the same time, marching in the direction whence the 
sound of firing was heard were the old antagonists of the 
J^leventh Corps — the veterans of Jackson that at Chan- 
cellorsville had driven these same troops in such disastrous 
flight. It will be remembered that Ewell, who commanded 
this corps, had been directed to countermarch from the Sus- 
quehanna and make a junction with the remainder of the Con- 
federate army either at Cashtown or Gettysburg, or as circum- 
stances might dictate. Now he had with the divisions of 
Eodes and Early bivouacked the night before near Heidlers- 
burg, ten miles north of Getteysburg, and having, on the 
morning of the 1st of July resumed his march, he soon 
caught the echoes of the combat from the field of Gettysburg. 



GETTYSBUEG. 331 

Marching au canon, he reached the scene of action between 
one and two o'clock, threw Rodes's division round to connect 
on the left of Hill's corps and disposed Early's division on the 
right face of the Eleventh Corps. The accession of strength 
brought by Ewell was opportune to the Confederates, and it 
played a part as important as Blucher's arrival on the field of 
Waterloo. The Eleventh Corps malve but a feeble resistance 
and, it is said, gave way before the enemy's skirmishers. 
Yet the disaster that followed was not entirely due to the in- 
ferior mettle of the troops ; but in part, at least, to their faulty 
disposition in an excessively extended line. Moreover, 
Rodes's division on its arrival succeeded in securins^ a com- 
manding height opposite the centre of the Union line where 
the flanks of the two corps approached each other : and when 
toward three o'clock the Confederates made a final advance, 
they easily burst through at this point, thus taking both corps 
en revers. Regiment after regiment from each corps fell 
away, and at length so shattered and disentangled did the mass 
become that it broke into retreat. This grew into rout as the 
Confederates, scenting the disorder, pursued with loud yells, 
and the fugitives becoming entangled in the streets of Gettys- 
burg, five thousand of them were taken prisoners. The rem- 
nants of the two corps, less than a moiety of their original 
strength, were finally rallied on Cemetery Hill, in rear of the 
town. But the day was irretrievably lost — so gloomy a se- 
quel followed the bright promise of the morning ! 

While these momentous events were passing at Gettysburg, 
General IMeade was still at his head-quarters at Taneytown, 
distant thirteen miles. So rapidly indeed had the crisis been 
precipitated that it was not till afternoon that he became aware 
that a re-encounter had taken place at the front — then the tid- 
ings came accompanied with the announcement of the death of 
Reynolds. Hereupon General Meade ordered General Han- 
cock to proceed to the scene of contest to assume general com- 
mand, and make au examination of the ground in the neigh- 



332 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

borhood of Gettysburg, and if it should be found suitable for 
t battle, the rest of the army would be ordered up. Elding 
tV, \ forward in all haste Hancock arrived on the field at half past 
isj * three. "I found," says he, "that, practically, the light was 
S then over. The rear of our column, with the enemy in pur- 
\y A suit, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg. 
General Howard was on Cemetery Hill, and there had evident- 
,^ ly been an attempt on his part to stop and form some troop^^ ' 
there." In this duty General Howard's success had not been 
eminent ; but Hancock soon made the magnetism of his pres- 
ence felt — "his personal appearance there," says Warren, 
^■"^ "doing a great deal toward restoring order." He extended 
. 'i^ the lines to the right so as to take possession of Gulp's Hill, 
J ^ and was soon able to present so formidable a front that the 
o ..^ Confederate skirmishers, who were already breasting the hill 
^ . ^, slope, were called oif. 

t-, Never was pause at the door of victory more fatal to the 
J -^ hopes of a commander. Had the enemy followed up his ad- 
-.s^ vantage by seizing the crest of Cemetery Hill or Gulp's Hill, 
^ \.^ there would have been no Gettysburg ; and indeed it is diffi- 
cult to forecast what in this case they might not have done ; 
for the Union corps were much scattered, and no place T 
, ,;^ of concentration had been secured. That they could ' 
* * . have gained these positions there is little doubt, and indeed 
> C Ewell was even advancing a line against Gulp's Hill when 
Lee reached the field and stayed the movement. What Avas 
it that thus lowered his upraised arm ? I shall state it in his 
^' own words ; and, if at this distance there are facts which in- 
, duce the belief that his reasoning was unsound, his decis- 
^ ion will only point the moyal of the fallibility of the 
wisest judgment in war. " It was ascertained from the pris- 
oners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army 
formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the re- 
mainder of that army, under General Meade, Avas approach- 
ing Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, 



GETTYSBURG. 333 

the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not 
be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions 
present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and 
bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. 
General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occu- 
pied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a 
'general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions 
which were ordered to hasten forward. In the mean time 
the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed 
to seize (Gulp's Hill) , but in what force could not be ascer- 
tained, owing to the darkness. Under these circumstances, 
it was decided not to attack till the arrival of Longstreet " — 
who, to abridge the story, did not arrive that night. Then 
the action of the first of July terminated. 

During the afternoon of the 1st of July General Meade 
received from Hancock such report of the nature of the 
ground in the neighborhood of Gettysburg, as deter- 
mined him to fight a battle there. He therefore ordered 
all the corps forward, and, by a vigorous night-march, all 
were concentrated by morning — all save the Sixth Corps, 
which, having a march of thirty-six miles to make, could not 
arrive till mid-day. By morning, also, the v,^hole of Lee's 
army, with the exception of Pickett's division of Longstreet 's 
corps, had reached the ground. And so dawn revealed to 
the eyes of the opposing armies the massive array of each 
drawn up within range of their respective artillery. The 
clouds that had j^arted on the RapiDahannock were now 
brought together, charged with electric elements, amid the 
hills of Western Pennsylvania. 

This, verily, was very far from what Lee had promised 
himself. He had resolved so to manoeuvre as to compel the 
enemy to attack him ; had assured his lieutenants he would not 
assume a tactical offensive : nevertheless, here he found him- 
self fronting the host of his adversary, who was posted in a 



331 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

coign of vantage, where attack must needs be most perilous, 
and yet, such was the situation, that the Confederate com- 
mander could not decline battle ; for in the high-strung con- 
dition of his arni}^, elated by the inspiration of the invasion, 
and puifod up by the success of the previous day's rencounter, 
to have withdrawn would have been an intolerable confession 
of weakness. 

Impelled by his fate, Lee resolved to attack, and his plan 
of battle was, in his own words, as follows : "It was deter- 
mined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, 
and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought 
that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. 
Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of Hood and 
McLaws on the right of Hill, partially enveloi^ing the enemy's 
left, which he was to drive in. General Hill was ordered to 
threaten the enemy's centre to prevent reinforcements from 
being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right 
division in Longstreet's attack. General Ewell was instructed 
to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's 
right, to be converted into a real attack, should opportunity 
offer." To make the details of this plan intelligible, let us 
see in Avhat manner the opposing forces were positioned. On 
the Union side, the right wing, composed of the Twelfth Corps, 
with Wads worth's division of the First Corps, based itself on 
the rough and wooded eminence of Gulp's Hill ; the Eleventh 
Corps, with Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions of the First 
Corps, held Cemetery Hill ; the prolongation of the line to the 
left along the crest of Cemetery Ridge was occupied by Han- 
cock's Second Corps ; the Third Corps, under Sickles, formed 
the left Aving, running from Hancock's flank to Round Top. On 
the Confederate side Longstreet held the right, opposite Sickles 
(the Union left) , his line drawn along the well-; wooded crown 
of Seminary Ridge, Hill continued the line along the same 
ridge to the Seminary, being opposite the Union centre under 
Hancock, and Ewell's corps, the Confederate left, stretched 



GETTYSBUEG. 335 

from the Seminary through the town, and enveloped the base 
of Gulp's Hill. Accordingly, when Lee states that Longstreet 
was to " drive in the enemy's left," the relative situation of 
the opposing forces was such that the onset must full upon 
Sicldes's coqDS. Now a certain circumstance, explained in 
the following extract from General Meade's evidence before 
the Committee on the Concluct of the War, had rendered this 
part of the Union line more vulnerable than any other. " I 
had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, com- 
manding the Third Corps, directing him to form his corps in 
line of battle on the left of Hancock's corps, and I had indi- 
cated to him in general terms that his right flank was to rest 
upon Hancock's left ; and his left was to extend to the Eound 
Top ]\Iountain, plainly visible, if it Avas practicable to occupy 
it. During the morning I sent a staif officer to inquire of 
General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was 
returned to me that General Sickles said there was no posi- 
tion there. I then sent back to him my general instructions, 
which had been previously given. . . When I arrived upon 
the ground, which I did a few minutes before four o'clock in 
the afternoon, I found that General Sickles had taken up a 
position very much in advance of what it had been my in- 
tention he should take ; that he had thrown forward his right 
flank, instead of connecting with the left of General Hancock, 
something like a half or three quarters of a mile in front of 
General Hancock, thus leaving a large gap between his right 
and General Hancock's left, and that his left, instead of being 
near the Round Top Mountain, was in advance of the Round 
Top, and that his line instead of being a prolongation of Gen- 
eral Hancock's line, as I expected it would be, made an angle of 
about forty-five degrees with General Hancock's line. As soon 
as I got upon the ground I sent for General Sickles and asked 
him to indicate to me his general position. When he had done 
so, I told him it was not the position I had expected him to 
take ; that he had advanced his line beyond the support of 
my army, and that I was very fearful he would be attacked 



336 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

and would lose the artillery ■which he had put so far in front, 
before I could support it, or that if I undertook to support it, 
I would have to abandon all the rest of the line which I had 
adopted — that is, that I would have to fight the battle out 
there Avhere he was. General Sickles expressed regret that 
he should have occupied a position which did not meet with 
my approval, and he very promptly said that he would with- 
draw his forces to the line which I. had intended him to take. 
We could see the ridge by turning around which I had in- 
dicated to him. But I told him I was fearful that the enemy 
would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no 
time for any further change or movement. And before I had 
finished that remark or that sentence, the enemy's batteries 
opened upon him and the action commenced." 

The precise position which Sickles thus took up may be noted 
in the accompanying map, where his line will be seen on a ridge 
along Avhich the Emmettsburg road runs — a ridge inter- 
mediate between Cemetery Ridge, held by the Union army, 
and Seminar}^ Ridge, occupied by Lee. The question of the 
merit or demerit of Sickles's advanced line has been the sub- 
ject of too much argumentation to require any here. It needs 
that one should go on the ground in order to see how natural 
it was for him to take up that position, how many induce- 
ments.there were for him to do so, how really laudable his 
motives were. Nevertheless it was an error, for it threw his 
right flank much out of position in reference to Hancock's 
line on his right, and gave him no place on which to rest his 
left flank except by refusing it sharply towards the Round 
Top, thus forming a salient, which if broken through, would 
enable the enemy's artillery to enfilade both faces of his line. 

It had been very still all day — noiseless shiftings, 
deployments, reconnoissances, and miscellaneous prepa- 
rations ; but a few moments before four o'clock, as the 
Union commander yet talked with General Sickles of the 
dangers incident to his position, the air was suddenly filled 



GETTYSBURG. 337 

with the tumultuous clamor of battle, and the whole massive 
array of Longstreet's line, not even covered by skirmishers, 
moved forward. The attack fell upon the left front of the 
Third Corps, from where Sickles's line receded from the ad- 
vanced ridge at Sherfy's peach orchard on the Emmettsburg 
road, and ran back through a low ground of woods, wheat- 
fields and woods, towardsRound Top — the position being held 
by the brigades of DeTrobriaud and Ward of Birney's division. 
But as Longstreet's front had a much greater development 
than the Union force on the wing, his flank extended quite 
beyond the left of Sickles — in fact overlapped it by two bri- 
gades. 

This extension was manifestly designed on the part of 
the Confederates ; for if by a forward rush they could 
crown the crest of the rocky spur. Little Round Top, they 
would hold in their hands the key of the whole position. Nor 
apparently was there aught to prevent their seizing this point, 
seeing that it was wholly unguarded when the enemy moved 
forward ; but before he could gain it, defenders arrived. 
When the action commenced, the Fifth Corps (Sykes), which 
had been in reserve on the right, was moving over, under or- 
ders from General ]\Ieade, to form a reserve on the left, and 
as the head of the column composed of Barnes' division was 
passing out to reinforce Sickles, General Warren, Chief En- 
gineer of the Army, having seen the nakedness of the key- 
point of Little Round Top, and marked the near approach of 
the hostile force that overlapped Sickles, detached Vincent's 
brigade to garnish the position. Moving rapidly up the pos- 
terior slope of Little Round Top, this brigade had barely 
time to come forward into line when the Confederates, all ex- 
ultant with their supposed success in flanking the Third Corps, 
came rushing up the ravine. The combatants immediately 
met in deadly clinch, in a grapple of such desperate fury as 
was seldom seen on any battle-field. But the j^osition was 
saved by the bravery of Vincent's men, and of Weed's bri- 



338 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

gadc, Avhicli reinforced them, though both Vincent and "Weed 
gave their lives for its defence. 

While, happily, the flanking force of Longstreet was thus 
held in check, the main part of his line, covering the left 
front of Sickles, met with greater success. The most terrific 
fighting occurred near the salient of the line at the peach 
orchard — a point the vital importance of which caused it 
to be contested Avith a wonderful determination. But no 
valor in the defence could countervail the faulty location of 
Sickles's corps ; so that, when the Confederate artillery had 
succeeded in gaining a position whence it would enfilade his 
line, and the infantry was advanced under cover of its fire, the 
peach orchard was carried. The troops of Birney's division, 
to the left of that, fell back, and retired in much confusion 
over the main ridge behind, leaving Humphreys' division, 
together "with Graham's brigade, alone in the advanced posi- 
tion along the Emmettsburg road. The situation was as 
critical as can well be conceived; for when Humphrey's, on 
turning round to look at the ridge in his rear (the ridge 
which, if carried by the enemy, would decide the fate of the 
field) he saw that, for half a mile or more — that is, from the 
left of Hancock nearly to the Round Top — it was bare of 
troops, and unless he could carry back his division in face of 
the enemy's fiercest efforts in such order as would enable him 
to fill up that gap, the day was lost. Fortunatelj^ Hum- 
phreys, by his skill and intrepidity, was equal to the occa- 
sion. The spontaneous impulse of this oflicer was to attack 
the enemy while yet the Confederates were assuming the 
offensive, and he felt confident of his ability to break their 
front. But, after the peach orchard was carried, Birney, 
who had succeeded to the command of the corps (Sickles 
having been carried from the field severely wounded), 
directed him to make a change of front to the rear, and form 
a new line, extending toward the Round Top. Knowing the 
almost impossibility of making the movement with any success 



GETTYSBUEG. 339 

in a situation that placed the enemy as well on both his 
flanks as in front, he would have disregarded the order had 
it not been coupled with the information that Birney's divis- 
ion would make a corresponding movement in connection with 
him. But Birney was iniable to hold his troops to their work, 
for IJieyfell back over the ridge, and were out of sight before 
Humphreys began to retire. This he still determined to 
effect in such manner as Avould enable him to fill up the gap 
in his rear ; so he withdrew his small command of five thou- 
sand men by frequent stands of resistance, and many a fierce 
buffet, and he formed them, the three thousand that were 
left, in compact array, on the original crest. Here, joined by 
Hancock's troops and others from the right, they repulsed all 
further attempts of the enemy. These, indeed, were not of a de- 
termined character, for the Confederates were thoroughly ex- 
hausted, and day was already passing into the dusk of evening. 
We must now look a little to what happened on the left of 
Humphreys, after the troops of Birney had been driven back. 
Following up their success the Coufederates pressed forward 
into the low wooded ground in front of Round Top, and the 
fire of the attack was yet so fierce that the two brigades of 
Barnes's division that Avere sent in to support Sickles's left 
went down before it. Then Caldwell's division, detached by 
Hancock from his own left, marched by a detour toward Lit- 
tle Round Top, skirting which, it fared forth to the low wood- 
land where hot battle boiled and bubbled as though it were 
some great hell-cauldron. The division fought with des- 
perate fury, gained some advantage, and then, overpowered, 
came out with the loss of half its strength — two of its brigade 
commanders, the gallant Cross and Zook being killed. Then 
Ayres's division of Regulars took the place, opposing their 
disciplined valor to the enemy's advance : thus, till at length 
the Confederates succeeded in working their way round the 
right flank of the division to its rear, when the Regulars were 
forced to change front and fight their way through the hostile 



340 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

franks, back to Little Round Top. There was then no 
Union force left on all the intermediate "'round — nothinij be- 
tween the enemy and the main crest. This, however, was 
now well garnished by troops of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, 
which, when the Confederates perceived on debouching from 
the woods (for from the direction in which the enemy was ai> 
proaching the crest is not visible until one issues from the 
woods) , they halted in dismay at what yet remained to be 
done. Disorganized by the advance and fearfully punished 
in gaining what they had already won, they were not minded 
to brave the perils of scaling the beetling heights that, crowned 
with troops and artillery, now rose before their gaze. While 
they thus hesitated, Crawford's division of Pennsylvania re- 
serves moving down the crest determined their conduct : they 
fell back to the wheat-field where they lay for the night. 

It has been seen that in the plan of battle devised by Lee, 
Ewell on the left was to make demonstrations while Long- 
street on the other flank attacked. Accordingly, after several 
shows of oiTence, Ewell about six in the evening formed his 
columns for a simultaneous attack both against Cemetery Hill 
and Culp's Hill. Against the latter position, where rested 
the right of the Union line, Johnson's division advanced ; and 
as Slocum's corps which had been holding it, was during the 
afternoon mainly withdrawn to brace up the forces on the left 
the Confederates succeeded in eifecting a lodgment within the 
abandoned breastworks which they held during the night. 
The ascent of Cemetery Hill Avas made by three of Early's bri- 
gades and was met with so little firmness by tlie troops of the 
Eleventh Corps there stationed that the head of the charging 
column gained a foothold on the crest within the Union bat- 
teries. The artillerists resisted manfull}^, and presently Car- 
roll's brigade of the Second Corps coming up made a counter- 
charge that quickly threw back the intrusive force, which in- 
deed was too weak for the task it had undertaken. Moreover 
it appeared that a grave mishap befell in the execution. " Gen- 



GETTYSBURG.. 341 

cral Ewell," says Lee, "had directed E.odcs to act in concert 
with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier- 
General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-op- 
erate on the right of Rodes. AYhen the time to attack arrived 
General Rodes, not having his troops in position, was unpre- 
pared to co-operate with General Early, and before he could 
get in readiness, the latter had been obliged to retire from 
want of expected support on his right. Lane was prepared 
to give the assistance required of him, and so informed Gen- 
eral Rodes, but the latter deemed it useless to advance after 
the failure of Early's attack." 

Such was the course of the action of the 2d of July. It 
was witliout important result to the Confederates. They had 
indeed driven Sickles from his advance position ; but this had 
only the effect to give a more solid integrity to the Union line 
drawn on the main crest. Some slight advantages perhaps 
they had acquired. The gain of the intermediate ridge along 
which runs the Emmettsburg road gave them a forward posi- 
tion for the artillery and they had secured a foothold Avithin the 
breastworks of the extreme right on Gulp's Hill. The chief 
fault in the eraemy's conduct was the insufficient weight of the 
main attack under Lougstreet, and the want of co-operation 
between the two wings. Any how, the result was such that 
Lee resolved to make another effort on the morroAV. " The 
operations of the 2d," says he, "induced the belief that, Avith 
proper concert of action, and Avith the increased support 
AA^iich the positions gained on the right Avould enable the artil- 
lery to render the assaulting columns, Ave should ultimately 
succeed, and it Avas, accordingly, determined to continue the 
attack." 

The general plan of Lee for the operations of the 3d of 
July remained unchanged ; but there Avere some important 
modifications of details. Lougstreet had during the night 
been reinforced by the division of Pickett, and it Avas pro- 



342 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

posed to make this the centre and main substance of the 
assaultino: column. Instead of dircctins: the attack a<:]^ainst 
the extreme left of the Union line, posted on the rocky sum- 
mit of Little Round Top, as had been done the day before, 
Lonijstreet determined to hurl his masses a2:ainst the left 
centre on Cemetery Ridge, holding the t^vo divisions of 
Hood and McLaws simply to cover the right flank of the 
advancing lines. To add vrcight to Pickett's storming force, 
it was strengthened on its left by Hcth's division of Hill's 
corps and tAvo brigades (those of Lane and Scale) of Pender's 
division of the same corps, and on the rear of the right flank 
by Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division, also of Hill's 
corps. Such "was the force prepared for the assault, and it 
numbered about eighteen thousand men. 

In co-operation with this main attack upon the left centre 
of the Union line, it was also proposed that Ewcll should 
renew his efibrts against the extreme right ; and as that part 
of his force that had the previous evening gained a lodg- 
ment within the breastworks on Gulp's Hill maintained its 
foothold during Ihe night, much was hoped from a vigorous 
cfl^u't at this point. Ewell therefore reinforced Johnston's 
division, which had gained the lodgment on Gulp's Hill, with 
three additional brigades. But early in the morning General 
Meade, having in the night returned the Twelfth Gorps to its 
original position on the right, ordered an assault for the pur- 
pose of expelling the intrusive force. This, after a severe 
struggle that continued from before dawn till near noon , Avas 
at length accomplished : and as Longstrcet was very much 
delayed in forming his dispositions, it came about that when 
at one o'clock he was prepared to move forward, he was com- 
pelled to do so alone. 

Yet, before the infantry attack should be begim, the Con- 
federate commander resolved to try the effect of a heavy 
artillery fire. He therefore caused one hundred and fifty-five 
guns to be placed in position along the fronts held by Long- 



GETTYSBUEG. 343 

street and Hill, and from this massive enginery tlicro opened, 
at one p. m. , a prodigious bombardment that was continued 
for near three hours. The fire was vigorously replied to by 
eighty guns placed on Cemetery Hill and the crest of Ceme- 
tery Ridge, under direction of General Hunt, the chief of 
artillery. As a spectacle, this, the greatest artillery combat 
that ever occurred on the continent, was magnificent beyond 
description, and realized all that is grandiose in the circum- 
stance of war. But in regard to the accomplishment of the 
purjjose intended by Lee — to wit, to sweep opposition from 
the hill slope — its effect was inconsiderable. Some damage 
was done the artillery materiel, but the troops had excellent 
cover and suffered but little. General Lee has indeed noticed 
in his report that the fire of the Union batteries slackened 
towards the close ; but this was because the chief of artillery, 
wishing to reserve his ammunition for the infantry advance, 
imposed economy on the batteries. 

Out of the smoke-veiled front of Seminary Ridge, at three 
o'clock of the afternoon, emerged, in magnificent array, the 
double battle-line of the Confederates. Not -impetuously, at 
the run or double-quick, as has been represented in the over- 
colored descriptions in Avhich the famous charge has been so 
often painted, but with a disciplined steadiness — a quality 
noticed by all who saw this advance as its characteristic fea- 
ture. The ground to be overpassed by the Confederates in 
order to attain the Cemetery Ridge where the Union battle 
array was drawn was a perfectly open plain of cultivated fields 
above a mile in width, and as it sloped gently up to the crest 
of Cemetery Ridge, it formed a natural glacis, and gave the 
defenders a fair field for the fire of artillery and musketry. It 
will, in fact, be difficult for one who shall survey the ground 
to conclude otherwise than that the enterprise of the. Con- 
federates was hopeless. Almost from the start, the assault- 
ing lines came under fire of the Union batteries, and then 
was seen the effect of the wasteful use of ammunition on the 



344 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

part of the Confederates during the preliminary bombard- 
ment, and on the other hand the good result of the imposed 
economy on the part of the Union artillerists. 

Scarcely had the Confederates moved forward from their 
own lines, than the fire with which they were greeted began 
to tell on the integrity of their formation. Heth's support- 
ing division, on the left of Pickett, indeed, began to waver at 
the time it was leaving its own lines, and while crossing a low 
stone wall behind which they had lain, some already showed 
such trepidation that they M'cre jeered by the resciTcs that 
lay behind. Then, as they became exposed to the fire of 
artillery from Cemetery Hill, the brigade on the left flank 
n hesitated and went back, and from that flank there was such 
a continual wearing away that, by the time the assaulting 
mass had advanced over half the width of the plain, Ileth's 
division had broken and disappeared. There was a like 
result on Pickett's right, where the supporting brigade failed 
to keep up ; so that it came about that, for the real storming 
column, there was left but Pickett's division alone. His 
right experienced the same fire from Round Top that had 
stayed the progress of the supporting brigade on that flank, 
but this did not cause the division to pause — it only caused 
it to double in somewhat towards its left. This brouirht the 
point of attack a little oflT from where it was intended, and 
directly in the face of the two reduced and incomplete divis- 
ions of Hancock's corjDS. And here I cannot resist the 
opportunity of transcribing from the manuscript report of 
General Hancock, the concise yet vivid language in which he 
describes the great scene that followed — a scene in which he 
formed so distinguished a figure. 

"The column pressed on, coming within musketry range 
without receiving immediately our fire, our men evincing a 
striking disposition to Avithhold it until it could be delivered 
with deadly effect. Two regiments of Stannard's brigade 
(First Coi-ps) , which had been posted in a little grove in front 



GETTYSBURG. 345 

of and at a considerable angle with the main line, first opened 
with an oblique fire upon the right of the enemy's col- 
umn, "which had the cfTect to make the troops on that flank 
double in a little towards their left. They still pressed on, 
however, without halting to return the fire. The rifled guns 
of our artillery having fired away all their canister, Avere 
now withdraAvn to await the issue of the strus-ofle between the 
opposing infantry. Arrived at between two and three hun- 
dred yards, the troops of the enemy were met by a destructive 
fire from the divisions of Gibbon and Hays, which they 
promptly returned, and the fight at once became fierce and 
general. In front of Hays's division it was not of very long 
duration : mowed down by canister from Woodrufl''s battery, 
and by the fire from two regiments judiciously posted by 
General Hays in his extreme front and right, and the fire of 
diflTcrcnt lines in the rear, the enemy broke in disorder, leav- 
ing fifteen colors and nearly two thousand prisoners in the 
hands of this division. Those of the enemy's troops Avho did 
not fall into disorder in front of this division were moved to 
the right, and reinforced the line attacking Gibbon's division. 
The right of the attacking force having been repulsed by 
Hall's and Harrow's brigades, of the latter division, assisted 
by the fire of the Vermont regiments already referred to, 
doubled to its left and also reinforced the centre, and thus the 
attack was in the fullest strength opposite the brigade of 
General Webb. This brigade was disposed in two lines — 
two regiments, the 69th and 71st Pennsylvania, were behind 
a low stone Avail and slight breastwork hastily constructed by 
them, the remainder of the brigade being behind the crest, 
some sixty paces to the rear, and so disposed as to fire over 
the heads of those in front. When the enemy's line had 
nearly reached the stone Avail, led by General Armistead, the 
most of that part of Webb's brigade posted here abandoned 
their position, but, fortunately, did not retreat entirely. They 
were immediately, by the personal bravery of General Webb 



346 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLITS OF THE WAR. 

and his officers, formed behind the crest before referred to, 
which was occupied by the remnant of that brigade. 

"Emboldened by seeing this indication of weakness, the en- 
emy pushed forward more pertinaciously, numbers of them 
crossing over the breastwork abandoned by the troops. The 
fight here became very close and deadly. The enemy's battlc- 
flaofs were soon seen wavinsr on the stone wall. Passin2^ at this 
time, Colonel Devereux connnanding the Nineteenth INIassa- 
chusetts, anxious to be in the right place, applied to me for 
permission to move his regiment to the right and to the front 
where the line had been broken. I granted it, and his regi- 
ment and Colonel Mallon's Forty-second New York on his 
right, proceeded there at once. But the enemy having left 
Colonel Hall's front, as described before, this officer promptly 
moved his command by the right flank to still further rein- 
force the position of Gen. Webb, and was immediately fol- 
lowed by Harrow's brigade. The movement was executed, 
but not M'ithout confusion, owing to many men Icaviiig their 
ranks to fire at the enemy from the breastworks. The situa^ 
tion was now very peculiar. The men of all tlio brigades 
had in some measure lost their regimental organization, but 
individually they were firm. The ambition of individual 
commanders to promptly cover the point penetrated by the 
enemy, the smoke of the battle and the intensity of the close 
engagement caused this confuson. The point, however, was 
covered. In regular formation, our line would have stood 
four ranks deep. The colors of the dificrcnt regiments were 
now advanced, waving in defiance of the long line of battle- 
flags presented by the enemy. The men pressed firmly after 
them under their energetic commanders and the example of 
their officers, and after a few moments' desperate fighting the 
enemy were repulsed, throwing down their arms and finding 
safety in flight, or throwing themselves on the ground to escape 
our fire. The battle-flags were ours and the victory was won. 
Gibbon's division secin*ed twelve stand of colors, and prison- 



GETTYSBURG. 347 

ers enough to swell the number captured by the corps to 
about four thousand five hundred." 

After the repulse of Pickett's assault, Wilcox's command, 
that had been on the right but had failed to move forward, 
advanced by itself to the attack, and came within a few hun- 
dred yards of Hancock's line. But in passing over the plain 
it met a severe artillery fire, and Stannard,, detached a force 
which took it in flank and rear, capturing several hundred 
prisoners ; the rest fled. 

Meantime within the Confederate lines reisrned a gi'eat dis- 
order. To the straggling parties that had begun to break off 
from the assaulting column almost from the start, •were con- 
stantly added new crowds of fugitives till the whole mass giv- 
ing way fled to their own lines Avhers it required the most stren- 
uous personal exertions of Longstreet and of Lee to rally and 
compose them. Of the conduct of the latter officer, an eye- 
witness thus wrote : " If Longstreet's behavior was admirable, 
that of General Lee was perfectly sublime. He Avas engaged 
in rallying and in encouraging the broken troops, and was 
riding about, a little in front of the wood, quite alone — his 
staff beins: cn<rao:ed in a similar manner further to the rear. 
His face, Avhich is always placid and cheerful, did not show 
signs of the slightest disappointment, care, or annoyance ; and 
he was addressing to every soldier he met, a few words of 
encouragement, such : as 'AH this Avill come out right in the 
end; Ave Avill talk it over afterwards; but meanwhile all 
good men must rally. We Avant all good and true men just 
now, etc' He spoke to all the Avounded men that passed 
him, and the slightly woundod he exhorted Ho bind up their 
hurts and take up a musket' in this emergency. Very few 
failed to answer his appeal, and I saAV many b:idly Avounded 
men take off" their hats and cheer him. Ho said to m3, 'This 
has been a sad day for us. Colonel — a sad day ; but wo can't 
always expect to gain victories.'" "f" 

This was the last offousive sally attempted by Lee. He 



348 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE YfAR. 

was himself thoroughly convinced of the hopelessness of the 
undertaking, and the fire of his troops was quenched in 
blood. "The severe loss sustained by the army, and the 
reduction of its ammunition," he mildly says, "rendered 
another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable." The 
fault in the Confederate tactics in the battle of the 3d, was 
the same as that I have pointed out as inhering in those of 
the previous day's action. Their lines were too much ex- 
tended, and the attack was not sufHciently powerful ; or, as 
Longstrect has put it, " the attack should have been made 
with thirty thousand instead of fifteen thousand men." 

It is still a point in dispute among military men Avhether 
Meade should have followed up the repulse of the Confeder- 
ates on the afternoon of the 3d by an advance of his own 
left. On this point General Hancock gives the following in- 
teresting testimony. "I think that our lines should have ad- 
vanced immediately, and I believe we should have won a 
great victory ; I was very confident that the advance would 
be made. General ]\Ieade told me before the fight that if the 
enemy attacked me, he intended to put the Fifth and Sixth 
Corps on the enemy's flank : I therefore when I was wounded 
and lying down in my ambulance and about leaving the field, 
dictated a note to General Meade, and told him if he would 
put in the Fifth and Sixth Corps I believed he would Avin a 
great victory. I asked him afterwards, when I returned to 
the arm}', what he had done in the premises. He said he 
had ordered the movement, but the troops were slow in col- 
lecting, and moved so slowly, that nothing was done before 
night, except that some of the Pennsylvania reserves went 
out and met Hood's division, it was understood, of the enemy, 
and actually overthrew it, assisted, no doubt, in some meas- 
ure, by their knowledge of their failure in the assault." But 
on the other hand, General Longstrect, in conversation with 
the writer of these pages, said in reference to the question of 
attack : " I had tiic divisions of Hood and McLaws that had 



GETTYSBURG. 349 

not been engaged during the day ; I bad a heavy force of 
artillery, and I have no doubt I should have given the Federals 
as severe a repulse as that received by Pickett." And in 
fact the experience of nearly all the Virginia battles goes to 
confirm the opinion of the Confederate commander. 

Although General Lee, after the failure of the attack of 
Friday came to the conclusion that further attack was hope- 
less, and had formed the resolution of withdrawin<2: from 
Northern soil, he still felt confidence in his ability to repulse 
any assault that might be made upon him. Accordingly on 
the 4th, while pushing forward the laborious task of sending 
off his immense trains to the Potomac, he drew in his flanks, 
threw up breastworks, and took a defensive position in which 
he rather coveted than deprecated attack by the Union army. 
General Meade, on the morning of the 4th, ordered demon- 
strations along the whole front ; but they were very feebly 
made, and when the oflicers met together that evening to 
report the state of things on their front, there was little or 
nothing definitely known as to the position or designs of the 
enemy. Lee, however, removed all doubt by withdrawing 
that night. The retrogi-ade movement was begun after dark, 
the whole column moving l)y the Fairfield road. A heavy 
rain continued throughout the night, and so much impeded 
progress, that Ewell's corps, which brought up the rear, did 
not leave Gettysburg until late in the forenoon of Sunday the 
5th. After an arduous march Lee's whole army reached 
Ilagerstown on the afternoon of the Gth and morning of the 
7th of July. 

When it was definitely discovered that the enemy had 
withdrawn, the important question of pursuit presented itself. 
But it was a difficult matter to decide whether this should be 
made in a direct following up of the enemy, or by a flank 
movement east of the South Mountain by way of Frederick. 
However, to harass the enemy's rear, the Sixth Corps, under 
Sedgwick, was immediately sent forward in direct pursuit. 



350 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Having on the evening of the 6th overtaken the enemy's rear 
guard, posted in the Fairfield pass, it was found occupying 
so strong a position, that Sedgwick deemed attack inadvisable. 
Meantime, Meade had resolved to adopt the other line of 
pursuit, and therefore directed the march of the whole army 
by way of Frederick. 

Lee's trains succeeded in reaching Williamsport on the 6th ; 
but were unable to cross the Potomac on account of the high 
stage of the water, and the pontoon-bridge left at Falling 
"Water had been destroyed by a party sent out by General 
French from Frederick. The wounded and prisoners were 
sent over the river as rapidly as possible in a few ferry-boats, 
while the trains awaited the subsiding of the Potomac and 
the construction of a new pontoon-bridge. "On the 8th of 
July," says Lee, "the enemy's cavalry advanced toward 
Hagerstown, but was repulsed by General Stuart, and pur- 
sued as far as Boonsboro'. With this exception, nothing but 
occasional skirmishing occurred until the 12th, when the main 
body of the enemy arrived. The army then took a position 
previously selected, covering the Potomac from Williamsport 
to Fallinir Waters, where it remained for two davs with the 
enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to 
attack, but throwing up intrenchments along his Avhole line. 
By the 13th, the river at Williamsport, though still deep, was 
fordable, and a good bridge was completed at Falling Wa- 
ters, new boats having been constructed, and some of the old 
recovered. As further delay would enable the enemy to 
obtain reinforcements, and as it was found difficult to procure 
a sufficient supply of flour for the troops, the working of the 
mills being interrupted by high water, it was determined to 
await an attack no longer. Orders Avere accordingly given 
to cross the Potomac that night, Ewell's corps by the ford at 
Williamsport, and those of Longstrect and Hill on the 
brid2:e." 

It will thus be seen that Lee reached the Potomac six days 



GETTYSBURG. 351 

in nclvancc cf ]Mcade, -which would indicate an excessive cir- 
cumspection in the movements of the latter at a time when 
the utmost impetuosity was called for. It is true that the 
line of pursuit adopted by General Meade — namely, that b}^ 
the east side of the mountains, via Frederick and the South 
Mountain passes — was nearly double the length of Lee's line 
of retreat through the Cumberland A^allcy. The distance to 
"Williamsport by the latter route is about forty miles, and by 
Aj^jA' the 4fttte«. seventy-five. Nevertheless, as it took General 
Meade seven days to make the seventy-five miles, the march 
must be accounted slow. Yet it would be unjust to make 
this circumstance a irround of censure as^ainst General Meade, 
for no one could have exerted himself more strenuously than 
did that commander to overtake and finish his adversary : the 
failure Vv\as really owing to the fact that the army, having lost 
most severely in its best ofljcers, Avas not in condition to re- 
spond to the wishes of General Meade. 

Whether ]\Ieade should have attacked or refrained from 
attacking Lee at "Williamsport, is one of those questions 
on which every American considers it his right and privilege 
to pronounce an ex cathedra opinion. It is probable that the 
popular verdict will alwa3^s condemn him for his hesitation to 
assume the offensive. Yet it is certain that Lee wished to be 
attacked at Williamsport, and if it be a cardinal maxim of 
war never to do what the enemy desires you to do, it may 
appear that there are at least two sides to the question. 

On the retirement of Lee, Meade did not delay the pas- 
sasre of the Potomac. But the Confederate commander refus- 
ing battle, continued his retreat to the Rapidan on the banks 
of which the opposing armies now took up position. 

III. 
RESULTS OF GETTYSBURG. 
Such was Gettysburg — the battle the greatest in respect 



352 THE TVrELYE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

of its pi-oportions and tho weightiest in respect of the issue 
involved, of all the actions Avagcd during four years between 
the mighty rival armies of the East. In point of losses alone, 
it deserves to rank with the fn-st-class battles of history, for 
on the Union side the casual ities "were near twenty-four thou- 
sand, and on the Confederate side they exceeded twenty-seven 
thousand men, killed, spoiled, or taken. 

Yv^ith what design the invasion of the North was undertaken, 
in what manner it culminated in the mighty wrestle among 
the hills of Western Pennsylvania, and with what result to 
the invader it was brought to a close, have already been set 
forth. It only remains to draw such general deductions aa 
are authorized by the review of the campaign as a whole. 

The circumstances under which Lee initiated the campaign, 
authorized him to expect the most important results from tho 
invasion of the North. Having many times before defeated the 
Army of the Potomac with a much inferior force, it was not 
unwarrantable for him to assume that he would again triumph 
now that he had an army equal in strength to that of his ad- 
versary — an army, too, in such high and daring spirit that, 
in the words of Longstrect, it was "capable of anything" ; 
while the commander opposed to him at the opening cf tho 
campaign was a man for whose character and abilities he en- 
tei'tained a contempt which it would be difficult to say was 
not merited. It must also be conceded that the plan of oper- 
ations devised by Lee, while wonderfully bold, Avas yet thor- 
oughly methodical and Avell matured. For if the march re- 
moved his army to an indefinite distance from his base, ho 
yet had an easily guarded line of communications by way of 
the Cumberland and Shenandoah Valley', to his depots at 
Winchester and Gordonsville, whence he could readily draw 
ammunition. And in the matter of supplies he was in no 
wise dependant on Virginia, for the well-peopled and produc- 
tive soil of Pennsylvania affords ample resources for the sul> 
sistence of an army, for a time and whilst moving, without 



GETTYSBURG. 353 

the use of magazines, by the European method of requisitions 
at the cost of the inhabitants. The proof of this is furnished 
in the fact, that the Confederate army not only subsisted on 
the country during the campaign, but that in addition, it for- 
warded to the Potomac great quantities of cattle and corn 
that served to eke out their meagre larder until such time as 
the maturing crops furnished fresh supplies. 

Being thus easy with respect to that part on which 
Frederick the Great has said that armies, like serpents, 
move — to Avit, its belly — Lee, leading a powerful, valiant, 
and enthusiastic army, confidently moved to an anticipated 
victory. Ilis aim was the capture of Washington, the defeat 
of the Army of the Potomac, and the retention of a footing 
long enough on loyal soil to so work upon the North, that 
under the combined pressure of its own fears, the uprising of 
the reactionary elements at home, and perhaps the iniluencG 
of the Powers abroad, it might be disposed to sue for peace. 
He had ample means for the conduct of the enterprise, which 
was of itself not extravagant, and it is rare that any military 
operation presents greater assurance of success than Lee bad 
of attaining his end of conquering a peace on northern soil, i^' 

This being so, we can rise at once to the height of the ap- 
preciation of the triumph at Gettysburg — a victory which, if 
we consider the tremendous issue which it involved, calls forth 
sentiments akin to the trembling joy with which Cromwell re- 
turned thanks to Heaven for the " crowning mercy " of Wor- 
cester. It was the crisis of the war — the salvation of the 
North. 

In tracing out the causes of Lee's defeat we shall find that 
something was due to the faults of that commander himself, 
something to the good conduct of General Meade, much to 
the valor of the Army of the Potomac, and much, again, to 
fortune, "that name for the unknown combinations of infinite 
power," which, maugre every seeming assurance of success, 
was wanting to the Confederates. It was not by the prevision 



354 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

nor by the manoeiivrcs of either general that the forces were 
brought into colUsion on the 1st of July, though the Union 
commander is certainly entitled to great credit for the promp- 
titude with which, accepting the issue accidentally presented, 
he threw forward his army to Gettysburg. Here, nature as 
well as circumstances, and the unusual temerity of Lee, favored 
the Union army. Elated by the success of the first day, the 
Confederate commander, contrary to his intent and promise, 
determined to attack. But while the position might readily 
have been turned, it was impregnable by direct assault, if 
maintained with skill and firnnicss. And it was so main- 
tained ; for the Army of the Potomac, realizing the tremen- 
dous issue involved, feeling that it stood there for the defence 
of its own soil, fought with far more determination than it 
had ever displayed in Virginia. 

The experiment of the Pennsylvania campaign gave a com- 
plete and final quietus to the scheme of Southern invasion 
of the loyal States, and the entei-prise was never more at- 
tempted. Nor indeed vras the army of Northern Virginia 
ever again in condition to undertake such a movement. 
This was not alone due to the shock which it received in its 
morale from so disastrous a blow, but to its material losses, 
the portentous sum of which exceeded the aggregate of its 
casualties in the whole series of battles Avhich Grant deliv- 
ered from the Rapidan to the James lliver. This subtraction 
of force viewed merely in a numerical count was most grave, 
considering the great exhaustion of the fighting resources of 
the Confederates ; while, when we take into account the 
quality of the men, the loss Avas irreparable ; for the thirty 
thousand , put Jiors de combat at Gettysburg were the very 
Hower and elite of that incomparable Southern infantry, 
which, tempered by tAvo years of battle and habituated to 
victory, equalled any soldiers that ever followed the eagles 
to conquest. 

But the rei^ults of Gettysburg were not confined to the 



GETTYSBUKG. 355 

Eastern theatre of operations : its effect was powerfully felt 
throughout all the West, where, in consequence of the ab- 
sorjDtion of force for the invasion of Pennsylvania, a succes- 
sion of severe disasters befell the Confederate arms. At the 
time the campaign was initiated the Army of the Mississippi 
was shut up in Vicksburg, and the Army of Tennessee con- 
fronted the force of Rosecrans in daily expectation of attack, 
and itself too weak to maintain its ground. Now let us sup- 
pose that Lee, in place of recalling the corps of Longstrcet 
from North Carolina in order to enter on the invasion, had 
confined himself to a defensive attitude on the Rappahannock 
(which he could certainly have maintained, since even with- 
out Longstrcet he had all the force with which he had a 
month before overwhelmed Hooker at Chancellorsville), and 
meanwhile, sent his energetic lieutenant, strengthened, per- 
haps, by an additional division or two, to the West. This 
accession of strength would have enabled Brasfg to take 
the offensive against Rosecrans, for it is a matter of his- 
tory that, in the month of October following, Bragg, rein- 
forced in precisely the manner indicated, was able to give his 
antasfonist a crushini]: defeat at Chickamauga.r/ But it is not 
Rosecrans alone that might have been thrown on the defensive 
— for this result accomplished, such detachments might then 
have been sent from the Army in Tennessee as would have en- 
abled Johnston to relieve Vicksburg. As it was, Bragg saw 
himself forced to fall back and abandon the whole of Tennessee 
when Rosecrans advanced in the month of June, while Vicks- 
burg, closely invested by Grant, and deprived of all hope of 
relief, was compelled to surrender — an event which, by a 
striking conjuncture, took place on the same day that wit- 
nessed Lee's final repulse at Gettysburg. 

And thus the battle-summer rose to its climax in the clash 
and clamor of Titanic war, which, spending its fury on the 
soil of Pennsylvania, was echoed back from the borders of 
the Mississippi and the Alpine heights of the Cumberland 
Mountains. 



356 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 



IX. 

THE WILDERNESS. 



PRELUDE TO THE WILDERNESS. 

When in the month of May, 1864, vernal grasses and 
flowers came once more to festoon the graves in battle-fields 
over which the contending hosts of North and South had 
wrestled for three years, the armies upstarting along all the 
front of war prepared to close again in deadly combat. It 
was the opening of the spring campaign of 1864 ; but it was 
more than the opening of a campaign, for the circumstances 
were such as to mark this as a new epoch in the history of 
the war. 

This characteristic it owed first of all to the clearly-defined 
aspect of the military situation, which for the first time 
shoWed an entire unity both in the objectives to be attained 
by the Union armies and in the organization of the war 
itself. 

When hostilities began between the North and South, the 
theatre was so vast, the circumstances were so novel, and the 
country so green in war, that the conduct of military opera- 
tions was of necessity almost wholly experimental. The 
North undertook to subdue rebellion throughout a country 
continental in its dimensions, stretching from the Potomac to 
the Itio Grande — a country in which the whole pojiulation 
was in arms and animated by the bitterest hostility. With- 



WILDERNESS. 357 

out military traditions, without a military establishment, 
without a military leader of genius, the North, strong in the 
faith of the Union, accepted the gage of war. It formed 
armies. It sent them forth to battle. Of course, the con- 
duct of the war was crude. There were three or four differ- 
ent armies in Virginia, three or four between the AUeghanies 
and the Mississippi — eight or ten in all where there ought 
to have been but three. These armies were placed frequently 
on faulty or indecisive lines. And there was no unity in 
their action. Nevertheless these armies went to work. They 
began " hammering." And at the end of three years they 
had produced results somewhat notable in their way. Let us 
recall briefly what these were, both as regards the East and 
the West, to the end that we may the better realize both what 
remained to be clone and the change now introduced into the 
conduct of the war. 

In considering the operations in Virginia there are two 
facts that should be borne in mind. First, that the Army of 
the Potomac had there not only to combat the main army of 
the South, but an army that by means of the interior lines 
held by the enemy, might readily receive great accessions of 
force from the western zone. " To the Confederates," as I 
have elsewhere said, " Virginia bore the character of a fortress 
thrust forward on the flank of the theatre of war, and such 
was their estimate of its importance, that they were always 
ready to make almost an}' sacrifice elsewhere to insure its 
tenure." Secondly, that the Army of the Potomac, in ad- 
dition to its offensive charge, was the custodian of the 
National Capital — a duty that governed all strategic combi- 
nations in Virginia. Having thus at once to make head 
against the most formidable, the best disciplined, and the 
most ably commanded army of the Confederacy, and to guard 
Washington, which, while a glittering prize ih the eyes of 
the enemy, was also most unfortunately located on an exposed 
frontier, it is not wonderful that the Army of the Potomac 



358 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

had not yet been able to attain its goal — the capture of 
Richmond. From the fact that eacli army had a jjoint of the 
highest importance to cover and an objective of the highest 
importance to gain, there resulted from the alternate aggres- 
sive movements of these two mighty and closely-matched 
rivals an ebb and flow, a flux and reflux of battle and blood- 
shed that rarely burst beyond the boundaries of the Potomac 
and the James. The history of the three years' operations 
U]3 to this period is a history of the collisions of these two 
powerful bodies in combats wherein victory adhered now to 
the one and now to the other of the opposing standards. If 
the one side could claim a Manassas, a Fredericksburg, a 
Chanccllorsville, the other could claim a Malvern, an Antie- 
tam, a Gettysburg. But it is the glory of the Army of the 
Potomac, that through all these weary three years it had 
kept good its trust, that it had preserved the Capital, that 
while receiving terrible blows it had not failed to inflict the 
like, and that it had already put hors de combat alone a 
hundred thousand of the bravest and best soldiers of the 
Confederacy. The opening of the spring campaign found it 
lying on the north bank of the Rapidan — its adversary being 
ensconced in works on the opposite side. 

Meanwhile, the deeds of the armies of the west through- 
out these three years claim a more brilliant page. 

It is one of the well-known generalizations of the war, 
that while victory so long shunned in Virginia the Union 
standards, she crowned them through the West witli constant 
laurels. This inequality of fortune is partly explained by the 
diversity of the obstacles to be overcome, East and AVest, 
and of the proportionate means for overcoming them : for the 
relative skill, strength, advantage of position, and what not, 
in the combatants, were very diftcrcnt on the two fields. But, 
nevertheless, ^s if to proclaim the dominion of fat©, even 
where at the West energy and address were replaced by care- 
lessness and blundering, there too the star of success shone 



WILDERNESS. 359 

fixed in the ascendant ; and whatever there lacked of sound 
dispositions or right use of resources, seemed made up by 
pure good fortune and the prestige of past triumphs more 
legitimately won. No Union negligences or errors, however 
great, would as at the East, inure to permanent disadvantage. 
Confederate offensive campaigns met, when at the very sum- 
mit of success, unexpected and improbable checks, ruining 
the enterprise — as in Sydney Johnston's invasion begun and 
ended at Shiloh, and in Bragg's elaborate movement towards 
Louisville. Confederate defensive campaigns were suddenly 
turned to disasters, near the hour fixed for the saving contre- 
coup — as by Pemberton's operations at Vicksburg and the sub- 
stitution of Hood for Johnston at the Chattahoochie. A rare 
cloud appeared on the Union path only to magically furl off, 
leaving at last the whole retrospect so luminous with victory 
from bound to goal, that one would say Fortune had been 
suborned to march under the Union banners. 

The profit of these western successes was not confined to 
that region, but more than once roused the Union from the 
almost fatal melancholy into which the ruinous havoc repeat- 
ed upon its eastern armies was plunging it. The governmen- 
tal archives might, if ever penetrated, disclose the burden of 
gloom which western victories opportunely relieved ; for of- 
ten, while the cause Avas sinking in distress in the East, a blast 
from the West, blowing fresh and strong, gave it lease of life 
again. Beyond the Alleghanies, in an experience unknown at 
the East, each fought-out campaign led straight to the campaign 
succeeding : and a surplus of prestige froni past victory gave 
bright augury of victory to come ; till the very momentum of 
the Union columns rolling across their hundred-leagued cam- 
paigning grounds , was by friend and foe alike pronounced resist- 
less. The Union triumphs at Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort 
Donelson, and Shiloh, in the spring of 18G2, were followed 
by gradually unclinching the Mississippi forts from the sullen 
grip of the South, till Columbus, Island Ten, Fort Pillow and 



360 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Memphis being surrendered, and two elaborate lines of valley 
defence successively forced, the great Mobile highway lay 
open to Vicksburg. Bragg's angry lunge, in autumn, to win 
back lost fortunes, ended, after Murfreesboro', in a long recoil 
to Georgia, and in the abandonment of the north central 
zone, with all its cities, its arms-bearing people and its sup- 
plies. Onward with the new year 1863, moved the Union 
banners. Rosecrans scaled the Alleghanies toward Chatta- 
nooga, while Grant followed the guidance of the Mississippi, 
whose embouchure had been already won by the great river- 
ii2:ht below New Orleans. Midsummer was crowned with the 
conquest of Vicksburg ; and when Port Hudson succumbed, 
in close corollary, the famous ]Mississippi line was fought out, 
and its record closed up in th3 war's annals. In the latter 
days of September, the Rosccrans column, winding its way far 
up the Alleghanies, aiming at Chattanooga, seized it and there- 
with the key of the whole mountain system. It only remained 
now for Grant, as commander of the whole Valley Depart- 
ment, to set a seal on the year by securing what was gained ; 
and this he did (November, 1863,) in a great mountain battle, 
dashing Bragg from his seat on the heights Avliich engirdled 
Chattanooga, and forcing off, in the same blow, Longstreet's 
eager grasp from Ivnoxvillc : then the Confederate hosts fell 
back into Georgia. 

Such then was the result, territorially considered, of the 
three j^ears of war. It had reduced the belligerent force of 
the Confederacy to t^vo armies — the one under Johnston in 
Georgia, the other under Lee in Virginia. And in reducing 
the area of the rebellion it practically limited the functions of 
the Union force to the destruction of these two armies, which 
were the sole material support of the Confederacy. The 
anarchic elements of the war had been reduced to order 
and organic form, and if much yet remained to be done, 
there was at least a clear unity in the objectives to be at- 
tained. 



WILDERNESS. 361 

Happily, also, the same unity had lately been imported into 
the conduct of the war by the appointment of General Grant 
in March, 1864, to the grade of Lieutenant-Gencral and his 
nomination to the office of General-in-Chief. Aside from the 
approved good qualities of that commander, the stroke was 
most just and wise, for in truth for three years the war had 
been without a head. Since the time when, for a brief period, 
McClellan had exercised the functions of General-in-Chief — 
a period during which he had outlined but had had no oppor- 
tunity to execute a comprehensive system of operations — an 
incredible incoherence prevailed in the general conduct of the 
war. It is true that since that time General Halleck had 
exercised the functions of a central military director at 
Washin2:ton. But his office was the shadow of a name. He 
could not get himself obeyed by the commanders in the field, 
and when he did actually intervene it was commonly only to 
entail disaster. In point of fact, as General Halleck's last 
annual official report had clearly shown, operations were 
directed sometimes by the President, with or without the 
approval of his military counsellors, sometimes by one or 
another of his military counsellors, without the approval of 
the President, and sometimes by the general in the field 
without the approval of any one. In this lamentable state of 
facts, it is not wonderful that the results thus far achieved 
fell far short of the army's lavish expenditure of blood. " The 
armies in the East and ^Yest," in Grant's pithy phrase, 
"acted independently and without concert, like a baulky 
team, no two ever pulling together." Indeed, between the 
armies in the two zones, there had hitherto been such lack 
of combination of effort that the Army of the Potomac and 
the Army of the West had commonly found themselves in 
their cxtremest crisis at the moment when the other, being 
reduced to inaction, left the Confederate force to concentre 
on the vital point. And in truth the wonder was not that 



362 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

the war was not already brought to a close : rather the won- 
der was that so much should have been accomplished. 

But now Grant commanded " all the armies of the United 
States," and he was at once able, with all the resources of 
the country at his call, with near a million men in the field, 
and a generous and patriotic people at his back, to enter upon 
a comprehensive system of combined operations. The task 
before him was plain. Strategetic positions now played but a 
secondary roZe .* armies had become objectives. In the West 
the successor of Bragg lay, recruiting his army after its rude 
bout at Chattanooga, in secure camp at Dalton, on the rail- 
road to Atlanta. His presence at that point was simply de- 
sisrned to cover from further incursion the broad State of 
Georgia, as Lee's army behind the Rapidan Avas planted there 
for the shielding of Virginia : and both of these forces had 
now obviously been thrown mainly on the defensive. It was 
the primary scope of the two great camj^aigns of the year to 
project the Union armies respectively upon the natural line 
of retreat chosen by their antagonists, and, in so doing, to 
force the latter to give decisive battle : the battle resulting in 
their defeat, would drive these armies from their lines of 
supplies, or else quite disperse them, leaving, in either event, 
the cities they covered to their assailants, who would thus 
capture Richmond in Virginia, and, in Georgia, Atlanta, the 
Richmond of the "West. 

Raised to the supreme command, Lieutenant-General Grant 
committed the care of the Mississippi Valley, and all the 
armies between the Alleghanies and the great river, to 
Major-Gencral Sherman. The campaign against Lee he de- 
termined to direct personally, and in this view he established 
his head-quarters with the Army of the Potomac, the immedi- 
ate command of which, however, continued in the hands of 
General ]\Ieade. The few weeks that remained until the 
season favorable for military operations should arrive, were 
filled up Avith manifold activities, and by the opening of May 



WILDERNESS. 3(33 

all needed preparations had been completed. Then Grant 
gave the word "Forward," and the army in Virginia and the 
army in Tennessee, unleashed, joyfully entered upon those 
grand campaigns that will form the subject-matter of this 
and the succeeding chapter. 

n. 

THE BATTLE OF THE WHvDERNESS. 

On Tuesday, the 3d of May, 18G4, knowing that the 
Army of the Potomac must soon move, and being desirous of 
chronicling a campaign to which in advance a surpassing 
public interest attached, I left "Washington and proceeded by 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to Culpepper Court- 
house. General Grant had established his head-quarters in 
a house in that dilai3idated and war-worn old Virginia town, 
and in the evening I was received by him. It proved that I 
was just in time to witness the opening of the campaign, for 
orders had been issued for the army to move at midnight, 
and the commander was then giving the final touches to his 
preparations^, His maps were before him, and he spoke 
with confidence of the future. He was to cross the Rapidan, 
turn the Confederate right, and then throw his army between 
Lee and Richmond. 

Lee's army lay behind the Rapidan — a stream which had 
never been crossed by the Union array save to be quickly re- 
crossed. The three Confederate corps were positioned en eche- 
lon behind that river — Ewcll's corps guarding its course ; 
Hill's corps lying around Orange Courthouse, and Longstreet's 
corps being encamped about Gordonsville. The journals of 
the time amused their readers with most absurd speculations 
regarding Lee's lines, which were pictured as another Torres 
Vedras. But in reality the works on the Rapidan Avere of 
the simplest kind, and were not designed as a battle-line. 
Lee knew perfectly well that a direct passage of the Rapidan 



364 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

would never be attempted ; for the south banks of that 
stream in its upper pai-t rise into considerable bluffs, which 
completely dominate the north bank, and precluded all 
thought of attempting a crossing' in the enemy's face. Be- 
sides, in Lee's method of defending rivers, it was never his 
habit to plant his army on their banks for the purpose of pre- 
venting a passage. It was his wont, rather, to observe the 
river-line with a small force, sufficient to dispute the crossing 
for a time, while, distributed at convenient points within 
supporting distance, he held his masses to be hurled against 
his antagonist after he had crossed. Lee's army at this time 
numbered 52,626 men of all arms. 

The Army of the Potomac had wintered in cantonments 
along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the vicinity of 
Culpepper Courthouse. Since Grant's arrival it had been 
reorganized into three corps — the Second, Fifth, and Sixth. 
The Second Corps was under Major-General W. S. Hancock, 
the Fifth under Major-General G. K. Warren, and the Sixth 
under Major-General John Sedgwick — three most able and 
experienced lieutenants, subordinate commanders of the 
highest type. With the Army of the Potomac was asso- 
ciated the Ninth Corps, which arrived immediately before 
the opening of the campaign. It was under General A. E. 
Burnsidc, who held command independent of General Meade 
— a very faulty arrangement, which worked so ill that the 
corps was afterwards merged in the Army of the Potomac. 
The powerful body of cavalry, numbering over ten thousand 
sabres, had been placed under General P. II. Sheridan, the 
man of all others most worthy the command. There was a 
great deal of raw material in the different corps, but it had been 
thoroughly fused with the veteran element : so that the army 
of 130,000 men which Grant held in hand was not only very 
formidable in numbers, it was in excellent discipline and in 
the highest spirits. " Hope elevated and joy brightened its 
crest. " 



WILDERNESS. 365 

The camps were broken up during the 3d of May, and at 
midnisfht the columns moved out under the starli<]^ht towards 
the Rapidan. To those of us who lay m Culpepper Court- 
house there was little sleep that night ; for during all its 
hours the air was filled with the tramp of armed men and the 
rumble of wagons — and indeed the anticipations of the 
morrow were too exciting to permit slumber. "When the 
morning came, Generals Grant and Meade and their staffs 
rode forward to the Rapidan at Germanna Ford. We found 
that Warren's corps had already crossed there on pontoon 
bridges, and that Sedgwick's corps was following. Han- 
cock's corps, forming the left column, was at the same time 
filing across the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, a few miles down 
stream from Germanna Ford. The crossing of the river was 
made without the slightest opposition, for the* points of pas- 
sage were quite beyond Lee's right flank. The few videttes 
had fled at the apparition of the Union cavalry which pre- 
ceded the infantry. The scene when we arrived, and 
throughout all the afternoon as the troops continued to 
defile across the Rapidan, was wonderfully imposing — the 
long columns winding down to the river's brink, traversing 
the bridges, and then spreading out in massive array over 
the hill-slopes and subjacent valleys of the south bank. 
Before the afternoon was spent the whole army was across, 
and the heads of columns, plunging into the depths of the 
forest, were lost to view. Hancock pushed out to Chancel- 
lorsville, and lay all night on the old battle-field of Hooker. 
Warren advanced southward by the Stevensburg pknk road 
six miles, to Old Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick remained 
close to the river. Burnside had orders to hold Culpepper 
Courthouse for twenty-four hours, and then follow in the 
path of the other corps. The head-quarters' tents were 
pitched for the night within a few hundred yards of the 
river ; but the troops of Hancock and Warren bivouacked in 
the heart of the Wilderness. 



3G6 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Well aware was Lee of his opponent's move ; for from the 
Confederate signal station on the lofty height of Clark's Momi- 
tain the motions of the Union columns toward the Ilapidan 
had been descried in the early daAvn, and as we went for- 
ward we saw beacon-fires blazing on the mountain-top to sum- 
mon the concentration of the far-scattered Confederate corps. 
Lee had predetermined that if Grant turned his right b}' cross- 
ing the Rapidan at the lower fords, he would take the offen- 
sive, launch forAvard his army to the Wilderness, and there 
join battle with his antagonist. From the position of the three 
Confederate corps, the average distance to where — march- 
ing north-eastward, they might strike the Umion force after 
crossing the Rapidan — Avas about twenty miles ; but the move- 
ment was facilitated by the two excellent roads (one a turn- 
pike, the other* a plank road) from Orange Courthouse to 
Fredericksburg. By throwing forward his army on these 
roads Lee would strike Grant's line of march at right angles, 
and if the movement was made with sufiicient celerity it 
would avail to intercept the Union army in the Wilderness. 
Lee made his dispositions accordingly, and while, during the 
4th, the Union columns were defiling across the Rapidan, the 
Confederate army was hastening forward to meet them as fast 
as legs and hoofs and wheels could travel. Bj^ dark of the 
4th, so much of the intervening distance had been overpassed 
that Ewell, whose cordis moved by the Orange turnpike, and 
Hill, whose corps advanced by the Orange plank road, had 
approached to within a very few miles of where Warren lay at 
Old Wilderness Tavern, which is at the junction of the Or- 
ange turnpike Avith the Stevensburg plank road leading south- 
ward from Germanna Ford. 

At head-quarters we were up long before daAvn of the 5th 
of May, and rode southward from Germanna Ford to reach 
Warren's position at Old Wilderness Tavern. We found the 
road filled with Sedgwick's corps taring forth in the same di- 
rection. The sun blazed hotly and fiery red, and many sol- 



WILDERNESS. 367 

dicrs succumbed by the roadside to die ere the campaign was 
besfun. After a few hours' ride we reached Old Wilderness 
Tavern. "\Ve found that "Warren's corps had bivouacked here 
during the night — one division (Griifin's) being thrown out 
on the Orange turnpike about a mile to the westward to guard 
the approaches by which the enemy would advance if he was 
minded to risk battle. Warren's orders had been to resume 
the march early that morning, and advance by a Avood-road 
running south-westerly from Wilderness Tavern to Parker's 
Store on the Orange plank road. Accordingly at daybreak 
Crawford's division, followed by the divisions of Wadsworth 
and Robinson, moved forward to attain that point — Griffin's 
division being still held on the turnpike. But Avhen Craw- 
ford's division had ncared Parker's Store it found a Union 
cavalry body that had been sent forward to preoccupy that 
point being driven out by a hostile column which was pushing 
rapidly down the plank road ; and at the same time Griffin's 
skirmishers on the turnpike became engaged with another 
body of the enemy. It happened that just as we reached 
Old Wilderness Tavern, about 8 a. :m. of the 5th, the tidings 
came that Griffin had encountered a Confederate force moving 
down the turnpike. Xow there was here an appearance and 
a fact ; and it is necessary to explain both how the commander 
construed the circumstances and what the circumstances 
actually were, for they diifcred most materially — and indeed 
thereby hangs the battle of the Wilderness. 

When, on the 4th of May, the Army of the Potomac by 
its successful passage of the Rapidan at Germanna and Ely's 
fords, had turned Lee's right flank, it seemed a warrantable 
inference to conclude that the Confederate commander, iind- 
mg his river-line now become obsolete, would not attempt to 
join battle near the Rapidan, but that he would be compelled, 
in view of the wide dispersion of his corps, to choose a point 
of concentration nearer Richmond. Grant and IMeade therefore 
had no thought of being interrupted in the march through the 



368 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

AVilderncss, and their purpose was by a rapid march south- 
westward to throw themselves between Lee and his capital, or 
at least to catch the Confederate corps divided, and beat them 
in detail. It was in execution of this purpose that on the 
morning of the 5th, Warren was directed on Parker's Store, 
and that Hancock, Avhose corps had bivouacked at Chancel- 
lorsville, was ordered, that morning, to move to Shady Grove 
Church, six miles south of Parker's Store. By launching 
forward in the same south-westerly direction, it was supposed 
that the Union army would, in a few vigorous marches, bring 
Lee to battle somewhere between Gordonsville and Louisa 
Courthouse. Now when, on the morning of the 5th, War- 
ren reported that Griffin had encountered a hostile force press- 
ing down upon him on the Orange turnpike, Grant and 
Meade, fully believing that Lee was executing a movement of 
retreat, did not attach any importance to the fact. It was 
concluded that the force Avhich now faced Griffin was only 
some part of the Confederate right which had been observing 
the line of the liapidan, and which was now left behind as a 
rear-guard while the mass of Lee's army concentrated far be- 
low ; and I put down in my note-book an observation which, 
while standing beside General Meade shortly after our arrival 
at Wilderness Tavern, I heard that officer make to Generals 
Sedgwick and Warren. " They [the enemy] ," said he, " have 
left a division to fool us here while they concentrate and pre- 
pare a position toward the North Anna ; and what I want is 
to prevent those fellows getting back to Mine Run." Acting 
on this hypothesis, the order was given to Warren to attack 
the enemy on the turnpike. 

Such were appearances. The reality, as has been seen, 
was very different. Lee instead of falling back on learning 
of Grant's advance, had no sooner detected the nature of the 
manoeuvre than he resolved to assume the offensive. On the 
morning of the 4th he directed Ewell to march rapidly east- 
ward on the ttirnpike ; he gave Hill the s.->.me direction on the 



WILDERNESS. 369 

plank road, and he called Longstreet up from Gordonsville to 
follow Hill. Evvell and Hill after marchinij durinsr the whole 
of the 4th, encamped within a few miles of where Warren 
lay at Old Wilderness Tavern — Ewell being on the turnpike 
and Hill on the plank road. The force that encountered 
Griffin on the morning of the 5th, was Ewell's van ; tlie 
colunm seen by Crawford hastening down the plank road was 
that of Longstreet. Lee had met Grant's move with anotlier 
equal in dexterity and surpassing it in boldness. 

That the hope of getting between Lee and Richmond was 
futile soon became apparent to the Union commander, for as 
the forenoon wore away, the pressure on Griffin's front be- 
came more and more weighty, and on the plank road an end- 
less column of the enemy was seen filing past with swift 
strides. It was now imperative to form new combinations. 
Hancock at least must be recalled from his march southwards 
towards Shady Grove Church, and brought up into position 
with the rest of the army. If indeed it were only possible 
that he should get up in time, for the enemy Avas gathering 
so strongly on the plank road, and pushing forward so stren- 
uously, that it was doubtful Avhether he would not sever con- 
nection between Hancock and the rest of the army ! " My 
advance," says Plancock, " was about two miles beyond Todd's 
Tavern, when at nine a. m. I received a dispatch from the 
Major-General commanding the Army of the Potomac to halt 
at the Tavern, as the enemy had been discovered in some 
force on the Wilderness pike. Two hours later I was directed 
to move my command up the Brock road to its intersection 
with the Orange plank road." To prevent Hill's attaining 
this all-important intersection, and allow Hancock, who was 
now full ten miles off, to come up mto position on the left 
of Warren, Getty's division of the Sixth Corps was sent to 
the junction of the Brock road and the Orange plank road 
to hold it at all hazards ; and, meanwhile, Warren was to 
attack Ewell on the turnpike with all his force, Sedgwick 
24 



370 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE V'AR. 

assisting on his right. Warren, mounting, rode to his com- 
mand and ordered an assault. Let us follow him. 

It was the Wilderness ! This desolate region embraces a 
tract of country of many miles, stretching southward from 
the Kapidan, and westward be^^ond Mine Kun — the whole 
face of it being covered with a dense undergrowth of low- 
limbed and scraggy pines, stiff and bristling chinkapins, 
scrub-oaks, and hazel. It is a region of gloom and the 
shadow of death — such a " darkluig wood " as that where 
through Dante passed into the Inferno : " Savage and rough 
and strong, that in the thinking it reneweth fear " : 

" Questa selva selvaggia ed aspra e forte 
Che nel pensier rinuova la paura ! " 

Passing westward from Wilderness Tavern, across the in- 
sisrnificant brook of Wilderness Run, one ascends a consider- 
able ridge which slopes westAvard into an extensive clearing, 
then pleasant and green with the verdure of spring — the one 
oasis in the circumjacent wild. On the western hill-slope 
stands the house of one Major Lacy, and on the hill itself 
beneath some fine trees, Generals Grant and Meade took 
their station. The cleared meadow lay around, and, beyond, 
to the westward, was the thick forest into which the great 
arm}", penetrating, had become lost to view. Thither follow- 
ing, we take a look around — not a far look, indeed; for 
about and beneath and overhead, the tangled underbrush and 
knotted trunks and ragged foliage of chaparral, consume the 
spaces into which the eye yearns to j^enetrate. Is a battle to 
be fought here in this labyrinth? There is a glory and a 
grandeur, there is pride and pomp in the marshalled lines of 
two mighty hosts that meet to contend on the open plain — 
there is something to thrill, to inspire, to intoxicate. Carry 
battle into a jungle and listen to it without a shudder. You 
hear the Saturnalia, gloomy, hideous, desperate, raging un- 



WILDERNESS. 371 

coufiued — you see nothing : and the very mystery augments 
the horror. 

By noontide Warren had formed his corps. Griffin's 
division was across the turnpike ; Wadsworth's division was 
to go in and take position on the left of Griffin, with Robin- 
son's division in support and one brigade of Crawford's 
division (the movement on Parker's Store being now sus- 
pended) was put in on the left of Wads worth. From the 
patter of skirmish shots the fight rose presently into the loud 
climax of battle. But nothing was visible : only from out 
those gloomy depths came the ruin that had been wrought, 
in bleeding shapes borne in blankets or on stretchers — the 
ghastly harvest of war. When the fight had lulled in the 
afternoon I had time to find out what had been done. 

Griffin's division, with Ayres's brigade on the right and 
Bartlctt's brigade on the left of the Orange turnpike, at- 
tacked with great impetuosity ; and as at the first onset only 
a part of E well's corps had come up. Griffin for a mile carried 
everything before him. Then, however, the Confederates 
turned at bay, formed on a wooded acclivity, and there being 
joined by the remainder of Ewell's corps, refused to be 
moved any farther. Unhappily there was no connection be- 
tween Griffin's division and that of Wadsworth, which went 
forward on its left, and a great misfortune befell the latter. 
In advancing Wadsworth's division, AYarren was compelled, 
as there were no roads, to give it direction by a point of the 
compass. Its course was to be due west from the Lacy House, 
which would have brought it to the left of Griffin's division, 
and on a prolongation of its line. But Wadsworth started 
facing north-west, instead of going due west, so that by the 
time he had approached the enemy his left had swung so far 
round as to present that naked flank to the fire of the Con- 
federates. Becoming confused in the dense forest, the divi- 
sion broke, and retired in much disorder. At the same time 
Ewell assumed the offensive against Griffin, and succeeded 



372 THE TT7ELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

in throwing back that division over all the ground it had be- 
fore wrenched from the enemy. The fate of McCandless's 
brigade of Crawford's division was still worse, for occupying 
an isolated position, it was nearly surrounded and was driven 
from the field with the loss of almost two whole regiments. 
Thus all the ground gained was given up ; but the Confeder- 
ates did not follow, and Warren assumed a new line across 
the turnpike, a little west of Wilderness Tavern. The shock to 
the Fifth Corps was very severe, and entailed a loss of above 
three thousand men. 

Three hours after noon there came a lull : the opening act 
of the drama had been concluded Avith such result as we have 
seen. The air was stifling, and the sun sent down his rays 
like spears. I went to Warren's head-quarters at the Lacy 
House, to rest and await further developments, and found 
the house had one historic event of interest associated with 
it, for it was here that Stonewall Jackson lay after he was 
borne, mortally hurt, from the battle-field of Chancellorsville, 
and it was here that his arm was amputated. Picking up a 
copy of Horace, which I found lying on the littered floor, I 
opened it mechanically, and happened to light on where the 
poet, in the Ode to Mecoenas, speaks of war, — 

" Multos castra juvant, et lituo tubse 
Permixtus souitus, bellaque matribus 
Detestata ; " 

which set me a-musing, for to how many mothers whose sons 
then lay in the dark woods of the Wilderness, must wars be 
" detestata.''^ But such thoughts were quickly interrupted ; 
for from the far-ofi* left there came a guttural, oceanic roar 
of musketry, and riding thither I found that it was Hancock, 
who had at length come up, had joined the faithful Getty, 
guardian of the precious junction of roads, — precious as that 
at Quatre-bras, — and was now attacking the enemy. What 
here befell may best be told in the words of Hancock's re- 
port, which lies before me in manuscript : — 



WILDERNESS. 373 

" AYhen I first joined General Getty, near the Orange 
plank road, he informed me that two divisions of Hill's 
corps were in his immediate front, and that he momentarily 
anticipated an attack. I therefore directed that breastworks 
should be constructed in order to receive the assault should the 
enemy advance. Between three and four o'clock I was or- 
dered to attack with Getty's command, supporting the advance 
with my whole corps. At 4.15 p. m. General Getty moved 
forward on the right and left of the Orange plank road, hav- 
ing received direct orders from General Meade to commence 
the attack without waiting for me. His troops encountered 
the enemy's line of battle about three hundred paces in front 
of the Brock road, and at once became hotly engaged. Fiud- 
Aug that General Getty had met the enemy in great force, I 
ordered Birney to advance his command (his own and Mott's 
division) to support the movement of Getty at once, although 
the formation I had directed to be made before carrying out 
my instructions to advance were not yet completed. General 
Birney immediately moved forward on General Getty's right 
and left — one section of Ricketts's battery moving down the 
plank road, just in rear of the infantry. The fight became 
very fierce at once : the lines of battle were exceedingly 
close, and the musketry was continuous along the entire line. 
At 4.30 p. M. Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division ad- 
vanced to the support of Getty's right on the right of the 
plank road, and a few minutes later Owen's brigade of Gib- 
bon's division was also ordered into action in support of 
Getty, on the right and left of the Orange plank road. The 
battle raged with great severity and obstinacy till about 8 
p. M., without decided advantage to either party." 

Thus closed the first day of the Wilderness — a deadly 
combat, or series of combats, yet hardly a battle. It was, as 
I have elsewhere called it, " the fierce grapple of two mighty 
wrestlers, suddenly meeting." The action w^as thoroughly 
indecisive. If Grant had been arrested in his passage 



374 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

through tho Wilderness, Lee, at least, had been foiled in his 
purpose of interposing between the two divided Union col- 
umns. The whole army was brought into position, and Burn- 
side's corps was ordered up to participate in the great strug- 
gle, now seen to be inevitable. Lee anxiously awaited 
Longstreet, who would doubtless arrive in the morning. 

For combinations of grand tactics there was manifestly no 
opportunity in the Wilderness. Men might here carry on a 
/deadly work of 'HDushwacking," but for an army to manoeu- 
vre in this chaparral, through which a bird could scarcely 
wing its way, was wholly out of the question. Grant's plan 
was formulated in a single sentence, — "Attack along the 
whole line at five in the morning." 

At early dawn of the 6th \ve were up again on tlie hill 
*^^' "^near the Lacy House, to await the overture of the battle. 
yj^^,,»«2f. But fifteen minutes before the appointed hour of attack 
f arrived, the enemy, anticipating us, snatched the honor of 

the opening. The onset was made on the Union right 
(Sedgwick's corps), falling first upon Seymour's brigade, 
then involving the whole of Ricketts's division, and extending 
finally to Wright's. But it made no impression on the SLxth 
Corps front, and Sedgwick was able to join in the general 
attack. It is at this distance of time manifest enough that 
this sally of the enemy was made for the purpose of discon- 
certing the Union commander and paralyzing action on his 
part for a while — a point which it was extremely desirable 
Lee should gain, for as neither Longstreet's corps nor An- 
derson's division of Hill's corps were yet up, he feared the 
result of an assault, especially from the Union left, and in 
acting offensively against the other Union flank, he did so 
merely as a diversion. However, it failed of realizing Lee's 
intent, and neither hastened nor retarded Grant's attack, 
which was begun at 5 a. bi., as had been appointed. 

The battle-line, as now drawn, was about five miles in 



WILDERNESS. 375 

« 

length — limning north and south and facing westward. 
Sedgwick held the right, Warren the centre, and Hancock 
the left. Burnside's corps, after a forced march, arrived 
during the piorning, and was to be thrown in to fill up an 
interval between Warren and Hancock. There were, there- 
fore, to be no reserves — a circumstance that made some of 
the older campaigners shake their heads. 

The chief interest centred in the left, under Hancock. It 
was from them that the main and most forceful attack was 
to be directed, and with this view a very weighty accumula- 
tion of troops was made on that flank. In addition to his 
own powerful corps of four divisions, Hancock held in hand 
Getty's division of the Sixth Corps, and Wads worth's divi- 
sion of the Fifth Corps, which during the previous evening 
had been sent through the woods to co-operate with Han- 
cock, and had secured a position hard by the left flank of the 
hostile force confronting that officer. This consisted of two 
divisions of Hill's corps, — the divisions of Wilcox and 
Hcth, — which held jjosition across the Orange plank road, 
their left connecting with the right flank of EwcJl's corps. 
These two divisions constituted the whole of Lee's ri<^ht 

O 

wilig, for neither Longstreet nor Hill's other two divisions 
had come up when at five in the morning a bla^ic of musketry 
announced that Hancock was advancinsr. 

From the breastworks along the Brock road Hancock sent 
forward his battle-line, covered by a cloud of skirniishers. 
The assaulting force was made up of Birncy's, JMott's, and 
Getty's divisions, with Carroll's and Owen's brigades of 
Gibbon's division, the remaining brigade of Gibbon's divi- 
sion and the whole of Barlow's division, forminof tlic left of 
Hancock's line, were retained in the works along the Brock 
road; for Hancock had been warned that Longstreet was 
approaching by the Catharpen road in such a manner that 
had he advanced his left, Longstreet would have fallen full 
on his rear. The left flank rested securely on a piece of 



376 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

open and commanding ground, where a plentiful supply of 
artillery had been massed. 

Pushing out into the dense thicket along both sides of the 
Orange plank road, the assaulting line presently encountered 
the two divisions of Hill, upon which it fell with such vigor 
that they soon began to waver and shake ; and as at the samo 
time Wadsworth terrified them by an attack in flank, the 
Confederates wxro completely disrupted, and retired in much 
disorder. "After a desperate contest, in which our troops 
conducted themselves in the most intrepid manner, the ene- 
my's line," says Hancock, "was broken at all points, and he 
was driven in confusion through the forest for almost one and 
one half miles, suffering severe losses in killed and wounded 
and prisoners." In fact Hill's troops could not be stayed till 
in their retreat they had overrun the trains and artillery and 
even the head-quarters of the Confederate commander, 
where, as Longstreet afterwards told me, he found on his 
arrival a confused huddle of bewildered and broken bat- 
talions. It required but that the Union troops should press 
on in order to snatch a cro^vning victory ; for the overthrow 
of Hill's divisions uncovered the whole extent of the Con- 
federate line. 

But if the Confederates in their rout were thrown into dis- 
order, tlio advance of the Union force so far through the 
forest brought upon it scarcely less confusion. For in such 
w-ood-fighting all that gives cohesion to a battle array — the 
touch of tlio elbow, the sight of a firm support on either 
side — is wanting, and in a short time all alignment is hope- 
lessly lost. It thus came about that Avhen Hancock's men in 
pressing after the flying enemy had advanced into the heart 
of the Wilderness, it was found that the integrity of forma- 
tion had so disappeared that the commander was forced to 
call a halt in order to make a readjustment of the line. It 
was now almost seven a. m., Getty's exhausted division was 
replaced by Webb's brigade, drawn from Gibbon's command 



WILDERNESS. 377 

on the left ; Frank's brigade of Barlow's division made an 
advance from the same flank, and after an obstinate contest 
succeeded in forming a connection with the left flank of the 
advanced line ; Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps re- 
ported to Hancock ready for duty, and Wadsworth's division 
after being gallantly fought by its intrepid commander across 
the front of that part of the Second Corps which lay on the 
right hand of the plank road, was now brought into proper 
relations with the rest of the forward line. 

Two hours passed in perfecting these dispositions. But 
these two hours had wrought a change for the Confederates. 
The remaining divisions of Hill's corps had arrived, and the 
head of Longstreet's column was reported not far behind. 
Lee seizing hold of the first comers, hurried them forward to 
patch up liis broken front ; and reading a little trepidation in 
the faces of the men at the sight of the debris of Heth's and 
Wilcox's divisions, the Confederate commander put himself 
at the head of Gregg's Texans, and commanded them to fol- 
low him in a charge ; but a grim and raGrsfed soldier of the 
line raised his voice in determined resistance, and was imme- 
diately followed by the rank and file of the whole briga,de in 
positive refusal to advance till the well-loved chief had gone 
to his proper place in the rear. After this there was no fal- 
tering. Anderson's and Field's divisions quickly deployed, 
and Longstreet's powerful corps soon afterward coming up, 
added such weight and breadth to the line that the Confeder- 
ate commander was in position not only to withstand' further 
pressure, but himself to strike. When therefore, at nine 
A. M., Hancock, having perfected his dispositions, resumed 
the advance, he struck a front of opposition that was now 
immovable. Though he assaulted furiously, he made no far- 
ther progress. 

The situation of Hancock's force was now somewhat pecu- 
liar. His left remained on the Brock road ; his centre and 
right were advanced a mile or more in front of that road.. 



\ 



378 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAU. 

But while that portion that remained in the breastworks along 
the Brock road had a secure stay for its flank, the left of the 
forward line was wholl,>' unprotected, being quite in the air. 
It had been found impossible to further move the enemy, 
and for a defensive position the advanced line was ill placed. 
Yet it was soon to be thrown on the defensive by a ^erce at- 
tack of the enemy. 

From the close of Hancock's morning combat about nine 
A. M., there was a long lull till near noon. During this in- 
terval I rode from the head-quarters of Generals Grant and 
Meade to visit Hancock, whom I found on horseback at the 
junction of the Brock road and the Orange plank road. I 
had been there but a short time when a terrific outburst of 
musketry announced that the Confederates had taken the of- 
fensive, and in a few minutes a throng of fugitives came 
rushing back from Hancock's advanced line, and overran us 
on the Brock road and spread through the woods in great 
confusion. Hancock, flaming out with the fire of battle, rode 
hither and thither, directing and animating ; but the disrup- 
tion of the left flank spread calamity through the line, and 
though Hancock endeavored by throwing back that flank to 
still hold on to the advanced position with his right, it wsis 
found impossible to do so, and he had to content himself with 
rallying and reforming his troops behind the breastworks on 
the Brock road. "VVadsworth, on the right of Hancock, op- 
jDOsed the most heroic eflbrts to the enemy's onset ; but he 
was finally unable to hold his men to their work, and he fell 
mortally hurt while endeavoring to stay their flight. 

It seemed indeed that irretrievable disaster was upon us ; 
but in the very torrent and tempest of the attack, it suddenly 
ceased, and all was still. What could cause this surcease of 
efibrt at the very height of success, was then wholly un- 
known to us ; but when after the close of the war, I had an 
opportunity of meeting General Longstreet, he solved the 
riddle for me. It appears that on Longstreet's arrival, Lee 



WILDERNESS. 379 

determined by concentrating both corps in a supreme eflbrt 
to overwhelm Hancock in one decisive stroke. The forenoon 
was therefore spent in careful preparations ; and in order to 
give full effect to the meditated blow, it was planned that 
while one force should press directly against the Union front, 
another should be sent by a detour to attain the rear of the 
Union left, and seize the Brock road. Having seen the front 
attack opened with most encouraging success, Longstreet, 
with his staff, galloped down the plank road to direct the 
effects of the turning force, when suddenly)* confronting a por- 
tion of his own turning column, the cavalcade was by it mis- 
taken for a party of Union horse, and received a volley, under 
Tvhich Longstreet fell severely wounded. As that officer had 
made all the dispositions, his fall completely disconcerted the 
plan : so that Lee suspended the attack, and it was not till 
four in the afternoon that he got things in hand to renew it. 
Returning to head-quarters under the trees on the hill-side 
near the Lacv house, I found Grant sittins: on the srrass, 
smoking alternately a jDipe and a cigar — calm, imperturbable, 
quietly awaiting events and giving few orders, for indeed on 
such a field there were few orders to be given. I soon learnt 
that little had resulted from the attack of Warren and Sedsr- 
wick. And indeed the main interest centred on Hancock, to 
whom, from the corps of the former officer, had been sent two 
divisions, and from that of the latter one division — so that 
Hancock held in hand full half of the army. Nevertheless, 
with the remaining moiety of these corjis both Sedgwick and 
"Warren had vigorously attacked in the morning. It soon be- 
came apparent, however, that the enemy held one of those 
powerful positions that could not be carried, and against which 
all effort was a vain sacrifice of life. In fact, both Warren 
and Sedgwick were brought to a dead-lock : no impression 
whatever could be made on the enemj-'s position. Much had 
been hoped from an effort which was to be made by Burnside, 
who was to advance through an interval between Warren's 



380 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

left and Hancock's right in such a manner that he would have 
struck the rear of the hostile force confronting the latter of- 
ficer. But after passing the day in a fruitless course of peripa- 
tetics through the woods, the corps in the afternoon fell back 
and entrenched. It thus came about, that as the fight died 
away along the right and centre, and as after Lee's attack upon 
Hancock there was quiet also on the left, the storm of war 
along all the opposing lines was hushed into a dead calm that 
continued up to four p. m. 

But Grant was far from having given up the fight. " It has 
been my experience," he observed to the writer as we sat un- 
der the trees on the hill-side, " it has been my experience that 
though the southerners fight desperately at first, yet when we 
Jiang on for a day or two we whip them awfidhj y He there- 
fore ordered Hancock to attack once more at six in the even- 
hig. 

Yet it soon appeared that neither was the aggressive ardor 
of Lee wholly quenched. For while Hancock Avas making his 
dispositions for the attack, the Confederates resumed the of- 
fensive against him. Lee had, at length, got things in hand, 
and, being resolved to complete the work begun by Longstreet, 
but broken off by that ofiicer's fall, he once more launched for- 
ward his lines. A little past four, the Confederate lines in 
long and solid array came forward through the woods, and 
overrunning the Union skirmishers pressed up Avithout halting 
to the edge of the abatis less than a hundred paces from Han- 
cock's front lines. Here, pausing, they opened a furious and 
continuous fire of musketry, Avhich, however, did not greatly 
harm the Union troops, vrho, kneeling behind 'their breast- 
works, returned the fire Avith vigor. It is not doubtful that 
the repulse of the enemy would have been easily effected : 
but an untoward accident for a time placed the result in jeop- 
ardy. The forest in front, through Avhich the battle of the 
morning had been fought, chanced to take fire, and a short 
time before the afternoon attack Avas made the flames com- 



WILDERNESS. 381 

municated to the log parapet of the left of the front line. 
At the critical moment of the enemy's onset a high wind 
blew the intense heat and smoke in the faces of the men, 
many of whom were from this canse kept from firing, while 
others were compelled to vacate the lines. The Confederates 
seizing the opportunity swept forward, and some of them 
reached the breastworks, which they crowned with their colors. 
But the triumph was short-lived. " At the moment when the 
enemy reached our lines," says Hancock, "General Birney 
ordered Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division to advance 
upon them and drive them back. Carroll moved by the left 
flank and then forward at the double-quick, retaking the 
breastworks at once, and forcing the enemy to fall back and 
abandon the attack in great disorder and with heavy loss in 
killed and wounded." 

This substantially closed the action of the second day of 
the "Wilderness, though the enemy contrived to excite con- 
siderable alarm by a night sally made against the ri^ht flank 
of the army. In this aflair Generals T. Seymour and Shaler 
were captured ; but the result w^as, as a whole, unimportant. 

The morning of Saturday, May 7th, found the opjDosing 
armies still confronting each other in the Wilderness : yet 
neither side showed any aggressive ardor. There was light 
skirmishing throughout the forenoon ; but it w^as manifest that 
both armies were so worn out that they mutually feared to 
attack, though they were not unwilling to be attacked. It 
had been a deadly wrestle, yet the result so far was inde- 
cisive. The Union troops, wearied and chagrined, sent up 
no cheer of victory through the Wilderness. Many, indeed, 
believed we would recross the Rapidan. 

But there vras one man that was otherwise minded. 
During the day the coi-ps were gathered into compact shape, 
the trains were drawn out of the way, and the columns were 
disposed for the march ; for Grant, like Phocion, desired to 



382 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

have .111 army " fitted Jor the long race." When night came, 
he seized the mighty mass and launched it southward — to- 
wards Eichmond ! 

ni. 

EESULTS OF THE WILDERNESS, 

The story of the Southern AYar is filled with the records 
of great battles whose immediate fortunes were divided with 
such equal hand that both sides claimed the victory. Nor 
were these issues dul:)ious in semblance onl}^ ; for, if we as- 
sume as the test of decisiveness in action some material 
change ■wrought in the military problem, some positive alter- 
ation in the ratio of the contending forces, something, in a 
word, M^iich has palpal^ly deflected the current of the war by 
its interposition — very many of the four years' battles must 
be set down as tentative and fruitless. This observation 
holds gqpd even when gigantic armies h;ive wrestled in pro- 
longed stress of combat on fields heaped with the holocausts 
of ineficctual sacrifice. Into the reasons on which this fact 
rests, it would be discursive here to enter deeply : — whether 
it be partly traceable to the nature of the struggle and the 
character and equality of the combatants, whose veins pulsed 
with a common blood ; whether partly to a similarity of arms, 
equipments, discipline, and method of action ; whether joartly 
and principally to the physique of the battle-fields, whose 
sites were mainly hostile to manoeuvre, noAV consisting of a 
mere maze of dense undergrowth hardly passable by its de- 
ceitful, tortuous, boggy footpaths, now a terrain upheaved 
mto a tumble of swamp, ravine, and thicket, — often defying 
tactical combinations, and not seldom neutralizing cavalry, or 
artilleiy, or both, and turning pitched battle into an enor- 
mous Indian fight of man to man, with pursuit by the final 
victor almost impossible. 

To all appearances, the battle of the Wilderness had every 



WILDERNESS. 383 

characteristic of such bloody and indecisive combats. And, 
indeed, if we regard the individual action without reference 
to its sequel, it would be difficult to say of what it was de- 
cisive. The material losses on the Union side exceeded 
those of the Confederates, being about fifteen thousand to 
ten thousand. Besides, after the action was concluded in 
such manner as we have seen, Lee still held his position defi- 
antly, and only withdrew when on the night of the third 
day he found himself flanked by his antagonist's manoeuvre 
towards Spottsylvania Courthouse. 

Nevertheless, if we deeply consider this mysterious and 
terrible battle in the Wilderness, we shall discover that it 
differed essentially from the many encounters that had taken 
place on the Rapidan and Rappahannock ; and it will, per- 
haps, appear that it takes this significance from being the 
type of that series of operations which make up the wonder- 
ful campaign from the Eapidan to the James — a campaign 
unparalleled in military history for its duration, the character 
of the operations and the number of battles fought, and 
which, prosecuted with a remorseless energy, resulted in 
gradually throwing back the Confederate army, and finally in 
shutting it up within the lines of Petersburg and Richmond, 
whence it was not to issue save to its doom and downfall. 

The Wilderness, I say, prefigured this campaign. As an 
action it was without brilliancy in its conduct. It was a 
mere collision of brute masses — or as an officer on the field 
pithily expressed it to me, "the bumping, bumping of two 
armies, to see which could bump the hardest." It might 
have been fought by any other commander. But the differ- 
ence in the result was this : that while any other commander 
we had thus far seen would have fought the battle of the 
Wilderness and gone backward, Grant fought the battle of 
the Wilderness and went — forward! 

Looking at the war as a whole, Ave can see that the time 
had came for this manner of procedure. The North, fatigued 



384 THE TV^ELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

•with three years of seemingly fruitless warfare in Virginia, 
chagrined at the constant advances followed by constant re- 
treats, demanded a captain who, without too chary a regard 
for human life, should go on: and the people were perfectly 
willing that he should use the resources lavishly, provided 
only he produced results. If the time had come, the battle 
of the Wilderness showed that the man also had come. • 

It is not my purpose here to follow out that wondrous 
series of operations that make up the overland campaign — 
those up-piled terraces of struggle at Spottsjdvania and the 
North Anna and Cold Harbor — those Titanic combats that 
made the country between the Rapidan and the James one 
vast red Aceldama. Let the mighty wrestle in the Wilder- 
ness stand as the type and exemplar of all the rest, as 
that which announced alike to friend and foe that hencefor- 
ward it was war to the death. 



ATLANTA. 385 



X. 

ATLANTA. 



PRELUDE TO ATLANTA. 

Surveying from his loft}'- mountain fastness at Chattanooga 
the broad subjacent country to the far-off Mississippi, Sher- 
man, to whom Grant, on his removal to Virginia, had delegat- 
ed the command of all that vast theatre, saw that the war in 
the West was already nigh its end. The basin of the IVIissis- 
sippi was substantially overrun, the soil of Kentucky, Ten- 
nessee, and Missouri fast and forever in Union keeping, while 
in Mississippi and Alabama on the hither slope of the val- 
ley, and Arkansas and Louisiana on the other, such positions 
were held as to make military operations there on a grand 
scale waste of time and troops. A profitless blaze of victory 
might indeed be easily kindled in many quarters ; but to the 
distant south-west, there were no strategic points unconquered 
which might not better claim the attention of a body of cavalry 
or an invasion from a base near the Gulf. A few experi- 
mental thrustings of cavalry columns, and, in one case, of an 
infantry column, through the Gulf States, had verified Grier- 
son's pithy saying, that the Confederacy there was " a shell ; " 
and though other such expeditions might meet more discom- 
fort than danger, the shell was not worth the puncturing. 

But the Confederacy yet lived in its armies, and of these 

25 



386 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

one of the tAvo that still held the field strong and defiant con- 
fronted Sherman in an entrenched camp at Dalton, where it 
covered Georgia. But Georgia was now not only the chief 
granary, it was the main military workshop of the Confeder- 
acy, as Florida and Texas had been its corrals. Down in the 
heart of the State was Atlanta, the centre of a network of 
manufacturing cities and villages, — such as Rome, Roswell, 
Marietta, and the like, — from whose factories the Southern 
armies were now drawing powder, shot, shell, caps, cannon, 
small arms, clothing and equipments, wagons and harnesses, 
all the paraphernalia of war. Central Georgia Avas a vast 
grain-growing prairie, whence loaded cars rolled constantly to 
army store-houses, after harvest-time, to furnish the winter 
sustenance of many Confederate armies besides that of 
Johnston's. Georgia was the key-stone of the Confederate 
arch, whose firm northern buttress was Virginia. Through 
Macon and Atlanta ran the great railroad lines between the 
eastern and western Confederacy : to break them Avould be to 
sunder direct communication between the Atlantic States and 
the States of the Gulf, to cleave once more the Southern terri- 
tory from mountain to sea, as it had been rent asunder on 
the line of the Mississippi. To do this, and to destroy 
the army of his adversary, was the task imposed upon Sher- 
man. 

Of that ofBcer's fitness for the task its history is the best 
evidence ; and beforehand there was proof abundant not only 
in his skill and recognized genius on the one hand, but in his 
wide experience on the otlier. lie was a man of martial in- 
stinct, of quick intelligence, of fiir-reaching habit of thought, 
and even on his first field his talents had flashed out. iVt Bull 
Run, being for the first time under fire, he handled his brigade 
with noticeable ease, and gave several specific exhibitions of 
soldierly skill. In his second battle, Shiloh, Sherman was 
still more conspicuous ; for, though commanding a raw divis- 
ion, and while officers ranking him were on the field, the chief 



Atlanta. 387 

control of the action seems to have been instinctively and at 
once accorded to him, on the first day. General Halleck, on 
reaching the scene of action immediately sent word to Wash- 
ington that *'it is the unanimous opinion here that Brigadier- 
General "W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on the 
6th," while Grant crowned many words of eulogy by declar- 
ing " to his individual efibrts I am indebted for the success of 
that battle." Commencing his record thus brilliantly, Sher- 
man had very naturally soon become General Grant's favorite 
subordinate. The last act of his famous career had been a 
superbly rapid and well-conducted march of four hundred 
miles from Vicksburg to Chattanooga in season to allow him 
a " full man's share " of what hard blows were to be borne in 
the dethronement of Bragg from Missionary Ridge ; when, 
without taking breath, once more his fate appointed him to go 
to the relief of Burnside, then imprisoned at Knoxville : add- 
ing one hundred miles to his four hundred, by incredible ex- 
ertions he saved the gallant garrison. Thus the very nature 
of his best-known achievements, in the way of moving vast 
armies over vast regions with the precision and smoothness of 
mechanism, was the best augury of success in sweeping hith- 
er and thither as he might list, throughout Georgia. 

For his projected campaign, Sherman demanded one Inmdred 
thousand men in the proper ratio of the three arms ; and of ord- 
nance two hundred and fifty guns. The actual force with which 
he took the field was nearly as designed, the aggregate being 
ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven men 
and two hundred and fifty-four guns. The command con- 
sisted of three armies — Thomas's Array of the Cumberland, 
sixty thousand seven hundred and seventy-three strong ; ]Mc- 
Pherson's Army of the Tennessee, twenty -four thousand four 
hundred and sixty-five ; Schofield's Army of the Ohio, thirteen 
thousand five hundred and fifty-nine. 

The positions which the opposing armies had now assumed 
brought into striking light the strategic character of the 



388 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OE THE WAR. 

region, and the military value of its primary feature, Chatta- 
nooga. The great mountain system of East Tennessee ran 
like a ridge into the heart of the Confederacy : Chattanooga 
"was a natural bastion on the line of Confederate communica- 
tions. Ousted by Rosecrans from this key-point of the cen- 
tral zone, Bragg felt that without regaining it and the depend- 
ent mountain system, the Confederacy would always be 
vitally menaced, and accordingly essayed the movement 
which Grant had so rudely rebuifed. The possession of Chat- 
tanooga transferred to the Union armies the advantage of 
interior lines, while their opponents, throAvn off in turn upon 
exterior lines, ran the risk of being beaten in detail. South 
of Chattanooga, also, the mountains of the Blue Eidge, so 
hostile to operations directed across them easterly into Vir- 
ginia or North Carolina, by falling into the champaign country 
permitted forward movements. Knoxville, the centre of that 
valley district between the Alleghanies proper and the Blue 
Ridge, known as East Tennessee, and extending from Cum- 
berland Gap to Chattanooga, was held, like the two latter 
points, by Union forces, while, on the other flank, the 
Tennessee River was lined with garrisons sufficient to prevent 
the passage of infantry from the south. In a word, then, 
the Union jjosition at Chattanooga, itself impregnable, was 
Avell guarded on both flanks, and tempted its possessors to 
thrust strong columns into the plain below. Meanwhile it 
gave the inestimable advantage of a single line of operations 
combined with a double line of supplies, by means of the 
two railroads running, the one north-west to Nashville, the 
other due west to Memphis. 

The mishap of Bragg at Chattanooga had completed the 
disappointment and chagrin of that officer at his ill-starred 
western campaign. With the fact of his misfortunes only too 
l^alpable, their precise cause was still somewhat involved in 
mystery, it now appearing to be his own errors, now the mis- 
conduct of subordinates, now the weakness of his force, and 



ATLANTA. 389 

sometimes even a fatality ^vhich followed the Confederate 
cause in that region, whose influence it was hopeless to throw 
off. Mortified and annoyed, he withdrew to Richmond, and 
his superior, General J. E. Johnston, took the hdton of com- 
mand into his own hands. He found himself in possession, 
at Dalton, of 45,000 effective men — 40,900 infantry, and 
artillery, and 4000 cavalry : while several thousand cavalry 
were ready to be recalled, which meanwhile were prying hither 
and thither, through Georgia and Alabama, to see if some 
careless avenue had not escaped the watchful Sherman along 
his wide flanks, at which entering, they might get upon his 
enormously attenuated lines of supply. Some other rein- 
forcements were collecting, to be poured into the gaps made 
by battle- These, therefore, and certain indefinite masses of 
possible Georgia militia, which, thanks to the impracticable 
intensity of States' Eights authority, had to be left to come to 
the field at the call of their own delicate fancy, constituted his 
army. The whole fortune with which it started on its new ca- 
reer consisted of a testamentary bequest of numerous disasters. 
To Avhat role Johnston was now limited by the evolution 
of past events, it was easy to see ; for his foe, in all a hundred 
thousand strong, lay intrenched with his main army at the 
apex of the grand strategic triangle before him, and covering 
armies drawn a little distance down on either side of the 
salient. One flank of this Union position was ribbed and 
ridged with the natural barriers of a great mountain system, 
the other by a broad river, studded with garrisons at the 
crossing-points. Of necessity content to protect what re- 
mained, rather than to idly attempt regaining what was lott, 
Johnston fortified himself strongly in and around Dalton, the first 
position of importance south of the Union advanced lines, now 
at Ringgold, in front of Chattanooga. But the restless gov- 
ernment at Richmond, stung into petulance by past defeat in 
the West, and half impressed by the fate which seemed inev- 
itably to cloud that horizon, resolved to shake ofl" the spell of 



390 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

disaster before it was further fixed, or at least to prove that 
it had good cause to despair, before despairing. Accordingly, 
Johnston, on taking command about Christmas of 1863, was 
instantly pressed for an offensive camjDaign, to redeem the 
disaster of Missionary Ridge : but the condition of his anny 
forced him to decline the undertaking, and winter was passed 
in recruiting. However, when March opened, it had brought 
to Johnston no troops of importance, and, on the other hand, 
detachments for minor purposes had weakened him, so that 
March and April passed in the rapid exchange of tele- 
graphic theses between Dalton and Eichmond, as to whether 
an offensive army could be made out of nothing, and a brisk 
disputation on the method by which such an army should 
advance into Tennessee. 

It is needless to inquire what might have been the upshot 
of these speculations, for they were rudely interrupted by 
Sherman's initiative. On the 4th of May the Army cf the 
Potomac crossed the Rapidan, and on the same day Gnmt, 
pausing by the wa3^sido, while seated upon a felled tree, 
wrote a terse word to be flashed over the wires to his col- 
league at Chattanooga. Sherman's three armies, as if loosed 
from the tugging leash, bounded forward, and the campaign 
began. Let us follow its course closely, for in respect of 
the skill displayed, both in the attack and defence, it forms 
a most interesting study. 

Commanders do not always insist upon recalling, after the 
working out of a campaign from theory to history, precisely 
what their real intent was, but have their memory of what 
they designed to effect influenced by the palpable fact of 
what they did or did not effect : this habit simplifies history, 
though sometimes it checks confusion at the expense of strict 
accuracy. In the two great spring campaigns of 18G4, there lay 
before each Union commander, in Virginia as in Georgia, 
first, a hostile army, his immediate objective ; secondly, a 
city, his remoter geographical objective : and since the de- 



ATLANTA. 391 

clsivc defeat of the former was the easy capture of the latter, 
such a defeat at the outset became the first object of the new 
campaign. To force the adversary at once by manoeuvre to a 
great battle, and to win therefrom decisive victory, became 
the aim ; to be unable to do so could not be fairly regarded as 
a defeat, but it would be a foil, and a disappointment, — a post- 
ponement of victory. Sherman's desire was, if possible, to 
fall upon his opponent soon after sallying from Chattanooga, 
and to overthrow him in a grand battle ; in that case, he could 
drive the exhausted remnant of Confederate force either 
altogether from its natural liue of retreat, or force it rapidly 
backward beyond Atlanta. If, ou the other hand, it was 
Sherman's aim to fight the battle for Atlanta near Chattanoo- 
ga, the reverse was Johnston's policy, unless, indeed, he 
could get such odds of position, in return for willingness to 
fight at once, as would compensate for withdrawal. For 
decisive battle and victory for Sherman was essentially the 
same, nearer or farther from Atlanta : in either case, such 
were the numbers and character of Johnston's forces that the 
city would be sure. But decisive battle and victory for 
Johnston Avould be infinitely more valuable far away from 
Sherman's base, since then the latter's communications could 
be ruined by the cavalry, and his army distressed for sup- 
plies. At the start, however, Johnston lay well forward in 
and around Dalton, on the railroad, in a position almost im- 
pregnable. In front, on the line of advance from Chatta- 
nooga, or rather from Ringgold, where Thomas's army lay, 
Itocky Face Mountain imposed n huge, impregnable, natural 
barrier, divided by a narrow ravine called Mill Creek Gap 
(or, ftiorc expressively, Buzzard's Roost), at the bottom of 
which ran the main road and railroad to Dalton, and, winding 
among the hills. Mill Creek, a tributary of the Oostanaula. 
Along the slopes of this ravine, on its natural rock epaulc- 
ments, Johnston planted batteries, sweeping it in all direc- 
tions, and mouuted artillery especially upon a ridge at its 



392 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

easterly end, which, as Sherinau says, ran "like a traverse 
directly across its debouche.'' To detain the assailants under 
the fire cf his artillery and infantry Johnston felled al^atis 
through the ravine, and flooded it by dams built on Mill 
Creek. His flanks he easily preserved by similar defences 
on the inaccessible spurs of the same mountain system, and 
so felt himself secure. Had Johnston been able to count on 
his opponent's "willingness to fling himself in direct attack 
against his various prepared positions, all anxiety for the 
campaign would have ceased, for he could have found any 
required number of natural fortresses for that purpose be- 
tween Dalton and Atlanta, and would have had men to spare 
for other desirable objectn. But he could not hope that j)iece 
of fortune from his antagonist, who, being by no means fool- 
hardy, could be safely counted on to devise in his brain a 
method for forcing an encounter on something like equal 
terms. Sherman, in a word, must certainly make a detour, 
with intent to turn the enemy's flank, and, getting upon his 
communications, would force him out of his craggy citadel. 
Johnston's right had assurance of safety, not only in the im- 
practicable region, but in the obvious aun of Sherman's 
advance, and the line he must take in order to cover his com- 
munications with the Tennessee. His left was the point to be 
menaced. Accordingly, while Sherman was busily preparing 
his supplies, Johnston was as busily mending and cutting 
roads in the rear of his position, so that whatever direction 
Sherman's flankinoc column should take throu2:h the rou£2:h 
country, he could march faster to confront it : and he also 
minutely observed the physique of the whole region, and 
selected later i^ositions for defence, from the Tennessee down 
to the Chattahoochie ; for obviously the great battle of the 
campaign ought to occur near the banks of the latter river. 
Well aware of the reception prepared for him at Rocky 
Face INIountain, Sherman had planned — under cover of a 
demonstration on the latter point so very vigorous as to de- 



ATLANTA. 39^ 

ceive even Lis wily antagonist into the notion that the Union 
troops were aiming to parallel the successful storming of 
Missionary Ridge — to throw a strong column far to Johnston's 
left and rear. For this jiurpose he had hitherto positioned 
the armies of McPherson, of Thomas, and of Schofield, form- 
ing his right, his centre, and his left, respectively at Gordon's 
Mill on the Chickamauga, at Ringgold, and at Red Clay, due 
north of Dalton on the Georgia line. Schofield was to 
march south, upon the enemy's right flank, Thomas to actually 
enter Buzzard's Roost Gap, in a determined move, while 
McPherson was to slip hastily down on the west through 
Ship's Gap, past Villanow, through Snake Creek Gap, to 
Resaca, eighteen miles on the railroad due south of Dalton, 
there or in that region fall upon the railroad, and so thorough- 
ly break it up as to cut Johnston's line of supplies. This suc- 
ceeding, Johnston could not fail instantly to withdraiv ; when 
McPherson, who, after breaking the road, was to have retired 
a few miles to Snake Creek, and there fortified himself, would 
sally forth and attack Johnston in flank on the retreat. While 
McPherson thus hung upon him and detained him, Thomas 
would push through the now abandoned gap, and, with 
Schofield, catch up with Johnston's rear and fall upon it, and 
so bring on a general and decisive battle. 

On the 7th of May, after two days' skirmishing, the columns 
went forward, and Thomas, driving the Confederate cavalry 
outposts from Tunnel Hill, at the mouth of Mill Creek Gap, 
entered it, and made a bold push, on the 8th and 9th, for the 
summits. Geary's division of Hooker's corps brilliantly 
assaulted the Confederate troops in their position at Dug Gap. 
Newton's division of Howard's corps forced its way well to- 
wards Dalton, and Schofield pushed down thither with his 
army from the north. But this gallant attack was not de- 
signed to carry the position, much less expected to do so : 
for everything was based on McPherson's detour. The latter 
officer, as ordered, had entered Snake Creek with the corps 



394 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE TVAR. 

of Logan and Dodge, i^receded by Kilpatrick's division of 
cavalry, but found there Canty's brigade of cavalry ; and, on 
driving the latter into Resaca, discovered, to his chagrin, 
that Johnston, fathoming the whole scheme, had already in- 
terposed a checkmate, and made Resaca " too strong to bo 
carried by assault." Canty's brigade, indeed, had been sent 
to Resaca on the 5th, and, on giving the alarm on the 9th, 
had been joined in the works by three full infantry divisions, 
which marched the same evening by roads constructed for 
this purpose. Moreover, while ]\IcPherson thus paused, fac- 
ing Resaca, and imable to get upon the railroad either above 
or below, he became suddenly aware that, instead of turning 
the enemy's flank, his own was in danger, from roads which 
ran down from Dalton across his present left Hank and rear. 
Pearing lest Johnston, suddenly abandoning Dalton, might 
appear on these roads, McPherson fell back across them 
several miles westerly, to Snake Creek, and there threw up 
intrenchments. And so quickly ended the first stage of the 
campaign. 

In reviewing this movement, several reflections arise as to 
its conduct. The times of moving and attacking, as usual in 
Sherman's operations, were perfectly arranged. But McPher- 
son, instead of doing the main part of his assigned task, that 
of breaking the railroad, did only the secondary part, which 
was to fall back from it and intrench himself. The reason 
assigned is the strength of Resaca, and the actual fact in the 
case determines the question of feasibility. The force Avhich 
McPherson had was between twenty thousand and thii-ty thou- 
sand — considerably larger than that of the garrison on his 
arrival, and sufficient to overcome any but a very strong and 
well-defended position. Moreover, it may be suggested that 
since ever3^hing was made dependent on ]\IcPherso!i's demon- 
stration, it might have been well at least to feel the enemy's 
strength, and even to make a bold adventure of attack ; for 
if this part of the plan did not succeed, no part succeeded. 



ATLANTA. 395 

But, on the other hand, it is clear that, if Rcsaca were really 
too strong to be carried, McPherson is to be praised for not 
attempting it, and so dampening the campaign with defeat at 
the outset. Of the actual fact, McPherson 's peculiar engi- 
neering genius and training enabled him very well to judge, 
and his position as commander authorized him to act on that 
judgment. Moreover, the discovery that the enemy was not, 
as expected, taken unawares at Resaca, but was ready for 
him, placed him in a false position as he halted before it; 
and the good roads from Dalton running in his rear, con- 
firmed his impression that the object of his presence was 
understood, and would be turned to his disadvantage if he 
remained there, by an attack from those roads. It is true 
that at this point one inquires again if battle was an unde- 
sirable thing to obtain ; but, at all events, having found the 
state of affairs diifcrent from what he had been led to expect, 
^IcPherson could rely on that fact to decline making an un- 
calculated assault. Above all, however, there is the decisive 
fact that Johnston had seen through the move from the out- 
set, had long before prepared the defences at Eesaca to check 
it, and had so repaired the roads as to throw back thither any 
required portion of his force at Dalton. It will be suggested, 
however, admitting this point, that a force sufficient to take 
Eesaca should have been thrown out to the right. But it 
may bo answered that this would have exposed still more 
thoroughl}' the plan, and have made the demonstration at 
Buzzard's Eoost a very palpable feint. McPherson's move was 
the main one, yet it could not be made with the main force, 
for fear of attracting attention. It may farther, accordingly, 
be suggested that the move might have been made by a 
wider detour, striking the railroad still lower; or, if this 
would imperil too much the flanking colimm, that it should 
be made by a light cavalry column. Sherman's dcsn-e, how- 
ever, had been not merely to make the enemy retreat towards 
Atlanta by getting on his line of supply, but to have a force 



396 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ready also, on the flank, to check that retreat so soon as it 
was commenced, in order that the rest of the army might 
come up, and fight the enemy dislodged from position. 

At all events, Sherman was not long in making up his 
mind what to do next. " Somewhat disappointed at the 
result," he had yet, as usual, provided for its possibility. It 
being useless to keep up the attack on Kocky Face Ridge, he 
gave orders, on the 10th, for throwing his whole army round 
to JMcPherson's position, except Howard's corps and some 
cavalry. To cover this move, skirmishing was carried on all 
day of the 10th, and a spirited attack made upon Bates's 
division at night. Next day the Union army was in motion 
to the right, and simultaneously Johnston threw Loring's divis- 
ion down to Resaca, following it, on the night of the 12th, with 
the rest of his force, the cavalry bringing up the rear. 
Howard marched after him throuoh Dalton. Havino^ divined 
his opponent's intent, Johnston, on the loth, drew up his 
whole army in his second prepared position, in and around 
Eesaca, with Polk's left on the Oostanaula, Hardee in the 
centre, and Hood's right on the Connesauga. They, and 
especially Loring, on the left, had sharp fighting with Mc- 
Pherson, who drove Loring back to the Oostanaula; and so, 
ensconced in his works, Johnston awaited the arrival of the 
rest of Sherman's army, which the next day, indeed, brought 
to light. Sherman, comprehending all at a glance, resolved 
to try his hand once more upon his opponent's communica- 
tions, and this time in a somewhat different method. 

From Resaca, the Oostanaula runs south-westerly to 
Rome, whence a branch of the main railroad runs due east to 
Kingston which is due south of Rcsaca. Between Resaca 
and Kingston, are the railroad towns of Calhoun and Adairs- 
ville. Supposing Johnston to hold Resaca, as he had held 
Dalton, with his main force, Sherman determined to attack 
him at once with his whole army, detailing only light and 
rapid columns to cut off his communications below. Accord- 



ATLANTA. 397 

ingly, he threw pontoons over the Oostanaula at Lay's 
Fcny, near Calhoun, and marched one division, Sweeney's, 
across it against this place, while, under the mask both of 
his main force and Sweenej-'s, he threw the whole cavalry 
division of Gcrrard much farther below, to break the railroad 
between Calhoun and Kingston. "Without pause, on the 
same day, the 14th, Sherman attacked the Resaca intrench- 
ments at all points, from noon till late at night. McPherson 
was on the right, Thomas in the centre, and Schofield, who 
had forced his way through the rough woods, on the left. 
Thomas pressed obstinately through Camp Creek Valley, 
and Hooker's coi^ds crossed the creek. A severe engagement 
resulted all along the centre and right of Johnston's position, 
in which the troops of Thomas and Schofield, crossing the 
valley separating their own position from the intrenchments 
of Hood and Hardee, vigorously endeavored to carry the 
position. But the muddy bottom of Mill Creek, the natural 
entanglements of the undergrowth and stunted willows on its 
banks, interlaced with vines, and the trees felled over the 
ravines on both slopes, prevented advance, and nothing was 
gained there ; and, at nightfall. Hood was able even to recover 
some ground seized in the morning. On the Union right, 
however, McPherson got handsomely across Camp Creek, 
and, bursting upon Polk, drove him out of position, and 
planted his artillery on heights which swept with a command- 
ing fire the Confederate bridges across the river, while 
Sweeney crossed the Oostanaula below on the pontoon bridge, 
towards Calhoun. Hastening a division to the latter point, 
to check Sweeney, Johnston ordered Hood to attack, on the 
15th, so as to counterbalance Polk's misfortune. But, on 
hearing that the Union right had begun to cross down at 
Lay's Ferry, on the pontoons, Johnston quickly countermanded 
his orders of attack, and passed the Oostanaula at night, 
burning the railroad bridge behind him. Stewart's division, 
however, not receiving the countermand, attacked Hooker's 



398 TILE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

corps, and was badly repulsed, in the afternoon. Hooker fol- 
lowed up his advantage, and added to the positions he had 
before seized, which Stewart's attack was designed to recap- 
ture : his trophies were four guns and several hundred pris- 
oners. In the operations around Rcsaca, the Union loss was 
from 4000 to 5000 killed and wounded, that of the Con- 
federates much less, from the protection of their works. So 
ended the second stage of the cam"paign. 

From Rcsaca, Johnston retreated down the railroad to 
Cassvillc, four miles east of Kingston, with the Union army 
after him. At Calhoun, Hardee had a brush with IMcPherson, 
who had crossed, on the IGth, at Lay's Ferry, and next at 
Adairsville a sharp affair with Newton's advance division, mov- 
ing on the Resaca road. Meanwhile Davis marched his division 
westerly to Rome, and, finding it abandoned, took possession 
of a few heavy guns, and all the valuable rolling mills and 
iron works. On the 19th, Johnston had fully taken up his 
third position in rear of Cassvillc, on a steep, intrenched ridge, 
with a valley in front swept by his fire. His losses had 
hitherto been slight, and were now more than made up by re- 
inforcements, of which French's division of Polk's corps was 
the chief. Inspired by this addition, he ordered an attack on 
the approaching Union columns ; but, through a misappre- 
hension of General Hood, tlie plan miscarncd, and Sherman, 
misuspicious, and, indeed, probably careless of this intent, 
moved on into position in front of Cassvillc, and meanwhile 
ordered his artillery to play at the intrenchmcnts. At night- 
fall, Polk and Hood, both brave ofEcers, having first talked 
over the subject together, approached Johnston, and urged 
him to retreat at once across the Etowah, their reason being 
that their present position was untenable, luider the sweep of 
the Union batteries. Johnston and Hardee thought other- 
wise, but, yielding at length to the earnest appeals of the two 
former oSccrs, Johnston committed the groat mistake of his 
march, and, abandoning, without a blow, the whole of the 



ATLANTA. 399 

fine valley of the Etowah, he precipitately moved to that 
river at early dawn of the 20th, crossed it, and, making a 
longer stride in retreat than ever, passed both Allatoona and 
Ackworth, and made for the chain of hills which cross from 
east to west in front of Dallas and jMarietta. So ended pacifi- 
cally the third stage of the campaign. 

The morning of the 20th revealed to Sherman that his en- 
emy had fled. Astonished this time, and not a little cha- 
grined, at the revelation, he began to doubt whether it would 
be possible to bring his opponent to a decisive field on the 
hither side of the Chattahoochie. At all events, however, 
he could console himself with the easy mastery of the Etowah 
and its bridge* and the roads adjacent, and derived confidence 
from the numerical weakness exhibited by his enemy's declin- 
ing to fight even on terms so favorable as Cassville had pro- 
posed. The only word of ambition for a conquering army is 
" forward " ; so forward it was again for Sherman's columns. 
Their commander, convinced that Johnston was determined 
to draw him far into the interior before engaging him with 
anything like sincerity, nevertheless boldly accepted the issue ; 
and though he felt that he had lost the choice of battle-ground, 
was confident of success on a field of his enemy's choosing. 
His necessity, his success hitherto, and his own adventurous 
spirit, alike impelled him to rapid advance. Nevertheless, he 
resolved to make a third effort to cut oS his opponent's 
retreat, and so, dislodging him from his entrenchments, 
grapple with him on open ground. Supposing Johnston 
would pause in the natural stronghold of Allatoona Pass, 
Sherman determined to make a detour to the right, of the 
widest character, and this time in a method difierent from 
cither of the former. Accordingl}^, he filled his wagons with 
twenty days' supplies, and on May 23d started his whole 
army, except the garrisons at Rome and Kingston, for Dal- 
las, which lies to the south-west of Allatoona. The columns 



400 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

were so marched across the Etowah and beyond as to cloak the 
flanking move, but Johnston detected it on the very day of 
starting, and took position at New Hope Church, just east of 
Dallas, covering the various roads leading back to the rail- 
road. Hood was on the right at the church, Polk in the cen- 
tre, and Hardee on the left, crossing the road to Atlanta. 
On the 25th Hooker, in Thomas's advance, had got up near 
the church, and after Geary's division had skirmished severely 
all the afternoon, an hour before sunset he got the other 
two divisions in hand, and assaulted Stewart's division of 
Hood's corps at the church for two hours with tremendous 
fury, ceasing only when night and the storm made him desist. 
The next three days, however, Avere taken up with constant 
fighting all along the lines, resulting from Sherman's endeav- 
ors to deploy and push his troops close up to the enemy's in- 
trenchments ; and, on the afternoon of the 27th, this effort 
culminated in a fierce assault of Cleburne's position, which 
Johnston reports to have been repulsed " with great slaughter." 
This ofiicer estimates his own loss in each of the two main en- 
gagements at four hundred and fifty, and that of the Union 
forces at about three thousand in each. On the 28th, how- 
ever, Sherman says that a "bold and daring assault" on 
McPherson while the latter was "in good breastworks," re- 
ceived a " terrible and bloody repulse." Constant skirmish- 
ing continued till the 4th of June, during which interval Sher- 
man had worked to the left and covered the roads leading 
back to Allatoona and Ackworth, the former of which he had 
resolved to use as a second base for his now attenuated line 
of supplies. 

Ten days of this dead-lock and unprosperous grapple, how- 
ever, was already too much for a soldier of Sherman's tem- 
perament, and he determined once more to turn the enemy 
out of his position. To move again to the right Avould throw 
the Union force too far from the railroad, which Sherman was 
compelled to keep open and use. He therefore began to work 



ATLANTA. 401 

gradually and methodically across to the left, and Johnston, 
watching, followed in a parallel line also to the east, and so, 
face to face, the armies reached the railroad, Sherman at Ack- 
worth, and Johnston at Marietta. In front of the latter town, 
Johnston took up a formidable position on the mountain chain, 
which, with Kenesaw on his right, Lost Mountain on the left, 
and Pine Mountain thrust forward in the centre, formed a 
complete defence for Marietta and the railroad. His troops 
busily threw up intrenchments and felled trees in front, while 
Sherman, at Ackworth, was receiving large reinforcements, 
consisting chiefly of two divisions under Blair, and Long's 
cavalry brigade ; and meanwhile, he had repaired the railroad 
to the very rear of his camp, and unloaded ample jjrovisions 
within his linos. At length, when ready to advance, Sher- 
man found the same problem presented anew to him at Ken- 
esaw which he had solved at Dalton, at Resaca, and at Dal- 
las. This time, however, he Avas loath to risk its solution in 
the same way ; for his army was near at the end of a greatly 
prolonged line of supply, and a detachment of a flanking force 
to the right or left was a more serious aflTair than it had hith- 
erto been. The preparations of the enemy showed that this 
position was not to be abandoned, like the one at Cassville, 
but to be fought, like the one at Resaca : and so strong was 
it by nature and art that any detour of his might be met by 
an attack from forces easily detached from the small numbers 
required to hold Marietta. Accordingly he abandoned his 
previous methods for the time, and resolved to experiment 
directly against the hostile breastworks . He marched from Ack- 
worth on the 9th of June, his troops full of confidence, well fed, 
and encouraged by reinforcements. The fighting commenced 
the next day, and lasted, now in skirmish and now in battle, 
but always without respite, till the 3d of July. Hood was 
on the Confederate right, Polk in the centre at Pine Moun- 
tain, and Hardee on the left ; while McPherson was on the 
Union left, Thomas in the centre, and Schofield on the right. 

20 



402 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Through dense thickets and almost impassable ravines, Sher- 
man's troops sloAvly worked their way for many days, suf- 
fering much each day from the fire of their enemy, who had 
greater immunity, from his advantages of ground. During 
the battle of June 14th, General Polk was killed by a cannon- 
ball, and Loring succeeded him ; next day Pine Mountain was 
abandoned, and a few days later, L^pst Mountain. While these 
costly advances, however, were creditable to the gallantry of 
the assailants, they did not improve their position. For, in 
truth, Johnston's previous line had been extremely faulty by 
reason of its length ; and the tempting natural positions of 
those mountains, joined to some rational exiDectation tliat his 
enemy would again attempt to get round his left, in which 
case he would probably have sallied and attacked him, had 
induced Johnston to grasp a reach of ground disproportionate 
to his force. Indeed, it was this very fact Avhich had partly 
influenced Sherman, who saw it in his initial reconnoissance, 
to attack his position ; and his main effort had been to break 
through between Kenesaw and Pine ]\Iountain by a strong 
and Avell-officered force, composed of the corps of Hooker, 
Howard, and Palmer. But, instead of piercing the line, he 
had only rolled it back and condensed it ; since Johnston, 
seeing his error, had now put his centre, Loring's coi-ps, on 
Kenesaw as a salient, with Hood on the right flank drawn 
back across the Marietta and Canton road, and Hardee on the 
left aross the Marietta and Lost Mountain road. Hood was 
afterwards shifted to the left of Hardee, and on the 22d sud- 
denly and savagely attacked, near the Kulp House, Hooker's 
corps and a brigade of Schofield who was on the right ; but, 
after a spirited advance, he was checked and driven back with 
very severe loss. 

Sherman, however, had now been a month south of Ack- 
worth, and three weeks operating in vain against Kenesaw. 
The enemy was in stronger position than ever at the latter 
point, and had sufiered comparatively little, while his own 



ATLANTA. 403 

troops had been undergoing herculean labors, and had been 
cut up by the constant fire from the enemy's breastworks. It 
would not do to remain longer in this position, shifting and 
developing the lines with little profit ; and yet the other al- 
ternative, that of "flanking," besides the objections which 
were entertained to it three weeks before, would, if now 
adopted, suggest the query why it had not been chosen then, 
with saving of time and troops. Accordingly, Sherman felt 
authorized to make one grand assault against the heights of 
Kenesaw, with the desire of piercing the position. Three 
days' notice was given to the subordinate commanders, that 
the preparations might be complete. On the 27th, the bat- 
teries, planted for the purjDose, opened a terrific cannonade for 
several hours, and then, precisely at the moment fixed, two 
large armies rushed forward, Thomas and McPherson each as- 
saulting at the prescribed points, the former mainly striking 
Hardee's corps and the latter Loring's. They were both com- 
plefely repulsed, the killed and wounded being, according to 
Sherman, "about three thousand, while we inflicted compara- 
tively little loss : " indeed, the Confederate ofiicial loss Avas less 
than five hundred, while it was thought that the Union loss 
was as many thousands. 

Quick of apprehension, and not needing several experi- 
ments to teach him what one had demonstrated* Sherman no 
longer doubted as to his proper course. Feeling that his men 
had done all they could do for him in direct assault, he was 
content to resort once more to the old manoeuvre : and this 
time he executed it with even greater tactical brilliancy than 
before. After a few days' skirmish he moved McPherson, on 
the night of July 2d, once more on a flank march by the right 
down toward the Chattahoochie ; whereupon the same night 
Johnston abandoned Kenesaw and Marietta, and moved back 
on the railroad five miles from Marietta to Smyrna Church. 
Sherman eagerly pressed his columns, hoping to assail his an- 
tagonist while delayed by crossing the river ; but he found 



404: THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

that this event had been forscen, and the Chattahoochie covered 
with worlds, at the desired point, and an advance intrenched 
line thrown up at Smyrna. But pressing hard against this 
latter point, Thomas forced the skirmish line, w^here it was 
held by Smith's division of Georgia militia, just thrown in, 
and this, with other menaces, compelled the garrison to fall 
back to the intrenched river line which, at the point where the 
railroad crosses at Turner's Ferry, made an admirable bridge- 
head : to the river, also, retired the whole Confederate line. 
During four days' brisk skirmishing, Sherman, by degrees, 
threw a large force across the Chattahoochie, above Turner's 
Ferry, Schofield crossing at Soap Creek, on the 7th, Howard 
two miles below at Power's Ferry, on the 8th, while Mcpher- 
son's whole army lay ready and able to cross above, at Ros- 
well. All these forces built strong bridges, and intrenched 
their positions without much opposition, as the foi"dable nature 
of the river induced Johnson to take up his line along Peach- 
tree Creek and the Chattahoochie below that point. How- 
ever, as a consequence, on the night of the 9th, Johnson 
abandoned his strong position on the west bank of the river 
at Turner's Ferry, and in that act left Sherman, as the guer- 
don of his well-manceuvred and well-fought campaign, the 
unchallenged mastery of all North Georgia between the Ten- 
nessee and the Chattahoochie. 

n. 

BATTLE OF ATLANTA. 

In the latter days of the Confederacy, the grim fatality 
which from the outset had w^alked with it, side by side, along 
its destined course, silent and unseen, seemed to throw off, at 
length, the cloak of invisibility, to stab it boldly with mortal 
blows. Looking at that epoch even with such light as the few 
subsequent years of history have thrown upon it, in the logic 
of events and the character of the actors, we may find ration- 




TH. Thoinus 
Me. /> Me t'/ierson 
Sen ScAofiflA 
HO Howatxi- 
H. Hookrj' 

. Gnil'ederate Works 

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ATLANTA. 405 

al necessity for all that took place. But so stupendous were 
some of the acts of folly then perpetrated by the Confederate 
leaders, that one would say that it was not enough for the in- 
surrection to rear its front high opposed to the storm of blows 
which fell crushingly upon it from without, but it must suc- 
cumb to keener pangs received from within. "While, in the 
enthusiasm of the contest, it seemed hardly fanciful to declare 
that Fate itself, shadowing the Confederacy so long through 
successes, with unsuspected presence, at length revealed its 
sardonic figure in the moment of destiny, to fix its doom 
and downfall. 

One such mysterious blow to the Confederacy was that by 
which General Johnston was removed from its Western army 
at the moment when he was most needful for its salvation, 
kept from command till an intervening general had ruined 
and disintegi'ated it, and then gravely restored to the leader- 
ship of its pitiful fragments. 

By the middle of July, after a week of preparation on both 
sides, the well-earned rest of the two armies being broken 
only by detached skirmishes and the labom incident to the 
coming attack and defence, Sherman and Johnston were ready 
for the trial. Sherman, meanwhile, by way of episode, had, 
with Rousseau's cavalry column, broken up the Montgomery 
Kailroad, which brought Johnston's south-western supplies for 
many miles west of Opelika. For his main army he arranged 
specific plans of march and battle, posted the cavalry, im- 
proved the roads and bridges, and brought forward reinforce- 
ments and supplies. • Johnston was occupied as busily on his 
part. The railroad crosses the Chattahoochie at Turner's 
Ferry, a few miles distant from Atlanta, and at the same 
point Peach-tree Creek empties into that river. The Chatta- 
hoochie, above Peach-tree Creek, Johnston had abandoned part- 
ly, as he alleged, on account of its numerous fords, and partly 
because, in defending it, the broad and muddy channel of Peach- 
tree Creek would have separated the two wings of his army : at 



406 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

all events, Sherman easily commanded a crossing there, both 
north and west of Atlanta. Johnston, with a large force of 
negroes superintended by his engineers, girdled Atlanta with 
intrcnchments, mounted with heavy guns, and also selected 
two positions for assaulting the Union army as soon as it 
should appear in his front. Of these the first was on high 
ground south of the creek, from four to six miles from the city, 
whercfrom he would attack his enemy while crossing, in the 
hope of driving him back across the creek and then across 
the Chattahoochie, profiting by the confusion incident to the 
passage. Slioidd this prove unsuccessful, his second device 
was to withdraw his army to one side, and uncover his second 
position, which was a strongly intrenched line covering At- 
lanta between the Decatur and Marietta roads. Linins: this 
with the Georgia State troops ah-eady arrived and with others 
promised, he would await the moment when Sherman attacked 
them, when with his main army he would fall upon his oppo- 
nent's flank. This plan was obviously based on his adversa- 
ry's preparations to attack by crossing the Chattahoochie to 
the north of Turner's Ferry, and to advance against Peach- 
tree Creek, on the east of the city. His troops were well 
equipped and supplied, and his ordnance and trains in good 
condition. As to numbers, he had lost from Rinscrold to At- 
lanta ten thousand killed and wounded, and four thousand 
seven hundred from other causes. He had received durinof 
the campaign about twenty thousand men, leaving him there- 
fore, more than five thousand better than he started, and his 
army consisted of fifty-one thousand men, being forty-one thou- 
sand infimtry and ten thousand cavalry. He considered that 
Sherman's losses "could not have been less than five times as 
great as ours," particularly on account of the daily attacks 
made in line of battle upon the Confederate skirmishers in 
their rifle-pits, in dislodging whom " their loss was heavy and 
ours almost nothing. " Laying great stress, therefore, upon the 
belief that his troops " fighting under cover, had very trifling 
losses compared with those they inflicted," Johnston hoped 



ATLANTA. 407 

that against his o^vn ten thousand killed and wounded, an 
enormous counterbalance of Union loss must be set, swelled 
by losses, too, of garrisons, detachments, and expiring en- 
listments. To himself, on the other hand, many thousand 
State troops had been promised before the end of the month. 

But there were some elements in the problem not herein cal- 
culated. Johnston had been unable to break Sherman's won- 
derful line of supply ; and, therefore, the two armies met in 
that respect as equally as at Dalton ; his State troops were not 
in hand but in the bush, and his enemy not the man to Avait 
" for the end of the month " till they could be brought in ; the 
Union army despite its losses was again filled to the brim, 
near a hundred thousand strong, well-equipped and flushed 
with triumph ; and its army, corps, and division commanders 
included a portion of the ablest soldiers of the Union. 

On the 17th of July, in the order prescribed, the Union 
army went forward. On the same day Johnston, by an order 
from Richmond, was relieved from his position, and passed 
the baton. of command into the hands of Hood, a brave mau 
destitute of military ideas. 

. Developed in general line along the Peach-tree road, 
with Thomas on the right, Schofield in the centre, and Mc- 
Pherson on the left, the Union army swung around on the 
former as the fixed point. Thomas crossed Peach-tree 
Creek without difficulty in the front of the Confederate works, 
Schofield marched through Decatur toward Atlanta, and Mc- 
Pherson, coming down from Roswell, fell upon the Augusta 
Railroad and broke it up four miles, and continued on through 
Decatur to join Schofield's left. It now remained to develop 
all the armies in the line of battle close to Atlanta ; but, be- 
fore this could be well done, Hood, who, in accepting John- 
ston's command, had wisely adopted in general his plan, and 
requested him to make the dispositions of troops on Peach- 
tree Creek, began to play his part in the game. At four 
o'clock, on the afternoon of the 20th, Hood, having massed 
his troops, advanced on the Bucldaead road which runs from 



408 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Decatur to the CliJittahoochie, and struck into an interval be- 
tween Thomas's left and Schofield's right, which Sherman 
was just then trying to fill. The blow fell on Hooker's three 
divisions, and the divisions of Newton and Johnson ; and, 
suddenly given, was gallantly met. For a time the assault 
rolled back the Union troops ; but, after a five hours' battle, 
it was abandoned, the attacking party losing, as was conject- 
ured by Sherman, about five thousand men, while the troops 
attacked, being partly intrenched, lost but one thousand seven 
hundred and thirty-three. 

The execution of the first of Johnston's plans, that of 
attacking Sherman on his passage of Peach-tree Creek, having 
failed, although for a moment promising success. Hood now 
addressed himself at once to trying the second. This was, 
as has been explained, substantially to withdraw the main 
aiTiiy from the outer Peach-tree intrenchments, and, leaving 
Atlanta still under the protection of State troops and otliers 
in the works between it and the creek, to concentrate far out 
on the right, for the purpose of falling on Sherman's left 
flank, when it should come up, exposed, to form the general 
line in front of Atlanta. Accordingly, on the night of the 
21st, Hood moved out to the east, beyond Decatur and the 
Augusta Railroad, and awaited his opportunity. The device 
succeeded, for, next morning, Sherman found, to his aston- 
ishment, that the lines of works on the heights commanding 
the southerly banks of Peach-tree were left vacant, and was 
induced to believe that Atlanta had been abandoned. Push- 
ing Thomas across these lines towards the city, he hurried 
forward his left, McPherson, along the railroad from Decatur. 
McPherson, the night before, had, after severe skirmishing, 
moved two miles west of Decatur, and, crossing it at the south, 
Blair's corps had seized, after a hasty struggle, a command- 
ing hill not fiir from Atlanta. In this process, his right, 
Logan's corps, had been brought up to connect with Scho- 
field's left, at the Howard House, while Blair was on Logan's 



ATLANTA. 409 

left. Dodge's corps was now sent round in rear to form on 
the left of Blair. But, before noon of the 22d, Sherman be- 
gan to be undeceived ; for Thomas and Schofield found them- 
selves confronted by works which opened noisily with 
artillery and musketry, according to Hood's orders, while, 
about 11 o'clock, the rattle of musketry on his extreme left 
and rear, increasing and lengthening, and soon swelled by 
artillery, as far back as Decatur, forced upon his mind the 
danger which menaced him. It was instantly seen that, while 
heavily engaging Thomas and Schofield by the corps of 
Stewart and Cheatham, Hood was aiming to turn the Union 
left by an attack from Hardee, and that the crisis demanded 
prompt action. Already Hardee had struck and enveloped 
Blair's left flank, for Dodge had not reached the point for 
which he was moving, but, between his head of column and 
Blair's line was a wood half a mile broad, which Hardee 
had already seized. Hastily sending his staff hither and 
thither with the necessary orders, McPherson rode from the 
Howard House, where he was consulting with Sherman at 
the moment of the surprise, towards the front, and ordered 
one of Logan's brigades across into the interval between 
Dodge and Blair. Entering these woods himself alone, una- 
ware of the enemy's great progress, a shot struck dead the 
gallant leader of the Army of the Tennessee, and his horse 
rushed wounded and riderless out of the forest. » 

While Stewart's (formerly Polk's) corps sharply engaged in 
front, Hardee's and Hood's own corps now under Cheatham, 
continued their victorious progress on the flank. Carrying 
the greater part of the high hill which commanded the region 
around, the assailants captured the intrenching parties, and 
drove G. A. Smith's division back upon the division of Leg- 
gett, still clinging to the crest, where a terrific contest was 
kept up from noon until four o'clock. Before that hour a 
full regular battery had been surprised and ca^Dtured while 
moving up through the woods, besides a section of a battery 



410 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAK. 

taken from Smith's division when their position was carried ; 
and, meanwhile, Wheeler's cavahy burst in upon Decatur, in 
the rear, seized it, and, falling upon the trains, captured a 
few wagons, and drove the rest back towards the Chatta- 
hoochie. As the day waned, the contest grew hotter and 
the attack more desperate, and soon after four o'clock Hood 
again plunged into McPherson's army, now under Logan, and 
again broke through its lines, capturing two more guns, and 
then, driving a division before it four hundred yards, ad- 
vanced upon two full batteries, one of them 20-poimder Par- 
rotts, and, in the face of terrific fire, gallantly carried both 
of them. It had now become of great moment for the Union 
forces to regain this last position ; and, at length, by con- 
centrating all the available forces of Schofield and Logan, and 
raking the enemy's ranks with the remaining batteries, when 
the day was done Hood was stopped in his career exhausted : 
and successively withdrawing across the positions he had car- 
ried, and abandoniug the last two batteries he had taken, 
he was forced to be content with the two guns earlier cap- 
tured, for his trophies. In this desperate day of assault, the 
total Union loss was 3722, and that of the Confederates, as 
General Sherman estimated, "fully 8000." 

But this day ended the direct operations against Atlanta 
from the north and east ; and Sherman next, accordingly, 
began to try on the other flank. Meanwhile, to aid the pro- 
ject, he resorted to the familiar plan of cutting the communica- 
tions. Garrard's cavalry, whose absence had enabled Wheeler 
to seize Decatur, had, during the two great battles, broken 
some bridges, and burned some stores near Covingtoif^ on 
the Augusta Railroad, forty-two miles east of Atlanta; Rous- 
seau had broken the Montgomery road at Opelika : it now 
remained to break the Macon road. For this purpose, 
Sherman sent out two cavalry columns, one five thousand 
strong under Stoneman, and the other four thousand strong 
under McCook, with orders to meet at Lovejoy's Station on 



ATLANTA. 411 

the Macon road, far south of Atlanta, and there break 
it. The project failed from want of concert, except in 
effecting a slight and easily repaired damage to the road. 
Both commands were surrounded, McCook cutting his way 
out with the loss of five or six hundred men, and Stoneman 
with five hundred men being captured, and the rest for a time 
dispersed. After this triumph, Wheeler saw his way open 
to break Sherman's long line of supplies, which he did by a 
raid near Calhoun, capturing, also, nine hundred beef cattle. 
But Sherman had not relied entirely on his horsemen, and 
was already preparing to move his infantry on Atlanta from 
a new point. Unable to get around by the left, he now 
abandoned that idea, and closed up that series of operations. 
His new endeavor was inaugurated by moving Howard's 
(late McPherson's) army over to its wonted position on the 
other flank, the 27th of July, and this army, crossing Peach- 
tree Creek and Proctors Ferry, established, next day, the 
extreme right on the Lickskillet or Bell's Ferry road, which 
runs clue west from Atlanta ; so that, from being south-east of 
the city, it had changed to the opposite quarter. The Con- 
federate commander, seeing that Sherman had given up try- 
ing to enter the city from the east, also promptly moved to 
the other flank. About noon of the 28th Hood, in what 
Sherman styles a " magnificent advance," made a terrific 
assault on the extreme Union right, and for four hours the 
scenes of the 20th and the 22d were re-enacted. But, ren- 
dered wary by experience, the Union troops had no sooner 
been halted than, with marvellous dexterity, they had heaped 
up the usual breastwork of rails, logs, and earth ; and re- 
pulsed from these once more the gallant attacking columns 
withdrew over the fields strewn with their dead. The re- 
ported Union loss was six hundred, and the conjectured Con- 
federate loss five thousand. Sherman continued, therefore, 
his new line of effort, and began to subtract gradually from 
his left to piece out his right, till he might reach around to 



412 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OE THE WAR. 

the Macon Railroad. In this way Schofield's army and a part 
of Thomas's were moved over at the opening of August, and 
Hood built along his own works in parallel course, the two 
armies gliding, and facing, and sparring, like trained wrestlers. 
On the 5th of August Schofield made a dash to break through 
Hood's line a mile below Utoy Creek ; but it failed, and cost 
about four hundred men. During these operations, Sherman 
daily bombarded Atlanta with long-range guns, which fre- 
quently set it on fire. 

At length Sherman, finding time flying and his enemy still 
intrenched before him, consented to resort to the old tactics, 
so often successful, and once more to plant his army on his 
enemy's line of supplies from the rear. Nevertheless, mind- 
ful that those flank movements of the main army, while they 
worked the enemy out of his position, yet had always, un- 
happily, failed to force a decisive combat, a matter he greatly 
desired, Sherman was fain to experiment first on the enemy's 
line with a cavalry column : for this promised success on 
account of the absence of Wheeler's cavalry in breaking up 
the Dalton road, to Sherman's rear. Accordingly, on the 18th 
he dispatched Kilpatrick with five tliousand horsemen to the 
West Point Railroad, with orders to " break it good near 
Fairboni," and then to cross and tear up the i\Iacon road ; 
and meanwhile, he proposed to take more advantage than he 
had yet hitherto from his detours. Kilpatrick made his raid, 
encountered and fought the Confederate cavalry, and came 
back confident of having badly damaged the two roads ; but 
Sherman, conversing pointedly with that officer, as was his 
wont, on precisely what had been done and what had not 
been done, found the result insufficient for his purpose. 
There was nothing now left but to move the whole army, — a 
course sure to procure the evacuation of Atlanta, but which 
would probably allow the safe withdrawal of Hood's aimy. 
The movement began with the 25th : and, marching Williams's 
corps into the intrenched position at the Chattahoochie, which 



ATLANTA. 413 

covered the bridges, having filled his wagons with fifteen days' 
supplies, Sherman dexterously shifted his great army in suc- 
cessive movements from left to right. An expert now in 
manoeuvre, he transferred corps and armies as deftly as a 
veteran player shufiles and deals his cards ; and when, at 
length, the great army had been landed on the West Point 
Railroad, from Fairborn nearly up to East Point, the men fell 
to work by thousands in high spirits, and in a day hopelessly 
destroyed twelve miles of it. Conning his maps, meanwhile, 
for the next position, Sherman resolved to march due east to 
the Macon Railroad, partly because the road was nearest to 
him by that route, partly because its seizure there would 
bring him directly south of, Atlanta, and force Hood, unless 
he had seasonably taken the alarm, to make a wide march to 
get out of the city. Hood, "however, had extended his lines 
and moved his troops parallel with Sherman's, and, accord- 
ingly, when, on the night of August 30th, Howard's Army 
of the Tennessee, having driven Hood's skirmishers before 
him all day, arrived at Jonesboro', on the Macon road, that 
point was found intrenched and occupied in heavy force. The 
Union troops were now disposed along the Macon Railroad, 
but not on it : Howard on the right, at Jonesboro', twenty- 
two miles from Atlanta, Thomas in the centre, at Couch's, 
and Schofield on the left at Rough and Ready, eleven 
miles from Atlanta. Next day, the 31st, the army pressed 
forward at all points to attack the railroad ; but Hood, con- 
scious that this move was really the death-stroke to Atlanta, 
sallied from his works, about noon, at Jonesboro', and with 
the corps of Hardee and S. D. Lee, attacked Howard, to dis- 
lodge him. Two hours of heavy assault on the intrenchments 
which the Union troops had already got up, failed of their 
object, and with severe loss to both sides, Hood retired, and 
instantly, of course, prepared to evacuate his citadel. 

Next day, however, the 1st of September, Sherman con- 
tinued intently to destroy the INIacon Railroad above Jones- 



414 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

boro', working his forces towards the latter point. From 
Joncsboro', Hood had ah'eady drawn off S. D. Lee's corps, 
preparatory to retreat ; but Hardee still held the works. To- 
wards evening, Davis's corps, with some supports, attacked 
and pierced the Confederate lines, capturing eight guns. 
The drama, however, was substantially over. Hood had now 
completed his arrangements and was drawing his whole army 
and its trains towards Macon, along the road which runs due 
south from Decatur to McDonough, nearly parallel with the 
railroad, and Hardee had only been left in position to cover 
the movement. 

That night the army, slumbering along the well-earned rail- 
road, and dreaming of the end of its toils, was roused by the 
sound of heavy explosions, twenty miles away to the north, 
succeeded by sharper and lighter discharges, as if a battle were 
wasrinir there. A full hour these sounds reverberated, and, 
after an interval, again they burst forth. It was the exploded 
store-houses, trains, and magazines, of Atlanta, fired by the 
rear-ijuard of Hood, whose van was already well southward, 
marching with the loaded wagons of his army. Sherman 
had won Atlanta. 

III. 
KESULTS OF ATLANTA. 

To the people of the North, the midsummer of 1864 was the 
dark hour before morn. Their two great armies had started in 
early May with the promise of a campaign as short and brill- 
iant as it would be decisive in breaking the armed power of 
the insurrection. The prayers, the hopes, and the faith of 
the North attended them, nor was a doubt expressed, even if 
entertained, of their rapid triumph. This confidence, unlike 
that of the old days, was well founded : for after the -winter's 
preparations had passed, and after a lull in grand operations 
in the great theatre of Virginia for very many months, the 



ATLANTA. 415 

Confecleratc armies which stood up for the new campaign were 
of such inadequate strength, that they read in their own mus- 
ter-roll the death-sentence of their cause. Three months 
passed by ; and such had been their military record that the 
whole Union horizon seemed darkened, and the most hopeful 
were plunged in despair ; while the Confederates, succeeding 
beyond all hope, plucked up courage anew. A fearful retro-? 
spectmet the eye in Virginia, the great charnel-house whose i 
threshold the Union army had passed but to fill it afresh with 
the rows of the dead. In its grave-dotted path to the Ap- , 
pomattox, the noble army which had crossed the Rapidan so 
cheerily had dropped the greater part of itself — most of its 
best officers and its boldest men. In other years, it had been 
thought that the Northern armies had been made to suffer ; 
but in this brief campaign, before summer was over, more 
Union soldiers had been killed and wounded than in all former 
campaigns in Virginia from the beginning, under McDowell, 
McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker, while Lee, mean- 
while, had lost no greater number of killed and wounded than 
in the sinirle series of battles with JMcClcllan on the Peninsula. 
The disheartening feature, however, was that the campaign 
in which the principal disproportion of losses had occurred, 
that from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, after taking all 
summer to fight out, had been abandoned as a failure ; and 
now a new series of operations, in effect a new campaign, 
with almost a new army, had begun, which was inaugurated 
in bloody repulses. It was not enough that the Wilderness, 
Spottsylvania, the North Anna, Cold Harbor, had sapped the 
strength of the Army of the Potomac, but Petersburg, which 
at least it was hoped to carry, had repulsed many successive 
attacks ; twice had efforts to extend around it to the south 
met with similar disasters, and at length the last pitch of pa- 
tient endurance was reached in the mine-assault of painful 
memory. As the months wore away, the hope Avhich had iji- 
spired the start, gave way to sober reflection, to gloom, and 



416 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

at last almost to despair, when, in spite of the concealment of 
figures, it became known that Lee's army had already put out 
of the combat a number of Union soldiers equal to its own 
original force, and still lined its breastworks, defiant. 

The Virginia cloud even overshadowed the West, and, 
despite the favorable news from Sherman's campaign, a deci- 
sive battle Avas demanded in proof that the news might be 
trusted. To add to the calamity, an audacious army under 
Early streamed down the Shenandoah Valley, burst across 
the Potomac, swallowed all opposing forces, marched through 
the whole length of Maryland, posted itself on the railroad 
running between Washington and Philadelphia, and actually 
bombarded the forts of the National Capital ; thus giving color 
to the assertion of Mr. Davis, in his message to his Congress, 
that it was not Richmond but Washington which at that mo- 
ment was in a state of siege. IMoved by this unwonted de- 
pression of the public mind, and the unwonted position of 
national aflairs, at length a political convention representing 
one of the two great parties into which the nation was divided, 
proclaimed that the " four years of failure to restore the Union 
by the experiment of war " required that " immediate efibrts 
be made for a cessation of hostilities." Shocked, even in 
their own depression, by this boldness, the Government at 
Washington could not escape listening to the ominous sounds 
of popular dissatisfaction. Another draft for half a million 
of men had been announced in the midst of the general gloom, 
making this burden of the war more burdensome by the un- 
happy hour of its imposition, and causing the people to in- 
quire what had become of the five hundred thousand who had 
started to conquer the South in the spring. In the exigency 
of the moment even the President of the Union contemplated 
the possibility of making peace by negotiation with the polit- 
ical leaders of the insurrection, independent of operations in 
the field, and actually drew up a list of propositions to that 
effect. • 



ATLANTA. 417 

In such an hour, Sherman's bugle-noto of victory came 
strong and clear from out of the depths of Georgia. As by 
magic it startled the people from this lethargy of despair, in- 
spired the Government Avith confidence, freshened in spirit 
the comrade-army of the East, that army of heroic constancy. 
In the national capital, where among the rulers all had been 
anxiety, alarm, distress, or despair itself, there was an incred- 
ible change of feeling, while through the country once more, 
after being so long dumb and listless, the cannon pealed, the 
bells rung, and the banners flaunted over a series of victories ; 
and when Sherman's preparatory triumphs were in time 
crowned by the fall of Atlanta, and Farragut swelled the cho- 
rus of victory by his glorious bay-fight at Mobile, the joy was 
unbounded. Nor was this a temporary elation, since, exces- 
sive though it appeared by the very reaction from previous 
distress, it became sustained and justified. This steady 
breeze from the West drove across the sky and forever out of 
the horizon the dense clouds which had so long lowered, till 
they were in the deep bosom of the ocean buried. Thence- 
forward the path was clear and radiant ; nor was there ever, 
after the autumn of 1864, any rational doubt that the days of 
the insurrection were numbered. 

The immediate fruits of the capture of Atlanta were also 
very great, though so far surpassed by its moral influence as 
to deserve only secondary mention. Four months of vig- 
orous campaigning, with marching and fighting by night and 
by day, a contested passage of the Alleghanies for two hun- 
dred miles, with ten pitched battles and scores of lesser 
engagements, had given Sherman the control of North Geor- 
gia. Although Johnston's main army had escaped intact 
across the Chattahoochie, thus foiling Sherman in his main 
design, yet, under the guidance of Hood, it had been surely 
dealt four reeling blows ; and if it eventually escaped 
with its trains, yet Sherman had the consciousness that at 
least twenty thousand men had been in those four battles 

27. 



r^ 



418 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

put hors de combat. The country now occupied by Sher- 
man was at once the workshop, the granary, the store-house, 
and the arsenal of the Confederacy, and Atlanta was the centre 
of a network of many towns and villages, such as Rome, 
Eoswell, and Marietta, which had furnished forth so much 
of its war material to the Confederacy. Here were foun- 
dries, furnaces, rolling-mills, machine-shops, laboratories, 
railroad repair-shops ; here were factories of cannon and 
small arms, of powder, cartridges, and caps ; thence went 
army-wagons and ambulances and harnesses, and cotton 
clothing and woollen clothing in abundance for the army. 
Much of the machinery was now destroyed either by the 
Confederate or the Union troops, and that which Avas re- 
moved could no longer be used to advantage. The year's 
crop of the rolling valleys at his back had also come under 
the control of Sherman, Avith their plentiful grass and grain. 
Looking towards future operations, he had now leaped the 
great chain of arduous mountains, and could glide along 
their base or move on the smooth slope to the sea. He was 
planted at the skirt of the cotton-growing region of Georgia, 
into which he could now direct his columns. On his right, 
lay the railroad towns of Selma, IMontgomer}^ Opclika, Co- 
lumbus ; in front Macon and Milledgeville ; on the left Athens 
and Augusta — all exposed to his cavalry marches, while the 
railroad system connecting the Eastern Confederacy with 
the Western, — already badly broken, — could properly be 
said to lie at Sherman's mercy. 

The central figure in the Georgian drama, the man on whom 
its success chiefly hung, had been well fitted to the role he 
was called to play. Both by native temperament and by 
the accidents of his experience, Sherman had been made apt 
for the bold and novel method of warfare which it was need- 
ful to wage. A man of soldierly instincts, Sherman had 
received the training of the full curriculum at West Point, 



ATLANTA. 419 

where his military abilities gained him high scholastic hon- 
ors. The long interim between his graduation and the out- 
burst of the Great War, seems to have done but little 
additional for him, either in martial experience or in martial 
fame ; and nevertheless that interval must have been a gen- 
erous seed-time, since no man in the country at the fall of 
Sumter was a more thorough potential soldier. Amongst 
Sherman's early-displayed traits was a broad and thorough 
view of campaigning, which comprised at once a complete 
plan at the outset, and thereafter attention to the minutest 
details. Of Sherman it soon became insufficient to say that 
he knew the art of combat, but that he knew perfectly how 
to march, to feed, and to fight a great army, and had reduced 
each one of these to a distinct and complete science. 

Sherman, moreover, above all Union commanders, pos- 
sesses the geographical eye. His campaigning-ground lies 
as a grand chart before him, whereof every inch passes un- 
der his vision : its elevations, its depressions, its water- 
courses, its vegetation, its network of roads, and all its 
possibilities too, as well as its present features, he deems it 
not beneath him to study. At a glance the features of a 
landscape take on in his eye their military hue : a mountain 
range appears to him a natural traverse, the rising ground 
yonder a bastion, this precipitous pass a gorge, that river a 
■wet ditch to be passed ; and thus he may be said seldom or 
never to miscalculate the amount of the aid which nature 
tenders to him, or has lent to his adversary. Something, 
too, of the beauty of the natural surroundings, as well as 
their military significance, evidently catches the gaze of this 
commander, and expresses itself in words now and then, 
even in his official reports. But it is that other faculty of 
measuring and grasping the terrain on which he manoeuvres 
and gives battle, though its breadth and its length be meted, 
as it often was, b}' hundreds of miles in a single campaign, 
of which we mainly speak. His ground he studies with an 



420 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

anatomist's nicety, now watching the great backbone formed 
by the mountain chain, now the ribs and spines it puts off on 
either hand, with those great arteries, the rivers, fed by the 
lesser water-courses, the veins. Striking here, he knows 
that he will touch the heart of the country, or there, that 
he will paralyze the right arm of its strength. Nor is it 
merely the surface elevations and depressions, nor the geo- 
losrical drift of the land, nor its clothins; of forest and under- 
growth, nor its irrigation, nor the capacity and direction of 
its turnpikes and j^aths, nor the nature of the soil, which 
may affect his marchings or his bivouacs, that Sherman 
investigates ; but he evidently learns thoroughly the natural 
products of the land, with a view to the question of supplies 
for himself and for his opponents, and this, too, not by a 
tardy experience, but before he sets foot on the campaign, 
and not in his own neighborhood only, but for scores of 
miles on all his possible lines of advance. Accordingly, it 
has been related of him, that even while campaigning on the 
Mississippi years before, he was intently studying the whole 
theatre of his Georgia triumph, and indeed all the interior of 
the Confederacy. It is also said that at the very beginning of 
the war he obtained from the Census Bureau in Washington a 
map, made at his own request, of the Cotton States, with a 
table showing the cattle, horses, and products of each county, 
according to the last census returns reported from those 
States ; so that afterwards, when the time for such enter- 
prise arrived, he was practically familiar with the resources 
of the whole country on his line of march. 

The natural bent of his genius, also, provoked Sherman to 
undertake campaigns of the audacious nature of the Georgia 
and Carolina excursions. Being original in his conceptions, 
he habitually thought of many things which but few other 
commanders would have thought of, and, indeed, provided 
for a hundred fancied contingencies and dilemmas which his 
opponents never attempted to bring about. If ever unduly 



ATLANTA. 421 

elated by success, the first error of over-confidence was apt 
to rouse him to his customary discretion and skill ; l)ut a 
certain pride, joined to his bull-dog tenacity of purpose, 
commonly induced him to try to work through as he had 
begun, in order to approve himself to have been right at the 
start. He possessed a rare and felicitous union of method 
and originality, having a great devotion to order and sys- 
tem, which, however, he overthrew when they became trivial 
and constraining, as concerning petty things, and as being 
the marks of a mind working in a rut. 

He was a martinet in his ideas of military regulations, dis- 
cipline, drill, subordination, and held himself and his subal- 
terns implicitly to obeying orders ; nevertheless, neither in 
fashioning his campaigns, nor in executing their tactical details, 
was he hampered by any traditional leathern-stock method, 
since no small part of his success was due to the presence in 
his command of strict discipline and unquestioning obedience 
to orders on the one hand, and a certain freedom from restraint 
and wise latitude in the choice of means on the other. His 
own temperament was conscientiously exact and scrupulous, 
but yet bold and facile in invention, and naturally bent on 
some new and better way of doing an old thing, never 
admitting meanwhile that anything was impossible merely 
because it had not been done before. 

He was not alwaj-s correct in his judgments of men, 
and sometimes hasty in uttering opinions upon matters be- 
yond his professional scope and in which he was not an 
expert; but with regard to the latter it may be said, 
that it never could be averred of anything relating to the 
military art, and of the former, that no incompetent sub- 
ordinate ever had the chance to deceive him twice. In 
the constitution of his mind there was a kind of intellect- 
ual absolutism which might have led, but happily did 
not, to dangerous manifestations. It was controlled, indeed, 
by his soldier's habit of fidelity to orders : but on emergency 
and under the push of circumstance, might obviously have 



422 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

asserted its supremacy. In this respect Sherman differed 
remarkably from many brother officers, most of -whom 
looked to the way in which the people would regard their 
actions, kept always in mind their liability to be haled be- 
fore the popular tribunal, and never quite sank the citizen in 
the soldier. The tendency in Sherman of which we speak 
became the stronger from his being impetuous rather than 
imperturbable in spirit, and self-confident in ratio to his past 
successes. 

Sherman had a fine organizing and administrative ability, 
which he exhibited not only in his wonderful composition and 
preparation of vast armies, but also in directing municipal 
affairs in several conquered cities like Memphis, Atlanta, and 
Savannah. In the latter function, however, he showed, as 
was not unbecoming a soldier, the tact rather of an executive 
than of a legislative or judicial mind. Being a bom general, 
his quick eye, his deftness and his martial instincts, saved 
the time which many journeymen soldiers lose by awkward- 
ness and slow comprehension. He was jirescient from the 
start, and being among the first to detect the approach of 
war, was also amongst the few Avho at once appreciated its 
gravity. Accordingly, his scorn of three months' troops, 
and his bold estimate of two hundred thousand men as requi- 
site to march from the Ohio to the Gulf, procured him a 
rather prematune verdict of insanity from the " sixty-day ' 
sages of Washington. 

Remarkable above all was Sherman's restless energy, 
which kept him at work in season and out of season, and 
allowed no moment's respite in his measureless activity. 
This quality enabled him not only to superintend his cam- 
paigns, but to personally direct to a wonderful extent the 
evolution of their details. He was accustomed to know 
thoroughly the condition of the manifold departments of his 
armies, and to perform many of those functions which some 
officers would be glad to shift upon their aides-de-camp. 



ATLANTA. 423 

Allied to this trait was his perfect self-reliance and confidence, 
which made him desire, wherever possible, to take the 
supreme responsibility. ^ 

There are two classes of commanders, of which one may 
be said never to have gained a battle if gained, or to have 
lost it if lost : it was some corps, division, or brigade com- 
mander who saw and seized the key-point, or repulsed some 
unexpected assault, or made some happy unauthorized at- 
tack, or knew the ground whose nature had not been 
explained to him ; or else it was some accident of fortune 
that gained the victory, or some error or inferiority of 
the enemy, and in short, anything but original planning. 
Nevertheless, even such are invaluable, if only they know 
how to use the greatness of others, though they be not great 
themselves. 

However, Sherman belonged to the other class, and 
whatever victories he gained are his own. No aide-de- 
camp drafted his plan of campaign, no subordinate detected 
for him the key-points of his battle-grounds, and whatever 
there is of good or bad in Sherman's soldiership, is his own, 
for glory or blame. Accustomed to thoroughly plan and pre- 
pare his campaigns at the outset, so tliat he had a tolerably 
just jicrspcctive of their daily progress, he was left with lei- 
sure to employ great care upon details. His field orders are 
remarkably specific in their instructions, pointing out to sub- 
divisions the roads to be taken, and the times of starting and 
arrival, and the methods of manoeuvre and attack, with such 
minuteness as to shift much of the responsibility of the issue 
to the shoulders of the gcneral-in-chief. Such orders form a 
marked contrast to the loose and general and conditional in- 
structions of some commanders, whence one conceives a low 
idea of the influence they have exerted on the actual issue. 
Sherman, however, had himself furnished fine models of the 
promptness and precision which he desired in others. For a 
single example, at Vicksburg Grant had ordered Sherman to 



424 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

be ready with supplies of all descriptions, to move back 
against Johnston on the 6th of July, for which time an assault 
on the city had l^een fixed. Sherman, without a moment's 
delay prepared himself, though he might have taken leisurely 
advantage of the interval ; hence, when it so happened that 
Yicksburg fell on the 4th, the same day Sherman's columns 
were marchin": ajjainst the Confederate commander. Grant 
says, "when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days 
earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found 
ready, and moved at once." The same trait of promptness 
was visible in his forced marches during the Vicksburg and 
Chattanooga campaigns, while, as to his precision, being a 
master in the art of handling troops, a hundred battalions 
would move to and fro beneath his skilful touch, with the 
smoothness of mechanism. 

But here I must pause, it being no aim of mine to attempt 
a complete portraiture of Sherman, or even to set forth all 
his purely military traits ; but simply to indicate the qualities 
which so well fitted him for the grand campaigns in Georgia 
and in the Carolinas. His early opponent in the former cam- 
paign. General J. E. Johnston, who might perhaps have been 
the Fabius Cunctator of the Confederacy, was a soldier who 
oftener deserved success than commanded it. Of soldierly 
intuition, thorough training, wide experience in his profes- 
sion and among men, he was thoroughly worthy of the con- 
fidence with which he inspired the people of the Confederacy. 
His early Virginia campaigns illustrated his ability, while 
those of the West, if i^roperly regarded, do not diminish his 
fame. But he was unfortunate now by reason of the over- 
whelming forces opposed to him, now by the folly or dis- 
obedience of subordinates, now by the exigencies of the vast 
region he was assigned to protect, and chiefly by the inter- 
ference of the Richmond marplots, who either distorted his 
plans at the start, or foiled them at the moment of maturity. 
An excellent officer, sound in judgment, well-poised in char- 



ATLANTA. 425 

acter, wary, prudent, circumspect, he admirably husbanded 
his resources, and was never taken unawares. He conducted 
his campaigns with a vigor and intelligence which extorted 
admiration from his opponents, though it provoked censure 
from his government. After Vicksburg, Mr. Davis was de- 
sirous to remove him from command, and plunge him in 
oblivion ; after Atlanta, he fancied that he had permanently 
submerged him ; yet he again rose to the surface in North 
Carolina, whither his old antagonist in his continental cam- 
paigning had now brought the Army of the Mississippi to 
confront him. No higher praise could be awarded him, and 
no better consolation for the rebuffs of fortune, than this evi- 
dence of the trust of the people of the South, constant 
through all adversity. 

It would not be difficult to trace a kinship of genius be- 
tween the tAvo great antagonists in the Atlanta campaign ; 
and it is worthy of note that each had the highest apprecia- 
tion of the other's talent. Sherman's otHcial report is replete 
with expressions of admiration at the procedure of his "as- 
tute adversary," and I well remember that the same senti- 
ment was frequently expressed toward Sherman by Johnston 
in many conversations which I had with him in North Caro- 
lina at the close of the war. They were, in fact, both con- 
summate strategists ; both operated according to large plans ; 
both understood perfectly the true nature of war : and the 
campaign in which these worthy rivals pitted their skill 
against each other forms one of the most wonderful exhibi- 
tions of military chess-playing on record. 



426 I'HE TWELVE DECIiSIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 



XI. 

NASHVILLE. 



PRELUDE TO NASHVILLE. 

In early autumn of 1864, the good people of Georgia and 
Alabama were startled by the apparition of the gaunt, cadav- 
erous figure of Jefferson Davis, preaching among them a new 
crusade against the North : like Peter the Hermit, he jour- 
neyed from town to town, stirring up the minds of men and 
of women to his project. To say truth, the times Avcre inaus- 
picious for a tour of enthusiasm, people being still wonder- 
struck with the fall of Atlanta ; but it was this event itself 
which inspired the Presidential peregrination. Aware that 
Virginia was safe in the watch-care of General Lee, and the 
Eastern Campaign in train of prosperous continuance till an- 
other spring, the West had become the focus of all the Con- 
federate President's anxieties. And well it might, since 
there another summer of discontent was noAV added to those 
years of uniform misfortune, in whose course not only had 
the , great Mississippi Basin been delivered over to the 
enemy, but even the Alleghanies, whose wooded crags and 
labyrinthine fastnesses promised a century's warfare, when sea, 
and gulf, and stream, the South over, should be conquered : 
these, too, had been o'ermastered from the Chattahoochie 
back to the Ohio. 

Fearful lest some spell had fallen upon the Western people, 




Ss^a 'bf^tsabiBai& 




^^. 



^ ^^-^^ 



NASHVILLE. 427 

by reason of their mniiifold disasters, and eager to wake them 
from the stupefaction of despair which might avcU have fol- 
lowed the conquest of Northern Georgia, the Confederate 
President started on his travels from Richmond. Tlie ardor 
with which he undertook this mission was fanned not only by 
patriotic, but by personal emotions. For, if a gloom pre- 
vailed wlicrein the cause at the West seemed to be lost, the 
popular mind did not fail to lay the chief burden of fault at - 
the governmental threshold in Richmond, whence two 
months before had passed the order deposing General John- 
ston. To bandy reasons for that policy was now idle ; since, 
in the rude logic of his hearers, it would always appear that 
Johnston had greatly saved his army in order to save Atlanta, 
but Hood had greatly lost his army only to lose Atlanta too. 
The sole recourse was to vindicate the past by the future ; 
and since hollow generalities could not draw the people from 
despondency, he resolved to give tliem specific promises : 
and thus it happened, that, to the chagrin of friend and the 
profit of foe, before this crusading mission had been long 
afoot, the Confederate plans of autumn campaign were dis- 
closed by their own deviser. 

Nor did he wait until the aiTny had marched ; but unbur- 
thened his secret many weeks before their real intent could 
possibly be divined from the manoeuvres of the columns. 
Nor did he confine his instruction to one locality, but dis- 
tributed it more or less generously, in various public speeches, 
in the Caroliuas, in Georgia, and in Alabama, as at Salis- 
bury, Columbia, Macon, Augusta, Montgomery, and in the 
camps of Hood's army at Palmetto. " Be of good cheer," he 
cried, turning to Cheatham's division, when, in tho tv/ilight 
of the 26th of September, a great concourse of Hood's sol- 
diers had gathered at head-quarters, to hear their President, 
" Be of good cheer, for Avithin a short while your faces will 
be turned homewards, and your feet pressing Tennessee 
soil." And Hood, taking up the strain, ingenuously added, 



428 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

"Within a few days I expect to give the command 'forward/ 
even if we live on parched corn and beef." To the people of 
Augusta, four days earlier, Davis had declared that "the 
enemy must be driven from the soil of Georgia." To the 
people of Montgomery he defended the removal of Johnston, 
from whom, at Dalton, he had expected " a successful advance 
through Tennessee into Kentucky," and whom, had he sus- 
pected a retrograde, he would never have reinforced by Polk, 
but would have left the latter " to assail Sherman upon his 
flank by North Alabama." To the people of Macon, he said 
that " tlie fate that befell the army of the French empire in its 
retreat from Moscow will be reacted. Our cavalry and our 
people "will harass and destroy Shermans army as did the 
Cossacks that of Napoleon ; and the Yankee General, like 
him, will escape with only a body guard." There should bo 
nothing more like that " deep disgrace " of the " falling back 
from Dalton," by Johnston. "I put a man in command whom 
I knew would strike a manly blow for the city, and many a 
Yankee's blood was made to nourish the soil before the prize 
was won. . . It has been said that I abandoned Georgia 
to her fate. Shame upon such falsehood ! Where could the 
author Lave been when Wallicr, Avhcn Polk, and when S. D. 
Lee were sent to her assistance ? ^liserable man I The man 
who uttered this was a scoundrel. . . Your prisoners are 
kept as a sort of Yankee capital. Butler, the Beast, with 
whom no Commissioner of Exchange would hold intercourse, 
had published in the newspapers that if we would consent to 
the exchange of negroes all difficulties might be removed. 
This is reported as an effort of his to get himself Vvhitewashed, 
by holding intercourse vrith gentlemen." A week after this 
remarkable harangue, Hood was not yet in motion ; and, 
accordingly, Mr. Davis was able still to announccvwith some 
freshness at Augusta, " We must march into Tennessee ; 
there we will draw from 20,009 to 30,000 men to our standard, 
and so strengthened, we must push the enemy back to the 



NASHVILLE. 429 

Ohio." By October 4th, he had reached, in his perambula- 
tions, Cohimbia, South Carolina, to whose people he said, 
that " General Hood's strategy had been good," and that 
"his eye is now fixed upon a point far beyond that where he 
was assailed by the enemy," so that, "within thirty days, 
that army, which has so boastfully taken up its winter quar- 
ters in the heart of the Confederacy, will be in search of a 
crossing on the Tennessee River." 

Never was victor of a grand campaign more perplexed by 
his conquest than the triumphant master of Atlanta. Even 
while the world rang with his praises, and his fame was as 
brilliant in the Eastern Hemisphere as in the Western, while 
the North was intoxicated with the magnificence of his conquest, 
and the South had found in its depths of gloom the lower depth 
of despair, he who had wrought the miracle was already anx- 
iously casting his horoscope for the future, and read therein 
the presage of doubt, perchance of disaster. Ever restless, 
he paused no moment to enjoy his -victories, and far-sighted 
always, he was long since gazing ruefully at the autumn's 
prospects. 

Whence sprang the anxiety which clouded his victory ? He 
held Northern Georgia with one hundred thousand stalwart 
soldiers ; but these were chiefly pushed out to the end of an 
enormously-extended single line of supply, of which every rod 
was in hostile, and but recently overrun territory. To per- 
serve this line would paralyze his strength, by requiring detach- 
ments to gan-ison it from end to end. The remnant then 
left at its extremity would be powerless to advance, because 
a few miles in front lay its intrenched enemy, never yet en- 
trapped into decisive battle, who had been reinforced un- 
til numerically as strong as when four months before he lay 
at Dalton. Indeed, the grand Atlanta campaign had been 
ended at a fortunate moment, and in a manner which did 
credit to Sherman's prudence as well as to his genius. For, 
pursuing Hood from Jonesboro' to Lovejoy's, after the re- 



430 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAE. 

treat from Atlanta, he had found him admirably posted in 
strong works, in a region "wild, broken, with its ridges 
clothed with dense thickets, and its valleys spongy and 
patched with the morasses where the head waters of many lit- 
tle tributaries of the Flint River collected. Thither Thomas 
pursued, with Stanley's corps in advance and Wood's division 
leading. A gallant assault by this division was severely re- 
l^ilsed, and General Wood himself was among the many of- 
ficers wounded ; and in a dispiriting rain the troops fell 
back and encamped. But with that keen instinct which al- 
ways warned Sherman Avhcn to stop in a hopeless task, he 
drew his troops back into Atlanta, and issued his proclama- 
tion of victory. In the applause which followed this an- 
nouncement, the demonstration at Lovejoy's was forgotten : 
Sherman however remembered it, and knew that he had a 
powerful enemy in his front. Already now that enemy, fall- 
ing by detachments here and there upon the Union line of 
supplies, gave earnest of more dangerous moves to come. 

Looking back, Sherman saw the trains that supported At- 
lanta journeying to him over hundreds of miles. From 
Atlanta to Chattanooga there was but one stem of single 
track, with no loop-lines to support it, a measured distance of 
one hundred and thirty-eight miles. Allatoona, his sub-base, 
where a million of rations were accumulated, was ninety-eight 
miles from Chattanooga and forty from Atlanta. But since 
neither Allatoona nor Chattanooga was safe from siege and 
capture, with the main army at Atlanta, these could be 
regarded only as depots, and his true base was at least 
as far back as Nashville. Now from Nashville to Chat- 
tanooga the distance by rail is one hundred and fiftj^-one 
miles, and to Atlanta two hundred and eighty-nine miles. 
To transport supplies, however, for so great an army and for 
the protection of his garrisoned rear, required also the use of 
the routes from Nashville to Iluntsvillc and from Huntsville to 
Stevenson ; and, finally, since, as events proved, not even 

26 



KASHVILLE. 431 

Nashville was safe from attack, Sherman's absolute source of 
supplies could be traced to the Ohio, at Louisville. The di- 
rcctcst sinsrle railroad route from Louisville to Atlanta was 
four hundred and seventy-four miles in length, and that was, 
therefore, the measure of Sherman's line. But he was, in 
fact, forced to rely also on the Knoxville and Chattanooga 
road, a length of one hundred and twelve miles, thus swell- 
ing the sum to five hundred and eighty-six miles, and again 
upon all possible feeders in Tennessee ; so that, in fine, the 
actual railroad lines kept open by garrison and used for the 
Atlanta campaign, was something over nine hundred miles. 
The food, the forage, the clothing, the ammunition, all the 
military stores and outfit, in short, of at least one hundred 
and twenty thousand persons and fifty thousand animals, 
passed over these lines, and the quartermaster's department at 
Nashville alone, on the day of the capture of Atlanta, had 
fifteen thousand operatives at the former city, and ten thou- 
sand more on its nine hundred and fifty-six miles of railroad, 
by whose aid it loaded and despatched one hundred and fifty 
cars each day. Now, of this enormous network of commu- 
nication more than five hundred miles could be instantly men- 
aced throughout by a single bold move of the Confederate 
army ; and a great part of the region spanned by the track 
was made doubly hostile by its mountainous character, and by 
the temper of the neighboring people. 

In the very tempest of general admiration, therefore, over 
Sherman's marvellous skill in keeping these vast lines sub- 
stantially intact during a four months' vigorous campaign, 
guarding what he held at the start and adding thereto a'hun- 
dred miles and more — so that repairs were often made in the 
face of the breaking column, and that habitually, in Sherman's 
words, "the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced 
camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had 
ceased" — there was yet, to the reflective critic, an anxious 
query when this prolongation of the line of march would end. 
To Sherman's retrospective glance, it seemed absolutely sure 



432 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

that his communications could be snapped in fifty places by a 
judicious use of the Confederate army : nor was it wise to 
count upon any other use being made. But, even supposing 
it possible to hold the lines already gained, of what future 
avail? AYhither should he turn his columns ? To Macon, the 
next prominent city in his course ? it was a hundred miles 
away, and jNIontgomer}^ or Augusta, to the right or left, more 
distant yet. If his present line of supplies were too long, a longer 
would be preposterous : while, with an enemy strong in front, 
he could hardly send detached columns hither and thither, and, 
even if he could, his own attenuated line and fortified city 
demanded all his thought. 

In this perplexity, Sherman, as usual, first bent himself to 
the immediate necessities of the hour, and within ruminated 
the question of the future, — doubtless looking often and of- 
ten, let us add, to the lines of operation running easterly from 
East Tennessee. During the first week in September, he oc- 
cupied Atlanta with Thomas's army, putting IIoAvard's on the 
ri"-ht at East Point, and Schofield's on the left at Decatur : the 
cavalry were on the flanks. Ilood had divided his force, ad- 
vancing' a part on the Macon Railroad as far as Jonesboro', 
while his main army encamped on the West Point road at 
Palmetto Station, so as to meet an advance from Atlanta in 
either direction. A fortnight later, Forrest, that daring 
trooper called by his admirers "the Wizard of the Saddle," 
made his bold raid upon the Tennessee garrisons and railroads, 
confirming Sherman's fears. Then it was that, on the 2Gth of 
September, Davis achieved his pilgrimage to Hood's camp at 
Palmetto, and published the Confederate progi-amme for the 
autumn campaign. A few days later, on the 28th of Septem- 
ber, the news had reached Sherman's corps, and at once a 
burden rolled from the mind of that commander, and light 
streamed upon his future path. With unconcealed joy, ho 
heard the tidings that Hood was to withdraw his whole army 
from the front of Atlanta, and throw it into Tennessee : it now 



NASHVILLE. 433 

only remained to use his opponent's move for extricatinor him- 
self. The next day he sent Thomas, •with some fepare troops, 
to protect Tennessee. 

Already, indeed, Hood's camps were broken and his col- 
umns on the move ; and with the announcement of his intent 
came the news of his passage of the Chattahoochie in force. 
The gleam of fortune revealed to Sherman had been the 
possibility of a clear path through Georgia to the sea. 
To hold Atlanta he had found impossible ; to retrograde 
would seem to undo the summer campaign, and would be 
disastrous to the morale of his army ; to advance was suffi- 
ciently hazardous, with an enemy strong enough to cut off 
his supplies in the rear, and to prevent foraging parties from 
getting them in the country around. But now, every step 
of Hood made it possible to sweep unimpeded to the coast, 
and open communication with gun-boats and water supplies ; 
and, though the march might be bloodless, yet it would be a 
" change of base" from a point whose tenure was doubtful, to 
one whose tenure was sure, and all the while would wear the 
guise of conquest. "\Vith exultation , therefore , Sherman saw- 
Hood throwing himself north-west of Atlanta, and aimins-, 
■with all his legs, to increase the gap between them. " If 
Hood will go to Tennessee," he exclaimed, "I will give him 
the rations to go with." 

Nevertheless, Sherman at once turned in the other direc- 
tion, moved by several reasons. The object for which he 
had come into Georgia was not to feed his army, not to march 
over broad plantations : it was to meet, fight, and destrov 
the "Western Confederate forces. Accordingly, should Hood 
march triumphantly north, while the spectacle of the two 
combatants hurrying not coward, but away from, each other, 
would hardly be edifying, still more discreditable would be 
the exchange of Nashville and Louisville for Macon and 
Savannah. And if it were replied that Sherman's object was 
to reinforce Grant, the rejoinder would be swift, that it was 

28 



434 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

more needful first to conquer Hood, and then the question of 
march or transportation to the East would become very 
simple. Moreover, to allow Hood to go on his Avay rejoicing 
would be the surrender of a score of garrisons, and immeas- 
urable wealth of stores and ammnnition. Accordingly, 
Sherman instantly turned on Hood, in the hope to force 
a general battle, whose success would resolve all questions 
and allow a march to the ocean or the gulf or whithersoever 
else a march might appear a victory. 

Before Sherman could get out of Atlanta, Hood Avas far 
north of it, and StcAvart's corps and the cavalry, marching to 
the railroad, had destroyed it thoroughly for over twenty 
miles between Allatoona and Marietta, capturiug the garrisons 
of Big Shanty and Ackworth, and breaking all communication 
betAveen Sherman and Thomas. Hood, meanwhile, with his 
other two corps, marched briskly off to the Coosa river, crossed 
it below Rome, and moved towards Summerville and Lafayette, 
where his position threatened both Chattanooga and Bridge- 
port. Stewart continued his railroad adventures, and, on 
October 5th, sent French's division to attack Allatoona, just 
reinforced by Corse, who most brilliantly and stubbornly de- 
fended it, until, SheiTuan's main army appearing from Atlanta, 
the Confederates drew off. Sherman, indeed, had, on the 
day previous, taken his army, consisting of the Fourth, Foiu'- 
teenth. Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Corps, out of Atlanta, 
leaving the Twentieth to hold the works. He now started 
after Stewart up the raih-oad ; but the latter sped quickly to- 
wards Dalton, Avhich he captured on the 14th, Avilh its garri- 
son, destroying more raih'oad, from Tilton on one side of 
Dalton to the Tunnel on the other : then, his Avork done, he 
AvithdrcAV through Nickajack Gap to Hood's main army, now 
near Summerville. Hood, avcII pleased Avith his success thus 
far, and laughing a little at the Avild-goose chase on Aviiich he 
appeared to be leading his opponent, put his columns in mo- 
tion for Gadsden, on the Coosa. And Sherman, in the 



NASHVILLE. 435 

lack of anything better to do, followed, though somewhat 
disgusted at finding that his opponent, as he phrased it, 
"evidently wanted to avoid a fight." On the 19th, Sherman 
had got to Gaylesville, higher up on the Coosa than Gadsden, 
in Northern Alabama, near the Georgia line. Seven days at 
Gaylesville, Sherman waited to see what Hood would do at 
Gadsden. Then, on the 26th, he found that the latter had, 
while clothing and reshoeiug a part of his troops, sent a column 
of infantry west to Decatur, to clear the way, doubtless, for an 
advance in force against Nashville. To follow up Hood could 
no longer be thought of, because experience showed that he 
could move the faster, Sherman's columns being more cum- 
bersome. INIoreover, Hood, at present, was playing the win- 
ning game, since he had broken Sherman's line of supplies, 
captured some of his garrisons, and drawn him clear out of 
Georgia into Alabama, all without a battle. His present 
move aimed to coax the Union general into Tennessee ; but 
to this Sherman took exception, for to dance attendance upon 
a general whom he had just disastrously defeated, and to 
fight a defensive campaign for the retention 'of Chattanooga, 
Murfreesboro', and Nashville, after he had captured Atlanta, 
was something his temper could no longer brook. His north- 
ern movement must be stopped somewhere, and the sooner 
the better ; so, leaving Hood in good hands, he reversed his 
columns and marched to the Atlantic. • 

It was the 26th of October when Sherman began to gird 
and strip for the journey to the sea. He sent the Fourth and 
Twenty-third Corps to Tennessee, turned back the rest of 
his army from Gaylesville to Smyrna Church and Kingston, 
and, in the fortnight succeeding, organized and equipped his 
expedition, sent back all surplus artillery, stores, baggage, 
with the sick and wounded and refugees, to Chattanooga, 
and then destroyed the railroad from Atlanta to the Etowah, 
and from Eesaca to Dalton. At the same time, in Rome, 
Atlanta, and elsewhere, all remaining shops, foundries, mills, 



436 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

depots, and supplies were burned, lest they might become 
useful to the Confederates, to whose repossession North Georgia 
was now surrendered. Sherman had taken with himself 60,- 
000 veteran infantry, sixty guns, and 5,500 cavalry. A much 
smaller force could have accomplished all that was required, 
but it was advisable, for moral effect, to move all the troops 
forward that could be spared, and to send the fewest possible 
in retrograde. Had Thomas's army proved insufficient for 
its task, the disposition would have been censurable, no 
matter what the success of the march to the sea ; but the 
sequel vindicated all. As stout Cortez broke his ships be- 
hind him, on the Mexican coast, that the dream of retreat 
might not enter the minds of his men, so Sherman, as he 
turned his cohorts southward, put the torch to the camps and 
the city of Atlanta. With mighty tongues of flame leaping 
from the crashing edifices of the ruined " Gate City of Geor- 
gia," and blazing by night in portentous beacon-fires for 
miles along the untried paths, the columns of Sherman, cut- 
ting loose from the world behind, on the 13th of November, 
plunged into the forests, and were lost to sight. 

The officer who now reigned for the time over the broad 
Mississippi Valley, with a shield for Tennessee and a sword 
for the advancing foe, was Major-General George H. Thomas. 
Long before fanlous among the choicest soldiers of the Union 
army, Thomas had added to the laurels of Mill Spring, Mur- 
freesboro', Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge, those of the 
late Atlanta campaign, during which he had the handling and 
immediate command of 60,000 men, being more than three 
fifths of Sherman's whole army. He was Sherman's senior 
subordinate, Sherman's own senior in years, an approved offi- 
cer of the highest type, and one who had bettered by twenty 
months' longer experience the encomium passed upon him by 
Kosecrans at the opening of 18G3 — "true and prudent; dis- 
tinguished in counsel, and on many battle-fields celebrated 



NASHVILLE. 437 

by his courage." The importance of defeating Hood was 
illustrated by the assignment to this task of so excellent a 
soldier, with whom, also, was Schofield, an admirable ally ; 
so that with the coastward excursion rode not one of the 
three army commanders who fought at Dalton and Kenesaw. 

It was on the 29th of September that Thomas left Atlanta 
for Nashville, and the 3d of October when he arrived at the 
latter capital. His mission then was merely to protect Ten- 
nessee and its many cities, forts, and garrisons, and the rail- 
road and river communications of the army in front, against 
the bold raids of Forrest and Buford, who had been prowling 
through the neighborhood during the previous fortnight. 
Startled, however, by the prompt demonstrations of Generals 
Rousseau, Steedman, Granger, Morgan, and Washburue, 
Forrest's two Confederate columns made off across the Ten- 
nessee again, about the time when Thomas assumed com- 
mand. While the latter officer was posting the troops just 
enumerated along the Tennessee and the railroads, in sup- 
port of the chief garrisons established on those lines. Hood 
launched forward from Palmetto, on his northerly invasion. 

Once more now, precisely as in the spring of 18G2, nearly 
three years gone, General Beauregard had been sent from 
Virginia to Mississippi, to restore the failing fortunes of the 
West. Once again his mission involved the superintendence 
of an offensive campaign into Tennessee, for which purpose 
he again fixed his head-quarters for a time, as of old, at his- 
toric Corinth. But hoAv had the scene changed since that 
earlier experiment ! Then, the wide-spreading Mississippi 
Valley was in Confederate keeping from Arkansas to Georgia ; 
the Alleghanies were Confederate altogether, no Union column 
daring to look towards East Tennessee ; while the Great 
Kiver was fast in Southern tenure from Columbus to New 
Orleans. Feeling their way down into Kentucky from the 
Ohio, the Union columns were then not less astonished at 
their own temerity, than were the Confederates confident of 



438 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

punishing it. And no-\v, three disastrous years had made 
havoc so sad of Confederate possessions ! Indeed, the very 
remembrance of the ill-starred campaign of aggression •which 
began and ended on the field of Shiloh, might well have cast 
an ominous shadow on the mind of Beauregard, and presaged 
disaster for the campaign to come. But the hour was one 
for action, not for gloomy meditation over a changed land- 
scape. To Beauregard, in mid-October, had been assigned 
the grand "Division of the West," including all possible 
paths of Hood's army. Through October, workmen were 
busy in repairing the old Mobile and Ohio Railroad and its 
feeders and connections, till at length trains ran up as far as 
Corinth, and thence due east to Cherokee Station, where they 
poured supplies of every sort, collected through Alabama and 
Mississippi, — from Mobile, Selma, and Montgomery, — into 
Hood's camp. Besides clothing, shoes, arms, equipments, 
ammunition, food, forage, there came also to Hood, undef 
Beauregard's effective rallying, large reinforcements of troops. 
But with the end of these preparations, Beauregard disap- 
pears forever from the scene of the Tennessee campaign, 
wherein, indeed, he appears to have held not even the role 
of stage-manager, far less that of an actor in the drama ; but, 
as it were, the place of property-man, dispensing the costumes 
and the weapons, ar.d furnishing forth the appointments for 
Hood's ensuing tragedy. 

It was not only in clothing and shoeing his troops and fill- 
ing his wagons that Hood was busy at Gadsden, while Sher- 
man waited at Gaylesville. He sent before him those who 
should prepare his way into Tennessee ; Cheatham hovered 
about Decatur and Florence, and Forrest was once more in 
the saddle, and blowing his bugle along the Lower Tennessee. 
Thomas now had but one desire for the present, which was 
to keep the Confederates south of the Tennessee till at least 
Stanley's Fourth Corps could arrive on the scene of 
campaign. But Hood had moved before the Union plan Avas 



NASHVILLE. 439 

adopted, and, accordingly, while Stanley v.'a>-:> liurrying from 
Sherman, Hood, between the 29th and 31st of October, easily 
crossed the river three miles above Florence, his cavalry re- 
pulsing Croxton's brigade, which was all the force that could 
be then stationed at that point. At the same time, Forrest 
swung down the westerly bank of the Tennessee, with seven- 
teen regiments of cavalry, and nine guns, carrying all before 
him to Johnsonville, a Union base of supply and railroad 
terminus, and there captured a quantity of supplies, barges, 
and gun -boats, while to the remainder of the flotilla and the 
store-houses the garrison put the torch, destroying some mill- 
ions' worth of materials of war. 

But now, on the first day of November, the Fourth Corps 
arrived at Pulaski, where it was joined soon after by the 
Twenty-third — too late, however, to prevent the lodgment 
of Hood's infantr}^ north of the Temiessee. Pulaski was 
selected by Thomas as the outpost from which to observe 
Hood's movements, and all the available cavalry were picket- 
inc: the north bank of the Tennessee : while Schofield took 
command at Pulaski, Thomas was vigorously at work at 
Nashville. Hood, meanwhile, had already occupied Florence 
with the corps of Stewart and Cheatham, while to the oppo- 
site or north bank of the Tennessee he had thrown S. D. 
Lee's corps, with a division of cavalry on either flank patrol- 
ling the neighboring fords, and the banks and the regions 
beyond. 

Very anxiousl}', during the first two weeks in November, 
did Thomas, with his scanty forces, watch his enemy ; but 
the latter lay quietly at Florence and Tuscumbia, and his only 
hostile manoeuvres were with Forrest's cavalry, which pushed 
out to Shoal Creek and there incessantly skirmished with the 
squadrons of Hatch and Croxton. However, Thomas was not 
eager to hurry his antagonist, since every hour to him was 
golden, in collecting his forces. "While he thus watched and 
waited, Sherman, whose presence at Kingston was to Thomas 



440 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

of great moral support, cut the line of communication on tho 
12tli, and vanished from th^ scene. 

The days which succeeded Sherman's departure from King- 
ston were full of solicitude. Should Hood, taking the alarm, 
abandon his design and march off to harass Sherman, Thomas 
was instantly to follow upon his trail : otherwise he was to 
defend Tennessee and meet and overwhelm the Confederate 
army. Hour after hour the Confederate camp-fires were 
watched ; at length it was evident that Hood clung to his own 
enterprise, and would turn his banners north Avard. 

The situation of Thomas was one of enormous responsibility, 
calculated to weigh down a less firm and self-sustained spirit. 
To his care was committed the Military Division extending 
from the Ohio to the Gulf, from the Mississippi to the moun- 
tains ; the task of holding Tennessee, defending the line of 
the Tennessee Kivcr, and the railroad lines from Chattanooga 
to Nashville ; finally, the destruction of the Western Confed- 
erate army, the grand object of the "whole war west of the 
Alleghanies. Sherman's instructions were that he should 
" exercise command over all the troops and garrisons not ab- 
solutely in the presence of the general-in-chief." To accom- 
plish his ends, Thomas had not only to make a campaign, 
but to create an army — or, at least, to collect and crystallize 
one from materials scattered hundreds of miles ; and this be- 
fore the alert enemy should learn his difiiculties and take ad- 
vantage of them. It is by reflecting on Avhat was to be done 
and what there was with which to do it, that the energy of 
those days may be appreciated. " xVt this time," says 
Thomas, " I found myself confronted by the army which, un- 
der General J. E. Johnston, had so skilfully resisted the ad- 
vance of the whole active army of the Military Division of the 
Mississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochie, reinforced by 
a well-equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over 
twelve thousand men, led by one of the boldest and most 
succcssfid cavalry commanders in the rebel army." He esti- 



NASHVILLE. 441 

mated Hood's strength at from forty to forty-five thousand in- 
fantry, and from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry, while Sher- 
man fixed it at thirty-five thousand infantry and ten thousand 
cavalry. One commander looked at the force he met and de- 
stroyed, the other to the force he left behind for another to 
vanquish ; it is not safe, however, to place Hood's efiective 
force, when greatest, much above fifty thousand men. To meet 
it Thomas had at Pulaski and thereabouts an effective force 
of but thirty thousand men. Of the six corps in Sherman's 
army, he had left Thomas but two — the Fourth, about twelve 
thousand strong, and the Twenty-third, about ten thousand 
strong ; to these were added Hatch's division of cavalry, four 
thousand strong, Croxton's brigade, twenty-five hundred, 
and Capron's brigade, about twelve hundred — in all, twenty- 
two thousand infantry and seven thousand seven hundred cav- 
alry. The rest of Thomas's force was posted along the railr 
road and river, as at Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, 
Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to hold the lines of 
communication until Hood's purpose should be developed, 
and his path divined. All, however, that Thomas Avanted 
was time ; for two infantry divisions under A. J. Smith, were 
on their w^ay from Missouri, and other detachments were pour- 
ing into Nashville, while Wilson was busily moulding the 
fragmentary cavalry of Kentucky and Tennessee, and remount- 
ins: the regiments which Sherman had dismounted so as to 
take their horses for his own troopers in the march of Savannah. 
Schofield at Pulaski was ordered to retard the enemy when he 
should advance, but without risking a general engagement till 
the reinforcements were up. 

At length, November 17th, Hood leaped the river with his 
main force, from Tuscumbia to Florence, and two days later 
moved from the latter point, on two parallel roads, towards 
Waynesboro', and drove Hatch's cavalry out of Laurenceburgon 
the 22d. From Laurenceburg as well as Pulaski, a road runs 
back to Columbia ; and the Confederates were aiming to arrive 



442 THE T"\yELVE decisive eattlls of the war. 

first at this latter point hj the Laurcnccburg road, in order to 
cut off Schofield's retreat. The latter officer, accordingly, by 
Thomas's direction, fell back skirmishing from Pulaski along 
the turnpike, on the 2od, and next day safely reached Colum- 
bia, on Duck Kiver ; but there Avas no time to spare, for the 
leading division. Cox's, had barely leisure to move down the 
stream and check the Confederate cavalry column which was 
strujriilins to gret across the Union line of retreat. 

Looking at the map of manoeuvre, one would declare that 
skilful and brilliant strategy on the Confederate part, joined 
with a measure of good fortune, would have made Scholield's 
position at Pulaski, despite his promptitude, very perilous. 
The latter was, with all his trains, many days' march south 
of Nashville. Now, until he should reach Nashville, neither 
that city nor his own anny was safe. It may be said that 
Schofield had a long start of his opponent ; but time and dis- 
tance were not the only elements of the race. Schofield was 
tied to his trains, and most of his force was taken up with 
guarding them ; on the o^her hand, Ilood had no anxiety for 
his trains, and as his rear could not be touched by hostile 
raids, he had most of his army light and free for a rapid Hank- 
ing movements. Again, Hood far outnumbered Schofield, and 
above all outnumbered him in cavalry, the Union horsemen 
being no match for Forrest. It may be asserted, therefore, 
that considering the opposing numbers, the length of the re- 
treat, the excellence of Hood's flanking column, and the cer- 
tainty that Schofield's trains would, if set upon by the enemy, 
block the Avay and delay and confuse the Union forces — the 
situation of Schofield was for many days precarious. 

Hood's main plan was to push into Kentucky and there 
recruit his army and fill his wagons ; and he seems actually 
to have dreamed of swelling his force to 90,000 men. But it 
was first needful to defeat Thomas, and the hitter's poverty in 
troops gave him a good chance of success. The miry roads 
and the lack of maps and previous reconuoissances, defeated 



NASHVILLE. 443 

the scheme of cutting 015" Schofield between Pulaski and Colum- 
bia, and the second effort was made between Columbia and 
Franklin. Had Hood then succeeded in gliding between 
Schofield's army and Nashville, the city would probably have 
fallen. 

There was skirmishing between Hood's advance and Scho- 
field in front of Columbia, from the 24th to the 27th, and on 
the latter day Hood's whole army was up and in position. 
That evening, therefore, Schofield abandoned the town, which 
is on the south bank of Duck River, and crossing to the other 
shore, took up a very strong position a mile and a half dis- 
tant. At midnight of the 28th, Forrest drove off Wilson's 
cavalry, which guarded the Lewisburg pike, six miles above 
Columbia, and there crossed Duck River. Stuart's and 
Cheatham' scorps and Johnson's division of Lee's corps fol- 
lowed before dawn, one division of Lee's corps being alone 
left in Schofield's front at Columbia. 

The point at which Hood aimed was Spring Hill, fifteen 
miles north of Columbia, on the turnpike leading back to 
Franklin. His troops were in light marching order, with but 
one battery to a corps, and marched on roads parallel to the 
turnpike. Hood was already on Schofield's flank, and had cut 
communication between the latter and Wilson, l)efore the 
retreat of the Union troops from Columbia was commenced. 
It seemed that nothing could save the latter. 

It was now a "race for Franklin." As Hood had, by par- 
allel roads, endeavored to get past the Union flank, Stanley 
with the second division of his Fourth Corps, was hurried at 
once back to Spring Hill, fifteen miles north of Columbia 
(at which point the Confederate flanking column would de- 
bouch on the Franklin turnpike), in order to guard the rear. 
He was just in time to save the trains, as well as the line of 
retreat, from the clutch of Forrest. 

Forrest reached Spring Hill at mid-day, but Stanley's 
troops, who had that moment formed around the trains, 



444 '^IIE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

barely managed to keep him away. The contest, however, 
went on till four o'clock, when Cheatham's corps arrived on 
the field, two miles from Spring Hill, at which point Stanley 
had a small force deployed along the pike. Cheatham was 
ordered by Hood to make a vigorous attack, and, had he 
done so, beyond all question Schofield's retreat must have 
been cut oflf, for a part alone of Stanley's corps was strug- 
o-lino- ao"ainst the whole of Forrest's and the Avhole of Cheat- 
ham's, und all the rest of Hood's army, except one division, 
was marching up to the field. But Cheatham made only a 
feeble demonstration with only a part of his command. Yet 
even this Stanley's exhausted command might not longer 
have withstood after their heroic labors, had not tidings of 
their condition reached Schoficld, w^ho, at a late hour in the 
afternoon, started with Euger's division of the Twenty-Third 
Corps to Stanley's relief. 

Chagrined at Cheatham's sluggishness, which had con- 
sumed the day. Hood after dark endeavored to throw Stu- 
art's corps, which had arrived, across the turnpike. But the 
latter ofiicer also did not move upon the required position, 
and at eleven o'clock went into bivouac within 800 yards of 
the road. So, a second time, an opportunity for blocking 
Schofield's retreat was lost ; and the simple story is the best 
comment on the condition of the Confederate army. The divi- 
sion commanders seemed lacking in respect for their superior. 

Schofield appears to have been under the impression that 
Hood's main force was still around Columbia, and all day 
looked for an attack near that point. Thomas says, "Al- 
though not attacked from the direction of Huey's Mills, 
General Schofield was busily occupied all day at Columbia, 
resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck River, which 
he successfully accomplished, repulsing the enemy many 
times with heavy loss." As we have seen, only one of 
Hood's divisions was left to make the feint against Columbia. 
But, whatever the success of this division, the fatal blunder- 



KASHVILLE. 445 

ing of Hood's flanking column threw away victory, when it 
might have been made sure. 

However, when darkness had fixllen, the Union troops at 
Columbia, obedient to the instructions left by Schofield, 
stole back on the turnpike road to Franklin. The march 
was hiirried, for thouijh the railroad bridsre across Duck 
River had been destroyed, the jjontoon bridge, hastily fired, 
had been abandoned to the enemy, who might be expected to 
cross in prompt pursuit, the more especially as Lee's divis- 
ion had been pressing vigorously all day to detect a with- 
drawal. At midnight. Hood's pickets at Sirring Hill sent 
back word that the enemy was moving " in great confusion " 
along the pike, with trains and troops mingled. Hood 
quickly ordered Cheatham to move a heavy line of skirmish- 
ers against the pike, to delay this retreat. It was not done ; 
and with incomprehensible negligence the Confederate corps 
lay within easy march of the turnpike, over which the Union 
troops and trains which they had come thither to destroy 
were distinctly heard to rattle and hurry hour after hour. 
Indeed, it was believed, and no wonder, for a long time 
thereafter by the Union commanders, not only that the 
smaller part of Hood's army was at Spring Hill, but that 
even that part were asleep or heedless when their enemies 
marched past them. This was the third and last chance for 
Hood to destroy Schofield and capture Nashville. 

To Schofield it was a night of intense anxiety, especially 
when, going with Ruger to Stanley's aid, he had discovered 
the enemy bivouacking m force at Spring Hill, less than 
eight hundred yards from the turnpike, and fifteen miles 
north of the main army at Columbia. Three miles be- 
yond, at Thompson's, were the still-burning fires of another 
cavalry camp just abandoned. Quietly posting a brigade at 
each of these points, to prevent an irruption from the cross- 
roads on the line of retreat, Ruger anxiously awaited the 
passing of the main army. Swiftly the latter moved back 



44G '-rilE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR.' 

on the pike, enveloped in the fiivoring darkness, and passed 
Spring Hill at midnight, M'hilc the Confederates seemed to 
slumber in their camps near by after their day's labors ; mean- 
while Wilson's cavalry clattered back on the Lewisburg pike. 
At dawn of the 30th, the Confederates moved upon the pike in 
search of their foe ; but ho was gone, foot and horse, baggage, 
artillery, and ammunition. The baffled troopers dashed an- 
grily along the road, only to find Schofield drawn up, next morn- 
ing, after a hard night march of twenty-five miles, in firm line 
of battle around the town of Franklin ; and, except a few 
burned Avagons, his trains were safe behind him, beyond the 
Harpeth. 

The town lies on the left or southerly bank of a bend in 
the Harpeth Kiver, a tributary of the Cumberland, and eigh- 
teen miles south of Xashville, by the great turnpike along 
which the retreat had been conducted. The stream winds in 
horse-shoe shape at this point, so as to cover the north and 
east of the town, leaving only the south and west exposed ; 
accordingly, Schofield formed line of battle with his two corps 
across this front, and resting both flanks upon the river, the 
one above the town, the other below, still maintained a toler- 
alily dense and solid line. No sooner was the column de- 
l^loycd, than with that marvellous celerity which long practice 
had begot, the troops, though jaded and sleepless, fell to in- 
trenching with axe and spade ; and by four o'clock they had 
thrown up a handsome parapet of logs and earth. This line 
was dotted with artillery at available points, while on the 
northerly bank of the stream, in the rear, the rest of the 
artillery was posted along a range of intrenched heights, which 
swept the broad plain in front of the main position. In his 
semicircular line, Schofield posted Stanley's Fourth Corps on 
the right, and his own Twenty-third Corps, under Cox, on 
the left, w^hile Wilson's cavalry was disposed along the north- 
erly shore, beyond both wings, to guard the neighboring 
fords from the passage of flanking columns of Forrest's cav- 



NASHVILLE. 447 

airy. The position wjis a strong tete-de-poni, covering tho 
bridge and turnpike in the rear, along which, meanwliile, 
labored the rumbling trains which Schofield had made it a 
point of honor to preserve. 

Before noon of the 30th, Hood's skirmishers were up and 
pressing the Union outposts, while the latter struggled to give 
time for the rapid intrcnchment going on behind them. The 
region on both sides of the turnpike for some miles south of 
the river is level and cleared, with a few bushy patches here 
and there, which served as partial curtains for Hood's deploy- 
ments ; but the arrival and formation of his columns were in 
the main obvious from the Union lines. By four o'clock in 
tho afternoon Hood was all up, and, with Stewart on the 
right and Cheatham on the left, S. D. Lee in support, and 
Forrest's cavalry on the flanks, he began a general assault. The 
broad undulating interval, open in the main, but broken by 
bushy hillocks and clumps of undergrowth, was passed under 
destructive fire, with splendid gallantry. The first brunt of 
battle fell upon two brigades of Wagner's division, of the 
Fourth Corps, which, according to some strange theory 
of combat, had been posted about eight hundred yards in front 
of the main intrenched line, there to act as a sort of cushion 
to receive and deaden the initial violence of the charge. It 
was the same division which had stubbornly fought at Spring 
Hill the day before, and now comported itself with the like 
obstinate* gallantry. But Cheatham's corps, rolling in a bil- 
lowy mass over the plain, dashed full upon the outlying 
brigades, and, curling around their flanks, swept off six 
hundred and fifty prisoners, and stretched several hundred 
more Avoundcd on the earth. In a few moments, Maney's 
division was in full possession of Wagner's intrenchments, 
and the remnant of the two luckless brigades were flying in 
confusion back to the main line. It was clear enough now 
that this outpost had better at once have drawn behind the 
line of battle ; for, besides the havoc in its ranks, its tumult- 



448 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

uous rush to the rear threw the main line into disorder at that 
point, and by covering the enemy behind, prevented the 
troops in the works from opening fire upon him. Close upon 
the heels of the flying brigades pressed the exultant Confed- 
erates, and pursued and pursuers leaped together over the 
intrenchments. It was a critical moment ; a wide entrance 
had been effected into the Union works ; the position was 
imperilled, and two 4-gun batteries already captured by the 
Confederates. At this moment the remaining brigade of Wag- 
ner's division (Opdycke's), which had been held in reserve 
inside the lines, threw itself impetuously into the gap, and by 
a sudden charge, with Conrad's brigade in support, recap- 
tured the two batteries, and drove Cheatham's men across the 
intrenchments, with the loss of several hundred i)risoncrs. 
In this gallant struggle General Stanley was wounded, after 
having in person rallied "Wagner's men, and led them to the 
expulsion of the enemy. 

And now the battle redoubled in fury, and the roll of mus- 
ketry burst from wing to wing of either army, while the bat- 
teries echoed their deeper diapason. With oflicers of all 
grades leading the charge, the Confederates fairly leaped upon 
the parapet, and men in gray and men in blue grappled in 
deadly wrestle across the breast-high mound which divided 
them. Stewart's corps, on the Confederate right, was raked 
with a merciless cross-fire from Cox's corps and the intrenched 
artillery on the northern river bank, which, threatening to 
sweep away that wing, checked its repeated assaults. On 
the other flank, Cheatham, encouraged by having once broken 
into the Union right and centre, surged desperately thrice 
more against the lines, receiving each time a withering storm 
of canister and grape upon both flanks, and the musketry 
fire of the Fourth Corps in front. Four distinct assaults, it 
was thought, were made, in Hood's desperate style; for the 
assailants with surprising gallantry came again and again to 
the breastworks, now here, now there, as if loath to quit the 



NASHVILLE. 449 

prey whereof they had so long been baffled ; and between the 
compact assaults fierce artillery exchanges took place — 
and infantry exchanges too ; since the Confederate rillcmen 
clung constantly to the field, close up to the works, wherever 
the roughnesses of the ground would shelter them. "When 
darkness fell, desperate charges gave way to a general inter- 
change of fire, but it was only at ten o'clock that the assaults 
ceased and the battle was over. 

In this engagement at Franklin, Hood's loss was 6252, 
of which 702 were prisoners, while Schofield's loss was 
2326, whereof 1104 were prisoners. The Confederate losses 
included thirteen general ofiicers, of whom six were killed on 
the field, six wounded, and one captured : among the killed 
was Major-General Patrick Cleburne, who had risen from the 
ranks of an Arkansas regiment, and was, it may be said, the 
best soldier in Hood's army. 

Schofield's aim in joining battle at Franklin, was now 
achieved : for whereas to have fled without a stand on the 
banks of the Ilarpeth, would have turned retreat to rout, and 
in the intermingling of troops and trains, would have brought 
ruin on one or both, now he could make his way to Nashville 
in safety and order. A full day's journey had been secured 
for his trains, and, the battle being over, before midnight 
Schofield put his troops once more in motion, and withdrew 
as noiselessly and successfully from Franklin as he had from 
Columbia. lie marched, too, with the consoling reflection 
that he had inflicted a terrible »loss on his opponent, and 
checked his career at the outset by an unexpected and bewil- 
dering blow. 

Before Hood, the headstrong, got breath again from the 
bufiet at Franklin, the city he aimed at was safe; for the 
next day Thomas's reinforcements came. However, as if 
with appetite edged by frequent disappointment, the Con- 
federates, on finding Schofield gone, hurried along the turn- 
pike so stealthily emptied of their enemy, and paused only 

29 



450 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

in sight of his main citadel, which they straightway began to 
environ. 

n. 

BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 

In a military view there was little to give the city of Nash- 
ville the significance it early assumed in the war and always 
maintained. There was not much in the physique of the 
region around it of strategic value, while historically it was 
proved to be a dependent post, whose evacuation could be 
procured by operations scores of miles away. Fortified with 
much care, it yet became self-suppoi-ting only with the pres- 
ence of a large army, to which in turn it was as likely to 
prove a cage as a castle. Its lines of communication Avere not 
proof against skilful menace, so that at a well-directed shock 
on the flank, Nashville would succumb ; as yield indeed it did 
to Buell, upon the fall of Donelson, when Sydney Johnston's 
army withdrew without a shot. It wasy doubtless, this fact 
which influenced the conduct of Hood, wlio, as we shall see, 
having with much pains got up to Nashville, sat ten days 
before it, waiting to see it fall, as it might of yore, at the 
waving of his baton towards its lines of supply. 

However, considerations social, political, and geographical, 
made Nashville the great prize in Tennessee. It is the chief 
city of the Mississippi Valley between the Ohio and the 
ocean — the largest in population, the wealthiest, the leading 
mart of trade, the centre of social influence, and the chief 
focus of politics for all the region about. Within, it displays 
in sumptuous buildings and worthy institutions the proofs of 
civic prosperity and refinement, and its environs are studded 
with beautiful country-seats ; ten handsome macadamized 
roads radiate to the surrounding villages, and railroads start- 
ing in all directions, link it directly to all neighboring cities. 
It at once became the Union depot for the great campaigns 
in Tennessee and Georgia, and its repossession was coveted 



NASHVILLE. 451 

by the Confederates, both for prestige and actual vaUie, be- 
yond that of any other city in that part of the disputed field. 

But Nashville was not to bo had back for the asking. 
Though its safety could not be guaranteed by natural strength 
of its own, nor could any network of intrenched lines ally it 
to positions which might be pronounced impregnable for a 
given campaign, yet it was capable of effective fortification. 
The city lies on the picturesque heights rising from the 
southerly bank of a bend in the Cumberland ; and, as at 
Franklin on the Haqieth, strorig works are easily thrown up 
from river to river again, across the southerly side of the 
city, while all the rest is covered by the stream. The river 
was a sentry-beat for the Union gun-boats, which, ceaselessly 
moving to and fro, watched the banks, and prevented a hos- 
tile crossing : the heights about the city swept the interval 
over which a storming party must pass. 

Self-poised and deliberate. General Thomas arrayed his 
forces around Nashville, conscious that he was master of the 
situation. The period of doubt had passed. The army of 
observation at Pulaski had been safely drawn back, with all 
its trains, after dealing a severe blow at its opponent. On 
the day of the battle of Franklin the advance of A. J. Smith's 
command reached Nashville from St. Louis, followed the day 
after by a body of five thousand returned convalescents and 
furloughed men of Sherman's column, from Chattanooga, who 
had been collected there by degrees, under Steedman : with 
the latter came also a colored brigade from the same point. 
Bodies of detached troops of all sizes, from companies to 
brigades, gathered from all quarters — from Missouri and 
Louisiana, from Kentucky and Georgia ; released garrisons 
marched easterly from the Mississippi and westerly from the 
mountains ; from the frontier the outposts were drawn back 
to the interior, and from the rear recruits streamed forward 
in great numbers. A volunteer division, over four thousand 
strong, of employees of the Quartermaster's forces, was organ- 



452 THE T-\VELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ized in Nashville under Donaldson. No less than twenty new 
one-year regiments joined Thomas at the same point, many 
of which were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose 
terms of service had expired. Now, too, that Hood's path 
was known, the garrisons in Southern Tennessee and Alabama 
had been concentrated, those of Athens, Decatur, and Hunts- 
ville withdrawing to Stevenson, and that of Johnson ville to 
Clarksville : Milroy abandoned Tullahoma and joined his 
forces to Rousseau's at Murfreesboro', whither also were sent 
five new regiments from Stevenson. In short, Thomas, in 
early December, had his straggling troops collected, his army 
in hand, and an effective force of about fifty thousand men 
ready not only for defence but to take the ^eld in offensive 
campaign. 

Meanwhile, both Nashville and Murfreesboro' had been 
strongly fortified. Five thousand of the Quartermaster's 
men, under General Tower, reinforced by citizens, had been 
busily intrenching around the former city for many days, and 
two regular lines of earthworks, known as the exterior and 
the interior lines, with forts connected by strong curtains at 
proper intervals, and rifle trenches in front, girdled the city 
at distances of two miles and less therefrom. Eisfht irun- 
boats watchfully patrolled the Cumberland, which was for- 
tunately high enough to give them free course, and like so 
many moving fortresses guarded Avith their heavy guns the 
left bank of the river from Forrest's attemjots to cross it. 
Line of battle was formed, on Schofield's arrival, along the 
commanding heights surrounding Nashville. Smith, eleven 
thousand strong, held the right, with his right flank on the 
Cumberland below the city ; the Fourth Corps under Wood 
the right centre ; Schofield's Twenty-third Corps the left 
centre, with his loft on the Nolcnsville pike ; and Steedman 
the interval to the river above the city : Wilson's cavalry 
took post on the north bank, at Edgefield. 

By noon of the 2d of December, Hood's cavalry showed in 



NASHVILLE. 453 

front of the Union intrenchments and began skirmishing : 
next day his infantry was up and drove the Union pickets 
into tlie works. The same day Hood entirely invested the 
city on its southern, south-eastern and south-western sides, 
establishing his main line entirely across the river-bend, and 
crowding it well towards the opposing intrenchments. He 
threw up three lines of earthworks on a range of hills south 
of those occupied by the Union forces, and somewhat in- 
ferior, his salient being on the crest of Montgomery Hill, less 
than six hundred }'ards from the Union centre. His infantry 
occupied the high ground on the south-east side of Brown's 
Creek, his right resting on the Nolensville pike, and the lino 
thence stretching westerly across the Franklin and Granny 
White pikes, to the hills south and south-west of Richland 
Creek, and along that creek to the Hillsboro' pike, where his 
left rested : cavalry filled the interval between each flank and 
the river. 

While thus occupied. Hood also began to cut the com- 
munications of Nashville. Those with Johnsonville and 
Decatur were already severed, and Forrest's cavalry dashed 
upon the Chattanooga road and broke that also, capturing a 
few car-loads of troops in Stccdman's last train from Chatta- 
nooga. Hood then blockaded the Cumberland by planting 
batteries along the shore, and so closed that source of supply. 
The only line now left open was the Louisville road, a single 
stem of track one hundred and eighty-five miles long, exposed 
to guerillas throughout its length, and menaced by Forrest's 
troopers, who were only waiting for the Cumberland to fill 
in order to cross the river and break it. The Cumberland, 
indeed, had now become an exciting diorama, with the Con- 
federate horsemen moving relentlessly along its southern shore, 
chafing at the swollen stream, and eagerly searching where 
they might ford or bridge it ; on the opposite bank, the Union 
cavalry watching and following every movement ; between 
them a fleet of gun-boats steaming to and fro with sleepless 



454 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

activity, and checking eacli attempt of the Confederate horse 
to enter the stream. Soon, Forrest dispatched a strong body 
northward to Lebanon to vault the river there at the earliest 
possible moment, while Wilson posted a force of Union 
troopers at Gallatin to guard the country there. 

Meanwhile, Hood attempted the reduction of Murfrees- 
boro', and, the day after his aiTival, sent Bates's division of 
Cheatham's corps to attack the blockhouse on Overall's 
Creek ; but Milroy coming up with a column from Murfrees- 
boro', five miles distant, the Confederates hastily drew off, 
their battery having done the blockhouse no damage. During 
the next three days, Bates, aided by one of S. D. Lee's 
divisions and a strong body of cavalry, demonstrated heavily 
against Fort Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', garrisoned by 8000 
men, under Kosseau. But on the 8th, the expected assault 
not being made, Milroy, with seven infantry regiments, sal- 
lied out and attacked the investing force, and drove it from 
its breastworks, capturing 207 prisoners and two guns, his 
own loss being 205. Simultaneously the Confederate cav- 
alry had effected an entrance into the town of Murfreesboro', 
but was soon expelled. 

In these preliminaries the first two weeks of December 
slipped away. The silence of Thomas was interpreted by 
his enemy as a sign of weakness ; for the former had lain 
quiet behind his works since the artillery salvo wherewith 
he had greeted Hood's arrival, to which compliment the Con- 
federate batteries had deigned no reply. In great confidence 
Hood awaited the moment when, the river having fallen, 
Forrest should cross and cut the Louisville Railroad, where- 
upon he expected to give a Roland for an Oliver, and repeat 
at Nashville the Sherman tactics at Atlanta. Some dim sus- 
picion, however, that all was not well, ought, one would 
think, to have crossed him, on reflecting that his enemy Avas 
in a city full of supplies, and fortified with great care, with 
his flanks jirotected by gun-boats, and with an effective force 



NASHVILLE. 455 

iu Nashville, or within call, actually outnumbering the assail- 
ants in infantry and rapidly approaching them in cavahy — 
facts which gave Hood's sojourn a novel aspect when re- 
garded as a " siege." Yet his misconception of Thomas's 
inertness was j^erhaps pardonable, since a similar one pre- 
vailed in some Union quarters distant from the field of opera- 
tions, and General Grant himself, chagrined first at the 
retreat inside the works of Nashville, and still more so at 
Thomas's persistent defensive, actually dispatched an order 
for his removal from command — an order which fortunately 
for the Union cause was suspended for a time, and during 
the reprieve )vas fought the Battle of Nashville. 

Delay indeed there had been, but it was easily explicable. 
Thomas was cutting out his work, not for a reconnoissance, 
but for a sure and overwhelming victory, and not even for a 
victory alone, but for a jDursuit of the routed army, ending 
cither in its surrender or its dispersion south of the Tennes- 
see. To accomplish this, he must have al)ove all a strono" 
body of cavalry, in which arm the necessities of Sherman's 
expedition had left him far inferior to his opponent. The 
work of remounting the dismounted cavalry, in spite of 
"Wilson's vigor, could not be finished until a week after 
Hood's arrival at Nashville ; and until it was finished, 
Thomas, with the unshakable resolution which marks the 
man, declined to experiment against the enemy's works. 
However, all things were at length ready, and the 9th of 
December appointed for an attack upon the besieging forces ; 
but, on the night of the 8th, a violent storm sheeted the earth 
with ice, and made the movement of troops impossible. On 
the 12th, the cavalry corps marched or slid from their posi- 
tion at Edgefield, crossed the Cumberland, and took post 
within the defences on the Hardin and Charlotte pikes. It 
was now 12,000 strong, of whom, however, 9000 only were 
mounted, and about a fifth of these badly ; the rest were in 
fine condition. 



456 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

A tliaw came on the 13th, and before sunset of the 14th 
the ice embargo was removed. Accordingly, in the after- 
noon. General Thomas called bis corps commanders to his 
head-quarters, and, in a careful discussion, gave them their 
instructions for an attack the next day. Thursdays the 15th 
of December, dawned auspiciously, and at an early hour the 
Union army drew out of its intrenchments and formed pre- 
cisely according to the method explained the night before ; 
its movements were shrouded from the enemy, not only 
by the broken ground, but by a heavy fog which did not lift 
till noon. 

The plan of battle was simple and effective. Under cover 
of a violent demonstration against the Confederate right, the 
main army was to be massed and hurled against the Confed- 
erate left, the weakest point ; the jjosition having been 
turned on this flank, it was next proposed to attack the line 
the enemy would be forced to assume, using the advantage 
thus gained upon his left and rear to detach him from his 
hold on the right, and so expelling him from all his intrench- 
ments. To Steedman was intrusted the defence of Nash- 
ville, with Donaldson's division of Quartermaster's troops, 
the regular garrison under INIiller, and a part of his own 
Chattanooga command ; but with the main body of the latter 
he was to make the prescribed feint on the enemy's right. 
Schofield and Wood also left strong skirmish lines in their 
trenches. The rest of the army moved directly in front of 
its works, and this disposition brought Wilson's cavalry on 
the extreme right of the lino ; A. J. Smith's divisions of the 
Sixteenth Corps next, on the Harding pike ; Wood's Fourth 
Corps next, on the Hillsboro' pike, confronting jNIontgomery 
mil ; Schoficld's Twenty-third Corps on the left and rear of 
Wood, in reserve ; and Steedman on the extreme left. The 
battle was to open with Stccdman's feint on the Confederate 
right, and then, at the proper moment. Smith and Wilson 
were to vigorously turn the Confederate left, one division of 



NASHVILLE. 457 

"Wilson moving down the Charlotte pike meanwhile to j)ro- 
tect the Union right rear; then Wood was to assault the 
fro'vvning salient on Montgomery Hill, where the enemy's 
centre protruded like a wedge, and, taking it on the left and 
rear, to break through his line. Such was the scheme. 

Before dawn, Steedman moved out east of the Nolensville 
pike, and, under cover of a noisy fire from the forts and bat- 
teries, aided by the clamor of the gun-boats, pushed across 
the Murfreesboro' pike, and reached the Confederate pickets. 
His force comprised three brigades, Thompson's, Morgan's, 
and Grosvenor's, the two former beinof well-drilled colored 
troops, and these were deployed in skirmishing order. The 
Confederate skirmishers were driven in after a very sharp en- 
gagement, and the main works were reached and charged, 
where a battery swept a rocky gap on the railroad line. A 
protracted and gallant attempt to carry this position failed, 
and the assailants fell back with severe loss. But, in the 
purpose assigned to it, that of misleading the enemy and at- 
tracting his attention and his troops, Steedman's dembnstra- 
tion was a complete success, and permitted the Union right 
to swing resistlessly forward at the other end of the line. 

Brentwood Hills, on which Hood's left was posted, extend, 
with spurs and intervals, nearly or quite to the Cumberland, 
and accordingly the country over which Smith and Wilson 
were to move, was difficult, behig broken and thickly tim- 
bered ; a very few rods of marching, indeed, showed that if 
the attack had been made while the snow and sleet incrusted 
the ground, it would have been a dead failure. When Steed- 
man had well engaged his enemy's attention. Smith and Wil- 
son moved out on either side of the Harding pike, and then 
wheeled to the left across both the Harduio: and Hillsboro' 
pikes, in order to envelop and carry the Confederate left, 
flank, and if possible to reach the Franklin pike near Brent- 
wood Station. Whether or not it was that Hood had not ex 
pected an attack at all, as the absence of his cavalry at Mur- 



458 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE AVAR. 

freesboro' and along the Cumberland would imply, he seems 
at all events not to have attended the assault on his left flank, 
and the friendly fog which enveloped the Union march, to- 
gether with Steedman's feint, allowed Smith and Wilson to 
get well across the interval without hindrance. The cavalry, 
who were dismounted, and the infantry, vied in the elan with 
which they sprang upon their astonished enemies ; McArthur's 
division was in the advance of Smith's corps, with the remain- 
der closely following, and side by side with McArthur, on his 
right, was Hatch's cavalry division, with Croxtou's brigade 
beyond, and Knipc's division in close support. They first 
struck the Confederate picket line along Richland Creek near 
Harding's house, and swept it off with whirlwind rapidity, 
and, swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt mounting four 
guns. McArthur was advancing splendidly in solid columns, 
but Hatch's men, being deployed in skirmish line, plunged 
rapidly ahead, and at a single dash, swept the redoubt, and 
seized the guns, which were soon turned upon the fugitive 
enemy. Without losing momentum. Hatch pushed against a 
second redoubt, at the summit of a steep hill, and carried that 
in like manner with the first, capturing four more guns and 
two hundred and seventy-five prisoners. Thus, at one o'clock, 
Smith and Wilson were sharing the glory of piercing and 
turning the Confederate left, and driving their enemy back 
over his ranges of fortified hills towards the Franklin pike. 

At the same hour, the Fourth Corps was comporting itself 
with its traditional spirit, and winning fresh laurels elsewhere 
on the field. To it had been been assiajned the task of as- 
saulting the enemy's centre at his strong advanced post on 
Montgomery Hill, whose flanks and summit were lined with 
intrenchments, and its gorges and approaches swept with ar- 
tillery. Whatever doubt may have clouded Hood's mind as 
to the meaninfi: of Steedman's demonstration had long since 
vanished, and he was fast hurrying his troops to the support 
of his left and centre. Beatty's Third division was in ad- 



NASHVILLE. 459 

vance, with Kimball's ancL Elliott's closely supporting, and 
Post's brigade of the former, with Streight's supporting, and 
Klieppler's in reserve, at one o'clock moved up the rough ac- 
clivity. In a most gallant charge, Post ascended the heights, 
carried the intrenchments, and turned the position, with the 
capture of many prisoners. 

While the Confederates retreated to their interior line, the 
right of the Fourth Corps, Elliott's division, connected with 
the left of the Sixteenth Corps, Garrard's division, and, there 
being no space for Schofield to interpose, — Smith not being 
so far to the right as was designed, — Schofield's corps was 
moved from the reserve to the right of Smith, in a movement 
which threw the cavalry still farther around on the Confeder- 
ate left and rear. 

And now, all the forces being drawn up in connected line, 
the whole pressed vigorously forward during the afternoon. 
For Wilson, Schofield, and Smith, the work was mainly 
henceforth that of pursuit, but AYood had still a second line 
of strong intrenchments to capture, before his day's work was 
done. Advancing with all three divisions, the Fourth Corps 
carried by assault the entire line in its front, capturing eight 
pieces of artillery, five caissons, several hundred small arms, 
and about five hundred prisoners. Rapidly ^reforming the 
(jolumns which had been thrown into confusion by the assault, 
Wood hastened after his retreating enemy, aiming for his nat- 
ural line of retreat along the Franklin turnpike ; but before 
this could be reached the brief winter's day was done, and a 
darkness fell which put an end to the march. 

Well satisfied with his first day's work, Thomas found that he 
had driven his enemy from his original line of works to a new 
position several miles distant along the base of Harpeth hills, 
where he held a line of retreat on the main Franklin pike 
through Brentwood, and on the Granny White pike. The 
day's captures summed up twelve hundred prisoners, sixteen 
guns, forty wagons, and many small arms ; and these had 



460 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

been achieved with a heavy Confederate loss in killed and 
wounded, while the Union loss was light. Above all, the 
Union forces, though so newly moulded into an array, h!id 
behaved with a steadiness and spirit which gave bright augurj' 
for the morrow. Their line, when readjusted at nightfiill, 
ran parallel to the Hillsboro' pike and east of it, where the 
battle had left them with Wilson on the right, and, succes- 
sively, Schofield, Smith, Wood, and Stecdman, Johnson's 
cavalry divisiou was absent from the right, having passed the 
evening, aided by the gun-boats, in engaging a Confederate 
battery at Bell's Landing, eight miles down the river. 

All along the line the bivouac fires flared out into the bleak 
wintry air, and around them the tired troops dreamt of a 
brighter victory in the morning. Thomas rode back to tele- 
graph the first chapter of his story. " I shall attack the en- 
emy again to-morrow," he said, " if he stands to fight, and if 
he retreats during the night I will pursue him." 
• 

Day dawned amid a clamor of artillery. Promptly at six 
o'clock "Wood threw his corps forward from the Union line 
toward the Franklin pike, and soon found that Hood had 
drawn back his centre and right in order to conform them to 
the necessities of his left. As the interval, however, was too 
strong to be entirely abandoned. Hood had lined it Avith his 
skirmishers, whom encountering, the Fourth Corps by rapid 
fighting drove before it to the Franklin pike ; then, dcployin"' 
in line of battle across the pike. Wood swept southward from 
Nashville until he had driven the enemy's skirmishers within 
their intrenchments, and developed the main Confederate line. 
This achievement required of course a new formation of Gen- 
eral Thomas's troops, in order to assault the Confederate po- 
sition. Stecdman marched out from Nashville by the Nolens- 
ville pike, and connected with Wood's left, while Smith on the 
other flank moved up to Wood's right. While this line of 
battle faced southerly, Schofield remained facing easterly 



NASHVILLE. 461 

toward the Confederate loft flank, his line striking that of 
General Smith at right angles. Wilson's cavalry was dis- 
mounted, and moved up from the Hillsboro' pike to Scho- 
field's right, also facing easterly. Hatch's division joined 
Schofield, and Knipe, on Hatch's right, pushed by noon en- 
tirely across the Granny White pike, one of the Confederate 
lines of retreat, and stretched at least a mile in rear of Hood's 
left. 

The new Confederate position was exceedingly strong. Its 
right rested on Overton's hill, about five miles south of the city, 
its centre occupied the valley through which runs the Frank- 
lin pike, and its left a range of the Brentwood hills which 
border on the Granny White pike. The densely wooded 
sides and summits of all these hills had been rapidly intrenched, 
and trees were felled in front to entangle the assailants. The 
centre was naturally the weakest point in the line, and next 
the left, which, though well posted, was made uneasy by the 
menace of the prolonged Union right flank, while the right as 
on the day before was Ijyfar the strongest of all : the line had 
been shortened till it was now about three miles in extent. 
In view of the tremendous stake for which he played, it be- 
ing empire on the one hand or ruin on the other, even Hood's 
fier}^ blood might have chilled for an instant at the momentous 
results which an hour would bring forth. AVith an elder 
Hotspur he might well have considered " it were not good to 
set so rich a main on the nice hazard of one doubtful hour." 
But it was now too late for prudent thoughts, which perhaps 
iu any case had been spurned. 

The afternoon was well advanced ; the Union line had been 
everywhere joined, and had pushed up at all points to within 
six hundred yards of the enemy ; and, on the right, Wilson 
had felt his way well around Hood's rear. The decisive mo- 
ment having come. Wood ordered Post's brigade, supported 
by Streight's, of Beatty's division — the troops which had 
carried the salient on Montgomery hill — to assault Over- 



462 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

ton's knob, and Morgan's colored brigade of Steedman's 
command formed in co-operation on the left. The attacking 
cokimns, at three o'clock, formed in full view in the open 
plain, and instantly the troops could be seen hurrying from 
the enemy's centre and left to mass on his threatened right. 
The intrenchments of the knob rail athwart its northern face 
considerably below the summit, and then, turning southerly, 
across its eastern side, withdrew covering the right of the Con- 
federate line by a retired flank. Forward plunged the storm- 
ing parties, and rose steadily higher and higher up the slope 
through the entanglements, under a tremendous fire of grape, 
canister and musketry, white men and black (all clad in 
blue) vying in gallantry. With banners bowing forward, the 
line swept straight up to the breastAvorks, though great gaps 
were torn in it by the cruel fire ; but there, the Confederate 
reserves, rising up, poured into it a sheeted flame ; and paus- 
ing, and wavering, and as it Avere shuddering along its length, 
it fell back, broken as a long wave is broken on the shore, 
and blown off in spray. " They left their dead and wounded," 
says Thomas, "black and white indiscriminately mingled — 
lying amid the abatis, the gallant Colonel Post among the 
wounded." 

But Smith and Schofield, as soon as the Fourth Corj)s had 
grappled the enemy's right, rushed on his centre and left, 
"carrying all before them," says the general-in-chief, "and ir- 
reparably breaking his lines in a dozen places." They seized 
all of the artillery that had fired upon them, captured thou- 
sands of prisoners, including four general officers, and drove 
the astounded and dismayed Confederates from the crest of 
Brentwood hills down the reverse slope in tumultuous retreat. 
Pursuing the routed enemy, Schofield and Smith quickly en- 
countered Hatch and Knipe, who, dismounted, had l)y a wide 
circuit gained the Confederate rear, and struck it at the very 
moment their comrades were ascending the hill in the front. 

Excited by the victorious cheers on the right and the inter- 



NASHVILLE. 463 

mingling crack of rifle and carbine "which told of the joint 
triumf)h of infantry and cavalry, the Fourth Corps and Steed- 
man's command, which had been already handsomely re- 
formed, and were chafing for the final signal, burst, once more, 
with a vigor which nothing could stay, against the stronghold 
upon Overton's hill. Once more, too, a terrific storm of 
musketry and grape swept down the slopes of this dread ac- 
clivity ; but the enthusiasm of the Union forces was beyond 
all control, and without a pause they carried the crest, with 
its artillery and a great part of its garrison, and drove the rem- 
nant in utter rout through the Brentwood pass to Brentwood 
hamlet. 

A few~ hours of day were all that the Union legions now 
craved, to complete the ruin of their opponents. The latter, 
clogging the path behind them with wagons, broken caissons, 
muskets, knapsacks, blankets, whatever threatened to delay, 
poured in confusion do-svn the Franklin pike, the only road 
left open to them. Close at their heels hurried the relentless 
Fourth Corps, in a chase of several miles, gathering prisoners 
and spoils till night descended to save the beaten army. On 
the Granny White pike the cavalry saw, almost within their 
clutch, a confused mass of fugitives ; but, being dismounted, 
and unwonted to pursue briskly on foot, they impatiently 
awaited their horses. These at length came, and Hatch's di- 
vision, hastily mounted, rode down the Granny White piko 
with Croxton and Knipe behind them. Before two miles 
were past. Hatch ran upon Chalmers's cavalry division, which 
was posted across the road behind barricades. Dark as it 
was. Hatch's men were eager for attack, and charging, with 
Spaulding's Twelfth Tennessee in advance, broke through the 
barriers, and scattered the Confederates, capturing General 
Rucker amongst the other prisoners : it set the seal on the 
triumphs of the day. 

With the Confederate army routed, its dead and wounded 
left on the field, four thousand five hundred prisoners, fiifty- 



464 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

three guns, and thousands of small arms left to the Union 
forces, the two days' battle at Nashville ended. 

The morning after the battle dawned cold, rainy, and 
drearj^" — dreariest of all to the routed Confederate trooj)S, 
now streaming back to the Tennessee. At daylight "Wilson's 
cavalry and the Fourth Corps were on the march, the latter 
on the Franklin pike and the former along the Granny "White 
pike to the junction with the Franklin pike, where it took the 
advance ; Stecdman moved in rear of the Fourth Corps, and 
Schoficld and Smith in rear of the cavalry. Four miles north 
of Franklin, Knipe struck Stevenson's division, the Confed- 
erate rear-guard, and in a brisk charge by the whole column, 
Knipe, Hatch, and Croxton, in front and flank, the position 
was carried, with the capture of four hundred and thirteen 
prisoners. Meanwhile Johnson's division, dispatched by 
"Wilson direct to the Harpcth, had crossed and come rapidly 
up on the south bank of the river and menaced Franklin ; 
so that, to save its flank. Hood's rear-guard fell back from 
the river-crossino; and abandoned the town, leaviuii; in its 
hospitals over two thousand wounded. "Without a pause, 
the Union cavalry thundered down the Columbia pike, and 
along such by-paths as were practicable, in relentless pur- 
suit, the Confederate rear-guard sullenly retiring before them. 

At length, five miles south of Franklin, Stevenson, whose 
division (lately S. D. Lee's) formed the rear of the column, 
deployed in an open field, putting a battery in position on 
rising ground, and stood at bay. It was already quite dark, 
a mist enveloping everj^thing, and the rain still descending. 
But Wilson, deploying Hatch on the left of the pike and 
Knipe on the right, with their batteries, posted his own body- 
guard, the Fourth Regular Cavalry, one hundred and eighty 
strong, on the road to charge the enemy. The batteries 
opened with grape and canister, and then, at the word 
"forward," the gallant Fourth Cavalry dashed down the pike 



NASHVILLE. 465 

iu columns of fours, charging with drawn sabres, breaking 
the Confederate centre, riding over their guns, and pursuing 
for nearly a mile. Simultaneously Hatch and Kiiipe had 
enveloped the Confederate flanks, and a part of Hammond's 
command of Knipc's division even pushed across the West 
Harpeth. But darkness had already fallen, and in the con- 
fused running fight, pursuers were as likely to be captured 
as pursued, and, indeed. Lieutenant Hedges, commanding the 
Fourth Cavalry, was thrice made prisoner bofore he finally 
escaped. As for the Confederates, they were in a sorry 
plight, having little cavalry to cover their retreat : they 
abandoned four guns in the enemy's skirmish, and afterwards 
threw others into Duck River, which their opponents recov- 
ered when the water went down. Meanwhile, AYood's Fourth 
Corps, pressing impetuously forward to Harpeth River, had 
found the bridges destroyed and the stream impassable. 
There, accordingly, on its banks they bivouacked, with 
Steedman near by, and Smith and Schofield some miles 
back. . 

Next day, the 18th, with the rain still dismally falling, 
Wilson pushed his cavalry after the flying enemy to Ruther- 
ford's Creek, three miles from Columbia. The stream was 
impassable, and "running a perfect torrent." In an instant, 
the unwelcome conviction flashed upon Thomas that the frag- 
ment of an army which had seemed beyond escape, had 
probably eluded his grasp. The pursuers had no pontoons, 
and Rutherford's Creek and Duck River were impassable 
without bridges. One pontoon train had indeed been hastily 
built at Nashville, and was on its way, but its incompleteness 
and the bad condition of the roads retarded its arrival. The 
delay was fatal. Three full days were lost to the Union 
troops at this time, and Hood improved the respite to save 
the debris of his army. He urged his trains through the 
miry roads ; he tugged away at his pontoons and got them to 
Duck River, and thence to the Tennessee ; in fine, he organ- 

30 



4G6 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

ized a new and powerful rear-guard, containing all the ser- 
viceable troops in his army. Forrest's cavalry was able to 
roach him at Columbia, where also other detached troops 
joined him, and with these horsemen and four thousand 
infantry under Walthall, he formed a splendid rear-guard of 
eijjht small bri^rades. As for Thomas, that officer waited 
impatiently and .with ill-concealed mortification for his pon- 
toons to come up, rough bridges to be extemporized, the 
yoads to mcud, and the Hooded rivers to subside. It is with 
a bitter significance that his report declares, "I would here 
remark that the splendid pontoon train properly belonging to 
my command, with its trained corps of pontooneers, was 
absent with General Sherman." MeauAvhile he hurried off 
Steedman l>y rail to Decatur, so as to cross the Tennessee 
and threaten Hood's railroad communications west of Flor- 
ence ; and Wood's corps closed up with the cavalry, while 
the latter were delaying. On the 20th, Hatch and Wood 
improvised bridges on the ruins of the old railroad and road 
bridges at Rutherford's Creek, crossed, and hurried on to 
Duck River : Hood's rear had got over the night before and 
taken up their pontoons behind them. It was two days more 
before another bridge could bo improvised for Duck River, 
and Wood's corps moved across ; and Wilson passed the 
stream a day later, on the 23d. The rain had given way 
to bitter cold. 

Thus beset with difficulties, checked by untoward delays, 
and deprived of proper resources, a less resolute soldier had 
relinquished the pursuit, content with the triumph already 
gained. Thomas still gave the order "forward." 

Wilson and Wood were now the pursuers, Schofield and Smith 
more leisurely following. On tho 24th, they twice reached 
and drove the Confederate rear-guard, and pressed it so sorely 
as to save the bridges over Richland Crock. On Christmas 
morning tliey drove their jaded enemy out of Pulaski, and, 
on ths same evening, Harrison's brigade startled him from 



NASHVILLE. 467 

the point which ho had intrenclied for tlic night's bivouac. 
Tliree days of forced marching succeeded, over terrible roads 
and in a constant, cheerless rain, with short rations for the 
pursued and almost none for the pursuers, since the latter had 
outrun their trains. The wretched Confederates threw away 
Anything which could help their retreat. At Pulaski, they 
libandoned two hundred wounded in the hospitals, and threw 
four guns into Richland Creek ; a mile beyond they destroyed 
twenty wagons loaded with ammunition, belonging to Cheat- 
ham's corps. The road from Pulaski to the Tennessee was 
strewn with wagons, limbers, small arms, blankets, and other 
debris of a demoralized army, while stragglers filled the 
woods. "With the exception of his rear guard," says 
Thomas, " his army had become a disheartened and disorgan- 
ized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who souijht 
every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their 
cause to put an end to their suiTerings. The rear-guard, 
however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely 
to the last." At length, the fugitive army reached the long- 
expected and welcome Tennessee, and crossed it at Bain- 
bridge, six miles above Florence, where the Union gun-l)oats 
could not reach it ; and thanks to the rains which had turned 
the streams to torrents and the roads to sloughs, thanks, 
also, to the lack of pontoons by his pursuers, Hood escaped, 
with the wreck of his army, into Alabama. 

The rout of Hood was accompanied by another Confeder- 
ate disaster in East Tennessee. Breckinridore haviu":, in 
Kovember, defeated Gillem's command in that section, 
Thomas directed General Stonemau to recover the lost re- 
gion, and to drive the forces of Breckinridge, Duke, and 
Vaughan into West Virginia, and, if possible, to destroy the 
famous salt works at Saltville. All this Stoneman, with the 
commands of Gillem and Burbridge, handsomely accom- 
plished, by a series of extraordinary forced marches and 
arduous labors in the worst of weather. Gillem routed Duke 



468 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

at Kingsport and Vaughan at Marion, the latter on the day of 
the battle of Nashville ; Breckinridge was driven into North 
Carolina ; the works at Saltville ruined ; the region traversed 
laid waste. Still later, six hundred cavalry, under Colonel 
"W. J. Palmer, moved upon Hood's line of retreat in Missis- 
sippi, destroyed, near Russelville, his pontoon train of two 
hundred wagons and seventy-eight boats, and meeting a 
supply train near Aberdeen, consisting of one hundred and 
ten wagons and five hundred mules, burned the former and 
shot the latter : one hundred and fifty prisoners, besides, 
were captured, and one thousand small arms destroyed. In 
fine, Lyon, who with eight hundred horsemen had been 
operating briskly on Thomas's railroad lines in Kentucky, 
was driven back into Alabama with about a fourth of his 
command, the rest being scattered ; and the camp of this 
remnant was surprised by Colonel Palmer, and the greater 
part of the men captured. 

ni. 

RESULTS OF NASHVILLE. 

The word of the prophet Davis had come to pass ; the 
early snow of winter had, of a truth, witnessed "a Moscow 
retreat." It was not, however, the Union but the Confeder- 
ate hosts that were ruined, and not Sherman but Hood, that 
exhibited his pitiful travesty on the Great Napoleon. To 
complete the vision of the soothsayer, there were "Cossacks" 
too, in plenty, harrying the flanks and rear of the flying bat- 
talions : but these were Union troopers, and, as they s wanned 
around the ill-starred Confederate army, their sabres hacked 
it without mercy. 

At the end of December, Hood and his army, and all the 
co-operating columns, were driven out of Tennessee. But 
so small was the fraction that escaped , so large the proi^ortion 
of killed and captured left behind, that when the year went 



NASHVILLE. 469 

out the Confederate army of the West may be said to have 
expired with it. 

Aware that in the wintry season, and on roads impassable, 
to hunt still further after the wrecks of the Confederate 
forces would be a game not worth the caudle, Thomas an- 
nounced to his troops the close of the -campaign, and promised 
them their well-earned winter quarters ; but General Grant, 
not so well comprehending at his distance the completeness 
of the victory and the ruin which had befallen Hood's army, 
ordered a renewal of the campaign. It was promptly under- 
taken ; but there was nothing to campaign against. What 
was left of the Confederate forces began to dribble away each 
day in desertion, a calamity more fatal than hostile operations. 
The original Confederate army seemed to hayc vanished from 
the scene, suddenly and totally, as if through a trap-door. 
The career of its whilom commander was ended, and, as if to 
cap A monstrous satire upon military policy, the scattered 
pieces of the army which ITood had received from Johnston, 
were now coolly handed back to the latter, after the manipu- 
lations of the former could no longer do them harm. To 
Johnston was assigned the task of sweeping together the 
relics of all past and gone Confederate armies south of Vir- 
ginia, for the coming spring. He swept from Mississippi to 
Alabama, from Alabama to Georgia, through Georgia to 
South Carolina, across both Carolinas to the region of Raleigh 
and Goldsboro% where, for the first time, he had swept 
lojrether mass cnouarh to make a stand on the iield of Aver- 
asboro'. 

When Thomas came to audit his accounts for the new 
year, he found that, in the series of actions already sketched, 
extending from September 7th to January 30th, he had cap- 
tured 13,189 prisoners of war, including eight general officers 
and nearly one thousand others, seventy-two pieces of artillery 
fit for service, and many battle-flags. Besides these, there 
had been taken more than three thousand small arms and 



470 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

many infantry accoutrements, filled ammunition chests, and 
wagons loaded with ammunition and supplies. As to the 
material destroyed in the retreat, both by pursued and pur- 
suers, no computation was made or was possible ; nor was it 
easy to estimate the number of Confederate troops who, col- 
lected for the conquest of Tennessee, strayed off, as occasion 
served, to then* own homes, and doffed forever the jjrav uni- 
form. But besides these latter, in the interval already 
spoken of, 2200 deserters appeared within Thomas's lines, 
and took the oath of allegiance. Of all these swelling figures, 
the chief part, of course, belonged to the battle of Nashville 
and the pursuit, — sixty-four of the seventy-two captured 
guns, all the small arms and accoutrements, and most of the 
prisoners. In addition must be reckoned the Confederate 
losses in killed an J wounded, which wore A^ery severe. 
These achievements Thomas declares to have been accom- 
plislied on his part with a t(»tal loss of not over ten thousand 
men. 

The first result, therefore, of this magnificent victory was 
to roll back a daring invasion, which aimed at the recovery 
of Confederate prestige, the possession of the Tennessee and 
the Cumberland, and all the garrisoned towns thereon, and 
Nashville, Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Louisville itself. 
Had this campaign succeeded, not only would Kentucky and 
Tennessee have become Confederate States, but the war 
would have been gravely prolonged for years : not improb- 
ably even Lee's surrender in Virginia the following April 
would have been succeeded by a transfer of the contest to the 
Gulf States, or beyond the MississiiDpi. 

Next, the Nashville campaign was the annihilation of the 
Western Confederate army, the object for which Sherman 
and his hundred thousand had descended from Chattanooija 
in jNIay, now accomplished eight months later by the arm of 
Thomas. The Confederacy lived in its armies, which con- 
tinuing, its territory might be traversed and laid waste iu 



NASHVILLE. 471 

vain ; but from the ruin of these armies there was no recup- 
eration, since tlic fighting stock of the Confederacy was 
already exhausted. Thomas solved one branch of the prob- 
lem, and eliminated one army from the military equation. 
When Hood's forces were dispersed, when Sherman's mag- 
nificent columns reached Savannah, when Thomas, with fifty 
thousand men, was forced to look far away for other fields to 
conquer, it was discovered that the latter soldier had taken a 
Confederate piece from the board, and left the Union game 
one entire army ahead. Moreover, since Georgia, Alabama, 
and Mississippi had been drained and dredged of material to 
furnish forth the ranks of Hood, the splendidly-appointed 
legions which Sherman led out of Atlanta were able to jour- 
ney unmolested to the. sea. They marched whithersoever 
they listed ; the few squads of gray beards and boys whom 
they met got briskly out of their Av^ay or were trampled under 
foot. It Avas indeed less a campaign than a tour of triumph ; 
and Avhen Hazcn had gallantly stormed Fort McAllister, the 
city of Savannah fell. This "holiday march," nevertheless, 
had been a frightful blunder, if Hood had triumphed in Ten- 
nessee. 

It was, however, Avhen spring opened, — the last spring- 
time of the Avar, — that the results of the splendid victory 
around Nashville Avere most obvious to all eyes. The war 
had ceased over all the Western campaigning grounds, and 
GA'cn as for East as the Carolinas the hardy troops of Sher- 
man Avadcd SAvamp, and forded ri^•er and trudged along 
narrow causcAvay, far beyond Fayettcville, Avithout finding a 
noticeable foe. As for Thomas, Avith his great army master 
of all the territory about him, it only remained to break up 
his columns, and send them on expeditions thousands of 
miles aAvay. Schoficld's corps Avcnt to the Atlantic seaboard, 
and, embarking in transports, landed in Xorth Carolina. 
A second great infontry column Avas despatched doAA'n the 
Mississippi to Ncav Orleans, Avhere Cauby employed it to 



472 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

reduce Mobile. Stoneman rode almost unmolested with a 
great troop of horsemen into north-western North Carolina ; 
and when Wilson took the field again with his cavalry corps, 
he swept like a whirlwind through Alabama and Georgia, 
scattering the scanty militia before him, and proving by a 
second demonstration that, Avith its defeats around Nashville, 
the Confederacy at the West had already tumbled to the 
dust. 

The figure of Thomas looms up in many respects without 
a superior, in most respects without a rival even, among the 
Union Generals created by the war. 

When the Rebellion opened JNIajor Thomas was a soldier 
of twenty years' experience, during which he had not only 
not turned aside to the attractions of civil life, but had ac- 
cepted only two furloughs. It was during his latter leave of 
absence that the Insurrection broke out, and Thomas received 
the colonelcy of his regiment, now styled the Fifth Cavalry. 

From this time the fame of General Thomas becomes 
national. His complete and admirable victory at Mill 
Spring was the first triumph of magnitude for the North 
since the disaster at Bull Run, and brought back a needed 
prestige to the Union arms. As commander of the Four- 
teenth Army Corps, under Rosecrans, he was conspicuous 
in the marching and fighting which preceded ^lurfreesboro', 
and all-jrlorious in that decisive battle. Him Rosecrans 
then portrayed as "true and prudent, distinguished in coun- 
cil and celebrated on many battle-fields for his courage." It 
was he who alone and unaided saved the army of the Cum- 
berland at Chickamauga, when the example of all around 
him might have excused him for flying from a lost field. 
And again, accordingly, the enthusiastic tribute of praise 
comes up in the report of Rosecrans : *' To IMajor-Gcneral 
Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted com- 
mander, the modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and 



NASHVILLE. 473 

gratitude of the country are due for his conduct at the bat- 
tle of Chickamauga." It was Thomas, whose troops *' form- 
ing on the plain below with the precision of parade," made 
the wonderful charge on Missionary Kidge, which threw 
Bragg back into Georgia. It was he who, in the grand 
Atlanta campaign, commanded under Sherman more than 
three-fifths of that army, and who delivered the opening 
battle at Buzzard's Roost and the closing battle at Lovcjoy's. 
It was Thomas, in fine, who set the seal of success on the 
Georgia campaign, 300 miles away at Nashville. 

Imposing in stature, massive in thew and limb, the face 
and figure of General Thomas consort well with the impres- 
sion made by his character — the firm mouth, the square jaw, 
the steady blue eye, the grave expression habitual on the im- 
passive countenance, being indexes to well-known traits. The 
war showed that his gifts, like his qualities, were in the main 
of that more solid and substantial sort which gain less imme- 
diate applause than what is specious and glittering, but which 
lead on to enduring fame. Yet there was noticeable in him 
a rare and felicitous union of qualities which do not often ap- 
pear with full vigor in the same organization. Cautious in 
undertaking, yet, once resolved, he was bold in execution ; 
deliberate in forming his plan, and patiently waiting for 
events to mature, yet when the fixed hour struck, he leaped 
into great activity. Discretion in him was obviously spurred 
on by earnestness, and earnestness tempered by discretion. 
Prudent by nature, not boastful, reticent, he was not the less 
free fr&m the weakness of Avill and tameness of spirit which 
are as fatal to success as rashness. He was, in short, one 
of those " whose blood and judgment are so well co-mingled that 
they are not a pipe for Fortune's finger to sound what stop she 
please." 

Of his complete mastery of his profession in all its details, 
of his consummate skill as a general, the best monument is the 
story of his battles ; for he never lost a campaign, or a field ; 



474 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

he never met his enemy without giving him cause to grieve 
for the rencontre : and he culled laurels from fields on which 
brother officers were covered with disgrace, and more than 
once plucked up drowning honor by the locks, as at Chicka- 
mauira. As he did not himself fail, so he did not suffer him- 
self to be ruined b}^ incompetency in superiors, much less in 
subordinates, for he was accustomed to consider beforehand 
such possibilities, and to guard against them. His successes 
were won by art, not tossed to him by fortune, and Avhenever 
victory came to him he was conscious of having earned it. 
Such successes indicate temperaments at once solid and acute, 
and in which wisdom and valor concur, — Nestor of the 
council, and Hector of the field. 

He was a soldier who conned his maps before he marched 
his arm}', who planned his campaign before he fought it, who 
would not hurry, who would not learn by thoughtless experi- 
ments what study could teach, who believed in the duty of a 
general to organize victory at each step. He was a lover of 
system, and was nothing if not systematic. He approved 
what was regular, and required i)roof of what was irregular ; 
had that fondness for routine whicli does not ill become an old 
army officer ; and even in exigences desired everything to 
proceed duly and in order. He was not a slave to method, 
but naturally distrusted what was unmethodical ; and that ho 
invariably won battles by virtue of time-honored principles, 
and in accordance with the rules of the art of war, was, be- 
sides its value to the country, a truth invaluable to military 
science in the land, whose teachings had been somewhat un- 
justly cast into contempt by the conduct of other successful 
soldiers. 

His Nashville campaign gave more than one instance of the 
trait just noted. Superiors were vexed at his constant re- 
treat from the Tennessee, at his flight behind the parapets of 
Nashville, at his delay to attack the investing force ; but 
neither this vexation nor the danger of removal which threat- 



NASHVILLE. 475 

ened liim could avail with Thomas, for that soldier would 
not bo badgered into premature battle. Soon after, the wis- 
dom of Thomas in delaying attack in order to mount his 
cavalry, approved itself, for never before in the war had grand 
victory been so energetically followed by pursuit. In the 
battle itself, too, spectators fancied that he Avas pausing too 
lone: before en"fa£fin<; his rin^ht flank, but he held that Aving 
poised as it were in the air, till the fit moment, when he swung 
it like a mighty sledge upon the Confederate, and smote him 
to the dust. 

The best justification of his system was its success, for if 
discreet he was safe ; if slow, sure. One of his earlier friend- 
ly nicknames Avas " Old Slow Trot," and another, " Old 
Reliable," Avhile later troops sometimes called him *'01d Pap 
Safety." He provided for dilemmas and obstacles, he suIFered 
no surprises, made no disastrous experiments at the sacrifice 
of position, of prestige, or of the lives of his troops : and in- 
deed he was Avont to make his enemy pay dearly for the privi- 
lege of defeat, and usually lost fcAvcr troops in action than 
his adversary, Avhether pursuing the offensive or the defensive. 
Thus, if the processes of his thouglit Avere sIoav of evolution, 
they at least attained to their goal. 

His natural impulse Avould seem to be to stand inehranlahJe 
on the defensive, and having taken manfully his enemy's 
blows till the assailant Av^as exhausted, then to turn upon him 
in furious aggression ; so it Avas Avith his first national victory 
at Mill Spring, and so AA'itli his latest at NasliAalle, Avhile his 
fight at bay at Chickamauga is immortal. A fine analj'zcr of 
character might perhaps trace a sympathy betAveen this mili- 
tary method on the one hand, and the Avell-known personal 
traits of the soldier on the other — his modesty, his unassum- 
ing, unpretending spirit, his absence of self-assertion and 
habit of remaining in the background ; and thercAvith his vigor 
when roused, and his bold championship of any cause entrust- 
ed to him. At all events, the fame of his persistency, of his 



476 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

firmness, almost amounting to obstinacy, of the unyielding 
grip with which he held his antagonist, became world-wide. 
When Grant hurried to the relief of belcagured Chattanooga, 
there to supplant Rosecrans, he telegraphed to Thomas, then 
in command, "Hold on to. Chattanooga at all hazards;" to 
which message came the sententious response — " Have no 
fear. Will hold the town till we starve." When steadfast 
he stood in Frick's Gap, on the field of Chickamauga, after 
the columns on both his flanks had given wa}'-, — the torrent 
of Bragg's onset, the hail of fire that swept the Union ranks, 
moved him not a jot from his firm base, and the billow that 
swamped the rest of the field recoiled from him. " The rain 
descended, and the floods came, and beat upon that house ; 
and it foil not : for it was founded upon a rock." Thereafter, 
the soldiers of his xVrmy of the Cumberland Avere wont to call 
him " The Rock of Chickamauija." 

Grave and wise at the council board, yet it is on the well- 
contested field that Thomas shines most conspicuous. In 
the ordinary tide of battle he is emphatically the Imperturbable 
— calm, poised, entirely cool, self-possessed, one on whom 
the shifting fortunes of the day have only a subdued eficct, 
and whose equanimity even success cannot dangerously dis- 
turb. But he is greatest in extremity, that " trier of spirits." 
In the supreme moment of exigency which demands a great 
soul to grasp it, — such an one as came to o'ertasked Hooker at 
Chanccllorsville, — Thomas shines out pre-eminent, and asserts 
his superiority. Phlegmatic at most hours, the desperate 
crises of battle are alone sufficient to stir his temperament 
into fullest action, and then his quiet, steady eyes flame a 
little with battle-fire. 

He had the great quality of inspiring in his troops perfect 
confidence and great devotion. Indeed, his soldierly skill 
was well set off* by the air and manner of a soldier — unaf- 
fected, manly, far from the pettiness bred by long pampering 
in the drawing-room, but with a simplicity, robustness, and 



NASHVILLE. 477 

hardiness of character, like that of his owii physique, the in- 
heritance of thirty years in field and garrison. Dignified and 
decorous, his brother officers found him free from show and 
pretence, frank, open, and magnanimous ; while to his troops 
he was kindly and amiable. He excited no envy or jealousy 
in his rivals, who found him straightforward and conscien- 
tious ; and his men had cause to know that he was observ- 
ant of merit and rewarded it. His reputation was without re- 
proach, his controlled temper superior to the vicissitudes of 
camp and battle, and joined to them was a courage which set 
life at a phi's fee. A Virginian, and of such social ties as 
might well have made him " a Pharisee of the Pharisees," ho 
had proved at the outset the quality of the allegiance he boro 
to the Republic, by casting in his lot with the Union arms. 
His loyalty was disinterested, and the result of conviction not 
of political aspiration. 

The jDrogress of the war, too, gave him, as it did so many 
officers, a chance to show the quantity and stability of his 
patriotism. Even while the country resounded with the glo- 
ries of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, Sheraian, his jun- 
ior in experience, in length of service, and in years, and his 
equal only in rank, was appointed over him to the command 
vacated by General Grant. Without murmur, perhaps with- 
out thought of injuiy, Thomas took his place under Sherman 
with the cheerful obedience of a true soldier. On the eve of 
Nashville, he was to have been relieved of command, l)ut 
desired, for the sake of the country, that he might execute a 
long-formed plan, after which he would be at such disposal as 
might seem fit. 

Such was General Thomas, the completely rounded, skil- 
ful, judicious, modest soldier — a man compact of genuine 
stuff, a trustworthy man — 

Kich in saving common sense. 
And as the greatest only are, 
lu his simplicity sublime. 



478 I'lIE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 



xn. 
FIVE FORKS. 



I. 

PRELl^DE TO FIVE FORKS. 

The end of the Confederacy was nigh. Four years had 
Yirginia, buttress and sea-wall of the South, withstood the 
tide of invasion Avhich ceaselessly rolled in upon her, spurn- 
ing it from her battlements, shattered and spent, as the rock 
flings back the billow beaten into foam. Six times the tumul- 
tuous flood had surged with whelmino: front asrainst her firm 
barrier, and six times baffled had recoiled : now it was IMc- 
DoAvcll ; now McClellan ; now Pope ; now Burnside ; now 
Hooker ; now Meade ; now Grant. 

Grant it was, indeed, whose great host came, at length, 
like the mighty seventh wave, topping its fellows, to crush 
into ruin even the ramparts of rock-bound Virghiia. 

Once more at the end as in the beginning, the armed 
champions of North and South gathered towards that battle- 
ploughed State, on whose soil was fated to end, as there it 
had begun, the arbitrament of arms. From North, from South, 
from AVest, Federal and Confederate alike drew nearer to the 
historic campaigning ground. Savannah, AVilmington, and 
Charleston, falling in succession, had left the Atlantic a sealed 
ocean to the Confederacy, Avith no port along three thousand 





y 

■t^- 



^::^. 



FIVE FORKS. 479 

miles of seaboard mid gulf-board — save where, far down the 
south-western horizon, the Union gun-boats and armies thun- 
dered in ]\Iobile Bay, and pitched the fintd war-note for an 
echo of deeper diapason around Petersburg and Richmond. 
The coastwise garrisons shrunk back to join each other in 
the Carolinas — Hardee and Brairg and Beaurejjard — whom, 
with whatever other Confederate soldiery could be found ex- 
tant, east of the ^Mississippi, the veteran Jolmston laid hold 
of, and drew back closer to their comrades at Petersburg;. 
Finally, the General-in-Chief of the Confederacy, Avhose own 
unflinching army had been so long the ^gis of its beloved 
Virginia, collected all from mountain and valley around his 
capital, and girded him for the death-struggle. 

While thus the armies of the Confederacy drew together 
within the circle, around them and always converging ap- 
proached the serried rows of Union ba3^onets and sabres. 

Bursting in a tornado through the Shenandoah Valley, and 
scattering like chaflTthe paltry handful of opposing horsemen, 
Sheridan with ten thousand troopers thence trailed in majestic 
circuit around to the left of the Army of the Potomac — like 
some peerless knight Avho paces about the field of the tourney 
before he enters the lists. 

In Alabama and Georgia, Wilson, with thirteen thousand 
men, rode rampant through the centre of the Confederacy, 
capturing all the towns and troops and stores in his path, 
and sweeping the land with the besom of vengeance : then 
paused in position at Macon, and held the lower avenues of 
Confederate retreat from Virsfinia to the West. 

From Knoxville, Stoncmanled a third cavalry column, five 
thousand strong, through the passes of the Alleghanies, and 
having laid waste western North Carolina as Wilson had 
Alabama, waited and watched there in turn for the mighty 
issue in Virginia. 

And lo ! approaching hither, appears the great " Army of 
the Mississippi," come, in lack of Western fields to conquer, 



480 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OE THE WAR. 

' to fill up the measure of its fame along the Neuse and the 
Roanoke. Marching down the banks of the Great River, 
this renowned host had unlocked its manifold fetters, and let 
it run rejoicing to the sea ; thence moving across the central 
zone, it gave back the Border States to the Union ; descend- 
ing southerly, it overran the broad Mississippi Valley ; turn- 
ing easterly, it scaled the Alleghanies, and planted its banners 
on their cloud-capped crests ; then, plunging through Georgia, 
it lighted its Christmas bivouac-fires in conquered Savannah : 
it turned north when the sun turned ; busily waded river and 
footed causeway ; and when the doomed Confederate armies, 
compassed in fatal toils, looked southerly for an outlet of 
escape, there came rolling across the plains of the Carol bias, 
beating nearer and nearer, the drums of Champion Hills and 
Shiloh ! 

In the early days of March, 1865, Robert E. Lee resolved 
to abandon the cities of Petersburg and Richmond, and to 
join his Army of Northern Virginia to the companion army 
of Johnston in northern North Carolina. To this end, the 
two officers arranged the prior manoeuvres, the choice of 
routes, the bridging of intervening streams, and the storing 
of rations. It was a grave change in Confederate strategy , 
and told the pressure of more than one impelling cause. 
The Confederate general saw that, with opening spring, the 
sunshine and the gales were fitting the roads for a new cam- 
paign, wherein no longer a single but a fivefold danger 
threatened his army and his capital — no longer Grant alone, 
but Sheridan, Shemian, Wilson, Stoneman, were marching or 
waiting to march upon him ; and as he glanced around the 
sky there was menace in every quarter of the compass. Nor 
was it more the numbers of the Union forces than their new 
possibilities of manoeuvre which disturbed the Confederate 
chieftain. "With ten thousand fresh sabres which would take 
the remnant of Confederate cavalry at a mouthful, and with 



riVE FORKS. 481 

overwhelming masses of infantry in support, no doubt re- 
mained that, sooner or later, Grant would cut the Danville 
Eailroad. But that stroke Avould be fatal, since this was the 
channel of supply for Lee's army, already too scantily 
rationed. 

The ruin that menaced the Danville road had already be- 
fallen the railroad lines of Georgia and both Carolinas, thanks 
to the energy of Sherman and the destructive genius of his 
men. Bitterly satirical was the comment already written by 
history upon the strategy of the winte*-'s Tennessee campaign. 
It had accomplished many things : annihilated Hood's army ; 
ruined the Confederacy at the AVest ; given existence to one 
Union army at Xashville, and escorted another safely to Savan- 
nah ; stopped up the conduits of supplies of the Virginia army ; 
and placed Sherman within supporting distance of Grant. 
Eash Hood ! short-sighted Davis ! in that blindness of arro- 
gance which strove at this stage of affairs to invade the North, 
so as to " make the enemy feel the war in his own borders," 
by v/ay of reformatory punishment rather than in pursuit of 
strategic advantages, this pair of strategists brought a new 
army from the womb of the exhaustless North, to ruin a con- 
test already desiderate. Not content with forcing Sherman 
back to whence he came, by legitimate appliances, they 
wanted not Georgia alone but Tennessee, not Teimcssee alone 
but Kentucky ; nay, Atlanta and Chattanooga were nothing 
without Nashville, Knoxville, Louisville, and a campaign 
along the Ohio. This exploit left Genera] Lee, in spring, 
the moiety of two States for his military domain. 

On paper, in March, 1865, Lee's immediate army numbered 
one hundred and sixty thousand ; in fact, owing to enormous 
desertions, added to the usual depletions, it numbered fifty 
thousand effectives ; and of these, deducting the detached 
troops, there remained wherewith to line his long trenches,- 
forty thousand. Johnston, also, had promising rolls, but an 
army only forty thousand strong — of whom somewhat over 

31 



482 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

twenty thousand were effective. For these sixty thousand to 
eighty thousand men, pitted against double their numbers, 
Lee was to plan his campaign. But of supplies there were 
less than troops ; for while the Confederate conscription was 
a monstrous abuse and failure, the Confederate commissariat 
was worse than its conscription, — which, npon the Avhole, is 
the most expressive thing to say of it. 

Such then was the look of the board before ths closing 
move, and such the warning voice which called on the Con- 
feplerate commander to abandon the field he had so long dis- 
puted. He might then have been jjardoned for a flood of 
despair over calamities which others, not he, had brought on ; 
for that which he saw prophetically as danger to the Confed- 
eracy, we see historically as downfall. But though the air 
was full of disastrous auguries, he, like the hero of Homer, 
asked "no omen but his country's cause." With unbroken 
confidence, Lee prepared to withdraw from his capital. 

Across the Appomattox, another soldier, quiet, undemon- 
strative, resolute, was studying the same map of war, and 
forming quite another schedule of conclusions than that of 
General Lee. Earlier than his rival, Grant had forecast the 
fall of Richmond in the spring, knowing better than Lee 
could know the enormous results to be expected from the 
winter campaigns of Sherman and Thomas. His plan, how- 
ever, was not to force, nor to suffer, but to prevent, the 
abandonment of Petersburg and Richmond. He sought, in- 
stead, to keep his adversary there, to push the affair to another 
Vicksburg or Donelson, to surround him, cut off his supplies, 
and force him to surrender. What he purposed himself to 
do for Lee's army, he designed that Sherman should do for 
Johnston's, so that, in one tremendous campaign, between 
the Neusc and the James, he might bring the Confederacy to 
•the ground. 

To retreat unscathed from Richmond, Lee must so manceuvre 
or strike as to outwit an antagonist lying in wait to prevent 



FIVE FORKS. 483 

that very movement. Moreover, to avoid being overtaken 
iu marching to join Johnston, it was desirable to move on the 
shortest road, which was not north, but south, of the Appo- 
mattox, namely, the Cox road, towards which the Union left 
wing was thrown oiit. Accordingly, Lee resolved to initiate 
an attack on the opposite Union flank, partly in general to 
cloak his retreat, and partly in particular that the troops ly- 
ing nearest the Cox road might be moved away to succor the 
Union right. This accomplished, he would slip down that 
road with his army and laugh at pursuit. The point selected 
for attack on the Union right was Fort Steadman, on the line 
of the Ninth Corps ; and, on the 25th of March, two divisions, 
under Gordon, handsomely surprised and stormed the work. 
But, by a fatal blunder, the assaulting column was not sup- 
ported, and, the Union works being so built as to command 
from the rear and flanks the position already carried, at the 
end of their brief triumph most of Gordon's troops were cut 
off by a cross-fire, and one thousand nine hundred of them 
laid down their arms. Gordon's loss was heavy, too, in killed 
and wounded ; that of the Union troops being four hundred 
and five, besides five hundred and six captured. At once, 
Meade followed his parry with a thrust, and, pushing out the 
Second and Sixth Corps, they captured the picket lines in 
their fronts, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. In 
the desperate struggle at this point the Union loss was 
eleven hundred and twenty-three ; the Confederate loss 
severe. The Union left had not stirred towards the right ; 
and Lee's initiative was a costly failure. 

Neither sooner nor later for this attack, but on the day ap- 
pointed, like a fate which seizes but cannot itself be seized or 
evaded. Grant's own scheme rolled forward to consummation. 
In general the manoeuvre was the fiimiliar movement " by the 
left," designed to swing a heavy column across the extreme 
Confederate right, against the Southside Kailroad. The 
troops of the turning column were the Second and Fifth 



484 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and Sheridan's cavalry, 
nine thousand sabres. The Ninth Corps and three divisions 
of Ord's Army of the James, remained to guard the trenches, 
and formed the pivot for the wheeling column. The 29th of 
March was assigned for opening the manoeuvre, and on that 
day it began. 

The reader who may please to follow upon the map which 
accompanies this sketch, the journey of the Union columns 
from their familiar trenches to the cross-roads known as Five 
Forks, will find the initial marches easy of comprehension. 
But it must be noted that the battle-field destined to be forever 
famous was not at the start the objective of the Union columns, 
nor was even a pause expected there, much less a battle. 
But the Union general, as we shall see, boldly and wisely 
changed his plan on the first day of its execution, and Five 
Forks became what it is in history. The Confederate works 
ran south-westerly from Petersburg so as to cover the Boydton 
plank road as far as Hatcher's Run, and then turned off west- 
erly and covered the White Oak road to where the Claybourn 
road intersects the latter, and there ended. The two infantry 
columns were designed to lie close up to the Confederate 
right flank, while Sheridan rode farther west, through Din- 
widdle, on a wide detour to break up the railroad. 

"Warren, having on the morning of the 29th of March crossed 
Hatcher's Run, moved his Fifth Corps up the Quaker road, 
sweeping away the enemy's skirmishers, and, when about two 
miles from the latter's main works, Griffin's division, in ad- 
vance, encountered that of Bushrod Johnson, which he 
defeated in a spirited engagement, the Confederate dead and 
Avounded and over a hundred prisoners being left in his 
hands : his own loss was three hundred and seventy, chiefly 
in Chamberlain's brigade. Upon this success, Warren 
pressed well forward towards the main Confederate line. 
Humphreys, with the Second Corps, crossed Hatcher's Run, 
and moved up through the Avoods on Warren's right ; and 



FIVE FORKS. 485 

Sheridan, six miles to Warren's left and rear, occupied Din- 
widdle. Thus, at nightfall of the 29th, the expedition was 
well afloat, with bright prospects of success. It was then 
that General Grant's courier, reaching Sheridan at Dinwiddie, 
countermanded the order to cut the roads, and directed him 
instead " to push around the enemy, and get on to his right 
rear," declaring in characteristic words, "I now feel like end- 
ing the matter." 

However, night brought a rain which fell dismally all day 
of the 30th, and worked the Virginia roads back into then- 
normal state of quagmires. All that Sheridan, Warren, and 
Humphreys could do was to reconnoitre the Confederate 
positions, which was accomplished by heavy skirmishing, 
without assault. So, too, the 31st must inevitably have 
passed (for such were the orders) in a suspension of hostili- 
ties, till horses could march and wains be drawn ; but, on 
that day, another actor came to move the scene, and, true to 
a polic}'^ as old as the olden days of the Peninsula, himself 
took the initiative. 

With a skilful audacity, which, even if not justified by oft 
experience, his hard necessities would have justified now, Lee 
had once more stript his almost barren iiitrenchments of 
everything but a strong skirmish line, in order to procure a 
force wherewith to check the Union flanking column. So 
swiftly, however, had the three Union corps moved out by 
their loft and rear, that Lee's dispositions might have been 
incomplete, but for the rain of the 30th, which halted the 
Union march. But, on the morning of the 31st, Lee had 
massed fifteen thousand men on his right, comprising the 
divisions of Pickett and Johnson, with a few other troops ; 
with these he sought, as usual, to drive back the Union left. 

At the left of Grant's infantry line was, as we have seen, 
Warren's corps, which had handsomely advanced nearly to 
the White Oak road, opposite the extreme right of the Con- 
federate intrenched line. On Warren's right was Humphreys, 



486 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

but his left Avas unprotected, Sheridan being six miles distant 
at Dinwiddle. Ayres's division was in advance, Crawford's 
behind, and Griffin's in the rear, the three divisions being 
eii echelon. Although general operations had been suspended, 
Warren prudently threw forward Winthrop's brigade of 
Ayres's division, to reconnoitre the "\^''hite Oak road west of 
the Confederate intrenchmcnts, with the view of subsequently 
occupying that road if the report should be favorable. It so 
happened that, at the very moment of the reconnoissance, Lee 
was sweeping forward his massed column for a desperate at- 
tempt to drive back the whole Union left. His sudden and 
swift attack in dense woods easily disrupted not only Win- 
throp's brigade but the rest of Ayres's division, who were 
attacked both in front and on the left. The confused retreat 
of Ayres's men disordered Crawford's, who in turn gave 
way, and were soon, in Griffin's words, "running to the rear 
in a most demoraliztjd and disorganized condition." But, 
thanks to Warren's careful dispositions in massing his troops, 
Griffin's division not only stood firm, but, with the aid of 
Miles 's, which Humphreys sent up on its right, repulsed the 
assaulting force and drove it entirely across the White Oak 
road. In this contrecouj), Warren tlircw in his Avholc availa- 
ble corps, but Chamberlain's gallant brigade was the only one 
earnestly engaged, and it captured one hundred and thirty- 
five prisoners of the 5Gth Virginia, with its flag. This was 
the battle of White Oak Eidgc, the precursor of Five Forks. 
In it the loss of the Fifth Corps was not far from 1200 men, 
its total loss in the three days' operations thus far, being 1800. 
The storm that burst on Warren spent but half its fury 
there : the remainder was reserved for Sheridan, who, on the 
same day, and against a part of the same troops, fought the 
battle cf Dinwiddle Courthouse. The road from Dinwiddle 
to the Southsidc Eailroad is crossed by the White Oak road 
at Five Forks, which point, accordingly, Sheridan aimed to 
seize. The day before he had made an unsuccessful eflbrt 



FIVE FORKS. 487 

with Devin's division and Davies's brigade of Crook's, to cap- 
ture these cross-roads ; but on the morning of the 31st the 
same troojis renewed the attempt, and with success, the 
force which had held it on the 30th, being at that moment 
mainly absent and engaged with Warren. Soon, however," 
the Confederate infantry went tramping hastily down the 
White Oak road from their aifair with the Fifth Corps, to re- 
possess Five Forks. Overborne by this column, Devin and 
Davies fell back in confusion towards Dinwiddle. Pickett 
and Johnson, pursuing, followed down the west side of Cham- 
berlain's Creek, but were repulsed in an attempt to cross by 
Smith's brigade of Crook's division, which had been skirmish- 
ing at that point with some Confederate cavahy. But in 
these manoeuvres Sheridan's men had not only been engaged 
with a force too strong for them, but of necessity the whole 
cavalry column became awkwardly dislocated, and required 
new dispositions. 

It was then that the genius of Sheridan — a soldier always 
boldest, promptest, most fertile of expedients, most irresisti- 
bly brilliant, in the supreme hour of j)eril — shone out con- 
spicuous. Despite the enemy's pressure, he disentangled his 
troops and got them all in hand again, though on the retreat, 
and that being accomplished, dismounted his troopers behind 
the light parapets which had been thrown up near Dinwiddle, 
and so held the Confederates in check till nightfall forced 
their withdrawal : nor had the Union carbines then failed to 
pay some return instalment of the severe loss the cavalry 
had earlier sufTered. 

His comrades of the infantry meanwhile, anxious as well 
they might be, when the news came at nightfall of Sheridan's 
danger, prepared to aid him ; and Warren, though the Fifth 
Corps was exhausted with its own battle, at once sent Ay res's 
division on the road to Dinwiddle, and prepared to follow 
with the rest. But Sheridan had already worked out his own 
salvation, and risen superior to dubious fortune at Dinwiddle 



488 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Courthouse, as he had earlier at Cedar Creek and Murfrees- 
boro'. Before midnight he had the satisfaction of knowing 
that his baffled enemy had retreated from his front, leaving 
but a skirmish line behind. 

n. 

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

The vast line of Confederate earthworks which once en- 
girdled Petersburg and Richmond, after stretching from left 
to right full thirty-five miles, paused on the White Oak road 
where the Clay bourn road crosses, and thence carried its re- 
tired flank a few miles northerly along the latter highway. To 
what point on the continent this parapet might have been pro- 
longed, under some circumstances, one dares not affirm ; but 
it found a terminus at last from the lack of defenders. With 
40,000 effective men. General Lee had long held it against a 
double investing force, though his cordon of trenches spanned 
two rivers, covered two cities, and protected a line of rail- 
road which, once destroyed, would have ruined his position. 

But when his persistent adversary opened a fresh campaign 
by moving once more far out on the Confederate right a flanlc- 
ing column, which embraced not only two infantry corps, but 
9000 well-mounted horsemen, Lee's resources were so strained 
that no dexterity of management could relieve them. 

Four miles due west of the terminus of the main Confed- 
erate line, was a cross-roads as important as any which that 
line covered in its course ; it was the intersection of the 
White Oak road with the one running from Dinwiddle to the 
Southside Baih'oad, and the junction w^as known as Five 
Forks, since there five paths radiate. The possession of Five 
Forks by the Union forces, Avould enable them to march thence 
by what is called the Ford road against the Southside Rail- 
road; it became, therefore, a point of strategic importance. 



FIVE FORKS. 489 

To furnisli forth a garrison for the Five Forks, which might 
also serve to confront the Union column which was marching 
to turn the Confederate right, Lee resorted to the well-worn 
device of stripping the Petersburg intrenchments. The force 
he had so collected, consisted of Pickett's division, 7000 
strong, which for nine months had seen comparatively little 
service, Bushrod Johnson's division, 6000 strong, and the 
two small brigades of Wilcox and Wise, in all 15,000 men. 
It was this force which made the attacks in the battles of 
White Oak Ridge and Dinwiddle Courthouse, as already 
narrated. 

On the morning of April 1st, Sheridan began a new move- 
ment against Five Forks. To him, during the night. General 
Meade had wisely assigned the command of all the forces de- 
signed for the attempt, consisting of his own cavalry, now 
about 8000 strong, McKenzie's cavalry division, 1000 strong, 
and the Fifth Corps now 12,000 to 13,000 strong — the losses 
of Warren and Sheridan during the three days previous hav- 
ing been from 2500 to 3000 men. A movement of such a 
character required a single head, and neither General Grant 
nor General Meade was to be present at its execution, their 
head-quarters being many miles distant from the battle-ground. 
The remainder of his army, the forces of Parke, Ord, Wright, 
and Humphreys, General Grant retained in their intrenched 
lines, awaiting the issue of Sheridan's contest ; for although 
well aware that the garrison of Petersburg had been weaken- 
ed for concentration on Lee's right, he preferred in place of 
a co-operative attack to attend Sheridan's fortune, and, that 
being made sure, to assault the next day. 

The plan of battle was brilliant in its simplicity. It was 
to drive the enemy by means of the cavalry back to Five 
Forks, to keep him within the works there, and to make a 
cavalry feint of turning his right : then, under that curtain of 
horse Avhich Slicridan so well knew how to draw, Avhilc behind 
its impenetrable screen he manoeuvred the footmen, he 



490 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

would secretly move the Fifth Corps up on the enemy's left, 
and swing it full ajjainst that flank, cutting off the whole force 
from Petersburg and capturing it. 

The topography of the region around Five Forks gives the 
clew to the Confederate movements. The general position 
assumed by its garrison, and by the forces of Sheridan at 
Dinwiddle and of AYarren at White Oak Ridge, on the 31st, 
had been tliat of a triangle, of which the Union column occu- 
pied two angles and the Confederates a third. Partly to secure 
the obvious advantage of the offensive, and partly to prevent 
the Union forces from advancing with impunity against Five 
Forks, both by the Dinwiddle and White Oak roads, and so 
executing the manoeuvre which Sheridan did the next day exe- 
cute, Lee fell upon Warren's corps on the morning of the 31st 
as we have seen. But this manoeuvre had uncovered the strat- 
egic position itself to Sheridan, who, advancing on the Din- 
widdle road, had seized Five Forks. No advantage gained 
against Warren would make amends for giving Sheridan free 
course ; and accordingly the Confederates hastily rushed back, 
and drove Sheridan's advance from Five Forks, a movement 
more readily made after their severe check by Miles and Grif- 
fin : it is easily seen how in the subsequent advance, General 
Warren says he "met with but little opposition." In the 
same way, after having driven Sheridan to Dinwiddle that 
same night, the Confederates were again obliged to withdraw 
their main force towards Five Forks, to prevent the Fifth 
Corps from marching on the White Oak road, and so seizing 
that point and cutting off their retreat. 

Accordingly, Sheridan had little difficulty, during the 
morning of April 1st, in executing the first part of his scheme. 
At daylight, Merritt's two divisions, with Devin on the right 
and Custer on the left, Crook being in the rear, easily drove 
the force left in their front from Dimviddic to the Five Forks. 
Merritt, by impetuous charges, then expelled the Confederates 
from both their skirmish lines, and, in fine, at two o'clock 



FIVE FORKS. 491 

Sheridan had sealed them up within their main worlds and had 
drawn across their front his mask of cavalry skirmishers, 
behind which he now proceeded to the second part of his plan 
— the secret moving of the infantry. 

General Warren had been directed, until the cavalry move- 
ment should be consummated, to halt at the point where he 
joined Sheridan, in order to refresh his men. At one o'clock, 
he received orders from Sheridan to march the Fifth Corps to 
Gravelly Run Church, about three miles distant, forming with 
two divisions in front and one in reserve. This formation 
was at once begun. jSIeanwhile, Merritt was demonstrating 
strongly against the Confederate right at Five Forks to de- 
ceive the enemy. Lynx-eyed, and attent to every quarter 
of the ^eld, Sheridan now prepared to guard against any sally 
from the main Petersburg works upon what, after his line 
should be formed, would become his right and rear. This 
task was entrusted to McKenzie. The precaution Avas timely, 
for McKenzie, marching along the White Oak road towards the 
angle of the Confederate works at the Claybourn road, met a 
hostile force thence issuing, and attacking it boldly and skil- 
fully drove it towards Petersburg. 

The Fifth Corps was now formed, and eager to advance 
and strike. Crawford was on the right, Ayres on the left, 
and Grifun massed in column of regiments behind Crawford ; 
Ayres and Crawford were each formed with two brigades in 
front and the third in rear, each brigade being in two lines. 
Then Warren pushed straight on to the White Oak road, 
wliich was speedily reached, being about half a mile distant, 
and changed front forward so that in place of being parallel 
to the road his line crossed it at right angles, and faced west- 
ward. This manoeuvre was a left wheel, in which Ayres was 
the pivot and Crawford with Griffin behind the wheeling flank. 
The Fifth Corps was now directly upon the left of the Con- 
federate position, overlapping it for a long distance, and 
McKenzie, having countermarched and returned on the White 



492 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

Oak road, as Warren advanced to attack, was sent by Sheri- 
dan round to the latter's right. 

The breastworks at Five Forks were of the usual character 
— a strong parapet of logs and earth, with redoubts at inter- 
vals, and heavy slashings thrown down in front : a thick pine 
undergrowth covered its approaches. The main line ran 
along the White Oak road upwards of a mile on each side of 
the road from Dinwiddle ; and the breastwork was retired 
northerly on its left flank about one hundred yards, in a 
crochet ; the interval thence to Hatcher's Run was guarded 
only by a skirmish line. 

It happened therefore, that, when the Fifth Corps wheeled 
into position across the White Oak road, close upon the Con- 
federate left, Ayres's division covered the ground fronting 
the refused line of breastworks, while Crawford and Griffin 
overlapped it. Before the two latter divisions had completed 
their change of front, Ayres became sharply engaged with the 
Confederate skirmishers, and driving them back, worked his 
men well up to the breastworks. There, however, the en- 
emy opened a hot fire, which reached not only Ayres but the 
left of Crawford. The latter officer, in order to get by the 
enemy's flank, as he had been directed, in order to seize the 
Ford road, obliqued to the right, so as to draw his other flank 
from the severe fire it was receiving across open ground. 
But this manoeuvre uncovered the right of Ayres, which stag- 
gered and finally broke under a flank fire. In this crisis, 
Warren promptly repaired the line by throwing Griffin into 
the interval between Ayres and Crawford, and this disposi- 
tion had a second good efiect in allowing Crawford to swing 
out with confidence upon the enemy's rear. 

Ayres now charged the intrcnchments wath his whole divis- 
ion, Gwin's brigade on the right, the jVIarylanders in the 
centre, and Winthrop's brigade on the left. The troops 
dashed in with splendid impetuosity and captured the works, 
over a thousand prisoners, and several flags. Griffin, on the 



FIVE roRKS. 493 

right of Ayres, falling upon the enemy's left and rear, car- 
ried the works there and fifteen hundred prisoners. Mean- 
while, Crawford had struck and crossed the all-important 
Ford road, in the enemy's rear. This latter success rendered 
of course the whole position of the enemy untenable, and, to 
make assurance doubly sure, Warren directed Crawford to 
change front, and move briskly down the Ford road. Coul- 
ter's brigade led, with Kellogg's on its right and rear and 
Baxter's beyond, and, encountering a four-gun battery posted 
to command the road, charged and captured it, Coulter suf- 
fering severely in the gallant exploit. 

At this juncture, the Confederate position was almost 
entirely surrounded ; for, while "Warren was attacking from 
the east, Merritt, who took the cue for assault from the roll 
of the infantry fire, was charging from the south. But one 
avenue of escape remained open, that to the west, along the 
White Oak road. But before this could be gained, the ex- 
ultant Union columns had broken in upon all sides, and most 
of the Confederates were forced to surrender. 

The Forks having been carried, Warren directed Crawford 
to change front again to the right, and to pursue south-west- 
erly so as to take the enemy a second time in flank and rear ; 
and thither also he sent a mounted cavalry brigade, which 
had approached on the Ford road. About a mile west of the 
Forks, and two miles west of the intrenchments which he had 
first carried, Warren found a similar line, designed to protect 
the left flank of what remained of the enemy, while the latter 
held the western extremity of his intrenched front against the 
Union cavalry on the south. Sheridan's orders had been 
that, if the enemy was routed, there should be no halt to 
reform broken lines ; but the infantry, although full of spirit 
and enthusiasm, had become disorganized somewhat by their 
own victory, and by marching and fighting in the woods ; and 
pausing before the enemy's new line, they were losing the 
momentum of pursuit in a straggling skirmish fire. At that 



494 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

moment ^Varrcn rode through to the front, and called those 
near liini to follow. The officers and color-bearers sprang 
out, the straggling fire ceased, and in an enthusiastic charge 
the last position was captnred, with such of the enemy as had 
remained to defend it. In this charsre Warren's horse was 
shot within a few paces of the enemy's line, an orderly killed 
by his side, and Colonel Richardson of the 7th Wisconsin, 
who had heroically sprung forward to shield Warren, was 
grievously wounded. 

The day was now done and the battle ended. But for a 
distance of six miles along the White Oak road, Mcrritt and 
McKenzie chased the fugitives, until night protected them. 
What loss Pickett, who commanded at Five Forks, sufiered 
in killed and wounded, is not recorded, but he left over five 
thousand prisoners, with four guns, and many colors, in the 
hands of the impetuous Sheridan. The lightness of the Union 
loss formed a novel sensation to the Army of the Potomac, 
compared to the inestimable value of the victory ; for it was 
not above one thousand in all, of w^hich six hundred and 
thirty-four fell upon Warren's corps. 

So ended Five Forks — a battle which may be pronounced 
the finest in point of tactical execution, on the Union side, 
of any ever delivered in Virginia, and in which, nevertheless, 
brilliancy of execution is eclipsed by the magnificence of its 
issue. It was a fit climax to that Shenandoah career Avhich 
had already made illustrious the name of Sheridan. 

III. 
RESULTS OF FIVE FORKS. 

Now at length the Army of the Potomac — glorious array 
of soldiery ! — immortal alike in its gallantry and its forti- 
tude, much-enduring, ofttimes in disaster but never in de- 
spair, the pattern of loyalty, the bright exemplar of citizen 
soldiery — after so many toils was nearing its goal. Through 



nvE FORKS. 495 

four years these and a greater host of fallen comrades, ■who 
died bequeathing them the unfinished task, had sought the 
prize set before them. The pangs of Tantalus had been 
theirs, — always to tc^ch the guerdon but never to clutch it, 
to see the shining spires of Richmond but not to reach them, 
to graze the battlements of Petersburg, not to surmount 
them ; and to receive grievous wounds from each vain strug- 
<::le. Thev had come across a sea of troubles, and vivid in 
memory were its Fredericksburgs and Cold Harbors, grim 
vortex-pools whose greedy maws had sucked up thousands 
of brave soldiers, till the waters rolled over them and they 
were gone. But the hour had come to fight the last fight, 
and to run the last race. 

The joyful news from Sheridan quickly reached the head- 
quarters of General Grant, and ran electrically along the 
Union trenches. A general assault was ordered for dawn of 
the 2d, and, meanwhile, a terrific cannonade was opened from 
every available gun along the vast line, until the moment ofn 
advance. A forecast of victory seemed to impress the troops, 
who took thence unusual confidence and alertness. The fate 
of the insurrection seemed as clear as if it had been writ up 
in flaming letters on the sky. All the formations were 
speedily made, and the troops waited for the signal-gun. 

The news of Pickett's disaster had reached Lee, too, and 
he felt its weight of meaning. His right flank was turned, a 
powerful column of horsemen, sustained by a corps of foot, 
was already moving imchecked towards the rear of his posi- 
tion. His main lines would be assaulted on the morrow. He 
resolved at once to abandon Petersburg and Richmond. 

But time was needed to provide for orderly withdrawal ; it 
was needful, too, to strike some last staggering blow at the 
Union columns, to paralyze as far as might be their immediate 
pursuit. For that purpose nothing was fitter than the net of 
intrenchmcnts, parapet behind parapet, whence he had so 
often bloodily repulsed the Union columns. He would make 



496 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE "WAR. 

the last assault cost clear, and gain a breathing time from the 
crippling of the assailants. Longsfcreet had two divisions 
north of the James, not having detected the weakness of the 
Union lines there : he now sent several Jjrigades over to the 
/ right. The same night Mahone, who held the Chesterfield 
front, received a message from General Lee, asking if he 
could give him some men, and in response put a brigade on 
the road to Petersburg, one of whose regiments, the JNIissis- 
sippians, he threw into Fort Gregg, which next day they 
defended to the last. Besides these reinforcements, Lee had 
but two incomplete divisions in the trenches : the attack on 
Fort Stcadman had gained nothing, and lost four thousand 
men, a thing of all things which Lee could not even once 
afford to do ; and Five Forks trebled that disaster. How- 
ever, with such as he had, Lee stood to do battle, for he was 
Used to contending with inequality of numbers. His most 
hopeful aim was to keep his enemy outside of the works till 
q^nother nightfall, when all should be abandoned, and the 
retreat begun. 

At four o'clock of Sunday morning, the 2d, a tremendous 
assault was made from the whole Union line between the 
Appomattox and Hatcher's Run. Parke's Ninth Corps, on 
the right, carried the outer Confederate line. "Wright's Sixth 
Corps, in the centre, swept the works in its front like a 
whirlwind, and in less than one hour its advance had crossed 
the Boydton road and struck and torn up the Southside Rail- 
road, the long-coveted line of supplies. Ord's column moved 
with equal spirit on the left of the Sixth Corps, and then both 
Wright and Ord turned and marched up the Boydton road 
towards Petersburg. Upon this, Humphreys, who with the 
Second Corps held the extreme left, west of Hatcher's Run, 
swept clean the Confederate position there, with the divis- 
ions of Hays and Mott, and Miles's division pursued the 
enemy northerly to Sutherland Station, where ho overtook 
and wholly routed him, capturing two guns and six hundred 



FIVE FORKS. 497, 

» 
men : meanwhile, Humphreys marched the other two divis- 
ions on Wright's left towards the city. 

When Ord had reached the Petersburg lines, the command 
of Gibbon attacked Forts Gregg and Alexander, two of the 
strongest redoubts amongst the Petersburg defences. The 
latter quickly fell, but in the former Mahone 's men fought 
with customary desperation, and again and again sent their 
assailants reeling from the works. At last it fell, but its 250 
defenders had been reduced to 30, and of Gibbon's men 500 
lay stretched in front of the redoubt. 

But now, before eight o'clock, all the network of exte- . 
rior defences had been swept by the Union troops, who, 
rapidly advancing, drove their exhausted opponents far back 
to the last strong chain of works which immediately girdled 
Petersburg. At this time, within the city, General Lee, 
General A. P. Hill, and General Mahone, were talking over 
the perils and prospects of the day at the head-quarters of 
the former officer. As the firing drew near and ominously 
nearer from the front. General Lee, listening, said to Hill, 
"How is this, general? your men are giving way." In- 
stantly General Hill mounted his horse, and dashed down 
the road to the front. General Lee's words were true : the 
Union forces were already crossing the lines at all points. 
As Hill rode along, he suddenly came upon two or three 
men in blue uniform, who, taking position behind a tree, 
levelled their pieces at him. "Throw down your arms," 
cried the general. The men were staggered for an instant 
by the very audacity of the demand, but recovering, gave 
back their answer from their rifles' mouths ; and A. P. Hill, 
who had fought throughout Virginia, from the first hour of 
Bull Run to the last hour of Petersburg, fell from his horse, 
dead. 

The fate of the city was not yet accomplished. Its inner 
cordon of works, well built and posted on commanding 
heights, forced the assailants to recoil with great loss, re- 

32 



498 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

calling the sanguinary assaults of early days. One of Long- 
street's brigades, coming up from Richmond, even sallied 
from the works, and for a time the famous Fort Mahone fell 
again into Confederate possession, again however to be cap- 
tured. Before noon the bloody strife on the Confederate left 
had ceased, and comparative quiet reigned along the line. It 
was the Ninth Corps that had suffered most severely in the 
attack, those of Ord and Humphreys much less ; the loss of 
the Sixth Corps was about 1100. The Confederate loss, too, 
had not been light, especially in prisoners, of which the 
Sixth Corps alone captured more than 2000, with many guns. 
Lee had gained his desired day of respite, but had only 
postponed, not averted, his fate. 

At dawn of April 3d, the Union skirmishers were alert, 
and creeping stealthily towards the enemy. They passed 
the open interval, got to the foot of the works, ascended the 
outer slope, and, half astonished, leaped the frowning para- 
pets. The enemy was gone ! no sight or sound of him re- 
maining ; and quickly over conquered Petersburg floated the 
Union banner. At the same moment, terrific explosions re- 
sounded from Kichmond, and thither the Union pickets, 
hurrying forward, found the Confederate iron-clads and 
bridges on the James blown up, and Richmond in flames. 

A wild carnival of triumph might well have succeeded in 
the Union camps the fall of proud Richmond, but no moment 
was spared for the joy of victory. Instantly, all the Union 
columns were formed and headed to the west, Ord along the 
Southside Railroad towards Burkesville, and more northerly 
and in a straighter course, Sheridan and the Fifth Corps, 
followed by the Second and Sixth, on the road to Jetersville. 

To Burkesville, too, was hastening the ruined army of 
Northern Virginia, forced to march by the longer road 
thither, north of the Appomattox. Moving noiselessly under 
cover of darkness, what was left of Loc's army met for flight 



riVE FORKS. 499 

not far from Chesterfield — Ewell marching southerly from 
Eichmond, Mahone westerly from Bermuda Hundred, and 
Field and Gordon, and the rest of the Petersburg troops, 
northward from that city. The remnant of Pickett's troops 
had retreated from Five Forks, northwesterly to the Appo- 
mattox. By daylight Lee was sixteen miles away. 

Of 40,000 infantry wherewith Lee began the fatal cam- 
paign, more than 12,000 were gone when the sun set upon 
Sheridan's battle. But this was not all that Five Forks had 
accomplished ; it had struck the signal for the storming of 
Petersburg, where thousands more were snatched from Lee's 
scanty hoard of men ; it had turned the right flank of his 
position ; it had blocked up his best and only sure line of 
retreat, since the Fifth Corps occupied the railroad at Suth- 
erland's, ten miles west of Petersburg, on the night of his 
retreat, with the cavalry at Ford's, ten miles farther west. 

It is an unbroken chapter of Confederate calamities that I 
am now relating ; a series of disasters indeed Avas needed to 
hurl to ruin an army wliich had shown itself on many fields 
too elastic and fire-tempered to break under any single mis- 
fortune. With Richmond and Petersburg abandoned, with 
an army reduced almost to 20,000 effective men, and forced 
to retreat over roads longer than those on which his enemy, 
having a powerful body of horsemen in front, was pursuing, 
Lee had commenced his ill-starred journey. His object 
was to unite with General Johnston, and first, therefore, to 
reach Burkesvillc, the intersection of the Southside and Dan- 
ville railroads, of which the latter was his line of retreat. 
On the morning of April 4th, Lee reached Amelia Court- 
house, thirty-eight miles west of Richmond, and found that, 
by a fatal blunder, the rations there collected to feed his 
army during its retreat, had been sent to Richmond. Till 
the night of the 5th, therefore, he was forced to wait there, 
and to break his command up into foraging parties. 

This was the next link in the chain of disaster, for on the 



500 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

afternoon of Lee's arrival at Amelia, Sheridan struck th© 
Danville Railroad, seven miles beyond, at Jetersville. It 
only remained for the Confederate General to fall upon Sher- 
idan, or to give up his retreat southwesterly to Burkesville, 
and to keep on due west. But Sheridan, with the cavalry 
and Fifth Corps, the victors of Five Forks, was 18,000 
strong, and Lee, with his troops broken into detachments, 
had not that number at command. Thus again was Lee's 
direct line of retreat blocked up, and again did Five Forks 
throw its fatal shadow over the fortunes of this army. 

Next day, the 5th, Sheridan, while intrenching at Jeters- 
ville, had his cavalry scouts on Lee's Avestern line of retreat, 
and Davies's command, advancing to Paine's Cross-roads, 
came upon a train of one hundred and eighty wagons, de- 
feated its cavalry escort, burned the wagons, and captured 
five guns and many prisoners. Gregg and Smith Avere sent 
to Davies's support, and the Confederate infantry dispatched 
to cut the latter off, were, after severe fighting, foiled. The 
same evening, Meade, with his Second and Sixth Corps, 
joined Sheridan. 

Accordingly, on the night of the 5th, Lee hurried westerly 
again to where, thirty-five miles distant, his road crossed the 
Appomattox at High Bridge. His aim was no longer Dan- 
ville and Johnston, but Lynchburg and the cover of the 
mountains. Close after him came the pursuers, with what- 
ever speed was possible to foot, hoof, or wheel. Leading the 
hunt Avith a terrible energy which knew no pause, no rest, no 
sleep, and which foretold death to the flying game on whose 
flanks he so remorselessly hung, was Sheridan. Near Sailor's 
Creek, a stream that flows northerly into the Appomattox, 
five miles cast of High Bridge, he sprang upon Lee's wagon 
train, and from its formidable guard seized four hundred 
wagons, sixteen guns, and hundreds of prisoners. But 
he would be content with nothing but the capture of the 
hostile column entire. Stagg's brigade Avas sent to charge at 



riVE FOEKS. 501 

E well's corps, which, as the rear-guard of the train, would 
be cut off from retreat, if detained till the Union infantry in 
its rear could come up. Wright soon came up, and, near 
Deatonsville, the divisions of Seymour and Wheaton, aided 
by Sheridan's impulsive cavalry, attacked Ewell, and, after 
heroic resistance and a sanguinary battle, captured the whole 
remaining force, consisting of several thousand prisoners, 
including Ewell, Custis Lee, and other general officers. 

Meanwhile, on the right of the Sixth Corps, the Second 
had had a running fight to near the mouth of Sailor's Creek, 
capturing many guns, prisoners, flags, and two hundred 
wagons. On the same morning, General Read's brigade, 
sent forward by Ord towards Farmvillo, heroically attacked 
the head of Lee's column near that place, and, with the loss 
of its gallant commander and many of his men, detained the 
Confederates till Ord came up. 

That night of the 6th of April was a sorrowful one for the 
Confederate army. There was little left now upon which to 
rely. Mahoue's division, five thousand strong, vivid example 
of the worth of discipline and the power of enthusiasm, was 
still as effective, as fanatical in the belief that it could not be 
whipped as when it drew out of its abandoned trenches; 
Field's division, too, four thousand strong, was in good con- 
dition. But as much could not be said of any other division 
in the army. Pickett had but a fragment left from Five 
Forks ; Johnson a handful from the same field ; Anderson 
only his own military staff ; Gordon's relics of Fort Steadman 
were in a poor condition to fight ; E well's corps had just 
been nearly annihilated at Deatonsville and Sailor's Creek. 
The enemy pressed on all sides, often in front as well as rear. 
The men sunk down from want of rest, sleep, and food. The 
forage parties were constantly set upon by cavalry, and their 
scanty collects plundered before their eyes by Union troopers. 
Wagons by the hundreds, almost by the thousands, had been 



502 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

lost. Horses dropped dead in their tracks from starvation. 
With escape ahnost hopeless, and a flushed and relentless 
enemy forcing a running battle from dawn till dark, it would 
not be long before the leaven of disorganization would 
ferment even in the mass that still remained solid and true. 

So reflecting, each within himself, a knot of Confederate 
generals, Lee's subordinates, conferred that gloomy night in 
the tent of General Anderson. They were all of one mind, 
and that was that the hour was hastening on for the surrender 
of the array of Northern Virginia. They resolved to com- 
municate that opinion to General Lee, Avith the assurance that 
his officers would take the entire responsibility of having 
suggested and requested the surrender. One of their numlier 
was aj)pointed for this mission, and it was determined that 
he should first seek as an intermediary General Longstreet, 
who was thought to be the most intimate in General Lee's 
counsel, and therefore fitted to convey the message with the 
better grace. This officer mounted his horse and set out for 
Longstrcet's head-quarters . 

Meanwhile, Lee, after the day's battle, was already press- 
ing the night retreat, and had already crossed his advance 
over the Appomattox, at High Bridge, which important 
structure had been saved. For some days past, Mahone and 
Field had guarded the rear with their strong divisions. A 
great herd of stragglers, the debris of the day's battles, many 
without guns, many without equipments, and even without 
hats, were collected in a confused mass in front of the Hi^rh 
Bridge waiting to cross — the very sight of them showed that 
the game was up. General Anderson, a brave and resolute 
officer, and one apt to stick precisely to the specific text of his 
orders, whatever they were, and even when he did not entirely 
take in their aim, was in charge of the stragglers, and on this 
occasion was under the strange impression that General Lee 
did not wish them to be at once crossed over the Hioh Bridsre. 
Mahone riding up thither, saw a great crowd of these disor- 



FIVE FORKS. 503 

ganized soldiers, sutlers, and cami)-followerS; mixed up ia 
the valley or bottom, with horses, artillery, and wagons, 
while a sentinel was posted on the bridge with orders to let 
no person whatever pass over. Hastening back through the \ 
confused mass, Mahone consulted with Anderson, and | 
the result was that the disorderly mass poured across the ' 
bridge. 

It now remained, so soon as the stragglers should have 
crossed, or even before, to burn High Bridge, for the Union 
columns would doubtless be up to save it in early morning, 
and it was better to leave a thousand men than to leave the 
bridge in their hands. This task was undertaken by General 
Gordon, who, in the temporary absence of Anderson, had 
charge of the stragglers. Meanwhile, Mahone had estab- 
lished a line of battle, forming the rear line of the army, on 
a rising ground three fourths of a mile beyond the bridge and 
facing it. Having passed the rest of the night in riding back 
from the river and picking out successive lines, on which to 
form in retreat, Mahone at dawn, having made the tour, 
returned to the river, and there found, to his mortification and 
rage, an officer in command who asked him in great simplicity 
when the bridge should be destroyed, as he had no orders 
naming the time. It Avas but another of the series of misfor- 
tunes in the retreat. Instantly the fuel was huddled together 
and the match lighted, and at the same moment Barlow's 
infantry appeared on the opposite slope, and his skirmishers 
catchinj? sis^ht of the bridofe rushed iii with a rattlinsf fire. 
The bridge guard rapidly retreated as the bullets whistled 
across the stream, and, on the other side, shots piercing the 
tent of General Gordon, drove out that ofiicer, who at that 
precise moment was in the hands of his barber, partially 
shaved. Mahone, from his position, was unable to command 
the crossing, and Barlow, who had so vigorously and promptly 
advanced, was able to secure it. The wagon-road bridge 
was secured, and eighteen guns along the banks were cap- 



504 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

turecl by the Second Corps. Humphreys continued the pur- 
.suit on two roads; Barlow reached Farmville, whence the 
enemy retreated, burning one hundred and twenty wagons; 
. Miles found Mahone very strongly intrenched five miles north 
of Farmville, and attacking, Avas completely repulsed, with 
the loss of more than six hundred men. 

But the long contest, the battle by day and flight by night, 
was nearly ended. In a spirit of magnanimity as worthy of 
praise as his victories in the field, the Union commander had 
already addressed his defeated rival, proposing the surrender 
of the Confederate army. Moved deeply by the generosity 
of these overtures, by the opinions of his subordinates, and 
above all by the condition of his troops. General Lee contin- 
ued, during the 7th and the 8th, the correspondence which has 
become so very famous : and meanwhile the race for life went 
on. 

On the morning of the 9th of April, the victors of Five 
Forks planted themselves squarely across the front of Lee's 
head of column and sealed up the retreat. The iron cavalry 
leader had during a thirty-mile march, the day before, cap- 
tured four trains of cars loaded with Lee's supplies at Appo- 
mattox depot, and forcing his way thence by hard fighting, 
had, after taking many prisoners, twenty-five guns, a hospital 
train, and a park of Avagons, draAvn his lines across the road, 
on which the enemy Avas marching to Lynchburg. At dawn, 
in a last desperate attempt, Lee ordered his advance guard, a 
few thousand men under Gordon, to cut its Avay through. The 
half-starved troops, charging Avith the old-time gallantry, 
forced back the dismounted cavalry ; but these, drawing aAvay 
to the right, as a curtain is drawn, disclosed the infantry 
lines of the Fifth Corps and of Ord, at which spectacle the 
Confederates paused. 

"With infantry pressing full upon its front and with greater 
hostile masses closing up the rear, AA'ith Sheridan's horsemen 
mounted on the flank and ready to swoop upon the trains and 



FIVE FORKS. 505 

v. 

confused forces of the Confederate army, the last day of the 
struggle had well nigh been a day of slaughter. For the en- 
vironed army, with a valor all Spartan, stood ready to dio 
after the example of Thermopyloe, not indeed in response to 
civic laws denying surrender, but obedient to the lofty impulse 
of honor,. 

But the sacrifice was not to be. While Gordon was throw- 
ing his troops to the front, behind them, at General Lee's 
head-quarters, three Confederate officers were holding a final 
consultation on the desperate strait of their fortunes. They 
were Lee, Longstreet, and Mahonc : it was but little after 
daybreak of a very raw April morning, and they gathered 
around the former officer's camp-fire by the side of the road : 
Bome staff-officers were present at a little distance from the 
consultation. Mahono had just come up from his post in the 
rear of the column to the front, at the summons of Gen- 
eral Lee. Longstreet, who had one arm in a sling, sat on 
the trunk of a foiled tree gravely smoking a cigar. Lee, 
cordial and pleasant, and clad in the new uniform he had 
donned just before leaving Petersburg, was as serene and 
cheerful as ever, his face, at least, betraying not the slightest 
discomposure at this crisis in his career. General Lee ex- 
plained toMahone the purport of the note received from 
General Grant proposing sarronder, for although the division 
commanders had surmised the object of Grant's flags in enter- 
ing their lines, they had not been certainly informed. He then 
asked for his opinion as that of a subordinate on the condition 
of the army. Mahone replied that while his owu division 
and one or two others were still able to fight, the rest of the 
army was so worn down as to be only fit for surrender. 
And, indeed, a single glance showed this army to consist only 
of about eight thousand effective fighting men, who, half in 
front and half in rear, were covering a confused ruck of ruined 
trains, fragments of batteries — the wrecks of the Army of 
Northern Virginia. To fly was as hopeless as to fight, since 



506 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

there was no route possible except to the North, and no 
friendly night to cover, for day had just dawned : the fugitive 
host was caught in a basin, with no escape from the grasp of 
its pursuers unless the surrounding hills had fallen upon them. 
Longstreet and Mahone nevertheless declared that the army 
deserved and would accept honorable terms alone. General 
Lee answered that the proposals of General Grant had been 
very generous, and showed that the latter officer had been 
prepared to give such terms as the Army of the Potomac 
could afford to offer, and the Army of Northern Virginia 
could afford to accept. But it was no longer certain that 
after two days' rejection those terms could be procured. 
There was no doubt, however, of the duty to make the effort, 
and General Lee, rising, and mounting his horse, turned to C 
say, " General Longstreet, I leave you in charge here ; I am } 
going to hold a conference with General Grant." Hardly / 
had General Lee gone to the rear, when General Custer / 
dashed at full speed down the road from the opposite quarter, / 
bearing a Avhite flag. Pie flung himself from his horse, and, | 
salutin<2: General Longstreet, asked if he were in command. ' 
General Longstreet replying in the affirmative. General Custer ] 
resi^onded, "I demand the surrender of this army to General f 
Sheridan's cavalry." The other rejoined, "I do not command 
the arni}^ for that purpose : General Lee is now at the rear 
under a flag of truce, communicating with General Grant for 
the purpose of surrender." General Custer retired, and, at 
the instance of the Confederates, the attack threatened in 
front was stopped. 

So, on the 9th of April, the work begun at Five Forks was 
finished in triumph at Appomattox Courthouse. The long 
toil was over ; and an emotion commingled of relief from 
arduous labor and of exultation at the crowning victory, 
tempered by a soldier's respect for the bravery of the van- 
quished, overflowed the hearts of the conquerors on that mem- 



riVE FOEKS. 507 

orable day. But those who stood bodily tliere were not all 1 
the conquerors. Ten thousand gallant hearts lay cold in sol- | 
diers' graves, since a twelvemonth gone the army crossed the j 
Eapidan; ten thousand heroes, scarred and maimed, were far / 
away in the cities and villages of the north ; and tens and tens 
of thousands more, poisoned by the deadly swamp-breath or/ 
worn down by the toils of campaign, had dropped by the; 
wayside, languished long on hospital pallets, or deserving v 
quick death in victory had yielded to the torture of disease. \ 
Nor only those who fell in the Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, \ 
alonsr the North Anna, at Cold Harbor, in the trenches or tho . | 
environs of Petersburg, — but the heroic dead who slept on I 
the ridges of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, whose rude j 
beds lay hid in the gloom of the woods of Chancellors ville, 
or adown the Shenandoah Valley, or along the banks of the 
Chickahominy, or dotting the plains of Manassas, or "s^iose 
baptismal blood rained on the pavement of Baltimore — these \ 
all were conquerors on the 9th of April ; and a vast host, 
silent, invisible, tasted the triumph of that day. 

When Lee had surrendered, in natural consequence and , 
without a blow ensued the capitulations of Johnston, Taylor, 
Thompson, Kirby Smith. Thenceforth, not so much as a 
lawless guerilla-shot vexed the air. Crag, fen, and everglade, 
bayou of Arkansas and Texan pampas, whatever wild spot 
might have become for desperate men an outlaw haunt 
through centuries, was given up, for so great was the influ- 
ence of the example in Virginia. Before May had passed, 
nature had covered with kindly mantle the telltale vestiges 
of War's grim track. Over the continental wrestling-floor 
where giants strove, there was peace. 

With the Slime magic swiftness in which the armies gath- 
ered, they dispersed. A million and a half of soldiers, when 
peace came, melted as silently back into the general nation as 
the snows of New England glide away under the vernal sun, 
and naught but a worn garment of blue or gray, here and 



508 THE TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WAR. 

there, or a marked soldierly port, betrayed the heroes of hard- 
fought fields. There was, indeed, no longer need of citizen 
soldiery ; for, when the storm had passed over the Union, 
though some of its limbs were reft of their glory, yet the 
roots were fixed. 

One who now revisits the fields whereon he saw great armies 
contending, or haply was himself in the van, marvels at the 
changed scene. The dread battle-sounds have died away ; 
the black-mouthed cannon are dumb ; in the furrows once 
ploughed by caisson- wheels, the dais}'' or tender violet 
springs ; no longer the hills echo the roar of artillery, and the 
plains resound with the clatter of hoof-beats and the clink of 
sabres : a four-years' story seems like a fearful dream that is 
gone. But as the fancy kindles, lo, the ghastly scars of the 
eartlf reopen, and again the field is peopled with embattled 
armies, — the dun pall draws back over the landscape, and 
out of its depths rise the cheer of the victors and the cries of 
the wounded — the tattered ensigns, blazoned with glorious 
legends, epitomes of history, toss once more in the battle- 
smoke, — the clangor of arms goes up. So in story and 
imagination, the heroes contend again ; as wayfarers at night, 
through many centuries, heard the neighing of the Persian 
war-horses and the shouts and blows of the warriors, on the 
plain of Marathon. 



INDEX. 



Lull Run, 13; the prelude, 13; confer- 
ence between Beauregard and John- 
ston, 13; meeting of the armies, 14; 
motives of the combatants, 14 ; con- 
trast with European -wars, 1 6 ; the 
national uprising. 17; character of 
the war, 18; niiiitary condition of 
the country, 1 8 ; over-confidence on 
both sides, 18; the danger to the 
capital, 21; the influence of the 
Potomac on shaping tlie war, 21; 
ordinance of secession passed by 
Virginia, 21 ; the first passage 
of troops through Baltimore, 2 1 ; 
the danger to Washington at the 
beginning of the war, 21; the flag 
of Sumter hauled down, 21; the 
President's call for military, 21; 
Virginia the selected battle-ground 
of the South, 22; the Confederate 
Government removed to Richmond, 
23 ; the cry of " Onward to Rich- 
mond," 24; popular clamor for a 
battle, 24 ; positions of the two 
main armies and their co-opera- 
ting forces, 25 ; Patterson's posi- 
tion at Harper's Ferry, 15 ; Butler's 
position at Fort Monroe, 25 ; com- 
position of McDowell's army, 26; 
he moves into Virginia, 26; Ty- 
ler's repulse at Blackburn's Ford, 
27; Johnston's movement to join 
Beauregard, 28 ; McDowell's plan 
of battle, 30; Confederates' intend- 
ed attack prevented by McDowell's 
turning their left flank, 30; Tyler's 
attack at Stone Bridge, .31 ; Con- 
federate left flank to be turned at 
Sudley's Ford, 31; Hunter's move 
in reverse of Sudley's Ford, 32; 
Hunter attacked by Evans, 33 ; 
Hunter and Keyes cross Stone 
Bridge, 35 ; Hunter's success — 
critical condition of the Confeder- 
ates, 35 ; arrival of Johnston and 
Beauregard with re-enforcements, 
35 ; position of the armies after 
40 



Hunter's success, 36 ; the fight for 
the plateau, 37 ; arrival of Confed- 
erate re-enforcements from the 
Shenandoah Valley, 39; the Union 
flanlc and rear struck by Smith's 
brigades, 40 ; the panic and tlie 
retreat, 40; results of the battle, 
42 ; oflRcial intentional misstate- 
ments, and absurd lay criticisms, 
43; excellence of the Union plan 
of campaign, 44 ; McDowell not to 
blame, 44 ; Johnston's praiseworthy 
junction with Beauregard, 44 ; in- 
experience of both armies, 45 ; 
disorganization of both armies, 46 ; 
Confederates justified in not pursu- 
ing, 47 ; Johnston, J. E., on im- 
possibility of pursuit at Bull Run, 
47 ; the victory was the winning of 
a campaign, 48 ; the losses and 
spoils at Bull Run, 48 ; the North 
learned what was before it, 49 ; 
Confederate force at the spring of 
1862, 55; moral influences of the 
battle, 49; the people prepare for 
war in earnest, 50; both North and 
South organize during the winter, 
51 ; Dr. Arnold on the Lessons of 
Military History, 51 ; the formation 
of the Potomac Army, 51; influ- 
ence of Bull Run upon- the South, 
52: the new Union army — its 
strength, 52; insignificant origin 
of the cavalry, 52 ; the battle uni- 
fied the South, 53; the tendency 
of foreigners toward recognition 
and aid, 54 ; Southern pride, infla- 
ted by IJull Rim, prepared the way 
for Southern defeat. 54. 

DoNELSON — the prelude, 66 ; the physical 
geography of the West, 56 ; the 
secession of the States of the 
lower central zone, 56 ; Kentucky 
became loyal, and was invested by 
the Confederates, 57 ; who seize 
and fortify Columbus and Bowling 



510 



INDEX. 



Green, 57; the Confederate defen- 
sive line from the Mississippi to 
the Cumberland Mountains, 67 ; 
Albert S. Johnston in command, 
57 ; Johnston's line extended from 
Columbus, his left through Forts 
Henry and Donelson, to Bowling 
Green and Cumberland Gap, his 
right, 58 ; the Union rendezvous 
at Cairo, 58 ; the naval force of 
A. 11. Foote, 58 ; the land force 
under U. S. Grant, 58 ; the Army 
of the Ohio, first under Ander- 
son, tlien Sherman, now Buell, 59 ; 
Buell prepares for an advance upon 
Nashville and East Tennessee, 59 ; 
the relative situation of the oppos- 
ing forces, 59; Grant threatening 
Columbus, and Buell Bowling Green 
and East Tennessee, 59 ; Johnston, 
by his railway between the two 
points, could concentrate at either, 
60; the Cairo position and its diffi- 
culties, 60 ; the credit of the initia- 
tive plan in the "West due both to 
Buell and Grant, 61 ; the Cumber- 
land and Tennessee Rivers — neces- 
sity for removing obstructions in 
them. 61 ; Forts Henry and Donel- 
Bon held the gateways of these 
water lines, 61 ; they must be 
taken, 62 ; Fort Henry the first 
point of attack — its location, 62 ; 
the attack by the fleet, 63 ; and 
surrender by Tilghman, 64 ; the 
Confederate resources at this time 
in the West, 64 ; Johnston's 
strength and dispositions, 65 ; 
Beauregard placed in charge of the 
Mississippi Valley under Johnston, 
65 ; proposal to concentrate Con- 
federate strength at Bowling Green, 
66 ; the fall of Fort Henry prevents 
this plan, 66 ; Johnston resolves to 
defend Nashville at Donelson, 66 ; 
Donelson was the key to the Cum- 
berland, 66 ; Johnston sends Buck- 
ner, Pillow, and Floyd there; the 
force now 16,000 men, 66; retains 
14,000 to oppose Buell and cover 
Nashville, 66 ; the topography and 
fortifications of Donelson, 67; its 
pregnability at the rear, from com- 
manding hills, 68; Confederates 
construct an infantry line of defense 
thereon, 68 ; Grant approaches — his 
force, 68 ; he mvests the defenses, 
and makes an assault, 69; arrival 



of Admiral Foote's fleet, with 10,000 
re-enforcements, 69; a combined 
land and water attack made, 70; 
the iron-clads forced to retire, 7 1 ; 
Grant resolves to perfect the in- 
vestment, and wait for increased 
naval force, 7 1 ; Floyd's council of 
officers at night, 71 ; they resolve 
to force their way out toward Nash- 
ville, 7 2 ; Wynn's Ferry road the 
only practicable route, 72; the plan 
of Confederate attack, 72; Pillow's 
attack, 73 ; the Union extreme 
right taken in reverse, and forced 
back, 73; the Wynn's Ferry road 
now open, 74; critical position of 
the whole Union army, 74; Grant 
absent at consultation with Foote, 
74 ; Floyd and Pillow, not satisfied, 
attempt more and fail, 76 ; the 
army ralhes, and repulses Confede- 
rate renewed attack, 76; Grant's 
arrival, 76, he orders a pet:eral 
advance, 77 ; the Confederate's right, 
driven from the commanding hills, 
retires into the works, and Pillow 
also driven in, 78 ; the investment 
thus restored, 78; losses of the 
day, 78; Grant prepares for a gen- 
eral assault next day, 79; the con- 
ference of Floyd, Pillow and Buck- 
ner on a surrender, 79 ; the two 
first surrender their commands to 
Buckner, 79 ; Floyd escapes with 
1,500 men, 80 ; Pillow and his staff 
escape across the river, 80 ; Buck- 
ner inquires terms of surrender : 
Grant proposes to move imme- 
diately on his works, 80 ; results of 
Donelson, 80 ; Johnston evacuates 
Bowling Green and moves to 
Nashville, 81 ; then abandons Nash- 
ville and retires to Murfreesboro', 81; 
BueU pushed to Bowling Green 
and Nashville, 81 ; Columbus now 
untenable by Polk, 81 ; who moves 
to Island No. 10, 81; the efi'ect of 
these events upon the South, 83 ; 
Johnston's strategic errors in this 
campaign, 84 ; he now resolves on 
concentration, 85. 

SniLOH — the prelude, 86; Pittsburg 
Landing described, 86 ; the Army 
of West Tennessee, 87 ; it was 
unsuspecting danger, 87 ; Confed- 
erate army perdu in Shiloh Woods, 
88 ; the Confederate council of 



IISTDEX. 



611 



war, 89; difiBculties of the Con- 
federate march, 91; wretched 
organization of the Confederate 
army, 92; Mississippi Valley, the 
second line of Confederate de- 
fense, 93 ; Mississippi the line of — 
its importance and facilities, 94 ; 
two lines of Union advance de- 
veloped by the fall of Donelson, 
94 ; the line through Nashville 
to Chattanooga and the ocean, 
94; Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
road — Johnston's second line of 
defense, 95 ; the Union design to 
separate Johnston and Beauregard, 

95 ; its frustration by their junction 
at Shiloh, 95 ; Halleck's original 
plan of advance \ip the Mississippi, 

96 ; subsequent plan, 97 ; Grant's 
command turned over to C. F. 
Smith, 97 ; restored on death of 
Smith, 98; Buell's march from St. 
Louis to Savannah, 98 ; Confeder- 
ate plan to attack Pittsburg Land- 
ing before arrival of Buell, 100 ; 
Beauregard leaves forts with small 
garrison, concentrating his main 
force in the field, 100 ; deficien- 
cies of the Confederate organiza- 
tion, 101 ; Confederate Army of the 
Mississippi, its formation at Corinth, 
101; The Confederate march to 
Pittsburg Landing, 102; the roads 
and the weather, 102; the close 
approach of Buell, 102 ; topography 
of the Union position, 103; the 
sixth of April, 103 ; the lines of 
Grant's army, 104; something 
wrong in the Union front, 105 ; 
Johnston's advance stealthily ad- 
vances, 105; Confederate fire drawn 
by reconnoitering party, 105; 
Hardee's whole force advances, 
105 ; the Union army springs to 
arms, 106; the confused conflict 
lasts for three hours, 107 ; Bragg 
re-enforces Hardee, 107; the whole 
Confederate force up, 108 ; Prentiss 
driven from all his camps, 108; the 
first Confederate onset successful, 
110; the Union line as now. 111; 
the defense of Sherman's left ; it is 
turned, 110 ; the rally of Prentiss's 
troops, 112; the Union troops 
slowly forced back to the Landing, 
113 ; the efforts to pierce the Union 
center and left, 114; the confusion 
in both Union and Confederate 



lines, 114; death of A. S. Johns- 
ton; estimate of his character, 
116; tlie Union array a vsreck, 
117 ; the rush for the river, 117 ; 
"Wallace killed, 117; the Union 
gunboats re-enforce the army, 
119 ; Confederate efforts to capture 
the Landing, 119; the siege guns 
on the bluff turned against the 
Confederates, 119 ; the desperate 
final charges of the Confederates, 
120; the disorganization by plun- 
dering, 120; their position at this 
time, 120; Buell's advance arrives, 
120 ; Beauregard decides to with- 
draw for the night, 122; Buell's 
energetic advance, 123 ; condition 
of the two armies, 123; April 7, 
Buell and Grant's advance upon the 
Confederates, 125; the losses and 
remaining forces, 124-5 ; the attack 
on Beauregard, 126; Beauregard 
abandons his right, 128; the final 
Union advance, 130; the Confeder- 
ate retreat; the battle over, 130; 
indecisive character of many bat- 
tles, 131; the result of Shiloh, 131 • 
its indecisive character, 132; tho 
losses, 132; the great Confederate 
possibilities lost, 133; Beauregard's 
original plans, and how frustrated, 
133 ; the defense of the Memphis 
road, 134; Grant's error in retain- 
ing the troopson the loft bank, 135 ; 
the second line of Confederate de- 
fense was lost by the battles of 
Shiloh, 136; Buell's zeal even out- 
stripped his orders, 136 ; the evacu- 
ation of Corinth, 137; the surrender 
of Forts Randolph and Pillow, 137 j 
Central and Eastern Tennessee now 
opened to the Union armies, 138. 

Antietam — the prelude, 139; origin of 
the campaign, 139 ; Lee's resolve 
to move into Maryland, 139 ; the 
Peninsular campaign and its conse- 
quences, 140 ; the supposed danger 
to "Washington, 140; McClellan's 
unfortunate pause before Yorktown, 
141 ; Johnston's Shenandoah "V^al- 
ley campaign, 142 ; Fremont and 
Banks attacked in succession by 
Jackson, 142 ; the fatuitous division 
of the Union forces in Virginia, 
142 ; the Mountain, the Shenandoah, 
and the Rappahannock Depart- 
ments, 142; Fair Oaks, the battle 



512 



INDEX. 



of, 143 ; ifcDowell hurries to the 
Valley to "bag" Jackson, who 
slips away, 143 ; the Potomac Army 
on both banks of the Rappahan- 
nock, 143 ; Johnston attacks the 
two corps on the right bank, and 
fails, 1 43 : Johnston wounded and 
.succeeded by Lee, 143-4; history 
of Robert E. Lee, 144 ; his plan for 
the defense of Richmond, 144; Mal- 
vern Hill, the battle of, 145; 
Gaines's Mill, the battle of, 145 ; 
Jackson withdrawn to Lee's main 
army, 145 ; Porter compelled to re- 
tire to the Chickahominy riglit 
bank ; the battle of Gaines's Mill, 
145 ; McClellan's position now, 
145; tlic change of base to the 
James, 1 45 ; the battle of Malvern 
Hill, 146 ; the armies of Fremont, 
Banlcs, and McDowell formed into 
the Army of Virginia, under Pope, 
14G ; Jackson sent against him, 
146; Lee's position between t' e 
two armies, 14G ; Lee retires toward 
Eichmond, 146; McClellan ordered 
by Hallcck to Alexandria to cover 
Washington, 146; Lee resolves to 
attack Pope, 147 ; the death of 
Stevens at Chan tilly, 148; the death 
of Kearney, at Chantilly, 148; the 
second battle of Bull Run and 
Pope's defeat, 148; the battle of 
Chantilly, 148 ; Pope's forces reel 
back to the fortifications of Wash- 
ington, 148; Lee's confidence in 
liis own powers, 148 ; his motives 
for Maryland invasion, as stated 
by himself, 149 ; the great dan- 
ger to Washington, 14U ; McClel- 
lan restored to command, 150; 
Lee concentrates at Frederick, 
Md., 151; fails to excite enthusi- 
asm, 151; and moves westward 
beyond the mountains, 151; the 
Confederate intended attack on 
Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, 
152; McClellan finds a copy of the 
plan of attack, 152 ; and advances, 
152 ; Longstreet and Hill wait west 
of the South Mountains for the 
reduction of Harper's Ferry, 153 ; 
McClellan suddenly discovered ap- 
proaching, 153; Lee covers the 
siege of Harper's Ferry by holding 
Turner's and Crampton's Gaps, 
154; Harper's Ferry hopelesslj' 
environed, 154; McClellan's duty 



to relieve the garrison, 155 ; Mc- 
Clellan forces his way into Pleasant 
Valley, 155; Longstreet and Hill 
retire to Sharpsburg, 155; Harper's 
Ferry surrendered, with McClellan 
within six miles, 155; Jackson's 
account of the surrender, 156 ; tho 
Valley of the Antietam, 157 ; Leo 
posts himself on the west bnnk of 
the Antietam, 158 ; McClellan ar- 
rives on the east bank of tho stream 
with two divisions, 160; the whole 
army except Franklin's corps ar- 
rives, 161 ; position of Lee's forces, 
161; topography of the field, 161: Lee 
stood on the defensive, compelling 
McClellan to cross the stream, 162; 
the bridges across the Antietam, 
162; McClellan's plan of attack, 
163; Hooker and Mansfield crossed 
toward Lee's extreme left, 16:! ; the 
17th of September, 163; Hooker 
attacks, 164 ; Ewell is thrown hack, 
164; Jackson's reserves re-enforce 
Ewell, 165; Mansfield comes up 
and is met by Hill, 165 ; both sides 
retire much shattered, 165 ; the 
losses on this part of the field as 
stated by Jackson, 165; Sumner 
attacks the Confederate sliattered 
left with Sedgwick's division, 168; 
Hood beaten and commenced re- 
tiring, 169; Sedgwick assailed by 
McLaws, 1 69 ; McLaws' account of 
his attack on Sumner, 169; Burn- 
side's orders to carry tiie lower 
stone bridge, l7l ; how he was 
held in check, 171 ; consequence of 
Burnside's delay, 172; arrival of 
A. P. HQl, 172; he sweeps Burn- 
side back, 172; the battle over, 
173 ; Lee retreats on the night of 
the 18th, 173; result of Antietam, 
173; losses in the battle, 174: tho 
real value of the battle to the North 
and what had preceded it, 174; it 
was a signal defeat, and a crowning 
victory, 176; consequences of a 
Union defeat, 175; the issue of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, 176; 
Lincoln, President, his account of 
the issue of tho Emancipation Proc- 
lamation, 176. 

MuRFREESBORO— tho prelude, 178; Buell, 
with the Army of the Ohio, to move 
against Chattanooga, 179; Grant 
to operate in the Mississippi Valley, 



INDEX. 



)13 



1*19; the relation of the b<attle to 
Shiloli and Chattanooga, 179; the 
adoption of the Chattanooga hne 
by both combatants after the occu- 
pation of Corinth, 179; Memphis 
and Charleston Railroad now in 
Union possession, 179; Bragg 
concentrates upon Chattanooga, 
180 ; Price and Van Dorn left to 
oppose Grant, 180; particulars of 
Buell's march, 180; the Memphis 
and Charleston road as a line of 
advance on Chattanooga, chimeri- 
cal, 181; Buell's total force, 181; 
Florence, Decatur and Cumberland 
Gap occupied, 181 ; the problem of 
Buell's advance, 181 ; Bragg arrives 
at Chattanooga, 182 ; his force and 
dispositions, 182; Kirby Smith at 
Knoxville, with 13,000 men, 182; 
raids of Forrest and Morgan on 
Buell's line of advance, 182 ; Kirby 
Smith advances into Central Ken- 
tucky, routs Gen. Nelson at Rich- 
mond and pushes toward the Ohio, 
183 ; Bragg crosses the Tennessee, 
into the Sequatchy Valley and 
turned Buell's left, 184; Bragg's 
advantages in holding the Cumber- 
land range, 1 84 ; the inadequacy 
of Buell's force to hold his commu- 
nications, 184; Halleck's whole 
scheme of the Chattanooga cam- 
paign chimerical, 185 ; Buell com- 
pelled to retreat and concentrate at 
Murfreeaboro, 185; then at Nash- 
ville — then to cover Louisville, 185 ; 
the position of the two armies, 186; 
Bragg reaches Munfordsville and 
finally captures it, 186 ; Bragg now 
directly on Buell's line of retreat, 
186; Bragg diverges east from 
Louisville, his objective, and moves 
to Frankfort, 186 ; Buell then occu- 
pies Louisville, 187; result of Bragg's 
operations thus far, 187; reasons 
for his changed movement, 187; 
the Union force at Louisville, 187 ; 
Bragg's error as to the political 
reconstruction of Tennessee and 
Kentucky, 188; Buell's retreat 
marked by great skill, 189 ; his 
task now, 190; his army re- 
organized and ready to move, 
190; relieved of command and 
George H. Thomas appointed, 190 ; 
Thomas refuses to supersede him, 
190 ; Buell advances toward Frank- 



fort and Bardstown, 190; Bragg's 
retreat to Perryville, 191 ; the battla 
of Perryville or Champion Hills, 191; 
Bragg withdraws south beyond 
Loudon, 192 ; Buell superseded by 
Gen. Rosecrans, 192; Rosecrans 
committed to an offensive, 192 ; 
Buell was said to have let Bragg 
escape, 192 ; Rosecrans concen- 
trated at Nashville, 194; Bragg's 
intrenched position at Murfrees- 
boro, 194 ; Rosecrans advances 
toward him, 194; arrives in his 
front, 195; positions of the two 
armies, 195 ; Rosecrans's plan of 
battle and its merits, 196; Bragg's 
plan of battle and its merits, 198; 
Rosecrans commences crossing hiA 
left over Stone River, 199; Bragg'a 
left attacks the Union right and 
carries its position, 199; the 
Union disaster unknown to Rose- 
crans, 201; on discovering it, he 
withdraws his left and strengthens 
Ills right, 201; Sheridan's left divi- 
sion of McCook repulses the fur- 
ther attack, 202; Sheridan's maneu- 
ver for a new front, 203 ; his re- 
sistance in the new position gains 
an hour, 204; his terrible fighting 
against an overwhelming force, and 
final withdrawal to west of the 
Nashville road, 205 ; he reports to 
Rosecrans, 205 ; Rosecrans's new 
dispositions, 206; Palmer's division 
the only one on the original front, 
207 ; all of the division swept away 
except Hazen's Brigade, 207 ; Ha- 
zen's great service ; slackening of 
his defense would have lost the 
battle, 208; Bragg now makes a 
new assault, 209 ; Rosecrans meets 
it with massed artillery and infantry 
fire, 209 ; Bragg, foiled in his 
attack on the front, essays the 
Union left flank, 210; Bragg's at- 
tack fails and the battle is over, 
211 ; the battle was a drawn one, 
211 ; Rosecrans's " Gentlemen, wo 
fight, or die right here," 211; the 
next day Rosecrans again throws a 
force to the east of the river, 212 ; 
Breckinridge attacks it ; finally driv- 
en by artillery fire across the river, 
212; Bragg withdraws to Shelby villo 
and Tullahoma, 213 ; results of Mur- 
freesboro, 213; the losses, 213; the 
battle similar to the battle of Prague, 



^14 



INDEX. 



214; President Lincoln's telegram 
of thanks to Gen. Rosecrans and 
the army, 215; the advance from 
Mnrfreesboro, 21G; Rosecrans's 
operations f(jrcing Bragg to Chatta- 
nooga, 217 ; his crossing of the Ten- 
nessee, 218; description of the 
country between Chattanooga and 
the Tennessee, 218; Rosecrans out- 
flanks Bragg's position on Lookout 
Mountain, 219 ; Chattanooga evac- 
uated by Bragg, his communications 
being in danger, 219 ; Chattanooga 
occupied by Crittenden, 219; courses 
now open to Rosecrans, 219; one 
to occupy Chattanooga and end the 
campaign, 219; the other to attack 
Bragg, supposed to be at Rome — 
this plan adopted, 220 ; Bragg op- 
posite to Rosecrans's isolated 
centre, 221 ; but could not use the 
opportunity of attack, 222 ; and 
Rosecrans concentrates, 222; Bragg, 
however, only a few miles beyond 
Chattanooga, 221 ; the Union army 
compromised by forward movement 
— how placed, 221 ; Rosecrans now 
on west of Chickamauga Creek, 
covering Chattanooga, 222 ; Bragg 
receives considerable re-enforce- 
ments, 222; and precipitates the 
battle of Chickamauga, 222 ; Rose- 
crans defeated at Chickamauga and 
falls back to Chattanooga, 222 ; 
Rosecrans's history, achievements, 
and strategy. 223. 

The Monitor and the Merrimac — pre- 
lude to Hampton Roads, 226 ; moni- 
tors and men of war — description of 
the former, 226 ; annals of naval 
warfare, 228 ; the first war screw 
propeller, the Princdon, 230 ; 
strength of the Union navy, 231; 
the requirements of the blockade, 
231, 232; the weakness of the 
Confederate navy, 232 ; Confederate 
Navy Department's letter on armored 
ships, 233 ; origin of the Virginia, 
or iferrimac, 234; Secretary Welles's 
advice to Congress on armored 
ships, 233 ; the frigate Merrimac, 
abandoned at Norfolk, selected for 
the first armored sMp, 234: de- 
scription of the work on her, 235 ; 
her armament, 236 ; completed, 
March 5, 1862, 236 ; U. S. Congress 
appoints a Board to procure iron- 



clads, 236 : the proposals made to 
the Board, 237 ; Ericcson's proposal 
to construct the Monitor, 237; 
his plan, 237 ; what Ericcson had 
before accomplished for the United 
States and foreign Powers, 238 ; 
the principle of the Monitor, 239; 
the Union lookout at Hampton 
Roads sees a fleet descending the 
Elizabeth River, 241 ; position of 
the blockading fleet, 241 ; the time 
and places of hor construction, 241 
the battle of Hampton Roads, 241 
" The Merrimac ! the Merrimac I 
242 ; she passes the Congress frig- 
ate, and bears down upon the Cum- 
berland, 242 ; the Union broadsides 
glance off "like peas," 242; she 
strikes the Cumberland and sinks 
her, 243 ; the Congress runs aground 
for safety, but surrenders and burns, 
243 ; the Minnesota, Roanoke, and 
St. Laiurence 'all grounded, 244 ; 
the Confederate vessels attack the 
grounded ships, 245 ; the close 
of a day of consternation, 245 ; 
the Confederate fleet steam back, 
245 ; tlie little Monit-jr arrives that 
night, 245 ; her officers demand to 
be laid alongside the Merrimac, 
246; the next day, the Merrimac 
again appears, 247 ; the Monitor 
lays herself alongside — David to 
Goliah, 248 ; the Yankee cheese- 
box is made of iron, 249 ; the fight 
rages from eight till noon, 249 ; the 
ineffective firing on the armor of 
both, 250; the J/ern/Hac attempts 
to ram the Monitor without effect, 
251; Lieut. Worden wounded, 251 ; 
the Merrimac abandons the contest 
and returns to Norfolk, 252; the 
congratulations upon the Monitor^s 
exploit, 252; results of the battle, 
national and international, 253 ; 
speculation on scientific warlike 
appliances, 261. 

VicKSBURG — ^the prelude, 262 ; the aspi- 
ration to open the Mississippi, 262; 
what constituted the defensive 
tactics of the river, 263; Columbus 
the first Confederate position, 263; 
Beauregard's theory of defending 
the Mississippi, 264; liis system cf 
works at Fort Pillow, 264; t*ie 
temporary use of Island No. 10, 
264 ; the fall of Corinth caused that 



IITDEX, 



515 



of Fort Pillo^', 2G4; the capture 
of Memphis, 264; the capture of 
New Orleans, 265 ; tlie fleet arrived 
before Vicksburg, 265 ; the con- 
dition of the Confederate fortifica- 
tions there, 266; Yieksburg bom- 
barded, 267; the attack of the Con- 
federate ram Arkansas, 267 ; Farra- 
gut withdraws from before Vicks- 
burg, 267 ; Williams returns to 
Baton Eouge, 267 ; the first siege 
ended, after lasting 70 days, 267 ; 
results of the bombardment, 267 ; 
Yieksburg, Grant's objective, the 
sole barrier on the Mississippi, 269 ; 
Grant's position; the line of the 
Memphis and Charleston raUroad 
between Memphis and Corinth, 
269 ; Pemberton'sopiDOsing position, 
269 ; the territory between the 
opposing armies, 269 ; Grant's plan 
of operations, 270; his advance on 
Pemberton's communications, 271 ; 
Pemberton falls back to Grenada, 
271 ; Grant repairs the railroad to 
his depot at Holly Springs, 271; 
plan to hurl a force on Yieks- 
burg from above the Yazoo, 272 ; 
Sherman with Grant's right wing 
detached on this enterprise, 272 ; 
Sherman arrives off the Yazoo, 
ascends it and disembarks 7 miles 
north of Yieksburg, 272 ; situation 
of both armies, 272 ; the Confed- 
erate strength, 273, Yan Dorn's 
capture of Holly Springs, 273; 
the earthworks at Vicksburg, 274 ; 
the topography of the position, 
274; the works at Snyder's Mills 
or Kaynes's Blufl', 274; Sherman's 
advance on Haynes's Bluff, 275 ; 
the Yazoo Valley and its defenses, 
275 ; the attempt to cross Chicka- 
saw Bayou, 276 ; the repulse of 
the left storming column under 
Blair, 276; Morgan Smith's attack 
also fails, 277; the losses in these 
failures, 278; Sherman re-embarks 
his troops, 278 ; McClernand as- 
sumes command, 278 ; the force 
formed into two corps — the 13th, 
Gen. Morgan, the 15th, Gen. Sher- 
man, 278; Grant now joins his own 
and McClernand's forces at MiUi- 
ken's Bend, 279; the capture of 
Fort Hindman by McClernand and 
Porter, 279 ; Grant's ive attempts 
—the Vicksburg cut-ofir, 280; 



the attempted route through the 
bayous, 281 ; the Lake Providence 
attempt, 281; the Coldwater River 
expedition, 282; the Steele's Bayou 
expedition, 283 ; the siege and fall 
of Vicksburg, 284; the difficulties 
and plan of the advance, 284; the 
movement of the troops commenced, 
285 : Porter runs the Vicksburg 
batteries, 285 ; the capture of Grand 
Gulf by Porter and McClernand, 
236 • Sherman's feint attack on 
Haynes's Bluff, 287 ; the ruse suc- 
ceeds, the rest of the army having 
crossed in the rear of Vicksburg, 
287 ; the capture of Port Gibson, 
288; the Confederate plans and 
preparations to defend Vicksburg, 
289 ; Pemberton's apprehensions, 
290; what was now his duty, 290; 
Vicksburg was now useless to the 
Confederacy, 291; but Pemberton 
resolved to hold it, 291 ; the topo- 
graphy in the rear of Vicksburg, 
291; McPher son's march to Jack- 
son, 293 ; which had been re- 
enforced, 293 ; Grant also advances 
on Jackson, 293 ; Johnston orders 
Pemberton to move on Clinton, 
which he fails to do, 293 ; John- 
ston retreats from Jackson, 294; 
the arsenal, railroads, &c., of which 
are destroyed by Sherman, 294 ; 
and Grant faces westward for 
Edwards' Station, Vicksburg-ward, 
294; Pemberton at Edwards' 
Station, 294 ; his council of war, 
294 ; Pemberton's movement toward 
Raymond to capture Grant's obso- 
lete line of communications, 295 ; 
he moves five miles, 295 ; but meets 
Grant on the road, 296; and coun- 
termarches for a union with John- 
ston — too late, 296 ; is forced to 
fight at Champion Hills, 296 ; hia 
position there, 297 ; the battle of 
Champion Hills, 297 ; Pemberton 
defeated and retreated, 298; Grant 
captures Edwards's Station, 299 ; 
the Union army crosses the Big 
Black, 299; the flying Confederate 
army reaches Vicksburg, 299 ; 
Johnston's orders to evacuate 
Vicksburg, 300 ; Pemberton hesi- 
tates, and decides to hold the place, 
301 ; the Union army immediately 
invests itand the siege begins, 301; 
the positions of the Union army 



i>16 



INDEX, 



and the Vicksburg fortiSca'dona, 
301; Johnston hovering on Grant's 
rear, 302 ; Grant assaults Vicks- 
burg and approaclies closer, 303 ; 
a general assault tliree days after- 
ward, 303 ; which fails, 304 ; the 
losses, 304; a regular siege now 
resolved upon, 304 j Johnston 
orders Pembertou to hold out till 
relieved, 304 ; he marches to 
Brownsville and sends news to 
Pemberton of an intended diver- 
sion, 305 ; but; meanwhile Pember- 
ton is forced by privation to sur- 
render, 305; his interview with 
Grant, 305 ; the number of paroled 
Confederates, material, &c., 307 ; 
results of Vicksburg, 307 ; the 
consequent fall of Port Hudson, 
307; the Mississippi completely 
opened, and the defense of the 
Valley extinguished, 303 ; Sher- 
man on the possession of the Mis- 
sissippi, 309'; Johnston driven from 
Jackson by Sherman, 310; various 
other minor expeditions and the 
army rests, 31 1 ; the only moun- 
tain line of Tennessee the only 
remaining field for conquest by the 
armies of the West, 310. 

Gettysburg — the prelude, 311; Gettys- 
burg was the most forward leap of 
the Confederacy, 311; the cam- 
paign of Gettysburg was Lee's 
only campaign of invasion, 312 ; 
the purpose of the Pennsylvania 
campaign, 312; one was to influ- 
ence European Powers, 3 12 ; recog- 
nition would have followed its suc- 
cess, 313; the Confederate army 
was in a condition for the enter- 
prise, 313; the Potomac army was 
weakened by defeat, and musters 
out of service, 314- the position 
and force of the Confederate army, 
314; Leo's intended strategy, 314; 
lie intended to turn Hooker's right 
and throw him back on Washing- 
ton, 315', the Shenandoah Valley 
would then be open, 315; Long- 
street and Ewell sent to Culpepper 
Court House, 315' Hill left at 
Predericksburg to mask the move- 
mfint, 315;. Hooker's cavalry sent 
to Culpepper to observe, 316; the 
battle of Brandy Station, 316; the 
Confederate- main body discovered 



at Culpepper, 316; Hooker ad- 
vances his right to the Upper Rap- 
pahannock, 31G ; Ewell bursts into 
the Shenandoah Valley, 31(>; MU- 
roy's force captured at Winchester, 
and the Valley open, 316; Hooker 
now retrogrades toward Washing- 
ton, 316; Hill Joins the Confederate 
advance, 316; Ewell crosses the 
Potomac, 317 ; and into Pennsylva- 
nia, 317 ; Hooker crosses to Fred- 
erick, 318; Lee intended to pre- 
serve his communications with Vir- 
ginia through the Cumberland Val- 
ley, 318 ,- he thought it not men- 
aced, 318; ho was ignorant of 
Hooker's move on Frederick, 319; 
effect of the movement, 319; Leo 
saspends his forward movement, 
319; resolves to threaten Balti- 
more, 319; how Lee failed to dis- 
cover Hooker's advance to Fred- 
erick, 320; Lee's report on his 
intention to cross the Susquehanna, 
32.1! ; the removal of Hooker and 
appointment of Meade, 322 ; the 
reasons for the change, 322 - char- 
acter and appearance of Gen. 
Meade, 323 ; Meade moves from 
Frederick toward the Susquehanna, 
323 ; how the two armiesconverged 
unexpectedly to each, 323 ; Lee 
moves toward Gettysburg to con- 
centrate, 3.24; Meade satisfied that 
Lee intended tO' meet him, 324', he 
forms his general line on Pipe 
Creek, 324; the van of Lee's main, 
column arrives at Cashtown, 325 , 
Pbttigrew's brigade, sent to Gettys- 
burg for supplies, discovers Buford's 
Union cavalry, 325; Hill resolves 
to dislodge the cavalry, 325 ; a col- 
lision becomes inevitable, 325 ; the 
battle of Gettysburg, 326 ; descrip- 
tion of Gettysburg, 327 ; the Con- 
federate position at Seminary Ridge, 
327;, Hill moves out to dispose of 
Buford, 327; Buford had moved 
out to Willoughby Run, 327 ; Bu- 
ford holds the Confederate van in 
check, 328 ; Reynolds arrives to his 
support, 328; moves to Seminary 
Ridge, and is at once engaged, 329 ; 
the death of Reynolds, 329; the 
arrival of Early, 330; the First and 
Eleventh Corps broken, and entan- 
gled in the town of Gettysburg, 
3^31 ;. they finally raEyon Cemetery 



INDEX. 



5ir 



Hill, 331 ; but the day ivas lost to 
the Union side, 331; Meade, thir- 
teen miles distant, hears of the 
battle, 331; sends Hancock to the 
scene, 331; Hancock restores order, 
332 , takes possession of Gulp's 
Hill, 332 ; the Confederates' pause 
fatal to their hopes, 332; why Lee 
stayed the advance, 332; next day 
Meade determined to figlit at Get- 
tysburg. 333 ; botli armies were 
concentrated by next morning, 333 ; 
Lee could not withdraw without 
discredit, 834, the principal attack 
to be made on the Union left, 334 ; 
positions of the two armies, 334; 
Sickles on the left wing advanced 
too far, leaving a gap between his 
right and Hancock's left, 335 ; and 
was attacked the first, 336; his 
motives were laudable, 336 •, the po- 
sition at Little Round Top, 337 ; tlie 
opportune arrival of Vincent there, 
337 ; the fighting in Sickles's left 
front, 338 ; Peach Orchard lost, 338 ; 
Humphreys and Hancock repulse 
further attempts, 339; nothing be- 
tween the Confederates and tlie 
main crest, 340 ; Ewell now formed 
for attack on Cemetery and Gulp's 
Hills, 340 ; does attack and hold 
part of the latter, but is repulsed 
from the former, 340 ; results of the 
action of July 2, 341 ; Lee's plan 
for July 3 unchanged, 341 ; pro- 
posed attack in force on Cemetery 
Ridge, 342 ; Confederates driven 
from Gulp's* Hill, 342 ; the artillery 
duel between the opposing lines — 
the greatest on this continent, 343 ; 
the Confederates from Seminary 
Ridge toward Cemetery Ridge, 343 ; 
they are met by tremendous fire, 
344; Hancock's account of the 
fight, 345 ; the Confederate right, 
repulsed, reenforced the center, 345 ; 
the heaviest attack now opposite 
"Webb's Brigade, 345 ; the formation 
of the brigade, 345 ; it partially 
wavers, but is reformed, 346; the 
Confederates make desperate efforts, 
but are repulsed, 346 ; great dis- 
order in the Confederate lines, 347 ; 
Lee's efforts to rally the troops, 
347 ; expediency of a Union ad- 
vance, 348 ; Lee threw up breast- 
works, waiting attack, 349 ; Meade 
demonstrates feebly, 349 ; at night 



Lee withdraws to Hagerstown, 349 ; 
Meade now directed march vid 
Frederick, 350; Lee reached the 
Potomac at Williamsport and Fall- 
ing "Waters, 350. 

"Wilderness — the prelude, 356 ; Virgi- 
nia as a theater of war, 357; the cov- 
ering of Washington and Richmond, 
357; the Union "Western successes 
constant, 358; in Virginia victory 
long waited, 358 ; Sherman intrust- 
ed with the "Western armies, 362 ; 
Grant joins the Potomac army, 
Meade still commanding, 362 ; re- 
sults of the three years of the war, 
360 ; Grant appointed General-in- 
Chief, 361; Wilderness, the battle 
of the, 363 ; Lee's position behind 
the Rapidan, 363; strength of the 
two armies, 364; Lee's method in 
relation to the river, 364; Potomac 
Army's organization, 304; Grant 
moved at midnight, May 3, 365 ; the 
army across, 365 ; Hancock at Chan- 
cellorsville, and "Warren at old W^il- 
derness Tavern, 365 ; Burnside's or- 
ders to hold Culpepper Court House 
24 hours, 365 ; Lee's plan to striko 
Grant in the "VVilderness, 366 ; Ewell 
and Hill very near Warren by dark, 
366; tidings of Confederate attacks 
on Warren's adv-ance next day, 367 ; 
Grant and Meade had not calculated 
on a battle near the Rapidan, 367 ; 
their purpose was to move between 
Lee and Richmond, 368; the attack 
on Griffin supposed to be a feint, 
368 ; but Lee had assumed the 
offensive, 368 ; and marched Ewell 
and Lee eastward on the Wilderness 
pike, 368; Warren ordered an as- 
sault, 370 ; description of the Wil- 
derness, 370; Warren's position, 
371; Griffin at first drives part of 
Ewell's Corps, 371; Griffin checked, 
371; Wadsworth started facing 
northwest, 371 ; his left flank ex- 
posed and broken, 371; Griffm 
now forced back, 372 ; Warren 
forms a new line west of the tavern, 
372; losses of the Fifth Corps in 
this fight, 372 ; Hancock comes up, 
372; his report of what followed, 
372; Hill's account of his share in 
first day of the Wilderness, 373; 
the first day closed without decided 
advantage, 373 ; the next day — 



518 



INDEX. 



Grant's order to attack along the 
whole line, 374; Confederate begins 
by onset on Sedgwick, 374; Sedg- 
wick right, "Warren center, Hancock 
left, 374; Burnside arrived — ordered 
to fill interval between Warren and 
Hancock, 374; Hancock's assault, 
375; two divisions of Hill the first 
met by him, 376; and is forced 
back in disorder, 37G; the neces- 
sary delay to restore Hancock's 
line, 37G; Hill's remaining divisions 
thus gain time to arrive, 377; Lee 
hurries them forward in person — 
the men refuse till he retires to a 
safe place, 377; Longstreet also 
arrives, 377; Hancock now finds 
an immovable enemy, 377; his po- 
sition now, 377; the Confederates 
assume the offensive, 378; Hancock 
forced to reform his troops behind 
breastworks on the Brock road, 
378; the Confederate progress sud- 
denly ceases, 378; the cause, 379; 
Longstreet wounded, 379; Warren 
and Sedgwick's attack meanwhile, 
379; both fail to carry positions in 
front, 379; Burnside's Corps had 
wandered, and finally intrenched, 
380; a lull now ensues, 380; Han- 
cock ordered to attack again in the 
evening, 3S0; bnt he is anticipated, 
380; the forest on fire, 380; con- 
sequent temporary Confederate suc- 
cess repulsed, and the second day 
closed, 381; the next day both 
armies weary, 381; at night. Grant 
■moved the army southward toward 
Richmond, 381; results of the "Wil- 
derness, 382; the losses, 383; 
Grant, imlike other commanders, 
fought the battle and went forward, 
which, was what the people de- 
sired, 383. 

Atlanta — the prelude, 385 ; Sherman at 
Chattanooga, 385 ; the relation of 
Georgia to the Confederacy, 386 ; 
Atlanta the center of the Southern 
storehouse, 386 ; the severance of 
the Gulf from the Atlantic States, 
386 ; Sherman's fitness for the task, 
387 ; his force for the campaign, 
387 ; it consisted of tlie Armj'- of 
the Cumberland (Thomas), of the 
Tennessee (McPherson), and tlie 
Ohio (Schofield), 3S7 ; the strategic 
positions of Sherman's and John- 



ston's armies, 387; the latter at 
Dalton — its force, 389; Bragg's 
withdrawal to Richmond, 389; 
Johnston fortifies himse.f at Dalton ; 
389; pressed bj^ the Richmond 
government to take the oSensive, 
389; Grant telegraphs to Sherman 
that he has crossed the Rapidan, 
390; and Sherman's three armies 
bounded forward, 390; Johaston's 
position at Dalton, 391; his de- 
fenses of Mill Creek and Rocky 
Face Mountain, 391; Sherman's 
plan of feint attack on Johnston's 
front, 392 ; and by a real attack on 
his flank, 39.'i ; Thomas enters Mill 
Creek Gap, 393 ; ]\IcPherson passes 
through Snake Creek, 393 ; but 
Johnston had strengthened Resaca, 
394; and McPherson intrenches at 
Snake Creek, 394; McPherson's 
movement considered, 394 ; Sher- 
man now moves nearly all his army 
round McPherson's position, 396; 
Johnston penetrates tlie design, and 
concentrates round Resaca, 396 ; 
Sherman now attacks Johnston's 
position, and sends his cavalry to 
cut railroad between Calhoun and 
Kingston, 397 ; a severe engage- 
ment ensues, 397 ; Thomas and 
Schofield unable to carry Johnston's 
center and right, 397 ; Polk assailed 
by McPherson across Camp Creek, 
397 ; Polk driven from his position, 
397 ; Johnston hears of movement 
on Lay's Ferry, 397 ; and crosses 
the Oostenaula, 397 ; Stewart at- 
tacks Hooker, and is badly re- 
pulsed, 398; the losses round 
Resaca, 398 ; Johnston's retreat to 
rear of Cassville, 398; Sherman 
moves into position in front, 398 ; 
Johnston's mistake — he crosses the 
Etawah, 399 ; toward Dallas and 
Marietta, 399 ; Sherman's only 
word, "forward!" 399; he resolves 
to flank Johnston's supposed posi- 
tion at AUatoona Pass, and moves 
for Dallas, 399; Johnston detects 
the design, and moves to Xew 
Hope Church, east of Dallas, 400; 
constant figlitingfor ten days, 400; 
Sherman works to the left, covering 
roads back to AUatoona and Ack- 
worth, 400; Sherman arrives at 
Ackworth and Johnston at Marietta, 
401 ; Johnston's position at Mariettat 



INDEX. 



519 



401 ; the fighting before Marietta, 
401 ; Polk and Loring killed, 402 ; 
Pine and Lost Mountains aban- 
doned by Johnston, 402 ; Kenesaw 
his salient 402 ; Sherman orders a 
direct assault, which falls, 403 ; and 
resorts to his old maneuver, 403 ; 
MePherson moved by the right 
toward the Chattahoochee, 403 ; 
Johnston then moves back to 
Smyrna Church, 403 ; is forced to 
intrenched line on the Chattahoo- 
chee, 404 ; and then to abandon it, 
404; Shei;man master of all North 
Georgia, 404 ; battle of Atlanta, 
404; the topography and Confed- 
erate positions, 405 ; his strength, 
406; the presumed losses of both 
sides to this time, 40G; Johnston 
removed, succeeded by Hood, 407 ; 
the Union positions, 407 ; the lines 
of advance, 407 ; the dispositions 
on Peach-tree Creek, 407; Hood's 
attack on Hooker at the creek, 
408; the attack fails with loss of 
5,000 men, 408; Hood now aban- 
dons Peacli-tree Creek, and moves 
his main army bej'ond Decatur 
and the Augusta railroad, 408 ; 
Sherman believed Atlanta aban- 
doned, and moves Thomas against 
it, 408; the city found defended, 
409 ; Hardee attempts to turn the 
Union left, 409 ; MePherson killed, 
409 ; danger to Sherman's left, 409 ; 
Hood's desperate attack, 410 ; he 
finally withdraws, 410; the mutual 
losses, 410; Sherman abandons 
direct attack on Atlanta, 410; 
Stoneman and McCook's raid, and 
their capture, 410; Howard now 
on Bull's Ferry road, 411; Hood 
also moves to the other flank, and 
attacks, but fails, 411 ; Sherman 
now coutiuues gradually flanking 
toward the Macon railroad, 412 ; 
Kilpatrick sent to destroy West 
Point and Macon railroads — does so 
partially, 412; Sherman shifts his 
army on the West Point railroad, 
413; marches on the Macon road, 
413; Hood opposes him at Jones- 
boro without success, and prepares 
to evacuate Atlanta, 413 ; the city 
abandoned by Hood, 414; results 
of Atlanta, 414 ; despondency at 
the North, 415 ; the fruitlessness 
of the Wilderness and other bat- 



tles, 415; the news from Georgia, 
and immediate change of lecling, 
417 ; Sherman's character and tal- 
ents, 418. 

Nashville — the prelude, 42G; Da^ 
vis's tour in Alabama and Georgia 
42 G ; popular discontent, 427 
Davis's and Hood's rash disclo- 
sures, 427 ; Sherman's anxieties 
his enormous line of supply, 429 
warning of Lovejo}^, 429 ; sta- 
tistics of army and lines, 430 
Thomas occupying Atlanta, How- 
ard at East Point, Schofield at 
Decatur, 432 ; Hood's positions, 

432 ; Hood's withdrawal from At- 
lanta was Sherman's opportunity, 

433 ; a clear path through Georgia 
to the sea now possible, 433 ; but 
Sherman could not let Hood retire 
unmolested, 433 ; instantly turned 
on Hood, 434 ; the chase of Hood 
toward Nashville, 434; Hood had 
the best of the game, 435 ; Sherman 
ceases his Northern movement, 
435 ; commences his march to the 
Atlantic, 435; his force, 43G ; 
Thomas left in Mississippi Valley, 
436; Schofield with him, 437 ; he 
arrives at Nashville, 437 ; his first 
mission to protect Tennessee against 
raids, 437 ; Hood now commenced 
his Northern invasion, 437 ; Beau- 
regard sent to Tennessee, 437 ; he 
disappears, 438; Forrest's capture 
of Johnson ville, 439 ; Pulaski, 
under Schofield, Thomas's outpost 
to observe Hood, 439 ; Sherman 
departs on his march, 440; what 
would Hood do, 440 ; Thomas's 
instructions and difficulties, 440 ; 
Hood's strength, 441 ; Thomas's 
strength, 441 ; Hood tries to cut off 
Schofield at Pulaski, 441; Scho- 
field's position, 442 ; falls back — 
"the race for Franklin," 443; nar- 
row escape of his trains, 443 ; 
withdrawal to Franklin, 446; battle 
of Franklin, 447 ; losses, 449 ; 
Schofield withdraws to Nashville, 
449 ; Hood environs Nashville, 449 ; 
battle of Nashville, 450 ; description 
of the position, 451 ; arrival of 
Thomas's re-enforcements, 452 ; the 
fortifications, 452 ; gunboats on 
the Cumberland, 452 ; Union line 
of battle, 452 ; Hood's disposi- 



520 



INDEX. 



tions, 453; Tliomas's preparations, 
455 ; his plan of attack on Hood, 
45G; Steedman on Hood's right, 
457 ; Hood's left attacked and 
driven toward Franklin pike, 458; 
attack on Montgomery Hill, 458; 
Hood driven to base of Harpetla 
Hills, 459 ; Thomas's captures, 459 ; 
Union and Confederate lines, 460 ; 
the storming of the Confederate 
breastworks on the right fails, 
461 ; their center and left routed, 
462 ; the Fourth Corps again as- 
saults Hood's right and carries it, 
463 ; Hood's wlaole army broken 
and flying, 463 ; the pursuit of 
Hood — he abandons Franklin, 464 ; 
Confederate disaster at Harpeth 
River, 464; pursuit delayed at 
Rutherford's Creek, 465 ; three days 
lost and Hood gathered the debris 
of his army at Columbia, 465 ; the 
Confederate army driven out of Pu- 
laski, 466 ; the fugitives escape into 
Alabama, 467 ; tlio capture of Salt- 
ville, 467 ; Hood's pontoon train 
destroyed by Palmer, 468; results 
of Nashville, 468 ; Thomas an- 
nounces the campaign closed, 469 ; 
Grant orders it renewed, but there 
is little to do, 469 ; Johnston re- 
stored to command, 469 ; he sweeps 
the fragments of the army together, 
at 4-verysboro, 469 ; Thomas's cap- 
tures and losses in the campaign, 
469; estimate of his character and 
abilities, 472. ■ 

Five Forks — the prelude, 478; Lee's 
resolution to abandon Richmond 
and Petersburg and unite with 
Johnston, 480 ; is menaced from 
every qiiarter, 480; the Danville 
railroad, 481 ; blind arrogance of 
Hood and Davis, 481 ; Lee and 
Johnston's strength, 481 ; Lee pre- 
pares to withdraw from Richmond, 
482 ; Grant's purpose, 482 ; the Cox 
road Lee's best route, 483; failure 
and losses, 483; Grant now initi- 
ates a movement against Southside 
railroad, 483 ; the position of the 
Confederate works ; Warren crossed 
Hatcher's Run, 484; Humphreys 
moved to "Warren's right, 484 ; 



Sheridan occupied Dinwiddie, 485 ; 
ordered to Lee's right rear, 485 ; 
Lee masses on his right, 485 ; tho 
Union left partially disrupted, 486 ; 
the losses, 486 ; battle of Dinwiddie 
Court House, 486 ; capture of Five 
Forks, 487 ; Confederates return to 
it, 487 ; Union troops forced back, 
Sheridan holds the Confederates at 
Dinwiddie, 487 ; battle of Five Forks, 
488; position of Five Forks, 489; 
Sheridan commands new attack on, 
489; Grant's plans against Fivo 
Forks and Petersburg, 489 ; Confed- 
erate force at Dinwiddie driven to 
Five Forks, 490 ; breastworks on 
White Oak road captured, 492 ; 
Confederate left and rear works 
carried, 493 ; the position surround- 
ed, 493; last position captured, 494; 
the Confederates retreat along the 
White Oak road, 494; results of 
Five Forks, 494; Grant orders a 
general assault on April 2, 495 ; 
Lee resolves to strike for retreat, 
495; re-cnforccs Fort Gregg, 496; 
the Union assault, 496 ; defense of 
Fort Gregg, 497 ; Confederates now 
driven to their last works, 497 ; 
evacuation of Petersburg, 498; fall 
of Richmond, 498 ; the Union col- 
umns headed West, 498 ; Lee hur- 
rying to Burkesville, 498 ; Ord also, 
493; Slieridan for Jetersville, 498; 
what force remained to Lee, 499; 
reaches Amelia C. H. 499 ; rations 
sent by mistake to Richmond, 499; 
Sheridan at Jetersville, 500 ; Meade 
joins Sheridan, 500 ; Lee crosses the 
Appomattox High Bridge, 500; bat- 
tle of Sailors' Creole — Lee's train 
captured, 501 ; E well's force cap- 
tured, 501 ; Lee's subordinates wish 
him to surrender, 502 ; the retreat- 
ing army crowded at High Bridge, 
502; and cross, 503; Mahone in- 
trenches at Farmville, and repulses 
Miles, 504 ; Sheridan across Lee's 
front of column, 504; Lee orders 
attack but Grant had proposed to 
accept surrender, 504 ; correspond- 
ence, 50 i; conference, 505; sur- 
render of Lee, 506 ; of remaining 
Confederate forces, 507 ; the war 
was over, 508. 







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